Today they talk about it a lot and with taste. Both in our country and in the West. In the West, they especially love the theme of the genius German generals and the mediocre corporal who commanded them. And if it were not for Hitler's miscalculations, then the victory would definitely be for Germany, and in general.
It is about this "and in general" we are now discussing.
In general, the two commanders-in-chief of the opposing countries did not have very good military training. That is, even with a civilian education it was so-so, we no longer remember about a military one. Hitler received some combat experience in the First World War, while Stalin did not even have such experience. That did not prevent Joseph Vissarionovich from occupying leading posts in the military structures of the Red Army and even successfully opposing Krasnov at Tsaritsyn and Kolchak (with Dzerzhinsky) near Ufa.
There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny frankly behaved in a bad way.
But we are not talking about that. And about such an interesting thing as the enormous efficiency of the leaders of the two countries, which helped both in their work with the issues of waging war.
Essentially, neither Stalin nor Hitler created the Barbarossa or Bagration plans. This was done by those who are most intended for this, that is, officers of the General Staff. And the commanders-in-chief only exercised strategic leadership, defining the general lines of behavior of troops and fleets.
Another question is who put more pressure on their generals, subordinating them to their will and imposing their own line of conduct.
I believe that here Hitler would have given a big head start to Stalin. Indeed, not being, as they would say now, an expert, but a real communist, Stalin preferred to make all difficult decisions collectively.
Yes, many Soviet commanders and administrators would give their right hand for Stalin to take all questions alone. It's easier to live this way. And there would be someone to blame everything on in case of failure. But Stalin's communist convictions did not allow him to bang his fist on the map and shout that it should be so.
Although, of course, special freethinking had to be earned. But they deserved it, didn't they?
Although, of course, both the NKVD and the Gestapo had enough specialists who knew how to explain to especially smart people whose spies they were.
In general, despite many similarities, the leaders of the two systems were very different. From the calm behavior of Stalin to the completely hysterical Hitler. But it's not even that Hitler was a bit of a show-off and craved all those roaring crowds marching past him. He knew how to get the crowd going, that's a fact.
But if the German leader only wanted blind reverence and worship … He really wanted to be "in the subject", so he consciously put pressure on his generals. Often sacrificing military designs to political ones.
Of course, it is good to watch crowds roaring with delight and defeated capitals underfoot. Indisputably. However, this is not always effective.
Let's take a look at a small alternative scenario.
In the Soviet Union, there were always actually two capitals. The first, administrative one, is Moscow. And the second, political, cradle of the revolution is Leningrad.
As you know, Hitler's plans included the destruction of both cities.
“The Fuehrer's decision is unshakable to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. You should not use tanks for this. This will be a "national disaster" that will deprive the centers of not only Bolshevism, but also Muscovites (Russians) in general."
(From the diary of F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces of Germany, July 8, 1941.)
To raze it to the ground is understandable. But why then suddenly comes such a strange order of the Fuehrer on September 12, 1941, which said: do not take Leningrad. Someone called it salvation, someone considers it the beginning of a tragic blockade, but let's see what happened next.
And then the commander of Army Group North von Leeb was instructed to immediately transfer the 4th Panzer Group (together with 5 tank and two motorized divisions), as well as the entire 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet (about 700 aircraft) to Army Group Center.
In fact, von Leeb was left with the 16th and 18th Armies and the 5th Air Fleet, which was half the size of the 1st.
In fact, the offensive that had begun near Moscow required more forces and equipment from the Germans than they could have imagined. There was simply nothing to take Leningrad with. It was not worth counting on the victorious march of the Finnish army, the Finns did not recover after the Winter War. And the Leningrad Front had a sufficient number of combat-ready units at its disposal.
In 1941, in August, after the division of the Leningrad front into the Leningrad and Karelian fronts, the 8th, 2nd and 48th armies, Koporskaya, Yuzhnaya and Slutsko-Kolpinskaya operational groups were part of the Leningrad front. Plus the ships of the Baltic Fleet and the 13th Air Army.
In such a situation, it was really easier to arrange a complete blockade of the city. Which is exactly what happened. The Germans were by no means stupid, and by that time they already knew perfectly well that for Leningrad they would have to wash themselves in blood in full.
An excerpt from the military diary of Army Group "North" dated 1941-12-10 and 1941-27-10 about military operations against Leningrad.
«12.10.1941.
The operational department of the high command of the ground forces transmits the order of the high command of the Wehrmacht to the group of forces:
The Fuhrer again decided not to accept the surrender of Leningrad, even if it was offered by the enemy. The moral rationale for this is clear to the whole world. Just as in Kiev, where, as a result of explosions with the use of clockwork mechanisms, a grave threat arose for the troops, this must be foreseen to an even greater extent in Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will defend itself to the last man was reported by the Soviet Russian radio itself. Therefore, no German soldier should enter this city. Those who try to leave the city across our line should be returned by the use of fire."
(Source: Bundesarchiv / Militararchiv, RH 19 III / 167. Quoted from: "The war of Germany against the Soviet Union. 1941-1945", p. 69.)
So, it is necessary to take Leningrad, but there is no strength for this. Therefore, they decided to simply starve to death. Okay, let's take this as a plan that may have hit the mood and morale of the Soviet people. The cradle of the revolution after all …
But Leningrad held out, and the two armies trampled around and side by side, until the moment they began to drive them in January 1943.
Move on. Next we have Moscow.
Do you think, purely according to Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with the loss of Moscow, the whole country would be lost? I am sure many will agree that no. Moreover, a reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was organized in Kuibyshev, from which, in the same way as from Moscow, the leadership of the troops would go.
Moreover, if anyone dreamed of surrender, it was very quiet.
Hitler was guided by purely European principles. Poland, France, Belgium, as soon as the capitals were captured by German troops, automatically ceased resistance. Well, or almost immediately. The Soviet Union is another matter. Quite another matter.
So, Moscow.
The insane battles near Moscow in the fall of 1941, when everything that was possible was thrown into battle, when the regiments and divisions of the people's militia burned down near Vyazma, Yelnya, Rzhev and other settlements, gave way to a lull caused by mudslides.
And then winter came and that very "strange" counteroffensive near Moscow. Strange themes. that the advancing Soviet troops were not 3 to 1, as it should be according to all the canons of strategy, but less than the defenders.
Soviet units numbered 1, 1 million people, 7,652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket launchers, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium ones), and 1,000 aircraft.
In the German army group "Center" there were 1.7 million people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. (Data on the publication: "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945: A Brief History" under the general editorship of BS Telpukhovsky and the team. Military Publishing, 1984)
It is clear that the German units were exhausted by the heroic resistance of Soviet soldiers and militias, plus fresh cadre Siberian divisions did their job.
And Army Group "Center", consisting of 3 armies and 3 tank groups (Hepner, Gotha and Guderian) was dragged into a positional confrontation, which ended in essentially nothing.
And against the Germans were 6 armies of the Western Front, 3 armies of the Bryansk Front and 5 armies of the Reserve Front in the second echelon.
It is clear that the German army and the Soviet one differed in composition, the point is not that. And the fact that this whole colossus (German army groups) was drawn into protracted positional battles until the end of 1943.
For what? For the sake of "demolishing Moscow and Leningrad from the face of the earth."
It is clear that the desire of the Fuehrer is the law. For those who don't understand, there are specially trained officers at the SS branch called the "Gestapo." Working with especially incomprehensible people.
It is clear that Hitler is not Stalin; he did not put generals against the wall for no reason at the beginning of the war. It was already at the end that a bird of three rushed, and the generals were imprisoned and shot no worse than we did in 1941. But nevertheless, to repeat the fate of General Walter von Brauchitsch, who was simply kicked out of the army after the failure of the seizure of Moscow exactly on December 19, 1941, there was no queue of people willing.
Strange, isn't it?
Does the Fuhrer want Moscow? Please. We will do our best. Does Leningrad want? More difficult, but everything will also be in the ordnung. Stalingrad? Yes, what problems … Everything will be!
Meanwhile, in the memoirs of Manstein and Guderian, you can sometimes find words about the fact that they did not agree with how Hitler interfered in affairs. And he intervened constantly.
The most interesting thing is that when the Fuhrer did not find a "blank verse" and he did not try to show himself as a genius commander, the Wehrmacht was doing just fine. Manstein cites the example of the Crimean and Kharkov operations, where the Germans simply planned and carried out everything perfectly. And Hitler did his best to help in the operations.
By the way, Kharkov.
It is not very customary for us to talk about such events as Kharkov, Barvenkovsky ledge, Malye Rovenki … And yet this is a terrible and tragic part of our history. And it doesn't matter who badly planned the offensive, who did it wrong. It is important that our army was inflicted simply huge losses, and the road to the Caucasus was actually opened.
And here Hitler really does something stupid.
Let's even assess at the level of couch strategists what was more important: take Grozny and Baku, depriving the entire Red Army of fuel, or give Stalin a splash by taking Stalingrad?
This is the front line obtained in 1942. Very long. Almost two and a half thousand kilometers. With several key points.
Leningrad. Not strategically important. Therefore, there were no such active battles.
Moscow. Strategically … Politically important, but nevertheless, it was difficult there.
Stalingrad. Also politically important. After the capture of Rostov-on-Don by the Germans, one could forget about Stalingrad at all.
Voronezh. A meat grinder that grinds those who were supposed to go to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Plus the South-Eastern Railway, which the Nazis wanted to cut, but failed.
Grozny and Baku with their oil fields.
Point.
The finale could well have come much earlier if Hitler had heeded the voices of his generals and had not fought in hysterics about Stalingrad and Voronezh. He did not try to seize Moscow and rot Leningrad. He did not put political goals above military ones.
That is, all the forces that are possible (and in the ability to concentrate and transfer troops the Germans were masters), throw to the south. To the oil fields of Grozny and Baku.
Could the Germans have ended the war ahead of schedule, leaving Soviet engines without fuel?
Easy.
Siberian oil reserves were not even explored at that time, all fuel was produced from Grozny and Baku oil. For some time it was possible to stretch out due to the supply of gasoline from the United States and accumulated reserves, but sooner or later exactly what happened in Germany in 1945, when the equipment simply could not be used due to lack of fuel, would have happened.
And this is where the question arises.
All that Hitler was able to allocate for the seizure of the oil fields was to separate Army Group A from Army Group South, consisting of:
- 1st Tank Army;
- 17th Army;
- 3rd Romanian Army.
Yes, according to the original plan, the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth and the 11th Army of Manstein were supposed to be added to Army Group A. The most serious and prepared formations with the most experienced commanders.
But … We can say that a miracle happened.
The 11th Army, leaving the 42nd Army Corps in Army Group A, set off for Leningrad.
4th Panzer Army, leaving 1 (one!) Panzer Corps in Group A, set off for Stalingrad.
3 Romanian army in full force was at Stalingrad.
11th Army: 7 divisions in two corps and a Romanian mountain rifle corps (2 mountain rifle and one regular division). In the swamps and forests near Leningrad, especially the mountain arrows were very useful. 42nd corps, left in the south - 2 infantry divisions.
The 4th Panzer Army was three-corps. Each corps consisted of three tank divisions, it is easy to calculate that 6 out of 9 divisions went to Stalingrad.
The Romanian army consisted of 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions with a total strength of 152.5 thousand soldiers and 11.2 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers, united in 4 corps and a reserve.
It can be roughly calculated that Hitler's political fanaticism led at least 400 thousand people away from the most important direction. With tanks, artillery, mortars and other components.
So the offensive in the Caucasus was led by the 1st tank and 17th field armies of the Wehrmacht, the 1st Romanian army corps and the cavalry corps.
Undoubtedly, it was also power. But tanks in the mountains are so-so. Especially in the mountains of the Caucasus, where the main vehicle is the donkey. Or a horse, but the horse is more difficult.
Of course, the Southern Front of Malinovsky and the Transcaucasian Front of Tyulenin were not the best formations, but at the cost of great efforts and setbacks they were able to stop the advance of the Germans. 10 armies of these fronts and 4 armies of the disbanded North Caucasian Front (commanded by Budyonny) turned out to be an insurmountable barrier.
Moreover, 51 armies from the North Caucasian Front went to Stalingrad.
As a result, the Soviet command solved one of the most important tasks: it did not allow losses of oil fields. But there was another successfully solved problem: the doubting Turkey never sided with the Germans.
It could have turned out very difficult if the Turks decided to support the Germans. Most likely, their interests would have ended up in the same place, in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR. But the successful occupation of Iran by Great Britain and the Soviet Union, which was nevertheless a neighbor of Turkey, as well as the successful actions of Malinovsky and Tyulenin, convinced the Turks that it was not worth interfering.
It turned out that in the pursuit of political bonuses, Hitler lost too much.
In order to completely bleed the equipment of the Red Army, there was no need to stomp around Leningrad and Moscow. It was necessary to take several key railway junctions on the North Caucasian and South-Eastern railways.
Oil pipelines were rare back then. And the production of fuels and lubricants was affected by failures at the fronts. However, we will talk about this separately.
But the main message of this material, returning to the very beginning, I think the following: no matter how "brilliant" Hitler was, no matter how short-sighted and inept they tried to expose Stalin, it is obvious that if it were not for the political ambitions of the German Fuhrer, the outcome of the war could be completely others.
Of course, this is nice: roaring and applauding crowds, rallies of many thousands, processions, parades … Loud statements, promises …
All this is beautiful, pompous and pleasant. And for the sake of this one can be self-willed, but … But it is better if specially trained people will be engaged in military affairs. Staff officers.
And when not completely (or rather, not at all) prepared people begin to mix up politics and military strategy, it turns out very unpleasant.
By 1942, the Germans had all of Ukraine with its coal and black earth. Almost all of the Black Earth Region has the richest soils. Yes, the occupied land would give birth to a little for the Germans, but it would give nothing to the USSR.
It only remained to deprive the country of fuel. But this did not happen, as I understand it, due to the given political promises. Hitler had masters. Like almost all world politicians.
The desire to put on a show with the capture of Moscow and Stalingrad in 1942 eventually led to Berlin in 1945.
A very instructive story, which is very useful for many modern gentlemen to know. Sometimes pompous processions and parades can lead a little not to where it was originally planned …
