Soviet historiography of the post-war period drove itself into a trap that generated cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, people have heard “Soviet is excellent” about the wonderful Soviet T-34 and KV. On the other hand, the failures of the initial period of the war were well known, when the Red Army was rapidly rolling back, surrendering one city after another. It is not surprising that it was difficult for people to combine these two facts: a miracle weapon, bringing from the battle up to a hundred holes from shells, and a front rolling back to Moscow and Leningrad. Later on this soil was grown a branchy cranberry version "all broke." That is, the miracle tanks were dishonestly defeated by their own commanders in marches.
Strictly speaking, Soviet historical science on the pages of the works of respected authors provided enough information to obtain an adequate picture of the events of 1941. However, the correct phrases about anticipating deployment were drowned in a stream of simpler and more understandable theses: "Soviet means excellent", "Sorge warned" and "Repression among the highest command personnel." The most transparent explanation was, of course, "surprise attack." It was also interpreted at the most primitive level - awakened by the artillery preparation on the morning of June 22 and running around in their underwear, sleepy soldiers and commanders. Confused and not understanding what was happening, people could be taken "lukewarm". It is clear that the explanation for the subsequent defeats in the summer and autumn of 1941, such as the failure of the mechanized corps counterattacks, the breakthrough of the "Stalin line" and the encirclement near Kiev and Vyazma, was no longer explained by the running around in underpants.
In addition, data on the total number of Red Army troops were most often cited without taking into account its spatial location. Since, in terms of these general figures, the Germans did not have a numerical superiority, they began to look for the causes of the disaster in problems lying outside the plane of the operational and strategic situation. Moreover, the figures of the size of the Soviet tank and aircraft fleet that became known made us look for something great and terrible. Something terrible and unusual had to happen so that in the collision of two equal (from the point of view of rather abstract numbers) one of them began to rapidly roll back. As if some small but important detail in a large mechanism called the army of a large country broke.
Generally speaking, the motive behind looking for the little detail that made it all fall apart was a faint hope of simply changing history. If the detail was small, then it could be corrected. The Red Army would have withstood the attacks of the enemy and the war would not have swept across the entire European part of the country, crippling and killing people and entire families. A by-product of discovering this small part would be the appointment of a "switchman" responsible for its absence or malfunction. In short, a ray of hope was the driving force behind the exploration. Understanding the inevitability and inevitability of a catastrophe was too heavy a burden.
The search for the detail that made it all happen has not stopped for six decades. In recent times, there have been false theories about the "strike" of the army, whose personnel were dissatisfied with the Soviet regime. Accordingly, the political system became the factor that allowed all the beating in one fell swoop. It is assumed that the tsar-father on the throne, instead of the godless general secretary, would be a reliable protection from all troubles. Previously, people were more inventive. As a recipe for happiness, it was proposed that the troops be put on alert. The thesis was put forward that if the few divisions of the covering armies had been alerted a day or two earlier, the situation would have changed fundamentally. This version was fueled by the memoirs of some of our military leaders, sustained in the spirit of "well, we would give them if they caught up with us." But in the technocratic society of the late USSR, the version about a flaw in a technical property became very popular. The role of a terrible flaw in the Red Army was given to communications. Indeed, even at the everyday level, it was clear that the scattered and deprived of control troops were not capable of much.
The famous Soviet historian V. A. Anfilov described the state of communications in the first days of the war with bluish-black paint: “The position of the 3rd Army units was aggravated by the difficulties in organizing command and control, since the wire communication was disrupted in the very first hour of the war. There was no radio communication either. Troops were commanded only through liaison delegates. The army headquarters had no contact with the front for two days "(Anfilov VA Beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - mid-July 1941). Military-historical sketch. - M.: Voenizdat, 1962, p. 107). This is not even a humble brush painting, it is vigorously painting the area with a roller of black paint. After reading this, people interested in the war should have been horrified and immediately understand everything about the causes of the catastrophes of 1941. All that was left was to clap their tongue sympathetically and repeat with expression: "Within two days!"
In 1962, when the quoted book by Anfilov was published, few people had the opportunity to examine the situation from different angles using documents. Times are very different now. The notorious "two days" is quite possible to taste and feel. In the journal of military operations of the Western Front, we find the following lines: “About 13-14 hours early. of the Operations Department of Headquarters 3 A, Colonel Peshkov reported: "At 8.00, the units of Major General Sakhno (56th Rifle Division) were fighting in the Lipsk - Sopotskin area" (TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 29, l. 22). Further, a detailed description of the situation in the zone of the 3rd Army is given, which occupies almost a page of typewritten text. What two days of absence of communication does Anfilov tell us about?
Further more. V. A. Anfilov writes: "The front lost contact with the headquarters of the 10th Army from the very beginning of the German attack" (Anfilov V. A. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - mid-July 1941). Military-historical sketch. - M.: Voenizdat, 1962. S. 107). However, the chief of staff of the 10th Army, Major General Lyapin, after leaving the encirclement, said something completely different. Returning from the Bialystok "cauldron", he wrote to the deputy chief of staff of the Western Front, Malandin: “Communication with the front headquarters on 22.6 was satisfactory not only by radio, but also by Morse telegraph, and even from time to time appeared by HF. Communication with the corps headquarters was finally lost on 28.6 at about 22.00–23.00 at the time when Shtarm was preparing to move from the Volkovysk region to the Derechin region”(TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 29, l. 22). That is, the headquarters of the 10th Army had a fairly stable connection with the front headquarters and subordinate troops. Chaos came when it was all over (June 28) and the encirclement was closed.
Former commander of the Western Front D. G. During interrogation by the NKVD, Pavlov also assessed the state of communications in the early days of the war much less dramatically than the post-war historian. Being a stone's throw from the execution, he said: “The RF check showed that this connection with all the armies was cut off. At about 5.00, Kuznetsov reported the situation to me by bypass lines. He said that he was holding back the enemy troops, but that Sapotskin was on fire, since especially strong artillery fire had been fired at him, and that the enemy in this sector went on the offensive while we were repelling the attacks. At about 7 o'clock, Golubev [the commander of the 10th Army] sent a radiogram that there was an armament and machine-gun exchange of fire on the entire front and that they had repulsed all enemy attempts to go deeper into our territory.” is not a problem in itself. HF, that is, closed telephone communication using high frequencies, was not the most common form of communication. Such communication is carried out by connecting a group of low-power long-wave transmitters, tuned to different waves with intervals of 3-4 kHz between them, to ordinary telephone wires. The high frequency currents created by these transmitters propagate along the wires, having very little effect on radios not connected to these wires, while at the same time providing good, interference-free reception on special receivers connected to these wires. Such a luxury in war could not always be afforded. More often, the troops used radio and telegraph, the so-called direct-printing devices BODO. Accordingly, contrary to Anfilov's claims, two independent sources claim that the front headquarters had contact with the 3rd and 10th armies. Reports were received and orders were sent.
The main problem of the Western Front was not communication, but a "window" in the zone of the North-Western Front, through which the 3rd Panzer Group of German Goth broke through to Minsk. The Germans concentrated far superior forces against the weakest Soviet special military district, including two tank groups. Having easily crushed the units of the 8th and 11th armies defending the border, the German tank groups penetrated deeply into the formation of Soviet troops in the Baltic States. The 4th Panzer Group moved north, in the direction of Leningrad, and the 3rd Panzer Group deployed to the east and southeast and from the strip of the North-Western Front invaded the rear of the Western Front D. G. Pavlova. Even if the connection between the headquarters of the Western Front and the armies subordinate to it were perfect, Pavlov could no longer prevent the breakthrough of the 3rd Panzer Group.
The Western Front was no exception to the rule. The failures of the troops of the Southwestern Front in June 1941 were also explained by communication problems. Anfilov writes: "So, for example, the 36th rifle, 8th and 19th mechanized corps did not have radio communications during the offensive in the Dubno region" (Anfilov V. A. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - mid-July 1941.). Military-historical sketch. - M.: Voenizdat. 1962, p. 170). It is unclear how radio communication between the mechanized corps could help in the battle at Dubno. Even the presence of a modern satellite "Inmarsat" could hardly help the commanders of the 8th and 19th mechanized corps. By the time the 8th Mechanized Corps D. I. Ryabyshev 19th building N. V. Feklenko had already been thrown back to the outskirts of Rivne. The 19th corps was attacked by the III motorized corps, which was outflanking Lutsk. Under the threat of encirclement near the outskirts of Dubno, the 43rd Panzer Division of N. V. Feklenko was forced to retreat east. So, according to the Inmarsat, suddenly received from advisers from the future, Feklenko could only cheerfully inform Ryabyshev about his departure.
I would not like the reader to get the impression that my task is to expose the Soviet historian Anfilov. For his time, his books were a real breakthrough in the study of the initial period of the war. Now we can even say more - Anfilov's books were based on collections of documents published in the 1950s. The claim regarding the interaction between the 36th Rifle, 8th and 19th Mechanized Corps is pure tracing paper from the directive of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front No. 00207 of June 29, 1941. It pointed out shortcomings in the actions of the troops in the first days of the war … In the original, the thesis about the connection between the buildings reads as follows: “Nobody organizes ties with a neighbor. The 14th Cavalry and 141st Infantry Divisions were 12 km away from each other, they did not know about each other's location; the flanks and joints are not provided or illuminated by reconnaissance, which is used by the enemy for infiltration. The radio is poorly used. There was no radio communication between the 36th Rifle Corps and the 8th Mechanized Corps, the 19th Mechanized Corps due to the lack of waves and call signs. Note that we are talking about organizational issues, and not about the technical impossibility of maintaining communication by radio as such. I must also say that this claim is not even the first in number. The first point of the directive was that the front command pointed out the shortcomings in the conduct of reconnaissance.
V. A. Anfilov, the situation is significantly dramatized. The formations of the Southwestern Front received all the necessary orders, and communication problems can in no way explain their failure. In some cases, it would be better if they did not receive these orders. I will try to illustrate this thesis with a specific example.
After long winding along the roads of the Lvov salient, the command of the Southwestern Front managed to bring the 8th Mechanized Corps into battle on 26 June. However, the front headquarters did not begin to develop the results achieved that day. Instead of orders to continue the offensive, the mechanized corps received an order to … retreat beyond the line of the rifle corps. This is how the 8th Mechanized Corps commander D. I. Ryabyshev, in a report on the combat actions of the corps, written in hot pursuit of events, in July 1941: “At 2.30 on 27.6.41, Major General Panyukhov arrived at the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps and gave him the following oral order from the commander of the South-West front: “The 37th Rifle Corps is defending at the front of Pochayuv Nova, Podkamen, Zolochev. 8th mechanized corps to withdraw behind the infantry line of the 37th rifle corps and strengthen its battle formation with its own firepower. Start the exit immediately."
A similar order was received by the 15th Mechanized Corps, which was delivering a counterattack: “On the basis of the order of the Southwestern Front No. 0019 dated 28.6.41 [an error in the document, more correct on the 27th. - AI] by the morning of June 29, 1941, it was ordered to retreat to the line of the Zolochivsky Heights beyond the defensive line of the 37th Rifle Corps to bring himself in order."
What happened? In the memoirs of I. Kh. Baghramyan (more precisely, in the memoirs of Ivan Khristoforovich, subjected to "literary processing" with the addition of dialogues that no one can remember after a few years), this is presented as a rejection of the strategy of counterstrikes by mechanized corps in favor of building a "stubborn defense" by rifle corps. However, this thesis is not supported by documents. In the operational summary for June 26, a pejorative assessment was given to the 36th Rifle Corps: "Due to disorganization, poor cohesion and insufficient provision of artillery shells in a battle with the enemy in the Dubno area, they showed low combat effectiveness." It would be strange to suppose that with the help of these formations of "low combat capability" the chief of staff of the front Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev, a man of the old school, was going to hold back the German tank divisions. The reason for the withdrawal of the mechanized corps from the battle is completely different. The main mistake of the front command was an incorrect assessment of the direction of the development of the German offensive. Accordingly, the front command decided to withdraw the mechanized formations behind the line of formation of the rifle corps to deliver counterstrikes. And, despite all the problems with communication, which frightened us in post-war research, the corresponding orders were delivered to the mechanized corps. Their withdrawal from the battle and withdrawal began.
However, Moscow did not support the decision of the front command. THEIR. Baghramyan recalls:
“- Comrade Colonel! Comrade Colonel! - I hear the voice of the operative on duty. - Moscow is on the wire!
I run to the meeting room. Seeing me, the body woman tapped out to Moscow: "Colonel Baghramyan is at the office."I pick up the tape and read: “General Malandin is at the apparatus. Hello. Immediately report to the commander that the Headquarters has forbidden the withdrawal and demands to continue the counterattack. Not a day to give rest to the aggressor. Everything "(Baghramyan I. Kh. So the war began. - M.: Voenizdat, 1971, p. 141).
M. P. Kirponos tried to explain his decisions to the high command, but could not defend them. Further developments showed that the Stavka was right in its assessments - the edge of the German tank wedge turned south much later, only after overcoming the "Stalin line". After receiving hauling from Moscow, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front began to prepare orders for the return of the mechanized corps to battle.
The order for the 15th Mechanized Corps to return to battle arrived at the headquarters of the formation by 10.00 am on June 27. The 37th Panzer Division of the corps managed to retreat and spent the day marching 180 degrees. Naturally, its tanks did not participate in the battle on June 27. The throwing of the divisions of the 15th Mechanized Corps on the roads was explained not by the fact that there was no communication, but by the fact that communication with it still worked. Accordingly, orders were given to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battle based on an analysis of the situation, the headquarters of Kirponos tried to predict the next move of the enemy.
The situation in the 8th Mechanized Corps at the time of receiving the order to return to battle was similar. His 12th Panzer Division stretched out in a column from Brody to Podkamnya (a settlement 20 km southeast of Brody). On the other hand, the 7th Motorized Rifle and 34th Panzer Divisions did not have time to receive a stop order and remained in the areas occupied in battle on the afternoon of 26 June. In the early morning of June 27, the corps command received an order from the commander of the Southwestern Front No. 2121 dated June 27, 1941, on the offensive of the 8th Mechanized Corps from 9:00 AM on June 27, 1941 in the direction of Brody, Cape Verba, Dubno. Already at 7.00 on June 27, Ryabyshev gave the order to attack in a new direction. The start of the offensive was scheduled for 9.00 a.m. on 27.6.41. Usually, the memoirists describe this episode as the return of the 8th mechanized corps to battle in parts on the hysterical order of commissar Vashugin, who arrived at the headquarters of the 8th mechanized corps at ten o'clock in the morning on June 27 with a firing squad team. Since it was foolish to complain about the connection in the face of receiving all the orders, another popular character was used to explain the reasons - "the hand of the party". The fact that all orders to bring the corps into battle in parts by the arrival of the hysterical Rottweiler of Marxism-Leninism had already been given were tactfully kept quiet. In the conditions of the closed archives in the 1960s, no one knew about such inconsistencies. H. H. Vashugin, moreover, shot himself, and it was possible to blame the deceased with a calm heart.
However, even according to recollections, no problems with the transmission of orders to the mechanized corps can be traced. If the order to withdraw to the mechanized corps simply did not reach, no chaos caused by the withdrawal would simply have arisen. The connection between the front command and the mechanized corps worked so steadily that the mechanized corps vibrated vigorously along with the general line of conducting a defensive operation by M. P. Kirponos with an accuracy of several hours.
In official documents written by professionals, assessments of the state of communication are given much more cautious and balanced. In a brief report from the head of the communications department of the Southwestern Front on July 27, 1941, it was said:
“2. Communication work during the operation.
a) Wire communication facilities were subjected to systematic destruction, especially nodes and lines in the zone of the 5th and 6th armies. To the headquarters of the 5th and 6th armies - Lvov, Lutsk, not a single highway could be approached with wires.
Communication with the southern group (12th and 26th armies) worked steadily.
b) Communication centers of the People's Commissariat of Communication after the first bombing were incapable of quick restoration of communication; the absence of linear columns and linear parts led to a long break in communication in certain directions.
c) With the mobilization of the first four half-companies, on 28.6.41, it was possible to secure the army directions in one incomplete company, which ensured the restoration of the destroyed lines and the establishment of wire communication.
d) Radio communication in front-line radio networks was the main means of communication in the directions of the 5th and 6th armies in the period when there was no wire communication.
e) In army, corps radio networks, radio communication in the first period, with paralysis of wire communication, was the only means of communication and provided command and control of troops (Collection of military documents of the Second World War. Issue No. 36. - M.: Voenizdat, 1958, pp. 106–107) …
As we can see, contrary to popular belief, radio communications were used to control the 5th and 6th armies, operating in the direction of the main attack of the German troops. It was at the junction between these armies that the 1st Panzer Group of E. von Kleist broke through to the east. Moreover, radio communication was the main command and control tool for the 5th and 6th armies. The headquarters of the armies also made extensive use of radio communications. In the operational reports of the 5th Army in June 1941, the refrain reads: "Communication - by delegates and by radio." In mid-July 1941, when the 5th Army's front stabilized, the range of communications equipment used was expanded. One of the 5th Army's operational reports states: “Communication: with the front headquarters - Bodo; with the 15th Rifle Corps - by radio, delegates and the ST-35 apparatus; with the 31st rifle corps, the 9th and 22nd mechanized corps - by radio and by delegates; with the 19th mechanized corps and the army reserve - delegates."
You also need to pay attention (point "c" of the document) to the fact that some of the communications were affected by a common problem for the entire Red Army - lack of mobilization. The mobilization was announced only on the first day of the war and, as we see from the document, on June 28 it became possible to maintain the operability of communication lines in wartime.
Among other things, we sometimes approach 1941 from the position of today. When satellites transmit information in real time on the movie screen, it is difficult to imagine how they fought in the days of pigeon mail and foot messengers. Radio communication of the 1940s should not be idealized. The radio equipment of the troops had only a tactical significance. For quite objective reasons, the basis of the control system was a wire connection. In the aforementioned report of the head of the communications department of the Southwestern Front, it is said:
1. Wired communications can be restored under all conditions of destruction and are a powerful means of ensuring control for frontal communications.
2. Radio communications in the absence of wire communication can provide control in a limited amount (insufficient bandwidth) (Collection of military documents of the Second World War. Issue No. 36. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1958, p. 108).
In other words, with the help of wire communication devices, it was possible to "push" a larger amount of information. We find numerous confirmation of this fact in the documents of the war. In the operational report of June 24, 1941, the chief of staff of the Western Front, the Klimovskys, complained: "Radio communication does not ensure the transmission of all documents, since the encryption is checked several times." Therefore, for effective management, an efficient wired connection was needed.
In many ways, we find similar theses in the report of the communications department of the North-Western Front of July 26, 1941.
The work of radio communication in it is characterized by the following words:
“Since the first day of the war, radio communications have been working almost without interruptions, but the headquarters reluctantly and ineptly used this means of communication at the beginning of the war.
The break in the wire connection was qualified by everyone as a loss of connection.
Radiograms were sent to 1000 or more groups. From the border of the West. Dvin, there was a gradual improvement in the use of radio communication and its recognition as the main type of communication on the part of the headquarters (Collection of military documents of the Second World War. Issue No. 34. - M.: Voenizdat, 1957, p. 189).
Why they were reluctant to use it is clear from the above - it was difficult to transmit large amounts of information by radio.
It must be said that the Soviet pre-war manuals rather cautiously assess the possibilities and scope of radio communications. The field manual of 1929 determined the mode of operation of radio facilities:
“Radio communication is allowed to be used only when it is completely impossible to use other means and only in the course of a battle or when completely surrounded by the enemy. Operational orders and reports on the decisions made to military formations from the division and higher to transmit by radio, except in the case of complete encirclement, is strongly prohibited (History of military communications. Vol. 2. - M.: Voenizdat, 1984, p. 271).
As we can see, quite strict restrictions are imposed on the use of radio communications. Moreover, these restrictions are not advisory, but prohibitive ("strongly prohibited"). Of course, the provisions of the 1929 charter can be attributed to obscurantism and outdated views on the place of radio communication in combat conditions. However, Soviet military specialists followed the progress, and an appropriate theoretical basis was drawn up under their positions in relation to radio communications.
For the sake of the purity of the experiment, I will quote a statement referring to the period before 1937. It is generally believed, largely unfounded, that after the purges of 1937-1938. the dark ages began in the Red Army. Accordingly, the opinion after 1937 can be considered a manifestation of obscurantism. However, even before the purges, there was little enthusiasm for the transfer of troops to radio control. The head of the communications department of the RKKA R. Longwa, considering the prospects for the development and use of radio and wire means for command and control, wrote in 1935:
“The last years have been the years of rapid development of military radio engineering. The quantitative and qualitative growth of aviation, the mechanization and motorization of the armed forces, control on the battlefield and in operations with combat assets with significant, moreover, different speeds spur and present more and more complex requirements for technical means of control, for communications technology.
Superficial observation could lead to the erroneous view that radio is supplanting wired communications and that, in military conditions, it will completely and completely replace wire.
Of course, it is possible to resolve the issue of controlling aviation, mechanical units and ensuring interaction of the combat arms at this stage of technology development only with the help of radio equipment. However, in rifle formations in a huge network of rear services and military roads, in an air defense warning system, only wired means can provide continuous stable communication with all points at the same time. Wired means, in addition, do not unmask the location of the command and control bodies, and it is much easier to ensure the secrecy of the transmission”(History of military communications. Vol. 2. M.: Voenizdat, 1984, p. 271).
Before us, we note, is not the opinion of a theoretician, an armchair scientist, but a practice - the head of the communications department. This person knew from his own experience what the organization of management with the help of various means of communication is. Moreover, the practical experience of the signal troops by 1935 was already quite extensive. Since the adoption of the charter in 1929, the Red Army has already managed to obtain the first samples of domestic radio stations of the new generation and used them in exercises and maneuvers.
A common thread running through various pre-war documents on the use of radio communications is the thought: "You can and should use it, but carefully." In the draft Field Manual of 1939 (PU-39), the role and place of radio communications in the control system were defined as follows:
“Radio communication is a valuable means of communication, providing control in the most difficult combat conditions.
However, in view of the possibility of intercepting radio transmissions by the enemy and establishing by direction finding the location of headquarters and grouping of troops, it is mainly used only with the beginning of the battle and in the process of its development.
The relevant chief of staff permits or prohibits (in whole or in part) the use of radio equipment.
During the period of concentration of troops, regrouping, preparation of a breakthrough and in defense before the start of an enemy attack, the use of radio equipment is prohibited.
If radio communication cannot be replaced by other means of communication, for example, for communication with aviation in the air, with reconnaissance, for air defense, etc., special receiving and transmitting radio stations are allocated in formations and units for this purpose.
Radio transmission is always done using codes, coded signaling and cipher. Open radio transmissions are not allowed, with the exception of the transmission of combat commands in artillery, tank units and aircraft in the air.
Negotiations during the battle by radio should be carried out according to the radio signal tables prepared in advance by the headquarters, a coded card, a coded commander's tablet and negotiation tables.
Transmission by radio of operational orders and reports on decisions made from a division (brigade) and above is allowed only if it is completely impossible to use other means of communication and only in cipher."
Before us is all the same set of prohibitive measures: "the use of radio equipment is prohibited", "when it is completely impossible to use other means of communication and only in cipher." But even this is not interesting. The charter clearly spelled out all those things that were regarded as irrational phobias and strange eccentricities of the red commanders. For example, in the description by the commissar of the 8th mechanized corps N. K. Popel of the Dubna battles has the following episode:
“But then, at night, approaching the command post, I did not know anything about the actions of the division. There was no connection.
“Our chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Kurepin, turned out to be an extremely cautious comrade,” Vasiliev explained, grinning, “he forbade the use of the headquarters radio station. As if the enemy did not track. Now we are considering whether it is possible to silently shoot from howitzers and advance on tanks with the engines turned off so that the Nazis would not guess our intentions.
Kurepin was standing nearby. In the dark, I did not see his face.
- Ivan Vasilievich, why is that so. Well, I blundered … (Popel N. KV hard time. - M.; SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 2001. P. 118).
I must say that the memoirs of ND. Popel in general contain many inaccuracies, so it is impossible to say for sure whether this conversation took place in reality or is a product of memory aberration. Another thing is indicative, Kurepin's argumentation in the form in which it was retold by Popel quite closely echoes the draft Field Manual of 1939 (PU-39). Firstly, it was the chief of staff who made the decision to use the radio station, and secondly, he pointed out the possibility of its direction finding by the enemy. However, for some reason, the PU-39 itself was not condemned and ridiculed.
After being mentioned in popular memoirs, the idea of radio phobia as an irrational phobia went to the masses. Pikul almost word for word reproduced the episode described by Popel and added vivid details and generalizations.
“The troops relied too much on the lines of the People's Commissariat of Communications - on the wire between the pillars. They did not take into account at all that the war would be maneuverable, and communication lines would be stretched, as a rule, along railways or important highways. The troops will move away from the roads a little further - no pillars, no wire. In addition, communication was not underground cable, but air-wire, and the enemy boldly connected to it, listening to our negotiations, and sometimes the Germans gave false orders to our troops - to retreat! Blind trust in telephones sometimes ended in tragedies, the death of many people. At the same time, there was a "radio fear": the marching radio stations were treated as an extra burden, for which one had to answer, at the first opportunity they were sent to the train. This stemmed from distrust of sophisticated equipment, from the fear of the headquarters to be tracked by the enemy "(Pikul B. C. The area of the fallen fighters. - M.: Golos, 1996, p. 179).
The fact that the words about direction finding were directly spelled out in the PU-39 was somehow nicely forgotten. The reader was gently pushed to the conclusion: "The Germans have nothing more to do - to look for Soviet radio stations." Mocking "radio fear" and the possibility of direction finding of operating radio stations, for some reason they forget that the Germans had and sometimes achieved impressive results in radio intelligence. Of course, it was not only and not so much about primitive aiming at Soviet aviation headquarters. One of the most famous examples is the Mius Front in July 1943. The German 6th Army of Karl Hollidt, which was defending Donbass, was forced to wait for the advance of the Soviet troops and used all means of reconnaissance to guess the likely direction of the strike. Guessing the direction of the strike often turned into "Russian roulette", but it was radio intelligence that allowed the Germans to delay the collapse of the German defense in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. Until July 9, 1943, no movements of troops or concentration of artillery were noted by German intelligence. But July 10 was a turning point, forcing Hollidt's headquarters to feverishly prepare to repel the enemy offensive in the zone of responsibility of the 6th Army. In the afternoon of July 10, the movements of infantry and tanks were noted in the strip of XXIX and XVII army corps. Two days later, movement was seen at the junction of the IV and XVII Army Corps - in the direction of the Soviet auxiliary strike. The fact that, due to the weather conditions from 11 to 14 July, effective work of aerial reconnaissance was impossible, and all the hope was on ground reconnaissance and radio intercepts, added a sharpness to the operational situation. The 623rd separate radio intelligence company was engaged in this in the 6th army. The movement of reserves was of particular concern to German intelligence officers. The position of the 2nd Guards Army as a strategic reserve of the Soviet command in the depths of the formation of troops in the southern sector of the front was known to the Germans, and its movements were monitored. According to Hollidt's headquarters, the 2nd Guards. the army could be put into battle within three to five days. An analysis of the radio exchange on July 14 allowed the Germans to conclude that the headquarters of the 2nd Guards. army has moved and is now located behind the positions of the 5th shock army. When the weather improved on July 15 and aerial reconnaissance began, the concentration of Soviet troops was confirmed from the air. On July 15, Hollidt visited the headquarters of the 294th Infantry Division and the 17th Army Corps and reported that all the intelligence data indicated an imminent start of the offensive precisely in their sector of the front. Two days later, on the hot morning of July 17, 1943, the thunderous rumble of artillery preparation confirmed his words.
Naturally, the Germans took the necessary countermeasures and pulled up reserves to the likely direction of the Soviet strike. Moreover, decisions were made at the command level of the entire Army Group South. Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps was removed from the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The corps was withdrawn from battle and loaded into echelons going to Donbass. The timely arrival of the SS formations played a key role in repelling the Soviet offensive on Mius, which ended in early August 1943 with the displacement of the troops of the Southern Front to their original positions.
The Mius front in this case is a negative example, but one should not think that in the same period there were no directly opposite cases. Such, oddly enough, is the counterstrike of the 5th Guards. tank army near Prokhorovka. Due to the strictest radio silence (the radio stations were even sealed), the Germans did not know until the very last moment that the Voronezh Front would be counter-attacking with large masses of tanks. The concentration of tanks was partially revealed by radio intelligence, but the Germans did not have a specific list of the arrived formations on the evening of July 11, 1943. Therefore, the defensive actions of the Leibstandart on July 12 were largely improvised, favored by the dense battle formations and terrain conditions. In any case, German radio intelligence did not reveal the appearance of the army of P. A. Rotmistrov, and her appearance was largely unexpected. Another issue is that this initial advantage was not properly exploited.
The aforementioned 8th Mechanized Corps was in the same position as the 5th Guards. tank army near Prokhorovka. He also moved forward to deliver a counterstrike. Therefore, the radio silence was one of the main requirements. German radio intelligence was operational in the summer of 1941, and the intensive use of radio communications would have cleared up the situation for the enemy. It would be easier for German intelligence to find out who is opposing them at the moment and the approach of which formations or formations from the depths is expected in the near future. Radio communication, like any other means, had its advantages and disadvantages.
The sending of officers to the troops with orders was not an emergency measure caused by the circumstances. Recommendations on the organization of control with the help of delegates went to PU-39 after the section on radio communications, furnished with prohibitive measures. The following was recommended to the Red commanders:
“To ensure reliable control, in addition to technical means, it is necessary to widely use all other types of communication, primarily mobile means (airplane, car, motorcycle, tank, horse).
The headquarters of military formations and units must take care of the availability and readiness for action of a sufficient number of mobile means for the transmission of orders."
The liaison delegates were not only a companion to unsuccessful operations. They were widely used to transmit orders in undoubtedly successful battles and operations for the Red Army. An example is an episode related to the period of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad. To the south of the city, the mechanized corps of the strike group of the Stalingrad Front advanced along the steppe. On the night of November 22, the 4th mechanized corps received an order from the deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front, M. M. Popov, by the end of the day, capture Sovetsky and push forward an advanced detachment to Karpovka. By that time, the body was moving forward blindly in the literal sense of the word. No information about the enemy in the direction of the offensive was received either from the headquarters of the 51st Army or from the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front. Requests for aerial reconnaissance were not fulfilled - due to bad weather, the aviation was practically inactive. The corps could only shine with "low beam" - sending reconnaissance detachments on motorcycles and BA-64 armored vehicles in all directions. Communication was also established with a neighbor on the right - the 13th mechanized corps. This clarified the situation to an insignificant extent: vague information was received about the front sector to the right of the offensive zone. On the left, there were simply no neighbors, one seemingly endless steppe. In such an environment, a counterstrike could follow from any direction. A thick "fog of war" hung over the battlefield. All that remained was to take all precautions and trust in my lucky star. Volsky put forward strong lateral security on the flanks and brought the 60th mechanized brigade into reserve.
Soon, the already difficult situation was aggravated by lightning "from the stratosphere." When the corps headquarters approached the Verkhne-Tsaritsynsky plane, an order was delivered by the commander of the Stalingrad front A. I. Eremenko with the task of capturing Old and New Rogachik, Karpovskaya, Karpovka. This significantly changed the original task of the corps. Now he had to turn away from the rendezvous point with the South-Western Front at Kalach and advance into the rear of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. More precisely, the corps was deployed to crush the rapidly building defense of the 6th Army by the front to the west.
Literally half an hour after the arrival of the plane from A. I. Eremenko, the deputy commander of the 51st Army, Colonel Yudin, arrived at the corps headquarters by car. The commander of the 4th mechanized corps was given an order from the commander of the 51st (in whose operational subordination was the corps), confirming the previously set task. The mechanized corps was supposed to capture Sovetsky and reach the line Karpovka, Marinovka, that is, approximately to the line of the railway from Stalingrad to Kalach. Finding himself with two orders in hand, Volsky made a compromise decision and turned the 59th mechanized brigade to Karpovka. The blow to Karpovka was ineffectual - the mobile units sent by Paulus occupied the old Soviet fortifications. The rest of the 4th mechanized corps moved to the Soviet, performing the same task.
As a result, Sovetsky was captured by 12.20 on November 22 by the 36th mechanized brigade together with the 20th tank regiment of the 59th mechanized brigade. There were auto repair shops in the city, and more than 1000 cars became trophies of Volsky's corps. Warehouses with food, ammunition and fuel were also seized. With the capture of Sovetskoye, the communication of the 6th Army with the rear by rail was interrupted.
It is interesting to note that the orders of the 4th Mechanized Corps were received by the liaison delegates. Moreover, the orders of different authorities contradicted each other. According to Russian historical tradition, it is customary to angrily condemn the use of delegates in the summer of 1941 and even present them as one of the reasons for the disaster that happened. However, this is an obvious positioning of the cart in front of the horse. The liaison delegates were successfully used in the successful operations of the Red Army. The corps without any problems were sent by the command to the desired point without the use of ideologically sustained radio communications.
In conclusion, I would like to say the following. It cannot be denied that there were significant shortcomings in the work of communications in the 1941 Red Army. But it would be unreasonable to declare communications as one of the main reasons for the defeat. The collapse of the communication system was often the result, not the cause of emerging crises. The headquarters lost contact with the troops when they were defeated in defense and were forced to withdraw. The defeats had a very definite explanation at the operational level, and the absence of any communication problems would hardly have significantly changed the situation.
