An article by the well-known to us Alexander Timokhin attracted my attention, but on a different resource. And the topic that Timokhin touched upon is, on the one hand, very interesting, on the other, just as controversial.
Was the Soviet fleet useless during the Great Patriotic War.
In order not to cite Timokhin's entire article and not to disassemble it, I will just run briefly where I agree, but where I disagree … We will talk there in detail, especially since I do not agree with all Timokhin's thoughts. Based on, I will say right away, the work I have, "The Combat Path of the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War." Naturally, the Soviet edition.
And I consider it necessary to start with a historical digression. A digression is very necessary, and if Timokhin starts from the 20s of the last century, then I think that one should watch a lot earlier.
What was the fleet in TOY Russia? It was the center of education and smart people. This applied not only to the officers, although the naval ones turned up their noses in front of the land ones, but everything was fair. For on one side there is a cavalry regiment, and on the other - a battleship. There is a difference.
Only artillerymen could compete with the naval forces, because the imperial army had no tanks at all, and aviation was in its infancy. So the battleship was the most complex mechanism.
That is why the sailors became an effective force of the revolution, it is precisely because the seeds of free-thinking sprouted in the navy so quickly, for there were almost no fools there. And therefore the sailors-agitators at first were listened to and believed, well, of course, a man from the navy is at least intelligent and trained in business.
And although during the First World War, the Russian fleet did not particularly shine, it did not participate in major battles, but the same German blood was drunk. And even when the fleet of the Russian republic, thoroughly shaken by agitation, took up battle in the Moonsund Strait, let's face it: the Germans got the victory at a great price.
But it should be noted that as a result of the October Revolution, it was the fleet that suffered simply enormous losses. A large number of competent officers emigrated abroad, and the sailors scattered along the fronts of the Civil War.
And I completely agree with Timokhin that in the twenties the Russian fleet was a sad sight. There were ships, but there were absolutely no personnel capable of making a fleet out of ships.
Being familiar with the works of Boris Borisovich Gervais, I will say that Timokhin somewhat exaggerates the significance of Gervais's works in general and the professor's role in the development of Soviet fleet strategy in particular. Yes, Gervais's work was fundamental in many ways, but there were simply no others!
And yes, Professor Gervais was not subjected to any repressions, he did not lose any posts, in 1928-1931 he was the head of the Naval Academy, then he became the head of the department at once in two (Military-Political and Military-Engineering) academies. The decline in 1931 was due to health conditions, not repression, as Gervais proved in 1934 when he died at the age of 56. Although it is worth noting that in 1930 Boris Borisovich was arrested, but in just less than 2 weeks they found out that the charges were false.
In fact, it is difficult to say how much the fleet could get an impetus in development, but at the turn of the 20-30s of the last century, unfortunately, the Soviet fleet was in a state of severe crisis, both in the construction of new ships and in the training of personnel.
Further, our roads, perhaps, diverge. The opponent starts a lot of assumptions and conjectures, eventually drawing a not quite correct and clear picture on the topic "But if …"
Of course, nowhere without Stalin, the bloody tyrant, who began to "restore order" through repression.
Yes, the list leapfrog with the commanders-in-chief of the Navy looks intimidating.
Viktorov, Mikhail Vladimirovich (August 15 - December 30, 1937).
Smirnov, Pyotr Alexandrovich (December 30, 1937 - June 30, 1938).
Smirnov-Svetlovsky, Pyotr Ivanovich (acting June 30 - September 8, 1938).
Frinovsky, Mikhail Petrovich (September 8, 1938 - March 20, 1939).
Yes, all four were shot in 1938-1940, but here you also need to look carefully, because Frinovsky and Smirnov were the organizers and main executors of the firing squad in the fleet. For which they deservedly received theirs in 1940.
Yes, Kuznetsov got a very sad economy, with staff shortages and complete ruin in shipbuilding and ship repair. But most of all, it was sad that no one really knew what to do with this fleet.
Let's look objectively. And do not poke into all the holes of Stalin. The fleet suffered the greatest losses not in the late 1930s, but much earlier. When the revolution broke out and a very large number of naval officers were destroyed by sailors' hands. Yes, they were tsarist officers, white bone and all that. But excuse me, the so-called "Krasvoenmores" could only hold a meeting well, but with an understanding of how to command a ship, they were sad.
Those who were not taken into account in 1917-1918, who were lucky, went abroad. Those who were unlucky - there were purges both in the 1920s and in 1932-1933. The "white bone" was cut out, I would say, with rapture.
And the main problem is not that there was no one to command the ships wisely, there was no one to TEACH how to command.
Weeds can only breed weeds. But we will come back to this. In the meantime, a few considerations gleaned from Zhukov in "Memories and Reflections." Georgy Konstantinovich was a man, to put it mildly, on the ground, and practically did not mention naval affairs. But he can read in the second volume that Stalin, as it were, was not good at naval affairs, but rather the other way around.
I will allow myself to quote Timokhin.
“Alas, but he (Stalin) tried to 'solve the problem' by unleashing a new wave of repressions on the fleet. If before 1938, with the cessation of ideological madness, the fleet would have had the opportunity to restore combat effectiveness in a few years, then by 1939 there were not enough personnel for this. Experienced commanders, for example, were simply nowhere to be found."
Figures from official sources (for example, a note by E. A. Shchadenko, sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1940, containing information on the number of people dismissed from the Red Army without the Air Force), which are referred to by all modern researchers of the history of the army and navy (Ukolov, Ivkin, Meltyukhov, Souvenirov, Pechenkin, Cherushev, Lazarev) say that in 1937-1939 28,685 officers were dismissed from the army and navy.
The figure is large, but, unfortunately, it does not distinguish between the army and the navy, and it is impossible to say anything about how trained the officers were. However, this figure includes everything: those dismissed for political reasons, on denunciations, for drunkenness, embezzlement, and so on. And, by the way, a lot of officers returned back in 1941. I hope this does not require any special confirmation.
Some researchers give a figure for the fleet from 3 to 4 thousand laid off. I do not presume to judge the veracity, but it seems to be the truth.
Move on.
“Until the end of 1940, the military-political leadership had doubts as to who we were going to fight with: Britain or Germany. On land, military leaders failed to predict the nature of a future war. Even after the German invasion, hardly anyone could have predicted that almost all the bases of the fleet would either be captured by the enemy in the course of ground attacks, or blocked by him."
Well, to be honest, hands down. What kind of war with Britain could we talk about, if at the famous military-staff game in December 1940 - January 1941, where Zhukov played for the "western" and utterly defeated the "eastern" ("clever" Kuznetsov and Pavlov), under the "western" did you mean the Third Reich?
“But the loss of the naval bases, which were captured by the enemy, in many ways led to such an unfortunate course of the war for the fleet. The army had a reserve of territory for retreat, factories far in the rear, the ability to lose millions, but still recover and drive the enemy back. The fleet had to "drive back" without recovering. It was in this form that the fleet approached the war."
The fleet approached the war in a sad state. There were no naval commanders, there were no commanders, there was no one. There was no headquarters capable of planning a more or less decent operation. And this was shown by the war in the early days.
The main problem is that the comrades Soviet admirals turned out to be incapable of tactical planning from the word "absolutely". And you don't really need to prove anything here, it is enough to recall the most famous milestones of the initial period of the war.
But let's think about the role of the fleet first. As it seems, well, from the couch.
1. Fight against enemy fleets.
2. Violation of enemy transport communications.
3. Support for ground forces.
4. Support for amphibious operations.
Enough.
Paragraph 1.
There was no fight against enemy fleets. Just because there was no one to fight on the Black Sea (three Romanian destroyers and one submarine do not count), in the Baltic the appearance of the same Germans was episodic, in the Pacific Ocean (thank God) there was no war with the Japanese, but when it began, Japan no longer had a fleet as such.
Only the Northern Fleet remains, where yes, once there was a battle between Soviet and German destroyers. Plus the sinking of the German ships "Fog" and "Alexander Sibiryakov".
Everything, more our surface ships did not come into contact with the enemy.
Point 2.
I believe that here our fleets have shown utter impotence.
By the beginning of the war, the USSR Navy had about a thousand ships of various classes. Among them - 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, 54 leaders and destroyers, 287 torpedo boats, 212 submarines. 2, 5 thousand units of aviation and 260 coastal defense batteries.
Force? Force.
Throughout the war, quite calmly, German and Swedish ore carriers carried ore across the Baltic and North Seas for the Reich. And the Baltic Fleet was absolutely unable to do anything about it. If the formidable force of the DKBF had blocked the flow of ore from Sweden to Germany, the war would have ended in 1943.
But the Baltic Fleet was able only at the beginning of the war, having suffered huge losses, to leave the Baltic for Kronstadt and there stand under German bombs as targets. Yes, the submariners tried to do something. And how many of them died on one Porkkala-Udda barrier, I don't even want to remember now, because this is a tragedy that should be discussed separately.
The Black Sea Fleet was not very different from the Baltic. How many of our soldiers were thrown in the same abandoned Sevastopol, which is now proudly called the "city of glory", but forgive me, how many thousands of soldiers remained there …
The abandonment of Odessa and Sevastopol cannot be called anything other than a shame for the Black Sea Fleet. And this despite the fact that two years later the war turned back, and the situation repeated itself, only for the Germans. It was only when the Soviet command abandoned the soldiers who had fought to the end in Sevastopol, the Germans took 78 thousand prisoners. And in 1944, the Germans, in turn, left about 61 thousand people to surrender.
The numbers are roughly equal, but we had the Black Sea Fleet, and the Germans had a Romanian naval division. By the beginning of the war, the Romanian naval division had 2 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers, 3 destroyers, 1 submarine, 3 gunboats, 3 torpedo boats, 13 minesweepers and several minelayers.
It is simply a shame to give data on the Black Sea Fleet. Including because at one time the so-called "raiding operations" cost the fleet several for just lost ships. But we had materials about this in due time.
Point 3.
Support for ground forces. Such, say, an occupation. In our case, shooting across areas. Without any adjustments with the help of aircraft, just throwing shells into the distance, as it mostly happened.
In itself, a pretty stupid activity, just a waste of the resource of weapons. I will not say anything at all on this topic, I will only say that the offensive operations of the Americans on the islands of the Pacific Ocean, in conditions of complete superiority in aviation and, accordingly, the possibility of adjustment, with the use of ships, each of which was head and shoulders above the ancient Russian dreadnoughts of the tsarist construction, did not give much results.
The earth can be plowed with shells of large calibers as much as you like, but it has been proven that the benefits of this are minuscule.
You can, of course, say about such a gesture of despair as the delivery of reinforcements to besieged Sevastopol on warships. It is possible, but I will not say anything. Gasoline in ballast tanks of submarines, infantry on the decks of cruisers and destroyers … The Japanese also had the Tokyo Express at the end of the war. With about the same success.
Clause 4.
Landings. So much has been written about them, so much honor has been given to the paratrooper heroes, there is nothing special to add. The simplest operation. The ships approached, fired on the shore, landed troops and left.
How many of these landings died, history knows very well.
Of course, we need to get out of the situation and show that not everything was so bad. This is exactly what they did in Soviet times, talking about some events at length and completely silent on others.
Therefore, we were in great detail aware of the heroic deeds of submariners and boatmen, but we do not know at all what contribution our battleships, cruisers, leaders and destroyers made to the victory.
I'll make a reservation, there are no questions about the destroyers of the Northern Fleet. They worked like the damned.
The rest of the ships coped very well with the role of targets for German pilots and worked as floating batteries. No more. Someone was lucky, probably, like the "Red Caucasus", entrusted with the role of transport.
Yes, we can talk for a long time about the fact that even there, on land, the fleet provided such tremendous support, diverting enemy forces, threatening, and so on.
Quote again.
“And what prevented the Germans from requisitioning several dozen steamers and barges, and then helping their troops in the Caucasus in 1942 with a series of landings from the sea? And the fact that they would have met with Soviet cruisers and destroyers."
It’s hard to believe in this in 1942. And the Germans, calmly chasing our ships with not so large masses of aircraft, without encountering much resistance, knew this very well.
What's the secret?
The secret is Stalin's incompetence.
Yes, Joseph Vissarionovich was not an omniscient person. And in the affairs of the sea, he did not really understand. Therefore, he simply had to trust his admirals. Trusted by the party, so to speak, comrades. Probably almost trustworthy, but prudent in naval affairs at about the level of Comrade Stalin.
And some (on the Black Sea) also turned out to be cowards. An incompetent coward is generally an explosive mixture.
And when, in 1941-1942, comrade admirals began to destroy large and expensive ships at an accelerated pace (some raiding operations were worth what), then Comrade Stalin did the only thing he could in this situation: ordered to drive battleships and cruisers to distant corners and not touch them.
"Marat" did not help much, but something remained on the Black Sea.
In fact, the losses for the fleet, which did not conduct active hostilities, are simply enormous.
Battleship - 1 irrevocably (out of 3 available).
Heavy cruiser - 1 (raised and restored) out of 1 available.
Light cruisers - 2 irrevocably (out of 8 available).
Destroyer leaders - 3 irrevocably (out of 6 available).
Destroyers - 29 irrevocably (out of 57 available).
I did not count American and British ships (battleship, cruiser), since they did not fight.
I repeat: for a fleet that has not fought, the losses are enormous. And all this thanks to the red admirals, who, in theory, had to repeat the path of the tsarist land soldiers. But if Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Malinovsky became real commanders, then this effect did not happen to the admirals.
And hence the Tallinn passage, full of tragedy, which cost many people and ships, the seat of the Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt, complete inability to fight in the Black Sea …
Alexander Timokhin is trying his best to justify the inaction of the naval command, looking for arguments in favor of the usefulness of the fleet, but …
No, you can talk about how the fleet with its actions distracted somewhere some reserves of the Germans from the directions of the main attack, inflicted some kind of damage …
“This is how events began on the Black Sea that many modern historians do not see point-blank - the continuous and systematic impact of the fleet on the course of hostilities on the ground. Continuous delays of the Germans and their allies and their loss of pace."
Indeed, as far as the Black Sea Fleet is concerned, I do not see any merit at close range. Ships hiding in Poti, Batumi and Sukhumi, incapable of anything. What they "influenced" there, I do not know. The battles went a little to the side.
“The fleet, with its landings, consistently turned out to be the straw that broke the back of the Germans. Yes, he was in auxiliary roles in comparison with the army, but without this help it is not known how the army would have ended."
Would have ended the same. There is really no desire to talk about landings, yes, this is the only thing that the Black Sea Fleet was capable of (for example, the Baltic Fleet was not suitable for this either), but how many people died in these landings, how many operations were unsuccessful …
“The fleet also seriously damaged the communications of the Germans in the Arctic, because their troops were largely supplied with coasters by sea, and not by land, almost completely devoid of roads. The fleet, although small, played an important role in the fact that the blitzkrieg in the Arctic stalled. The straw broke the spine in the north as well.
This is generally some kind of alternative history has gone. Blitzkrieg in the Arctic, German troops in the Arctic, coasters supplying these troops … I will not comment on this fantasy. In fact, the Germans have been very successful in harming us in the Arctic.
This is what they could do nothing with the German submarines during the entire war in the North - it was. The fact that they could not do anything with the "Admiral Scheer" was.
The Northern Fleet was very busy escorting convoy caravans, this is undoubtedly a huge contribution to the victory. And my opinion is that the Northern Fleet, the smallest in composition, has brought much more benefit than the Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet combined.
So, by and large, landings and the escort of northern convoys - that's all that the military fleet of a thousand warships turned out to be capable of.
The conclusions that Timokhin made, oddly enough, but I almost support.
“The Great Patriotic War shows two things. The first is that even in a war on land, the role of the fleet is very important."
Agree. The fleet, if there is one, if smart naval commanders are at the helm, is strength. The British, Americans, Japanese showed it in all its glory. Alas, we had ships, but there were no commanders.
“The second is that in order to fully realize the combat potential of even a small fleet, we need a sane theory of its combat use, a competently built command, careful and scrupulous preparation before the war. Alas, this was not the case before the Great Patriotic War, and the fleet did not show what it could have."
I agree again. But there was no preparation not immediately before the war, and there never was. There was no one to cook, as I said. Hence the outright inability of the naval command to plan and implement plans, which ultimately resulted in complete nonsense - the subordination of the fleets to the fronts.
What this led to in Crimea, I think, need not be repeated.
Here is the result. During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet navy turned out to be a completely useless formation by 90% due to the fact that there were no normal commanders in the fleet.
We managed to raise and train individual ship commanders. We managed to train a number of crews. Top-level commanders - sorry, it didn't work out. And therefore, a full-fledged fleet did not work out. Alas.
And here's what I would like to say as a summary.
Such material that Timokhin wrote, of course, has the right to life. Even if it is somewhat … fantastic. But my opinion is that it is simply not worth wasting time trying to show that not everything is as bad as it seems.
It was not bad in our fleet, it was disgusting up there.
Which does not humiliate at all, but on the contrary, even exalts the exploits of the sailors. It is not necessary to write about the supposedly extremely useful landings in general terms, it is necessary to talk about the people who went into battle as part of the landing groups. About the Black Sea submariners, choking on gasoline vapors in their boats, turned into tankers. About the crews of "sevens" and "noviks" looking out for German torpedo bombers in the gray northern sky. About yesterday's fishermen looking for German submarines instead of cod. About the gunners of the Aurora, who did not shame the ship's flag in the last battle.
Yes, in the Great Patriotic War, unfortunately, we did not have a fleet as such. And there were no real naval commanders. But there were men of the fleet, faithful to their work, bold, decisive, and proactive. Yes, at the lower levels in the hierarchy, but they were! That's what we need to talk about today. To be remembered.
And the last thing. It seems to me that for a person who claims to tell or analyze the events of that war, the use of the WWII abbreviation is not very beautiful. I would say unworthy of a Russian person.
There was the Great Patriotic War. There are still veterans of the Great Patriotic War. You shouldn't turn the Great Patriotic War into the Second World War. Who wants to - check, I and the Second World War only write in this way. With a capital letter. Precisely respecting those who fought in her theaters.
They say our history must be respected. It will even be included in the constitution. Laughter with laughter, but let's respect our past without constitutions. Just because this is our past. There were a lot of things in it, but we simply have to respect. Both people and events. And do it as honestly and openly as possible.
