The overwhelming majority of the citizens of our country will answer this question quite predictably - the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascism. And this is the correct answer. It was the USSR that bore the brunt of the war with Nazi Germany, laying the greatest number of victims on the altar of Victory. But does this mean that the participation in that war of our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition was reduced to insignificant, sometimes purely formal assistance, without which the USSR could well have done? This is exactly what the majority of participants in Internet discussions on all patriotic sites in Russia think today. And this is no coincidence. This point of view is intensively promoted, first of all, by the newly gaining popularity of Stalinists, who, under the guise of fighting the falsification of history, using the patriotic enthusiasm among Russians, again raise the figure of their "infallible" idol on the pedestal, presenting the time of his reign in the "golden age" of Russia and all the former THE USSR. But how true are such statements? Let's try to figure it out.
Pilots of the 2nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet Ivan Grudakov and Nikolai Didenko at the R-39 Airacobra before take off
The main argument in favor of the insignificance of the participation of the Western allies of the USSR in the victory over Hitler is considered to be a relatively small percentage of Western supplies in comparison with the USSR's own production of military products during the war years. This thesis is based on the point of view of all Soviet historiography, which was formed back in the Stalin era, at the very beginning of the Cold War. It was believed that the total supply of the allies was then only 4% of all products produced in the USSR, from which it was concluded that such assistance could not significantly affect the course and outcome of the war. The first to introduce this figure into circulation was N. A. Voznesensky in his book "The Military Economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War", published in 1947.
Without trying to dispute the ratio of the total amount of Western aid and its own Soviet production (rather doubtful, as it was quite convincingly shown in the works of the historian-publicist B. Sokolov in the 90s), let us focus on the very assessment of its role in the Great Patriotic War. This role can be determined only by knowing which products and in what quantity were supplied to the USSR from Western countries during the Second World War. Within the framework of this article, we will analyze only a few of the most significant examples. Let's start with the technique.
Most of all, the USSR was provided by the Western allies of cars. According to the testimony of Mikhail Baryatinsky, the largest specialist in the history of military equipment in our country, 477 785 units arrived in our country (Lend-Lease tanks in battle. M.: Yauza: Eksmo, 2011. S. 234). Is it a lot or a little? According to the same M. Baryatinsky, by the beginning of the war there were 272,600 vehicles of all types in the Red Army, which was only 36% of the wartime states. Most of them were lorries, and the rest mainly had a carrying capacity of 3-4 tons. There were very few 5- and 8-ton vehicles. There were almost no off-road vehicles (Ibid. Pp. 229-230).
In the summer and autumn of 1941, Soviet troops irrevocably lost 159 thousand vehicles (58, 3% of the original number). At that time, 166.3 thousand rubles were received from the national economy.cars, and new production in the fall and winter decreased many times due to the evacuation of the Moscow automobile plant to the Urals and the partial transition of GAZ to the production of tanks. Thus, the shortage of cars in the army remained and even increased significantly, since the number of units and formations increased sharply (due to the newly formed ones) (Ibid. Pp. 232-233). This put the Soviet troops from the point of view of maneuverability at a deliberately disadvantageous position in front of the German army, the degree of motorization of which was, at the beginning of the war, the highest in the world. Hence the abundance of boilers, and our associated with them many times greater, in comparison with the Germans, losses in the first two years of the war.
But in the future, our own automobile production in our country could not provide even the most minimal needs of the Red Army for vehicles. For all the years of the war, it received from industry only 162.6 thousand new vehicles (about 268.7 thousand more were mobilized from the n / x), and 55% of the trucks were lorries (Ibid. P. 233). Thus, it was Western cars that really made it possible to put our army on wheels. By the end of the war, they made up a large (and better) portion of the Soviet armed forces' vehicle fleet. Especially when you consider their significantly higher carrying capacity and cross-country ability. Fuel, tires and repairs for this fleet were also supplied by our Western allies.
Could Soviet troops successfully carry out their major offensive operations in 1943-45? (including the encirclement) without Western automotive technology? Unlikely. In a war of motors, such as World War II, this was almost impossible. In the best case, it would be possible to gradually push back the enemy frontally, at the cost of many times greater losses. It would be difficult to quickly block the enemy's strong retaliatory strikes.
Another type of transport, without which the USSR could not have waged a war with a strong enemy on a gigantic front for almost four years, and even more so to win in it, is the railroad. Without a sufficient number of railway rolling stock, it was impossible to transfer over long distances a huge amount of cargo and people, equally necessary in the offensive and in defense, not to mention civilian transport.
To understand the role of Lend-Lease in ensuring the work of the railway. transport, it is enough to look at the ratio of steam locomotives and carriages produced during the war by our industry and delivered from abroad. According to Soviet military historians, 1860 steam locomotives and 11,300 carriages and platforms were brought from the United States and Great Britain (Lyutov I. S., Noskov A. M. Coalition cooperation of allies: from the experience of the first and second world wars. - M.: Nauka, 1988. P. 91). The USSR's own production from 1940 to 1945, as M. Baryatinsky writes, amounted to 1714 steam locomotives, of which in 1940-1941. - 1622 (Lend-Lease tanks in battle. S. 279-280). Thus, during the Second World War, only a little more than 100 steam locomotives were produced, that is, about 15-18 times less supplies under Lend-Lease. Wagons were also produced 10 times less than received from the allies. Equipment and spare parts for the repair of rolling stock were also supplied from abroad, as well as rails, the total tonnage of which amounted to 83.3% of their total Soviet production during the war years (ibid.).
The third most important condition for the successful conduct of hostilities in modern warfare is good communication, that is, a sufficient number of radio stations and telephones, as well as a telephone cable connecting the latter. All this, too, we had from 1942 until the end of the war, mainly gifts from Great Britain and the United States (up to 80%). According to the estimates of the then Soviet foreign trade experts, by the beginning of the war the USSR was lagging behind the allies in this area by almost 10 years. As for radars, they were produced in the Soviet Union during the Second World War, almost 3 times less than received under Lend-Lease (775 versus more than 2 thousand). (Ibid. Pp. 268-272).
An equally important role in the war of engines is played by the availability of fuel, without which the most formidable military equipment is, at best, a fixed firing point of defense, and at worst, a helpless target or trophy for the enemy. The provision of Soviet military equipment with fuel was quite dependent on Lend-Lease. This is especially true for aviation. According to M. Baryatinsky, the share of aviation gasoline supplies by the allies amounted to 57.8% of its Soviet wartime production (Ibid. Pp. 278-279). In total, during the war years, even according to Soviet historians, 2 million 599 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants were supplied to the USSR, and of a higher quality than was produced then in the USSR (Lyutov I. S., Noskov A. M. Coalition cooperation of the allies. P. 91).
And one more thing: how to fight without ammunition? The Allies shipped us 39.4 million shells and 1282.4 million rounds of ammunition under Lend-Lease (Ibid. P. 90). In addition, for their production in the USSR, they supplied 295, 6 thousand tons of explosives and 127 thousand tons of gunpowder (Lend-Lease tanks in battle. P. 277). In addition, it was received from the United States and Britain (according to Soviet historians) 2 million 800 thousand tons of steel, 517 and a half thousand tons of non-ferrous metals (including 270 thousand tons of copper and 6.5 thousand tons of nickel, necessary, among other things, for the production of cartridges and shells), 842 thousand tons of chemical products, 4 million 470 thousand tons of food (grain, flour, canned food, etc.), 44, 6 thousand metal-cutting machines and many other products (Lyutov I. S., Noskov A. M. Decree.p. pp. 90-91). This is to the question of the reasons for such a rapid recovery and further growth in the USSR in the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition (as well as machine tools and other technical equipment for industrial purposes) after the loss in 1941-1942 of most of the main industrial regions of the country. I am not going to negate the feat of labor of our people during the war years, but the contribution of the allies, without which such an outstanding result could not have been achieved, must not be forgotten.
We can also mention the supply of military equipment and weapons to us. According to Soviet historians, they made up about 8% of our own production, which in itself is already a lot. However, in relation to aircraft, this percentage was increased by them to 12, and in tanks and self-propelled guns - up to 10 (Lyutov I. S., Noskov A. M. S. 93) (According to the data of the modern Russian historian M. Baryatinsky, Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 13% of those produced in the USSR (self-propelled guns - 7%), and combat aircraft - 16% (including fighters - 23%, bombers - 20%, attack aircraft were mainly of their own production). supplied us almost exclusively with anti-aircraft guns, which accounted for 25% of their Soviet production (Lend-Lease tanks in battle. pp. 59, 264-265).
So, let's summarize. Considering the above circumstances, as well as the fact that the United States and Great Britain were pulling off significant enemy forces (up to 40%, including most of its aviation), the Stalinist Soviet Union could not single-handedly win the war with Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the entire continental Europe (as well as our Western allies could not independently win that war). Is the recognition of this fact a humiliation for Russia? Not at all. Truth never humiliates anyone, it only helps to look at everything with sober eyes, not exaggerating one's achievements, but also not underestimating them. The ability to soberly assess the situation is a virtue, not a disadvantage, especially when it comes to such a great power as Russia.
How can knowledge of this fact help us in today's situation, when there is a real threat of a military clash with NATO? We, the Russians, must clearly realize that a war with the united forces of the West (non-nuclear, of course) Russia alone today is not up to the task. The only chance for success, just like 70 years ago, is to enlist the support of the largest industrial power in the world. China is now such a power. Even without the participation of the Chinese armed forces in the war, his economic assistance, similar to assistance under Lend-Lease during the Second World War, is able to provide us with an advantage at our borders over any enemy in strength. It's another matter whether China is ready to provide us with such support. Our relationship with him in recent years allows us to hope for an affirmative answer. If China does not help or finds itself on the other side of the barricades, then it will hardly be possible to do without the use of nuclear weapons, and this is already a disaster for the entire planet Earth.
