In general, the story is tragic and strange at the same time. It happened in the Kara Sea and became the largest in terms of human losses during the Great Patriotic War in the Arctic. The tragedy happened on August 12, 1944, in principle, when the war was already going on in the enemy's territory, which also probably played a certain role. On this day, the German submarine U-365 sank the motor ship Marina Raskova and two of the three minesweepers accompanying the ship.
We can say that the crew of the boat showed miracles of skill, destroying a well-guarded convoy. However, not everything is so simple.
Yes, there was an unforgivable number of human casualties, about 400 people died, including women and children. Perhaps such a number of casualties could have been avoided if not for a number of mistakes made by the convoy commander.
Let's start as usual with the characters.
Marina Raskova.
Wikipedia gives information that this is the cargo-passenger steamer Marina Raskova (American transport of the Liberty class), launched in June 1943 and operating until its sinking in the Kara Sea on August 12, 1944.
However, no. This steamer was built back in 1919, and was originally called "Salisbury". In 1941, he changed his name to Iberville, and in 1942, after being bought out by the US government, he again changed his name to Ironclad.
"Ironclad" went to the USSR as part of the convoy NH-178 (did not reach due to damage during the storm) and PQ-17 (survived and reached Murmansk, the epic of the corvette "Ayrshir", if anyone is interested). It was transferred to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, received the name "Marina Raskova" and was operated as part of the Northern Shipping Company.
The displacement of the steamer was 14,450 tons, the speed was 19 knots.
Minesweepers of the AM series ("American").
These were also American ships. T-114, T-116 and T-118 were also transferred to the USSR under Lend-Lease and operated under these numbers as part of the Northern Fleet.
Displacement 725 tons, speed 13.5 knots.
The armament of the AM minesweepers consisted of 2 × 76-mm guns, a 40-mm Bofors anti-aircraft machine gun and 6 Oerlikon 20-mm anti-aircraft machine guns.
Anti-submarine weapons: Mk.10 "Hedgehog" rocket launcher (24 barrels), two Mk.6 stock bombs. Hydroacoustic station and radar.
U-365.
Medium German type VIIC submarine. Surface displacement 735 tons, surface / underwater speed 17, 7/7, 5 knots.
Armament: gun 88 mm, four bow and one stern TA 533 mm.
And after the performance, the story begins. Actually, Marina Raskova and three minesweepers made up the BD-5 convoy, which has so sadly gone down in history.
Marina Raskova performed very important flights to supply polar stations and villages in the Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea. This explains such an impressive escort of three warships.
On August 8, 1944, the steamer set out to sea with cargo for the polar stations and a large number of passengers on the next shift at the station. The passengers were 116 servicemen and 238 civilian personnel of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. Among the civilians were 124 women and 16 children from families of winterers and military personnel. Including 55 crew members, there were 409 people on board Marina Raskova.
According to the documentation, the steamer had a sufficient number of life-saving equipment: four regular lifeboats, four inflatable rafts, several capacious wooden kungas, life jackets and circles. There was very little sense from the latter, even in the month of August, but nevertheless. However, as subsequent events showed, the life-saving appliances were not equipped with alarms, an emergency supply of water and food. This is the nuance that. however, it took a lot of human lives.
The transport was assigned an escort of three minesweepers of the "AM" type: T-114, T-116 and T-118. The convoy was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Shmelev, who held the flag on the T-118. It is difficult to say how many people were on the minesweepers, because the Shmelev control group and a commission from the flotilla headquarters under the command of General Loktionov were added to the standard crews of 70 people, which was supposed to check the state of the weather stations. It can be assumed that there were about 300 more people on the three minesweepers.
As a result, the convoy consisted of more than 700 people. An important figure, since we are going to talk about losses.
On August 11, without any incident, the convoy entered the Kara Sea. And the day before, on August 10, the headquarters of the Kara naval base, which was based on Dikson Island, received information that fishermen noticed a German submarine near the island. The base responded and sent a Catalina seaplane to search. The plane flew over the area around the island, as expected, did not find the boat. Thousands of square kilometers of the sea is no joke.
It is not known whether Shmelev received this information, apparently not, since the whole series of further events is a clear confirmation of this.
We can consider this the first fatal mistake: not to warn the convoy that an enemy submarine was seen in the area.
Obviously, there was some inconsistency on the ships of the convoy. The BD-5 was on a straight course, not bothering at all with an anti-submarine zigzag. Ahead of the transport was the T-118, to the right and left of the T-114 and T-116, keeping from the "Marina Raskova" at a distance of one and a half miles.
Most likely, they walked in general relaxed, since no matter how the enemy was expected. I am sure that the acoustics did not particularly listen to the water for the same reason. In general, it was very difficult to find something in the vast expanses of the Arctic Ocean, which once again confirms the commotion that Admiral Scheer made at the time.
Roughly the same thing happened this time. Nobody was waiting for the enemy, but at 19:57 Moscow time an explosion was heard at the starboard side of Marina Raskova. The area was characterized by very shallow depths (up to 40 meters), so no one (?) Expected enemy submarines here. And maybe not entirely logical, but it was decided that Marina Raskova was blown up by a mine.
A very difficult situation immediately arises here. Mine is a non-self-propelled thing. Someone simply must deliver it to the place of setting, activate and install it.
Germans? Well, theoretically we could. Their submarines could lay mines, for this a series of XB boats were built, each of which could deliver 66 mines of the SMA series. And the aforementioned series VII submarine, instead of torpedoes, could carry 26 TMA mines or 39 TMV mines. And in vertical shafts, 16 mines of the same SMA series could be placed.
In general, the Germans could have put mines, apparently, ours were aware, and the torpedo explosion was mistaken for a mine. That only once again testifies to the fact that normal observation was not carried out.
Therefore, eliminating the likelihood of a submarine attack on the ship, Shmelev ordered the T-116 and T-118 to approach the transport to provide assistance, and the T-114 to carry anti-submarine defense. Already not bad, but it would be entirely correct to report the incident to the headquarters of the flotilla, but this was not done.
Most likely, Shmelev decided that Marina Raskova ran into a wandering mine, now they will repair the damage and move on.
However, seven minutes after the explosion at Marina Raskova, exactly the same explosion thundered at the T-118. The ship stayed afloat for 27 minutes, after which it sank.
Part of the crew, including the convoy commander, were rescued by the rest of the ships and transport, which continued to float.
And … and all that happened only strengthened Shmelev's understanding that the convoy was in a minefield! And Shmelev continued to act on the basis of his erroneous beliefs.
Having got on board the T-114, Shmelev ordered to start rescuing people from transport. And if up to that moment the T-114 at least indicated some kind of anti-submarine action, then from that moment the crew began to engage in a completely different matter.
And then Shmelev at 20:25 gave the order to anchor and focus on saving the crowds from Marina Raskova. And that was done.
T-114, according to the orders of Shmelev, took on board more than 200 people. At 00:15 on August 13, a submarine periscope was seen from a boat belonging to the T-116 minesweeper, which was going with people from Marina Raskova to the T-116. It is clear that there was no radio station on the boat, so they could not promptly report what they saw. Why they didn't use the searchlight is not entirely clear, but at 00:45 a torpedo tore apart the T-114, and the ship sank four minutes later.
The crew of the T-114 was killed, the commander of the convoy, Shmelev, was killed, almost all the passengers transported from Marina Raskova were killed, and just a few people were saved.
By 01:00, the commander of the T-116 Lieutenant Commander Babanov received a message from the boat's crew about the spotted periscope. That is, the version of the minefield collapsed (finally) and it became clear that the submarine was working.
And then something strange at first glance happened: instead of searching for and attacking the submarine, Babanov turned the ship around and went to the Yugorsky Shar Strait, to Khabarovo. On the one hand, it looked like cowardice and betrayal, but on the other hand, the T-116 took almost two hundred people, and could repeat the fate of the T-114 …
Not an easy decision. Babanov reported on the decision to the commander of the White Sea Flotilla, but only half an hour later, when he was already leaving the sinking transport.
The flotilla commander, Rear Admiral Kucherov, gave Babanov an order: if the steamer did not sink and is floating, stay close to it and carry out anti-submarine defense. If the ship sank, then go to Khabarovo. Babanov said nothing and went to the base. As a result, the T-116 arrived safely in Khabarovo.
It is very difficult to assess Babanov's actions. On the one hand, the warship was simply obliged to attack the submarine, thereby, possibly, saving the transport. On the other hand, perhaps Babanov was not so confident in his abilities, and what is there, he could simply be demoralized by the massacre organized by the Germans.
Plus, it is quite possible that almost 200 rescued people on a small boat with a crew of fifty people simply would not have allowed the crew to work on a combat schedule.
Honestly, it is not for us to judge Lieutenant Commander Babanov. Not for us.
So, the only surviving minesweeper left the scene of the tragedy, taking the saved people with him. As I understand it, the ship was packed to capacity.
But Marina Raskova was still floating on the water. She had seven crew members along with the captain. In addition, next to the transport was a boat with a T-116 with seven oarsmen from among the crew of the minesweeper, who were engaged in rescuing people from the water, kungas and rafts with the passengers of Marina Raskova.
At 02:15, the transport was re-attacked by the submarine and went to the bottom. U-365, after being hit by the last, third torpedo, surfaced and left the scene of the attack.
It is difficult to say whether the fishermen saw this submarine near Dixon, but it is a fact: German submarines were present in the Kara Sea. This was the Greif group, which already had experience of operations in the Arctic.
Submarine U-365 Lieutenant Commander Wedemeyer was part of this group. Captain Wedemeyer was considered a very experienced sailor, and his actions to destroy the BD-5 convoy confirm this.
The data of the ship's log U-365 has been preserved, which allows you to look at what happened through the eyes of the other side.
On August 12, at 18:05, the crew found the BD-5 convoy 60 miles west of Bely Island. The boat sank to attack and began approaching the ships.
Taking advantage of the negligence in guarding the convoy, Wedemeyer managed to get closer to the transport by less than one kilometer.
19:53. U-365 fired two FAT torpedoes at the ship, one of which hit Marina Raskova. The second passed by.
19:58 the boat fired a T-5 acoustic homing torpedo in the direction of transport and escorts. Miss.
20:03 Wedemeyer released another T-5, which hit the T-118.
After that, U-365 lay to the bottom to evade a counterattack and reload torpedo tubes, which by that time were empty. The attack, however, did not take place, the minesweepers were occupied by the torpedoed T-118.
While the Germans were reloading their torpedo tubes, they heard the explosions of three depth charges. It is unlikely that this can be considered an attack, most likely, it was the T-118 depth charges that worked, reaching the specified depth.
23:18. U-365 surfaced to periscope depth in order to assess the situation.
Wedemeyer saw that he was only 3-4 cables from the T-114, then the Marina Raskova drifted. The T-116 was not visible. Realizing that the T-114 is at anchor, busy with rescue operations, the U-365 commander decided to attack this ship as well.
00:45. U-365 hits an anchored T-114 with a torpedo. The minesweeper sank five minutes later.
Further, the commander of the U-365 saw the T-116, but since the minesweeper was clearly moving away from the scene of the tragedy, Wedemeyer did not try to catch up with him, since there was still one target in front of him, an unfinished transport.
02:04. U-365 fired one torpedo at Marina Raskova, the torpedo hit, but the ship did not sink. It is obvious that additional buoyancy was given by the cargo of the steamer. Wedemeyer did not surface and fired a third torpedo.
02:24 Marina Raskova broke in half from the last explosion and began to sink. After half an hour, the ship disappeared under water.
U-365 has surfaced. People were swimming in the water, boats and rafts were on the surface. Since the U-365 campaign had just begun, the plans of the submarine commander did not include taking prisoners. So U-365 left.
The people who remained on the water had to survive in very difficult conditions.
Having received a report from Captain Babanov about the death of the BD-5 convoy, the commander of the White Sea flotilla, Kucherov, ordered a search for submarines and survivors. As for the search for submarines, of course, it is somewhat optimistic, but the rescue operation lasted right until September 3. And what they have been looking for for so long has saved many lives. Although someone could not be saved.
About 150 people remained at the site of the death of the transport. The planes found and rescued 70 people, although some of them could not be defended, people died of exhaustion and hypothermia after the rescue.
The T-116 delivered 181 people to Khabarovo, 36 sailors from the T-118 and 145 passengers from the Marina Raskova. Thus, 251 people were saved. The death toll varies slightly, but in any case, the loss was about four hundred people, including almost all the women and children who were at Marina Raskova.
The real feat was accomplished by the pilot Matvey Kozlov, the commander of the flying boat "Catalina".
On August 23, he noticed the first kungas and managed to pull out all the survivors with the crew. Here are the lines from his report:
“We found 14 people alive and more than 25 corpses there. The corpses lay in two rows at the bottom of the kungas, filled knee-deep with water. On the corpses lay and sat the survivors, of whom about six people were able to move with difficulty on their own. According to the filmed people and inspection of the kungas, it was established that there was no fresh water or any food on the kungas”.
Due to the storm and overload, the Catalina could not take off. The crew could not somehow lighten the plane so that it could take off, and Kozlov decided to go by sea. For twelve hours the pilot was driving a flying boat, which became an ordinary boat, over the waves. And in the end he brought it.
What conclusions could be drawn from this catastrophe?
Of course, the latest acoustic torpedoes from German submarines came as a very unpleasant surprise.
But it is already clear that it was simply criminal to make as many mistakes as the Soviet sailors made. In fact, the commander of the convoy, Shmelev, himself put his ships under attack, having incorrectly assessed the situation and made the wrong decision. Moreover, persisting in the minefield version, Shmelev significantly aggravated the situation.
Considering that Marina Raskova did not sink immediately, Shmelev could well have organized an attack by a German submarine, and, if not sunk, then make it impossible to attack the transport again.
Extra proof of this is the events that took place just 2 days after the end of the rescue operation, on September 5, 1944.
All the same T-116, under the command of the same Babanov, who for some reason was not demoted, was not shot, acting alone, discovered and reliably sunk the German submarine U-362 in the Kara Sea, in the area of the Mona Islands off the western coast Taimyr.
The submarine was found on the surface. That is, the observers worked fine, and perhaps the radar helped. It is quite natural that the boat went under water, but the minesweeper's hydroacoustics worked, after which the T-116 successfully attacked and sank the boat.
Tell me, could Babanov's crew a month earlier arrange exactly the same alignment for U-365? I'm 100% sure I could.
Instead, minesweepers' crews focused on operations in mine-risk conditions. Yes, if the convoy really got into a minefield, Shmelev's actions would be absolutely correct.
The whole problem is that there was no minefield.
U-365 fired 4 torpedoes in the first phase of the attack. Nobody noticed them on our ships. How could this happen?
Leaving the damaged T-116 transport does not look very nice. Yes, it looks like an escape. However, it is difficult to judge Babanov, who, left alone and having almost 200 rescued on board, did not dare to start a duel with the submarine. But the fact that the command decided not to punish Babanov speaks volumes. And the fact that it was not in vain is proved by the victory of the T-116 crew over the U-362.
That's all I would like to say about the events of August-September 1944 in the Kara Sea. The episode is completely unpleasant, but it took place in our history.
