Missile strike on Europe: myth or reality?

Missile strike on Europe: myth or reality?
Missile strike on Europe: myth or reality?
Missile strike on Europe: myth or reality?
Missile strike on Europe: myth or reality?

Due to the lack of effective means of anti-missile defense (ABM) against medium-range ballistic missiles (Russia, the United States and Israel have corresponding systems of protection against short-range missiles, they will soon appear in Europe and on the territory of the Arabian monarchies), such carriers can serve as an almost guaranteed means delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to targets.

However, the development of missile technologies is such a complex technical task that the overwhelming majority of states in the coming years are unlikely to be able to master them on their own, that is, in the absence of significant foreign aid. The reality of the latter is substantially limited by the internationally operating Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Based on this, we will consider the current state and prospects (until 2020) of missile threats to Europe. The analysis will be carried out for all states that have ballistic and cruise missiles, with the exception of permanent members of the UN Security Council. At the same time, anti-ship cruise missiles will not be considered.


The greatest successes in the development of missile technology in the Middle East were made by Israel and Iran, which were able to create medium-range ballistic missiles. As will be shown below, missiles of a similar type in the late 1980s. received from China Saudi Arabia. In addition to them, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria and Turkey have short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1,000 km).


The creation of mobile-based ballistic missiles of the Jericho type took place in Israel in the early 1970s. with technical assistance from the French rocket company Marcel Dassault. Initially, the Jericho-1 single-stage rocket appeared, which had the following tactical and technical characteristics: length - 13.4 m, diameter - 0.8 m, weight - 6, 7 tons. She could deliver a warhead weighing about 1 ton at a distance of up to 500 km. The circular probable deviation (CEP) of this missile from the aiming point is about 500 m. Israel currently has up to 150 missiles of this type, but not all of them are operational. For their launch, 18-24 mobile launchers (PU) can be involved. Of course, we are talking about a mobile ground-based missile system. This is how we will continue to consider mobile launchers.

In the mid-1980s. Israeli designers have begun to develop a more advanced two-stage missile "Jericho-2" with a firing range of 1, 5-1, 8 thousand km and a warhead weight of 750-1000 kg. The missile has a launch weight of 14 tons, a length of 14 m, a diameter of 1.6 m. Flight tests of missiles of this type were carried out in the period 1987-1992, their CEP is 800 m. Now Israel has from 50 to 90 ballistic medium-range missiles "Jericho-2" and 12-16 corresponding mobile launchers.


On the basis of the Jericho-2 rocket, Israel has created a carrier rocket for launching satellites.

It should be noted that in peacetime, Jericho-1 (Jericho-2) missile launchers are located in specially equipped underground structures at the Kfar Zakhariya missile base, located 38 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.

A further development of the Israeli missile program was the three-stage Jericho-3 missile, the first test of which was carried out in January 2008, and the second in November 2011. It is capable of delivering a warhead weighing 1000-1300 kg over a distance of over 4 thousand km (according to the western classification - an intermediate range). Adoption of the Jericho-3 rocket is expected in 2015-2016. Its launch weight is 29 tons, and its length is 15.5 m. In addition to the monoblock missile, this type of missile is capable of carrying a multiple warhead with several individually targeted warheads. It is supposed to be based both in silo launchers (silos) and on mobile carriers, including railway ones.

The Shavit space launch vehicle can be considered as a potential means of delivering nuclear weapons. This is a three-stage solid-propellant rocket created using American technology. With its help, the Israelis launched five spacecraft weighing 150 kg into low-earth orbits. According to experts at the American National Laboratory. Lawrence, the Shavit launch vehicle can be easily modified into an intercontinental-range combat missile: up to 7, 8 thousand km with a 500-kilogram warhead. Of course, it is located on a bulky ground launcher and has a significant preparation time for the launch. At the same time, the constructive and technological solutions achieved in the development of the Shavit launch vehicle can be used in the development of combat missiles with a firing range of over 5 thousand km.

In addition, Israel is armed with sea-launched cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Most likely, these are the American Sub Harpoon cruise missiles upgraded by the Israelis with a firing range of up to 600 km (according to other sources, these are Israeli-developed Popeye Turbo missiles with a range of up to 1,500 km). These cruise missiles are deployed on six German-made diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines.

Potentially Israeli ballistic missiles of intermediate (in the future - intercontinental) range, equipped with a nuclear warhead, can create a real missile threat to Europe. However, this is in principle impossible as long as the Jewish population is the majority in the country. Until 2020, a global change in the national composition of the State of Israel is not expected (now Sunni Arabs make up 17% of its population).


Currently, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is armed with various types of mainly single-stage ballistic missiles.

Solid fuel:

- Chinese WS-1 and Iranian Fajer-5 with a maximum firing range of 70-80 km. The 302-mm WS-1 missile and the 333-mm Fajer-5 missile, which was created on the basis of North Korean counterparts, have a warhead weighing 150 kg and 90 kg, respectively. One launcher carries four missiles of the indicated types.

- Missiles Zelzal-2 and Fateh-110 with a range of up to 200 km;

The Zelzal-2 rocket was created in the 1990s. with the help of Chinese specialists, it has a diameter of 610 mm and a warhead weighing 600 kg. One launcher carries only one missile of this type. According to American data, the upgraded version of the Zelzal-2 rocket entered service in 2004, and its flight range was increased to 300 km.

The Iranians began developing the Fateh-110 rocket in 1997, its first successful flight-design tests took place in May 2001. The upgraded version of this rocket was named Fateh-110A. It has the following characteristics: diameter - 610 mm, head weight - 500 kg. Unlike other Iranian short-range missiles, the Fateh-110A has aerodynamic quality and is equipped with a guidance system (according to American data, it is quite rough).


Rocket "Safir".

Mixed-fuel missiles:

Chinese CSS-8 (DF-7 or M-7) and its Iranian version Tondar with a range of up to 150 km. In the late 1980s. Tehran has purchased from 170 to 200 missiles of this type with a 200-kilogram warhead. This is an export version of the missile, created on the basis of the HQ-2 anti-aircraft guided missile (the Chinese analogue of the Soviet S-75 air defense system). Its first stage is liquid, and the second is solid fuel. Rocket CSS-8 has an inertial control system, resistant to external influences, and a warhead weighing 190 kg. According to reports, Iran has 16-30 launchers for launching missiles of this type. The Iranian version of the CSS-8 missile was named Tondar.


- Rocket Shahab-1 with a firing range of up to 300 km.

The R-17 single-stage ballistic missile (NATO classification - SCUD-B) and its modernized counterparts (primarily North Korean ones), created in the Soviet Union, served as the basis for the creation of the Iranian ballistic missile Shahab-1. During its first flight design test, a flight range of 320 km was ensured with a payload of 985 kg. Serial production of missiles of this type began in the second half of the 1980s. with the help of North Korean specialists and continued until 1991, the KVO Shahab-1 is 500-1000 m.

- Rocket Shahab-2 with a maximum flight range of 500 km.

During 1991-1994. Tehran bought from North Korea from 250 to 370 more advanced R-17M missiles (according to NATO classification - SCUD-C), and later also a significant part of technological equipment. The R-17M missiles are equipped with a 700 kg warhead. The production of missiles of this type, called Shahab-2, began on Iranian territory in 1997. Due to the increase in the flight range and the use of an imperfect control system, the firing accuracy of the Shahab-2 missiles turned out to be low: their CEP was 1.5 km.

The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missile programs were completely phased out in 2007 (according to other sources, a Shahab-2 missile manufacturing plant with a production rate of up to 20 missiles per month is still operating in the Isfahan region). In general, Iran now has up to 200 Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles, which are classified as operational-tactical missiles. A monoblock or cassette head is installed on them.

- Rocket Shahab-3 with a firing range of about 1,000 km.

When creating a single-stage medium-range ballistic missile Shahab-3, design solutions of North Korean missiles of the Nodong type have found wide application. Iran began testing it in 1998 in parallel with the development of the Shahab-4 rocket. The first successful launch of Shahab-3 took place in July 2000, and its serial production began at the end of 2003 with active help from Chinese companies.

By August 2004, Iranian specialists were able to reduce the size of the head of the Shahab-3 rocket, modernize its propulsion system and increase the fuel supply. Such a rocket, designated as Shahab-3M, has a bottleneck-like warhead, suggesting that it would contain cluster munitions. It is believed that this version of the missile has a flight range of 1, 1 thousand km with a warhead weight of 1 ton.

- Rocket Ghadr-1 with a maximum range of 1, 6 thousand km;

In September 2007, at a military parade in Iran, a new Ghadr-1 missile was shown, the firing range of which with a 750-kg warhead is 1,600 km. It is an upgrade of the Shahab-3M rocket.

At present, Iran has 36 launchers for Shahab-3, Shahab-3M and Ghadr-1 single-stage liquid-propellant missiles in two missile brigades located in the central part of the country. The firing accuracy of these missiles is rather low: the CEP is 2-2.5 km.

So far, Iran uses only Belarusian (Soviet) and Chinese-made mobile carriers for their ballistic missiles. However, silo launchers have been built near Tabriz and Khorramabad. The need for them could arise due to the limited number of mobile launchers.

In addition to tactical missiles (we will include all Iranian short-range missiles, with the exception of Shahab-type missiles), Iran has 112 launchers and about 300 other types of ballistic missiles. All of them are united under the Missile Command of the Air Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and are directly subordinate to the Spiritual Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khamenei. At the same time, short-range missiles are divided into tactical (72 launchers as part of one missile brigade) and operational-tactical (112 launchers as part of two missile brigades).


Rocket "Gadr-1".

According to some reports, up to 70 ballistic missiles of various types can be produced at the Iranian military industry enterprises a year. Their release largely depends on the rhythm of supply of units and components from North Korea. In particular, medium-range missiles are assembled at military factories in Parchin, each with a productivity of two to four missiles per month.

Earlier, Tehran planned the development of ballistic missiles Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 with a firing range of 3 thousand km and 5-6 thousand km, respectively. The program of creating Shahab-4 missiles with a range of 2, 2-3 thousand km was terminated or suspended in October 2003 for political reasons. However, in the opinion of Russian and American specialists, the possibilities of developing missiles in this direction are largely exhausted. This, of course, does not exclude the creation of multistage liquid-propellant rockets by the Iranians, but it is more likely that the main resources will be concentrated on improving solid-propellant rockets (the scientific groundwork obtained in the development of liquid-propellant rockets is being applied in space).

It should be noted that China provided significant assistance to Iran in the development of solid-propellant missiles, but the bulk of the work was done by Iranian specialists, who had been mastering the technology of producing missiles of this type for two decades. In particular, they created the Oghab and Nazeat solid-propellant short-range missiles, which were already decommissioned, as well as the previously mentioned Fajer-5, Zelzal-2 and Fateh-110A. All this allowed the Iranian leadership in 2000 to raise the issue of developing a ballistic missile with a firing range of 2 thousand km, using solid fuel. Such a rocket was successfully created by May 2009, when Tehran announced the successful launch of the Sejil-2 two-stage solid-propellant rocket. According to Israeli data, the first launch of the Sejil rocket took place in November 2007. Then the Iranian rocket was presented as Ashura. The second launch of a rocket of this type was made on November 18, 2008. At the same time, it was announced that its flight range was almost 2 thousand km. However, only the third flight test, which took place on May 20, 2009, became successful.

The maximum firing range of this missile with a warhead weighing one ton is 2, 2 thousand km. By reducing the weight of the warhead to 500 kg, which excludes the use of a nuclear warhead based on weapons-grade uranium, the firing range can be increased to 3 thousand km. The missile has a diameter of 1.25 m, a length of 18 m and a take-off weight of 21.5 tons, which makes it possible to use a mobile basing method.

It should be noted that, like all solid-propellant missiles, the Sejil-2 does not require refueling before launch, it has a shorter active flight phase, which complicates the interception process in this most vulnerable segment of the trajectory. And although the Sejil-2 missile has not been tested since February 2011, its acceptance into service in the near future is possible. This is confirmed by the fact that a new launch complex "Shahrud" was created 100 km north-east of Tehran. According to Western sources, this complex does not have a storage facility for liquid rocket fuel, so it will most likely be used for flight testing of ballistic missiles under the Sejil-2 program.


Rocket "Sajil-2".

A separate consideration should be given to the issue that at the end of August 2011, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced his country's ability to produce carbon composite materials. In his opinion, this "will eliminate the bottleneck in the Iranian production of modern military equipment." And he was right, since CFRPs play an important role in creating, for example, modern solid-propellant rocket engines. This will undoubtedly contribute to the development of the Sejil missile program.

According to the available data, already in 2005-2006. some commercial structures from the Persian Gulf countries, registered in Iranians, carried out illegal import of cermet composites from China and India. Such materials are used in the creation of jet engines as refractory materials and structural elements of fuel assemblies for nuclear reactors. These technologies have a dual purpose, so their proliferation is regulated by the missile technology control regime. They could not enter Iran legally, which indicates the lack of effectiveness of the export control systems. Mastering such technologies will contribute to the creation of modern ballistic missiles in Iran.

There is one more area of application of composite materials in rocket and space technology, which is not always paid attention to. This is the production of a heat-shielding coating (TSP), which is extremely necessary for the creation of warheads (warheads) of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a coverage, during the movement of the warhead in dense layers of the atmosphere on the descending part of the trajectory, overheating of its internal systems will occur, up to a malfunction. As a result, the warhead will fail without reaching the goal. The very fact of research in this area suggests that Iranian specialists can work on the creation of ICBMs.


The head of the Sajil-2 rocket.

Thus, thanks to close cooperation with North Korea and China, Iran has made significant progress in developing its national missile program. Nevertheless, taking into account the mass of a nuclear warhead based on weapons-grade uranium, suitable for deployment on a rocket carrier, it can be concluded that at present Iran's capabilities to deliver it using liquid-propellant missiles are limited to a range of 1, 3-1, 6 thousand km.

According to the joint report of Russian and American scientists, "Iranian nuclear and missile potential," prepared in 2009, it took Iran at least six years to increase the delivery range of a 1-ton payload to 2,000 km using a liquid-propellant missile. However, such a conclusion, firstly, assumed the retention of only single-stage missiles in the Iranian arsenal. Secondly, the limitation of the payload weight of 1 ton was somewhat excessive, which made it possible to increase the missile firing range by reducing the weight of the withdrawn cargo.

Third, the possible Iranian-North Korean cooperation in the field of rocketry was not taken into account.

Published on May 10, 2010, the report of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies "Iranian Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Joint Assessment" clarified the previously cited data. The report indicated that Iran is unlikely to be able to create a liquid-propellant missile capable of hitting targets in Western Europe before 2014-2015. And the development of a three-stage version of the Sejil solid-propellant rocket, which will be able to deliver a 1-ton warhead to a distance of 3, 7 thousand km, will take at least four to five years. A further increase in the firing range of the Sejil missile to 5 thousand km required another five years, that is, it could be implemented by 2020. The authors of the report considered it unlikely that Iranian specialists would create ICBMs due to the need to upgrade medium-range missiles as a matter of priority. The latter still have low firing accuracy, which makes it possible to use them in combat only against such area targets as enemy cities.


Launch of the Sajil-2 rocket.

There is no doubt that recent years have confirmed the high competence of Iranian specialists in the design of multistage missiles. Consequently, in some future they are able to create intercontinental ballistic missiles (flight range is not less than 5, 5 thousand km). But for this, Iran will have to develop modern guidance systems, to provide thermal protection of the warhead during its descent in dense layers of the atmosphere, to obtain a number of materials necessary in rocketry,to create naval means of collecting telemetric information and to conduct a sufficient number of flight tests with shooting in some water area of the World Ocean (for geographical reasons, Iran cannot provide a missile firing range of more than 2 thousand km along an internal trajectory). According to Russian and American scientists, Iranian specialists may need up to 10 additional years to solve these problems without substantial external assistance.

But, even after overcoming all the obstacles described, the IRI will receive easily vulnerable and clearly visible from space ICBMs, which, after being installed on the launch pad, will require considerable time to prepare for launch (the creation of a solid-propellant intercontinental missile is still not realistic). Such missiles will not be able to provide Iran with nuclear deterrence, but will, on the contrary, provoke a preemptive strike against them. Consequently, the Iranians will have to go much further in the face of powerful pressure from the West.

Based on this, Iran, most likely, decided to concentrate on improving short-range missiles and developing medium-range solid-propellant missiles. However, this created significant technical problems, in particular for the production of large-diameter fuel charges, and also required the purchase of a number of components and materials abroad in the context of international sanctions and tough opposition from Israel, the United States and a number of other Western states. In addition, the completion of the Sejil-2 program was hampered by the economic crisis in Iran. As a result, the implementation of this program may have been suspended, which requires a significant adjustment to the previously made forecasts for the development of Iran's missile potential.


1975-1976 Short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union entered service with Iraq: 24 Luna-TS launchers and 12 R-17 launchers (SCUD-B). Single-stage liquid-propellant missiles R-17 have a firing range of up to 300 km with a warhead mass of 1 ton. A significantly shorter flight range and warhead weight are characteristic of the Luna-TS missile system with a single-stage solid-propellant rocket: a firing range of up to 70 km with a warhead weighing 450 kg. These missiles have low firing accuracy. So the KVO rocket "Luna-TS" is 500 m.


Ballistic missile "Moon".

Iraq began implementing its national missile program in 1982. In the conditions of the war with its eastern neighbor, an urgent need arose to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching Tehran, located 460 kilometers from the Iranian-Iraqi border. Initially, for this purpose, the R-17 liquid-propellant missiles already supplied by the Soviet Union were partially modernized. Such missiles called "Al Husayn" (Al Husayn) had a maximum firing range of 600 km, which was achieved by reducing the weight of the warhead to 500 kg and lengthening the missile by 1.3 m. Later, the production of such missiles was mastered. In the course of their further modernization, the Iraqis created the Al Abbas missile, capable of delivering a 300-kilogram warhead over a distance of 900 km.

For the first time, Al-Hussein missiles were used against Iran in February 1988. Three years later, during the Gulf War (1991), Saddam Hussein used missiles of this type against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Israel. Due to the low accuracy of fire (KVO was 3 km), the effect of their use was mainly of a psychological nature. So, in Israel, one or two people were killed directly from missiles, 208 were injured (mostly lightly). In addition, four died from heart attacks and seven from improper use of a gas mask. During the rocket attacks, 1302 houses, 6142 apartments, 23 public buildings, 200 shops and 50 cars were damaged. Direct damage from this amounted to $ 250 million.


SCUD-B missile launcher.

Together with Egypt and Argentina, Iraq made an attempt to create a two-stage solid-propellant missile Badr-2000 (Argentine name - Condor-2), capable of delivering a 500 kg warhead over a distance of 750 km. Experts from West Germany, Italy and Brazil took part in this project. In 1988, due to disagreements between the parties, the project began to be curtailed. This was also facilitated by the fact that, after joining the MTCR, West Germany and Italy withdrew their specialists from Iraq. The project was completely discontinued in 1990.

In addition, in the period 1985-86. the Soviet Union supplied 12 launchers of the Tochka missile complex with a single-stage solid-propellant missile capable of delivering a 480 kg warhead over a distance of 70 km. In total, the Iraqis received 36 missiles of this type.

After the defeat in the Gulf War (1991), Iraq was forced to agree to the destruction of its ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. Thus, by December 2001, under the supervision of the UN Special Commission, 32 launchers of R-17 missiles ("Al-Hussein") were destroyed. Nevertheless, according to Western data, Baghdad managed to keep 20 Al-Hussein missiles, to continue until the end of 2001 the development of a new ballistic missile with a firing range of up to 1,000 km, as well as in the period 1999-2002. make attempts to purchase Nodong-1 medium-range missiles from North Korea.

The entire Iraqi missile program was eliminated in the spring of 2003 after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. Then all Iraqi short-range missiles were destroyed. The reason for this was that during the war against the coalition forces, Baghdad used at least 17 Al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles, capable of delivering a warhead weighing 300 kg at a distance of up to 150 km. In the short and medium term (up to 2020), Iraq is not capable of developing medium-range ballistic missiles on its own. Consequently, it does not even pose a potential missile threat to Europe.


Iraqi Al-Hussein missile shot down by the American Patriot air defense system.


In November 1975, after seven months of training, a missile brigade equipped with Soviet R-17 short-range missiles entered the combat composition of the ground forces of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR). In total, about a hundred of these missiles were delivered. The term of their technical suitability has already expired due to the termination in 1988 of the production of R-17 missiles at the Votkinsk plant. In the mid-1980s. 32 Tochka missile systems were delivered to the SAR from the Soviet Union, the performance of which also raises serious doubts. In particular, they all require a complete replacement of the onboard systems at the Tomsk Instrument Plant.

In 1990, the Syrian Armed Forces had 61 short-range ballistic missile launchers. The following year, Damascus, using funds received from Saudi Arabia for participating in the anti-Iraqi coalition, purchased 150 North Korean R-17M liquid-propellant missiles (SCUD-C) and 20 launchers. Deliveries began in 1992.

In the early 1990s. An attempt was made to purchase from China solid-fuel CSS-6 (DF-15 or M-9) missiles with a maximum firing range of 600 km with a 500-kilogram warhead. This could significantly increase the combat readiness of Syrian missiles (liquid-propellant missiles R-17 and R-17M require a significant amount of time to prepare for launch). Under pressure from Washington, China refused to implement this contract.


The USSR supplied R-17 missiles to such countries of the Near and Middle East as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.

In 1995, 25 launchers of the R-17 and R-17M missiles, 36 launchers of the Tochka missile complex remained in service with the ATS. The Syrian leadership is trying to maximize their technical resource, but there are limits to this process. The inevitability of a significant reduction in the Syrian missile potential is obvious due to the lack of procurement of new ballistic missiles against the background of their combat use against the armed opposition.

In 2007Syria signed an agreement with Russia on the supply of the Iskander-E mobile missile system with a range of up to 280 km and a warhead weighing 480 kg (if the warhead weight is reduced, the range can be increased to 500 km). The delivery of the specified missile system was never carried out. In the short term, the implementation of this contract is unlikely. But even if it is implemented, the range of the Iskander-E missile system is clearly insufficient to create any threat to Europe.


In the early 1980s. the command of the Turkish ground forces began to show interest in the creation of missile systems capable of increasing the potential of artillery and having a deterrent effect on missile threats from the Soviet Union and some other nearby states. The American company Ling-Temco-Vought was chosen as a foreign partner, with which at the end of 1987 a contract was signed for the production of 180 M-70 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and 60 thousand missiles for them on Turkish territory. For this, a joint venture was established the following year.


The United States supplied Turkey with 120 ATACMS short-range solid-propellant ballistic missiles and 12 of their launchers.

Later, Turkey decided that the implementation of this contract, which includes the transfer of relevant technologies, would not bring tangible benefits. Ankara withdrew from the contract, but under pressure from the command of the ground forces, it nevertheless purchased 12 M-270 MLRS installations and more than 2 thousand rockets for them from the United States. Such systems are capable of delivering a warhead weighing 107-159 kg at a distance of 32-45 km. The M-270 systems arrived in Turkey in mid-1992. By this time, Turkish companies had already achieved some success in the production of such systems, so the military leadership refused to additionally purchase 24 M-270 MLRS from the United States.

In the mid-1990s. France, Israel and China have agreed to help Turkey master missile technology. The best offer came from China, which led to the signing of the relevant contract in 1997. Within the framework of the joint Kasirga project, the production of Chinese 302-mm solid-propellant missiles WS-1 (Turkish version - T-300) with a firing range of up to 70 km with a warhead weighing 150 kg was organized in Turkish territory.

The Turkish company ROKETSAN was able to modernize this Chinese missile, which was named TR-300, and increase the firing range to 80-100 km. Cluster munitions were used as a warhead. A total of six batteries of T-300 (TR-300) missiles were deployed, each of which has from 6 to 9 launchers.

In addition, in 1996-1999. The United States delivered 120 ATACMS short-range solid-propellant ballistic missiles and 12 launchers to Turkey. These missiles provide a firing range of 160 km with a 560 kg warhead. At the same time, the KVO is about 250 m.

Currently, the main design center for the creation of ballistic missiles is the Turkish State Research Institute, which is implementing the Joker project (J-600T). Within the framework of this project, solid-propellant single-stage missiles Yildırım I (Yelderım I) and Yıldırım II have been designed with a maximum range of 185 km and 300 km, respectively.

In early 2012, at a meeting of the High Board of Technology, at the request of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, a decision was made to create ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km. Director of the above-mentioned institute Yusel Altinbasak informed about it. In his opinion, this goal is achievable, since the missile has already passed range tests with a firing range of up to 500 km.

In practice, it has not yet been possible to create a ballistic missile with a flight range even up to 1,500 km. Instead, in January 2013, it was decided to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 800 km. The contract for its development was awarded to TUBITAK-Sage, a subsidiary of the State Research Institute TUBITAK. The prototype of this rocket is planned to be tested in the next two years.

It is extremely doubtful that in the absence of large-scale external assistance, Turkey will be able to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 2,500 km even by 2020. The statements made more reflect Ankara's regional ambitions, which are not sufficiently supported by scientific and technological resources. However, claims for the creation of its own missile potential should cause justified concern in Europe due to the territorial proximity and the ongoing Islamization of the country. Turkey's membership in NATO should not mislead anyone, given the difficult relationship with another member of this organization, Greece, as well as with the EU's strategic partner, Israel.


In 1986, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with China to purchase CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles (Dongfeng 3A).


In 1986, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with China for the purchase of CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles (Dongfeng-3A). These single-stage liquid-propellant missiles are capable of delivering a warhead weighing 2 tons to a distance of 2, 8 thousand km (with a decrease in the weight of the warhead, the firing range increases to 4 thousand km). According to an agreement signed in 1988, China delivered 60 missiles of this type with a specially designed high-explosive warhead, which led to the appearance of missile forces in Saudi Arabia.

Work on the creation of missile bases on the territory of Saudi Arabia (Al-Harip, Al-Sulayil and Al-Raud) was carried out by local firms with the help of Chinese specialists. Initially, training of specialists was carried out only in China, but then its own specialized training center was formed. The Saudis refused the Americans to inspect the missile sites, but they assured that the missiles were only equipped with conventional (non-nuclear) equipment.

The adoption of missiles outdated even by that time, which had low firing accuracy, did not really lead to an increase in the combat power of the Saudi Arabian armed forces. It was more of an act of prestige than of practical use. Saudi Arabia now has fewer than 40 CSS-2 missiles and 10 launchers. Their current performance is highly questionable. In China, all missiles of this type were decommissioned back in 2005.

Within the Arab Organization of the War Industry in the 1990s. in Al-Kharj, an enterprise was built for the production of short-range ballistic missiles and anti-aircraft missile systems "Shahin". This made it possible to start production of its own short-range ballistic missiles. The first launch of such a missile with a firing range of 62 km took place in June 1997.


In the second half of the 1990s. The United Arab Emirates purchased six launchers of R-17 short-range missiles (SCUD-B) with a firing range of up to 300 km from one of the republics in the post-Soviet space.


In the early 1990s. The Yemeni Armed Forces had 34 mobile launchers of Soviet R-17 short-range ballistic missiles (SCUD-B), as well as Tochka and Luna-TS missile systems. During the 1994 civil war, both sides used these missiles, but this had more of a psychological effect. As a result, by 1995 the number of launchers for short-range ballistic missiles was reduced to 12. According to Western data, Yemen now has 33 R-17 missiles and six of their launchers, as well as 10 Tochka missile systems.


Since 1989, Soviet R-17 missiles have been in service with the Special Purpose Guards missile battalion of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In 1990, the Soviet Union, within the framework of rendering military assistance to Kabul, additionally supplied 150 R-17 missiles and two launchers of the Luna-TS missile system. However, in April 1992, the armed opposition entered Kabul and overthrew the rule of President Mohammad Najibullah. At the same time, the militants of the field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud captured the base of the 99th brigade. Including they captured several launchers and 50 R-17 missiles. These missiles were used repeatedly during the 1992-1996 civil war. in Afghanistan (a total of 44 R-17 missiles were used). It is possible that the Taliban were able to obtain a certain number of missiles of this type. So, in the period 2001-2005. The Taliban fired R-17 missiles five times. In 2005 alone, the Americans destroyed all the launchers of this type of missile in Afghanistan.

Thus, Israel and Iran have the most developed missile programs in the Near and Middle East. Tel Aviv is already creating intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which could create a potential missile threat to Europe in the event of a global change in the country's national composition. However, this should not be expected until 2020.

Iran, even in the medium term, is not able to create an intermediate-range ballistic missile, so it serves as a potential threat only to nearby European states. To contain it, it is quite enough to have an anti-missile base in Romania and already deployed radar stations in Turkey and Israel.

Ballistic missiles from Yemen, the UAE and Syria do not pose any threat to Europe. Due to the lack of industrial infrastructure, the missiles of these states cannot be upgraded on their own. They are completely dependent on the supply of missile weapons from abroad.

Turkey may create some concern for Europe due to its territorial proximity, difficult relations with Greece, the Islamization of the country and the strengthening of its regional ambitions. Under these conditions, the decision by the Turkish leadership to create ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km, which is not yet supported by real scientific and technical potential, should strengthen Brussels' attention in this area.

Saudi Arabia's medium-range ballistic missiles may pose a potential threat to some European states. However, there are serious doubts about the very possibility of their launch, and the defense of this country from such a serious external enemy as Iran without the introduction of US troops (NATO) is, in principle, impossible.


During the collapse of the Soviet Union, the following types of ICBMs were deployed on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan: 104 SS-18 Voevoda launchers, 130 SS-19 launchers, 46 SS-24 Molodets launchers and 81 SS-25 Topol. In accordance with the international obligations assumed, the SS-18 missiles were eliminated in 1996, the SS-19 and SS-24 missiles a little later, and all Topol mobile ground-based missile systems were relocated to Russia.


Missile systems "Tochka" ("Tochka-U") with a firing range of up to 120 km are in service with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

In the post-Soviet space, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have short-range ballistic missiles R-17. Due to their geographic remoteness, they cannot pose a missile threat to Europe. Until May 2005, Belarus also had R-17 missiles as part of a mixed-type missile brigade. In 2007, missiles of this type were decommissioned in Ukraine, and their disposal was completed in April 2011.

Missile systems "Tochka" ("Tochka-U") with a firing range of up to 120 km are in service with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Among them, only Belarus and Ukraine can pose a hypothetical missile threat to neighboring European states. However, due to the short range and altitude of the flight, as well as the use of a warhead in conventional (non-nuclear) equipment, enough air defense systems deployed in Europe are sufficient to counter such a threat.

A significantly greater threat, and for the entire international community, is posed by the risk of missile proliferation from Ukraine. This already took place in 2000-2001, when the Ukrainian firm Progress, a subsidiary of Ukrspetsexport, sold the Kh-55 strategic air-launched cruise missiles to Iran and China. By this time, Ukraine had joined the Missile Technology Proliferation Control Regime. Having sold Kh-55 cruise missiles, it grossly violated the MTCR, since the range of this missile is 2,500 km with a warhead mass of 410 kg. Moreover, in the summer of 2005, when this problem arose, Oleksandr Turchynov headed the Security Service of Ukraine, and Petro Poroshenko was the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. Soon they were both dismissed from their posts.

In April 2014, when Oleksandr Turchynov was already acting President of Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it expressed concern about the threat of uncontrolled proliferation of missile technologies by Ukraine. So, on April 5 this year in Turkey, negotiations were held by the delegation of the State Enterprise "Production Association Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant named after A. M. Makarov "(Dnepropetrovsk) with representatives of the Turkish side on the sale of technical documentation and technologies for the production of the strategic missile complex R-36M2" Voyevoda "(NATO classification SS-18" Satan "). This missile system is still in service with the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, the sale of even documentation for its production is a flagrant violation by Ukraine not only of the MTCR, but also of many other international obligations, including those arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is this, and not mythical missile threats to Europe, including from the territory of the post-Soviet space, that is the main problem of the entire international community. It is another matter, to what extent they are aware of this in Kiev, where the previously mentioned Petro Poroshenko is the president.


All Topol mobile ground-based missile systems have been relocated to Russia.



The de facto nuclear state India has the largest missile potential in South and Southeast Asia. It includes Prithvi-type short-range liquid ballistic missiles and Agni-1, Agni-2 and Agni-3 solid-propellant missiles, capable of delivering a 1-ton warhead to a distance of 1, 5, 2, 5 and 3, 5 thousand km, respectively. All of them are equipped with conventional cluster warheads, work is underway to create nuclear warheads for them. Within the framework of the Integrated Program for the Development of Guided Missile Weapons, the lead enterprise for the implementation of the missile program is Bharat Dynamics Limited.

The Prithvi missiles are developed on the basis of the Soviet B-755 anti-aircraft guided missile of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile system (SAM). At the same time, according to some estimates, up to 10% of the technologies used, including the rocket engine and guidance systems, were of Soviet origin. The first launch of the Prithvi-1 rocket took place in February 1988. A total of 14 flight tests were carried out, of which only one was unsuccessful. As a result, industrial production of missiles of this type began in 1994.


Rocket "Prithvi-1".

The Prithvi-1 (SS-150) missile is used by the ground forces. It has a mobile basing method, its maximum flight range is 150 km with a warhead weight of 800-1000 kg. To date, more than 150 missiles of this type have been fired, which are not supposed to be equipped with nuclear warheads. There are about 50 launchers of missiles of this type in the deployed state.

Further, modifications of this single-stage missile were developed: Prithvi-2 (the first flight tests took place in 1992) for the Air Force, Dhanush and Prithvi-3 for the Navy. Tests of the latter began in 2000 and 2004, respectively. All missiles of these modifications are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but in reality they use high-explosive fragmentation, cluster and incendiary warheads.

The Prithvi-2 (SS-250) missile is also mobile-based. Its firing range reaches 250 km with a warhead of 500-750 kg. More than 70 of these missiles have already been produced. It is believed that missiles of this type will only be used in non-nuclear equipment.

The Prithvi-3 and Dhanush missiles have a similar flight range with a 750 kg warhead and are planned to be deployed on surface ships. There is no complete clarity regarding the volumes of their production. It is only known that the Indian Navy plans to purchase 80 Prithvi-3 missiles, but so far there are no ships with the launchers necessary for their launch. Most likely, at least 25 Dhanush missiles have already been produced.

The cost of one missile of the Prithvi family is about $ 500 thousand, and their annual production rate is from 10 to 50 missiles. Delhi is considering the possibility of exporting missiles of this family, therefore, back in 1996, missiles of this type were included in the country's export catalog.

When creating long-range ballistic missiles, India actively used the assistance of the Soviet Union (Russia), Germany and France, but basically rocketry relied on its own research and production base. A major achievement in this area was the creation of Agni-type missiles, the first flight tests of which began in 1989. After a series of flight tests in 1994, work on the Agni project was suspended, mainly under pressure from the United States. In 1995, it was decided to create a more advanced rocket within the framework of the Agni-2 project.

Work on this project accelerated after Pakistan began flight tests of the Hatf-3 ballistic missile in the summer of 1997. The first tests of the Agni-2 rocket took place in 1999. In 2001-2004. India has completed a series of flight tests of the single-stage Agni-1 and two-stage Agni-2 missiles, which allowed them to begin serial production at Bharat Dynamics (developed by the Hyderabad-based Advanced Systems Laboratory). Apparently, over 100 missiles of these types have been produced at an annual production rate of 10-18 pieces. The Agni-1 rocket costs $ 4.8 million, and the Agni-2 - $ 6.6 million.

The peculiarity of the Agni-1 rocket is that the flight trajectory of its warhead is corrected according to the radar map of the terrain, which provides a CEP up to 100 m. These missiles are placed on mobile launchers: tracked and wheeled.


The launch of the Agni-5 ballistic missile.

In 2006, a two-stage Agni-3 rocket was successfully tested with a flight range of up to 3,500 km with a 1.5-ton warhead. In 2011, she was put into service.

The Agni-2 Prime two-stage rocket is under development and successfully launched in November 2011. It has composite rocket engines, an improved stage separation mechanism and a modern navigation system. In terms of firing range, "Agni-4" practically does not differ from the "Agni-3" rocket. In the near future, the Agni-4 rocket may be put into service.

On their basis, a three-stage rocket "Agni-5" is being created, the flight tests of which took place in April 2012. Its maximum firing range with a warhead of 1.5 tons exceeds 5 thousand km, which makes it possible to hit targets in China. The Agni-5 missile has a launch weight of 50 tons, its length is 17.5 m, and its diameter is 2 m. It is planned to equip the missile with a multiple warhead with several individually guided warheads. It can be used with mobile carriers, including rail. The specified missile is planned to be put into service in 2015. In addition, the plans for the development of missile weapons provide for the creation of the Surya ICBM with a flight range of 8-12 thousand km.

It is assumed that the Agni-type missiles will be equipped with 100 kt nuclear warheads. At the same time, work is underway to improve the conventional warhead, which may include homing anti-tank rounds or volumetric explosion ammunition.

India is developing a two-stage solid-propellant sea-based missile K-15 ("Sagarika"), which will be installed on submarines. Its maximum flight range will be 750 km with a warhead from 500 to 1000 kg. The ground-based version of the K-15 - the Shourya rocket has already passed a series of successful flight tests.

In addition, a more advanced ballistic missile for K-4 submarines is being created with a firing range of up to 3,500 km with a 1 ton warhead. Missiles of these types can be deployed on Arihant-class nuclear submarines. In total, it is planned to build five such nuclear submarines, sea trials of the first of them began in 2012, two more submarines are at different stages of construction. Each nuclear submarine, worth about $ 3 billion, is equipped with four launchers and is capable of carrying 12 K-15 missiles or four more powerful K-4 missiles.

India is developing a subsonic air-launched cruise missile Nirbhay with a range of up to 1,000 km. It will be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.




The de facto nuclear state of Pakistan was also able to create a significant missile potential as part of small ballistic missiles (Hatf-1, Hatf-2 / Abdalli, Hatf-3 / Ghaznavi, Hatf-4 / Shahin-1) and medium (Hatf-5 / Gauri-1, Hatf-5A / Gauri-2, Hatf-6 / Shahin-2) range. Now the Pakistani ground forces are armed with two types of mobile ballistic missiles - liquid and solid propellant. All of them are equipped with conventional warheads, work is underway to create nuclear warheads for them. It is possible that Islamabad already possesses several experimental samples.


Rocket "Gauri-1".

Liquid-propellant missiles include the single-stage Gauri-1 (Ghauri, Hatf-5 or Hatf-5) and the two-stage Gauri-2 (Ghauri II, Hatf-5A or Hatf-5A). "Gauri-1" was put into service in 2005, has a range of up to 1,300 km with a warhead weighing 1 ton. "Gauri-2" has a maximum firing range of 1, 5-1, 8 thousand km with a 700-kilogram warhead. Both missiles were created with significant design and engineering input from specialists from North Korea. Their prototypes are North Korean missiles "Nodong-1" and "Tephodong-1", respectively.

All Pakistani short-range ballistic missiles are solid-fueled. They were created with technical support from China and have the following firing ranges:

- "Hatf-1" (put into service in 1992) - from 70 to 100 km with a 500 kg warhead;

- "Hatf-2 / Abdalli" (in service since 2005) - from 180 to 260 km with a warhead from 250 to 450 kg;

- "Hatf-3 / Ghaznavi" (in service since 2004) - up to 400 km with a 500 kg warhead;

- "Shahin-1" - over 450 km with a warhead from 700 to 1000 kg.

It is planned to use the warhead on the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 / Abdalli missiles only in non-nuclear equipment.

A special place among them is occupied by a single-stage mobile-based missile "Shaheen-1" (Shaheen I, Hatf-4 or "Hatf-4") with a flight range of up to 650 km with a warhead weighing 320 kg. Its first flight tests took place in April 1999, and was put into service in 2005. This missile is equipped with a conventional warhead of two types: high-explosive fragmentation and cluster, in the future - nuclear. It is the Pakistani version of the Chinese Dongfang 15 (CSS-6) missile.

The flight design tests of the two-stage solid-propellant rocket Shaheen-2 (Shaheen II, Hatf-6 or Hatf-6), which was first shown in 2000 at the military parade in Islamabad (possibly 10 missiles of this type). It has a range of up to 2,500 km with a 700 kg warhead and is mounted on a mobile launcher. Only this missile will be able to shoot through the entire territory of India.

Pakistan is developing a solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile "Hatf-9 / Nasr" with a range of up to 60 km. It is distinguished by high firing accuracy and the use of a movable multi-barreled launcher. A ground-based cruise missile "Hatf-7 / Babur" is also being created, with a firing range of 600 km with a warhead of 400-500 kg. It is capable of carrying nuclear weapons and is launched from a three-barreled mobile launcher.

In addition, work is underway to create an air and sea-based cruise missile Hatf-8 / Raad, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a distance of 350 km. It is made using stealth technology, has high maneuverability and is capable of flying at extremely low altitudes with a rounding of the terrain.

According to reports, of the 360 ballistic missiles in Pakistan's possession, only 100 can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Moreover, Pakistan is increasingly using weapons-grade plutonium for their manufacture, which is determined by its significantly lower critical mass.

The states of Southeast Asia do not have ballistic missiles in service. The exception is Vietnam, which received a certain number of R-17 missiles from the Soviet Union. Currently, the performance of these missiles is in serious doubt.

Thus, by 2020, only India can create ICBMs in South Asia, which does not have any confrontational potential with Europe. Pakistan's promising ballistic missiles are clearly insufficient to reach even European borders. The states of Southeast Asia have no missile potential at all.



By the time of the successful nuclear test in May 2009, the DPRK had already created the appropriate carriers - single-stage short- and medium-range liquid-propellant missiles. Thus, in April 1984, flight tests of the North Korean rocket Hwaseong-5 (Mars-5) began. It was created on the basis of the Soviet rocket R-17 (SCUD-B), samples of which came to the DPRK from Egypt. Within six months, six test launches were carried out, of which half were successful. This missile program was completed with financial support from Tehran. As a result, limited production of missiles of this type was started in 1985, and in 1987 one hundred of them were delivered to Iran.

The Hwaseong-5 short-range ballistic missile had a length of 11 m, a diameter of about 0.9 m and a launch weight of 5, 9 tons. Its maximum firing range was 300 km with a warhead weighing 1 ton. The firing accuracy of this missile was low: KVO reached 1 km.

In 1987-1988. DPRK specialists, with the help of China, began to create an improved Hwaseong-6 missile based on the Soviet R-17M missile (SCUD-C). Its first flight design tests took place in June 1990. Four more test launches were carried out in 1991-1993. Most likely they were all successful. The maximum range of the missile was 500 km with a warhead weighing 730 kg. The KVO missile "Hwaseong-6" increased to 1.5 km, which made it problematic to use it in conventional (non-nuclear) equipment against military targets. The exception was made for such large objects as military bases. Nevertheless, in 1991 it was put into service.

According to American data, at the end of the 1990s. the modernization of the ballistic missile "Hwaseong-6" was carried out, which in the United States was called SCUD-ER. By increasing the length of the fuel tanks and reducing the weight of the warhead to 750 kg, it was possible to achieve a maximum firing range of 700 km. In this case, a detachable head part with low aerodynamic quality was used. This increased not only the stability of the missile flight, but also the accuracy of the fire.

The aforementioned ballistic missiles allowed Pyongyang to hit targets on the Korean Peninsula, but this was not enough to fire at important targets in Japan, primarily at the US Air Force Kadena on the island of Okinawa. This was one of the reasons for the creation, with the active financial participation of Iran and Libya, a single-stage medium-range missile "Nodon-1". The latter has a length of 15.6 m, a diameter of 1.3 m and a launch weight of 12.4 tons, as well as a detachable warhead and an inertial control system. The maximum firing range of "Nodon-1" is 1, 1-1, 3 thousand km with a warhead weighing 700-1000 kg. The KVO missile reached 2.5 km.

In the United States, it is believed that the implementation of this missile program began in 1988 with the participation of Russian, Ukrainian and Chinese specialists. At the same time, representatives of the Design Bureau named after V. I. V. P. Makeev (now it is OJSC State Rocket Center named after Academician V. P. Makeev "), who in the Soviet Union were the main specialists in the field of creating ballistic missiles for submarines. In their opinion, all this made it possible, even in the absence of a successful flight test, to begin limited production of Nodon-1 ballistic missiles already in 1991. In the next two years, negotiations were held on the export of missiles of this type to Pakistan and Iran. As a result, Iranian specialists were invited to the flight test of the Nodon-1 rocket, which took place in May 1993. These tests were successful, but for geographic reasons, the missile's firing range had to be limited to a distance of 500 km. With a longer flight range, there could be a threat of a missile hitting the territory of Russia or Japan. In addition, there was a threat of interception of telemetric information by the Americans and their allies using naval surveillance equipment.

At present, the DPRK ground forces have a separate missile regiment armed with Hwaseong-6 missiles and three separate missile divisions armed with Nodong-1 missiles. These missiles are transported on a mobile launcher and have a high-explosive fragmentation or cluster warhead. They can potentially act as carriers of nuclear weapons.

It should be noted that at the military parade in Pyongyang on October 11, 2010, two new types of single-stage mobile missiles were shown. One of them resembled the Iranian Gadr-1 missile, and the second resembled the Soviet sea-based R-27 (SS-N-6) missile. In the West, they were given the names "Nodon-2010" and "Musudan" (Musudan).

With regard to the Nodong-2010 rocket, it was believed that North Korean specialists took an active part in the development of the Iranian Qadr-1 rocket. Consequently, missiles of this type were either supplied from Iran as compensation for the technical assistance provided, or the technology for the production of this missile was transferred to the DPRK. At the same time, it was possible to take advantage of the results of flight tests of the Gadr-1 rocket carried out on Iranian territory.

While seemingly obvious, these assumptions are controversial. First, recently Iran and North Korea have been under increased scrutiny by the intelligence structures of many states. In particular, all actions in this direction of Tehran are carefully monitored by Washington and Tel Aviv. Under these conditions, it would be difficult to organize the export of even a small batch of ballistic missiles to the DPRK. Secondly, the delivered missiles need technical maintenance, which requires a constant supply of spare parts and appropriate equipment. Third, the extremely limited resources of North Korea make it problematic to master the production of a new type of missile within three to four years (for the first time the Gadr-1 missile was shown in Iran at a military parade in September 2007). Fourth, despite the close cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran in the field of rocketry, no convincing facts of the transfer of such technologies to the DPRK have been revealed. The same is true in the nuclear sphere.

With regard to the Musudan ballistic missile, the following can be noted.

1. The Soviet liquid-propellant missile R-27 had a number of modifications, the last of which was put into service in 1974. All missiles of this type with a firing range of up to 3 thousand km were decommissioned before 1990. Resumption of production of R-27 missiles In the last two decades, it was technically impossible on North Korean territory due to the complete re-profiling of the corresponding Russian enterprises and the dismissal of the overwhelming majority of workers in 1960-1970. In theory, they could only transfer technical documentation and some of the components, which most likely would have been insufficient for the development of long-obsolete missile technologies.

2. Sea-based ballistic missiles are extremely difficult to manufacture. Therefore, Russia, which has vast experience in rocketry, has been developing the Bulava-30 missile system for a long time. But why should the DPRK do this, which does not have the appropriate naval carriers? It is much easier to create a ground-based missile system at once. In this case, there will be no problem of loss of vertical stability at launch (unlike a submarine, the ballistic missile launcher is rigidly fixed on the earth's surface) or overcoming the aquatic environment, where the launch of the first stage propulsion engine is impossible.

3. No one can rule out that North Korean specialists copied some of the components of Soviet missiles. But it does not follow from this that they managed to make a ground version of the R-27 rocket.

4. The Musudan missile shown at the parade had a (too large) mobile carrier that did not correspond to its size. Moreover, it was 2 m longer than its prototype. In this case, we can talk not just about copying, but about the modernization of the R-27 rocket. But how could such a missile be put into service without having carried out at least one of its flight tests?

5. According to information provided on the WikiLeaks website, North Korea has delivered 19 BM-25 (Musudan) ballistic missiles to Iran. However, this has not been confirmed by anyone, primarily the United States and Israel. Never once has a missile of this type been used by Iran in the course of numerous military exercises.

Most likely, dummies of ballistic missiles were shown during the military parade in Pyongyang in October 2010. It seems premature to assume that they have already entered service. In any case, before flight tests of these types of missiles.

According to American data, since the early 1990s. Pyongyang is working on the creation of two-stage liquid-propellant rockets of the Tephodong type (their three-stage versions are used as space launch vehicles). This was confirmed in February 1994 by space observation data. Then it was assumed that the Tephodong-1 rocket uses Nodong-1 as the first stage, and Hwaseong-5 or Hwaseong-6 as the second. With regard to the more advanced Tephodong-2 rocket, it was believed that its first stage was a Chinese DF-3 rocket or a bundle of four Nodong-type engines, and the second stage was Nodong-1. It was believed that Chinese specialists took part in the creation of the Tephodong-2 rocket.

The first flight test of the three-stage version of the Tephodong-1 rocket took place in August 1998. Then it had a length of 24-25 m and a launch weight of about 22 tons. Its first and second stages worked fine, the third stage separated, but soon fell into the Pacific Ocean together with the satellite. At the same time, the flight range was 1, 6 thousand km. Analysis of the data obtained confirmed that the Nodong-1 rocket was used as the first stage. However, at the second stage - the engine of the Soviet anti-aircraft missile used in the obsolete S-200 air defense system. The third stage, most likely, was also represented by the obsolete Soviet Tochka missile system (its North Korean version is KN-02).

Apparently, the Tephodong-1 program was soon closed. It was more demonstrative (ostentatious) in nature, since the second stage of the rocket was not very suitable for the delivery of nuclear weapons, the CEP was several km, and the maximum flight range was 2 thousand km.


Military parade in Pyongyang.

In parallel, the Tephodong-2 program was carried out. The first flight test of a rocket of this type was carried out in July 2006. It turned out to be unsuccessful (the flight lasted 42 seconds, the rocket covered only 10 km). Then there was extremely limited information about the technical characteristics of this rocket: even its launch weight was estimated in the range from 60 to 85 tons (most likely about 65 tons). Its first stage was indeed a combination of four Nodon-type engines. However, it was not possible to obtain any information about the second stage.

In the future, all information on the Tephodong-2 ballistic missile could only be obtained from the results of launches of carrier rockets created on its basis. So, in April 2009, the North Korean launch vehicle "Eunha-2" was launched. She flew over 3, 2 thousand km. Moreover, its first and second stages worked successfully, and the third, together with the satellite, fell into the Pacific Ocean. During this launch, the international community was presented with extensive video information, which made it possible to identify the tactical and technical characteristics of the rocket. She had a length of 30 meters and a launch weight of 80 tons. Again, the first stage of the rocket was a bunch of four Nodon-type engines. Its second stage turned out to be similar to the previously described Soviet rocket R-27, the third - to the Hwaseong-5 (Hwaseong-6). The analysis of this launch convinced Western experts of the existence of the Musudan single-stage missile.

At the end of 2012, the Eunha-3 launch vehicle successfully launched the Kwanmenson-3 satellite into orbit. Shortly thereafter, representatives of the Republic of Korea naval forces lifted an oxidizer tank and fragments of the first stage of this rocket from the bottom of the Yellow Sea. This made it possible to clarify the technical level achieved in North Korea in the field of rocketry.

A group of American and South Korean experts was formed to analyze the collected data. Its main task was to convince the international community of Pyongyang's application of ballistic missile technology in the development of the Eunha-3 launch vehicle. This was not very difficult due to the dual purpose of any space technologies.

The joint expert group came to the following conclusions. First, a nitrogen-based substance was used as an oxidizer for rocket engines in the first stage of the North Korean launch vehicle, which serves as a component of long-term rocket fuel. According to experts, it is more preferable to use liquid oxygen as an oxidizing agent for the launch vehicle. Second, the first stage was a cluster of four Nodon-1 rocket engines. Third, the simulation of the missile's flight showed its technical feasibility of delivering a warhead weighing 500-600 kg to a distance of 10-12 thousand km, that is, to an intercontinental firing range. Fourth, the poor welding quality and the use of imported components for the production of the rocket body were revealed. At the same time, the latter was not a violation of the MTCR.

Noting the importance of the work done, it can be noted that in February 2010 Iran presented to the international community its Simorgh launch vehicle, which allows launching satellites weighing up to 100 kg into low-earth orbit. A bundle of four Nodon-1 rocket engines is used as its first stage, and the Gadr-1 rocket plays the role of the second stage. The Simorg and Ynha-3 launch vehicles have a high degree of similarity. Their difference lies in the number of stages (the Iranian missile has two stages) and the use in the North Korean version of a more powerful second stage based on the Musudan missile.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the third stage of the Ynha-2 launch vehicle is similar to the second stage of the Iranian Safir-2 (Messenger-2) missile, which in early February 2009 launched into low Earth orbit the first national satellite "Omid" ("Hope"). Most likely, the third stages of the Eunha-2 and Eunha-3 launch vehicles are identical and are based on the Hwaseong-6 rocket.

In the West, it is believed that the range of the Iranian launch vehicle "Simorg" when used as a ballistic missile will be up to 5 thousand km with a warhead weighing 1 ton. With a decrease in the weight of the warhead to 750 kg, the missile's flight range will increase to 5, 4 thousand km. So far, not a single successful launch of the Simorg launch vehicle has been recorded.

Taking into account the more powerful second stage and the presence of the third stage, it seems that we can talk about the possible flight range of the North Korean ballistic missile, created on the basis of the Ynha-3 launch vehicle, up to 6-7 thousand km with a 750-kilogram warhead … However, these estimates require experimental confirmation.

A technical obstacle to the creation by North Korean specialists of a three-stage ballistic missile of an intermediate range (about 5-6 thousand km) will be the problem of ensuring thermal protection of the installed warhead. In contrast to medium-range missiles, the height of the warheads of which does not exceed 300 km, the warheads of even intermediate-range missiles rise to heights above 1,000 km above the Earth's surface. In this case, the speed of their entry into the upper boundary of the atmosphere on the descending part of the trajectory will be several kilometers per second. In the absence of a TZP, this will lead to the destruction of the warhead body already in the upper atmosphere. To date, there are no facts confirming the mastery of the technology for the production of TPP by North Korean specialists.

An important characteristic of the missile system is its combat readiness. In the case of prolonged preparation of the missile for launch, there is a high probability of its defeat by the enemy, therefore, it is necessary to deliberately reduce the maximum firing range in order to increase the level of combat readiness of the missile system.

Thus, the North Korean missile program for the creation of two- and three-stage ballistic missiles of the Taephodong-2 type has ceased to be a myth. Indeed, there is the potential for the DPRK to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile in the medium term. However, the missile threat should not be exaggerated. In the absence of sufficient funding and the backwardness of the material and technical base, it is rather difficult to complete such work. In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 2087 not only imposed economic sanctions on the DPRK, but also requires the restoration of a moratorium on ballistic missile launches. This will make it much more difficult for Pyongyang to conduct flight design tests of the missiles under development, disguising them as launching carrier rockets.


Japan has a developed scientific, technical and production base for rocketry. It is successfully implementing the national space research program based on its own M-5 and J-1 solid-propellant launch vehicles. The existing potential allows Japan, after the country's leadership has taken an appropriate political decision, to create ballistic missiles not only of medium range, but also of intercontinental range. For this, two rocket and space centers can be used: Kagoshima (southern tip of Kyushu island) and Tanegashima (Tanegashima island, 70 km south of Kyushu island).


The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a significant rocket production base, created with the active assistance of the United States. When it was created, it was taken into account that the American Armed Forces use only solid-propellant missiles. It was on this path that they went to the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Development of the first Paekkom (Polar Bear) ballistic missile began in the first half of the 1970s. in response to Pyongyang's missile ambitions. The Baekkom missile with a range of up to 300 km was successfully tested in September 1978 from the Anheung test site in the South Chuncheon province. The program was curtailed under pressure from Washington, which did not want to be drawn into a new war on the Korean Peninsula. The Americans also took into account the concern over this issue of their other ally - Japan, which has rather difficult relations with Seoul. In exchange for the refusal of South Korea from independent missile and nuclear development, the United States pledged to cover it with its "nuclear umbrella" and to ensure national security with American troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan.

In 1979 g. The United States and the Republic of Korea signed an agreement to limit the range of South Korean ballistic missiles to 180 km (the distance from the demilitarized zone to Pyongyang). Based on this, in the 1980s. On the basis of the American Nike Hercules air defense missile missile, a two-stage Nike-KM missile was developed with a specified flight range with a 300 kg warhead.


Trying to keep Seoul from creating new ballistic missiles, in the period 1997-2000, the United States supplied it with modern ATACMS Block 1 mobile missile systems.

Under pressure from Washington, the South Korean leadership was forced to limit its missile program. So, in 1982, a group of specialists who were engaged in the development of promising missiles was disbanded, and the staff of the Defense Research Institute of the Republic of Korea was reduced by three times.

However, in 1983, the modernization of the Nike-KM ballistic missile was continued. In particular, all the electronic equipment of the guidance and control systems was replaced with a more advanced one, the design and layout of the rocket and its warhead were changed. And after replacing the starting accelerators with more powerful ones, the firing range increased to 250 km. This modified version of the rocket, assembled almost entirely from its own components, was named "Hyongmu-1" ("Black Turtle-1"), its first successful flight test took place in 1985. The production of ballistic missiles "Hyongmu-1" began in 1986 They were first demonstrated to the international community on October 1, 1987 at a military parade on the Day of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea.

The Hyongmu-1 two-stage ballistic missile has the following characteristics: length - 12.5 m (second stage - 8.2 m), diameter 0.8 m (second stage - 0.5 m) and launch weight 4.9 tons, including 2.5 tons weight of the second stage. Its maximum flight speed is less than 1.2 km / s, and its rise above the Earth's surface with a 500 kg warhead is 46 km. The deviation of this missile from the aiming point does not exceed 100 m, which indicates its fairly high firing accuracy.

The Hyunmu-1 ballistic missile violated a previously signed agreement, so the Americans forced the Republic of Korea to limit its production. As compensation in the period 1997-2000. The United States supplied Seoul with modern mobile-based missile systems ATACMS Block 1 with a range of up to 160 km with a 560 kg warhead.

In January 2001, Washington and Seoul entered into a new agreement under which the Republic of Korea pledged to be in the MTCR. As a result, the range of the South Korean missiles was limited to 300 km with a payload of 500 kg. This allowed South Korean specialists to start developing the Hyongmu-2A ballistic missile.

According to some reports, in 2009, when the Americans yielded again, in Seoul they began to develop a new missile "Hyongmu-2V" with a firing range of up to 500 km. At the same time, the weight of the warhead remained the same - 500 kg, and the KVO decreased to 30 m. The Hyonmu-2A and Hyonmu-2V ballistic missiles have a mobile basing method.

In addition, in 2002-2006. The United States supplied the Republic of Kazakhstan with ATACMS Block 1A ballistic missiles with a maximum firing range of 300 km (warhead 160 kg). The mastery of these missile systems and the implementation of the space program with the help of Russia allowed South Korean specialists to significantly improve the technical level in the national rocket industry. This served as a technological prerequisite for the creation of our own ballistic missiles with a firing range of over 500 km.

Taking into account the above, the Republic of Korea can, in a fairly short time, create a ballistic missile "Hyunmu-4" with a flight range of 1-2 thousand km, capable of carrying a warhead of 1 ton. Washington's ability to contain Seoul's missile ambitions is constantly diminishing. So, at the beginning of October 2012. The ROK leadership was able to get the United States to agree to increase the flight range of South Korean ballistic missiles to 800 km, which is enough to shell the entire territory of the DPRK, as well as certain regions of Russia, China and Japan.

In addition, the new South Korean missiles will be able to carry warheads heavier than 500 kg, that is, act as carriers of nuclear weapons, if an appropriate political decision is made. But at the same time, the firing range of missiles should be reduced in proportion to the increase in the weight of the warhead. For example, if the missile has a flight range of 800 km, the weight of the warhead should not exceed 500 kg, but if the range is 300 km, then the weight of the warhead can be increased to 1.3 tons.

At the same time, Seoul was given the right to manufacture heavier unmanned aerial vehicles. Now their weight can be increased from 500 kg to 2.5 tons, which will allow them to be used in the strike version, including with cruise missiles.

It should be noted that when developing air-launched cruise missiles, Seoul did not experience any restrictions on flight range. According to reports, this process began in the 1990s, and the American high-precision cruise missile Tomahawk was chosen as a prototype, on the basis of which South Korean specialists made the Hyunmu-3 missile. It is distinguished from its American counterpart by improved accuracy characteristics. A serious disadvantage of missiles of this type is their subsonic flight speed, which makes them easier to intercept by missile defense systems. However, the DPRK does not have such funds.

The deliveries to the troops of the Hyongmu-3A cruise missile with a maximum flight range of 500 km, most likely, began in 2006-2007. At the same time, airborne and longer-range cruise missiles are being developed. For example, the Hyongmu-3V missile has a firing range of up to 1,000 km, and the Hyongmu-3S missile - up to 1,500 km. Apparently, the Hyongmu-3V cruise missile has already been put into service, and the Hyongmu-3S is completing its flight test phase.

The main characteristics of the "Hyongmu-3" cruise missiles: length is 6 m, diameter - 0.6 m, launch weight - 1.5 tons, including a 500-kilogram warhead. To ensure high firing accuracy, GPS / INS global positioning systems, the American TERCOM cruise missile trajectory correction system and an infrared homing head are used.

Currently, South Korean specialists are developing sea-based cruise missiles "Chongnen" ("Heavenly Dragon") with a range of up to 500 km. They will enter service with the promising Chanbogo-3 diesel submarines with a displacement of 3,000 to 4,000 tons. These submarines, built using German technology, will be able to stay under water without surfacing for up to 50 days and carry up to 20 cruise missiles. It is planned that in 2020 South Korea will receive up to six submarines of this type.

In September 2012, President of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak approved the "Medium-Term National Defense Development Plan 2013-2017" proposed by the Ministry of Defense. One of the most important elements of this document was the reliance on missiles, which were to become the main weapon of retaliation and the main response to North Korea's nuclear missile potential, as well as its long-range artillery. Seoul, the country's most important political and economic center, is within the reach of the latter.

According to this plan, the missile forces of the Republic of Korea were to destroy 25 large missile bases, all known nuclear facilities and long-range artillery batteries of the DPRK in the first 24 hours of hostilities. For this, it was planned to purchase 900, primarily ballistic missiles for a total of about $ 2 billion. At the same time, it was decided to significantly reduce the modernization programs of the national air force and navy.

It was expected that by 2017in service with South Korea will be 1,700 ballistic missiles "Hyongmu-2A" and "Hyongmu-2V" (the basis of missile potential), as well as cruise missiles "Hyongmu-3A", "Hyongmu-3B" and "Hyongmu-3S".

The plans for the implementation of the missile program in the Republic of Kazakhstan were significantly adjusted after, following the results of the 2012 elections, Pak Geun-hye became the president of the country. Unlike its predecessor, it began to focus not on a disarming missile strike, but on the creation of a missile defense system, which has led to a reduction in funding for missile programs since 2014.

According to the 2014 budget plan presented by the Ministry of Finance to the National Assembly, the government has requested $ 1.1 billion to build the Korea Anti-Ballistic Missile and Air Defense (KAMD) and Kill Chain preventive missile destruction system. Development of the KAMD system began in 2006, when Seoul refused to join the US global missile defense system.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced the need to create a Kill Chain system in June 2013, considering reconnaissance satellites, various air surveillance and control equipment, multipurpose fighters and attack UAVs as components of this system. All this will allow early identification of threats to national security from missile systems, as well as combat aircraft and ships, primarily North Korean ones.

The KAMD system will include an Israeli-made Green Pine Block-B radar, the American Peace Eye early warning and warning system, Aegis missile control systems with SM-3 anti-missiles and Patriot PAC-3 anti-aircraft missile systems. In the near future, it is planned to open an appropriate command and control center for the South Korean KAMD system.

Consequently, the missile potential of the Republic of Korea is constantly increasing, which cannot but cause concern not only in the DPRK, but also in China, Russia and Japan. Potentially developed in Kazakhstan, ballistic and cruise missiles of air and sea-based, after appropriate refinement, can be used as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons based on plutonium, the creation of which does not pose a significant technical problem for South Korean specialists. In Northeast Asia, this could lead to a nuclear domino effect, when South Korea's example is followed in Japan and possibly Taiwan, leading to the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime at the global level.

Moreover, in Seoul, a decision was made to create not only a national missile defense system, but also a system for the preventive destruction of North Korean missiles, which could push the ruling elite to try to forcefully annex their northern neighbor. There is no doubt that this, as well as the presence of long-range cruise missiles in the ROK, is a serious destabilizing factor for the security of the entire Korean Peninsula, but does not pose any missile threat to Europe.


In the late 1970s. Taiwan, with the help of Israel, has created the Ching Feng (Green Bee) single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of up to 130 km with a 400 kg warhead. She is still in service with Taiwan. In the future, the United States largely restrained Taipei's missile ambitions.

In 1996, the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology under the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan began the development of a two-stage solid-propellant short-range Tien Chi (Sky Halberd) missile based on the Sky Bow II anti-aircraft missile (an analogue of the missile used in the American Patriot air defense system). Its maximum flight range was 300 km with a 200-kilogram warhead. To improve the firing accuracy, this rocket was equipped with the receiver of the NAVSTAR space navigation system. According to some reports, from 15 to 50 such missiles are deployed in silos on islands near the territory of the People's Republic of China.

In addition, the development of a new ballistic solid-propellant missile Tien Ma (Sky Horse) with a firing range of up to 1 thousand km with a 500-kilogram warhead is underway. For this, a test center built in the southern part of Taiwan Island at Cape Ganzibi is used.

Thus, the states of Northeast Asia have created a significant missile potential, which allows them to produce medium-range missiles. However, due to the geographical remoteness of this region, promising (up to 2020) ballistic missiles of these states do not pose a real threat to Europe. Hypothetically, an ICBM can only be created by the closest American ally, Japan, if it takes an appropriate political decision.



The first short-range ballistic missiles entered the Arab Republic of Egypt from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, already in 1975, ARE was armed with nine launchers for R-17 (SCUD-B) missiles and 18 launchers for Luna-TS missile systems. Gradually, the Luna-TS complexes had to be withdrawn from the combat strength of the Armed Forces, including due to the reorientation of foreign policy to the West.

In the period 1984-1988. Egypt, together with Argentina and Iraq, implemented the Condor-2 missile program (Egyptian name - Vector). As part of this program, a research and production missile complex Abu Saabal was built near Cairo.

As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the Condor-2 program was to create a mobile missile system equipped with a two-stage solid-propellant missile with a firing range of up to 750 km. The 500-kilogram cluster warhead detachable in flight was supposed to be equipped with concrete-piercing and fragmentation striking elements. The only test launch of this missile took place in Egypt in 1989. It was unsuccessful due to a malfunction in the on-board control system. In 1990, under pressure from the United States, work on the Condor-2 program was terminated.

In the 1980s-1990s. rather active cooperation in the field of rocketry developed with Pyongyang. So, in 1990, with the help of North Korean specialists, work began on the Project-T program with the aim of creating a ballistic missile with a firing range of up to 450 km. Later, Pyongyang passed on to the Egyptians the technology for creating ballistic missiles R-17M (SCUD-C) with a maximum flight range of 500 km. This made it possible in 1995 to start producing them on our own territory, but in rather limited quantities.

In the current environment, Egypt's missile program is likely to be phased out. In the future, its renewal is possible, and with the help of Russian specialists.


In the second half of the 1970s. The Soviet Union delivered 20 R-17 (SCUD-B) missile launchers to Libya. Some of them were transferred to Iran in the early 1980s, which was offset by new supplies. So, in 1985, the country's Armed Forces already had 54 launchers for R-17 missiles, as well as Tochka missile systems. By 1990, their number increased even more: up to 80 launchers of R-17 missiles and 40 Tochka missile systems.

In the early 1980s. with the assistance of specialists from Iran, Iraq, India and Yugoslavia, the implementation of its own program for the creation of a liquid-propellant single-stage Al-Fatah missile with a flight range of up to 1,000 km has begun. The first unsuccessful launch of this rocket was carried out in 1986. This program was never implemented.

With the help of specialists from Egypt, North Korea and Iraq, in the 1990s, the Libyans managed to modernize the R-17 missile, increasing its firing range to 500 km.

The international sanctions imposed on Libya in April 1992 weakened, among other things, its missile potential. The reason for this was the inability to independently maintain weapons and military equipment in working order. However, the fully missile potential ceased to exist only in 2011 as a result of the military operation of the NATO countries.


In the second half of the 1970s, 20 R-17 (SCUD-B) missile launchers were delivered to Libya from the Soviet Union.


Algeria may be armed with 12 launchers of the Luna-TS missile system (32 missiles). It is possible that Algeria, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have some R-17 (SCUD-B) missiles. But these missiles do not even pose a potential threat to Europe.

South Africa

According to some reports, in 1974 Israel and the Republic of South Africa (South Africa) established cooperation in the field of missile and nuclear technologies. South Africa provided Israel with natural uranium and a nuclear test site, and in return received technologies for creating a solid-propellant rocket engine, which later found its use in the first stage of the Jericho-2 solid-propellant rocket. This allowed South African specialists in the late 1980s to create solid-propellant missiles: single-stage RSA-1 (launch weight - 12 tons, length - 8 m, diameter - 1.3 m, flight range from 1-1, 1 thousand km with a warhead 1500 kg) and two-stage RSA-2 (analogue of the Jericho-2 missile with a firing range of 1, 5-1, 8 thousand km). These missiles were not mass-produced, since in the late 1980s - early 1990s. South Africa has renounced both nuclear weapons and their possible missile carriers.

Undoubtedly, South Africa has scientific and technical capabilities to create ballistic missiles of both medium and intercontinental range. However, there are no compelling reasons for such activities in view of the fairly stable regional situation and balanced foreign policy.

Thus, until recently, Egypt had limited capabilities for the production of short-range ballistic missiles. In conditions of serious internal instability, it cannot pose any missile threat to Europe. Libya completely lost its missile potential as a result of the NATO operation in 2011, but there was a threat of gaining access to these technologies by terrorist organizations. Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo only have short-range missiles, and South Africa has no compelling reason to develop long-range ballistic missiles.



The Brazilian rocket program has been in operation since the early 1980s, when, on the basis of technologies obtained in the space sector under the Sonda project, the development of two types of single-stage solid-propellant mobile rockets began: SS-300 and MB / EE-150. The first of them had a range of up to 300 km with a warhead weighing 1 ton, and the second (MV / EE? 150) - up to 150 km with a 500-kilogram warhead. These missiles were supposed to be used as carriers for nuclear weapons. At that time, Brazil was implementing a military nuclear program, which was closed in 1990 after the removal of the military from political power.

The next stage in rocketry was the development of a solid-propellant SS-600 rocket with a maximum firing range of 600 km and a warhead weighing 500 kg. At the same time, the terminal missile guidance system provided a sufficiently high firing accuracy. In the mid-1990s. Under pressure from Washington, all of these rocket programs were terminated, and efforts in the field of rocketry were concentrated on the program to create a four-stage VLS launch vehicle for launching light spacecraft into low earth orbits.

Constant failures in the creation of the VLS launch vehicle pushed the Brazilian leadership to use the experience that Russia and Ukraine have accumulated in the space field. Thus, in November 2004, Moscow and Brasilia decided to jointly create a family of launch vehicles under the general name "Southern Cross". A year later, this project was approved by the Brazilian government, and the State Missile Center "Design Bureau named after V. P. Makeev”, whose specialists propose to use their developments on launch vehicles of light and middle class, in particular on the“Flight”rocket from the“Air Launch”project. It was originally planned that the Southern Cross family will start operating in 2010-2011. But in 2007, its head developer was changed. It was the State Space Science and Technology Center named after M. V. Khrunichev, who proposed his own versions of launch vehicles based on developments for the promising family of modular launch vehicles "Angara".

The already created technological groundwork in rocketry allows Brazil, after making a political decision, to quickly create a short-range ballistic missile, and in some future even medium-range.


In 1979, Argentina, with the help of European states, primarily the Federal Republic of Germany, began to create a single-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile Alacran with a firing range of up to 150 km with a warhead of 400 kg. This program was named Condor-1. In October 1986, two successful flight design tests of the Alacran rocket took place, which made it possible in 1990 to take it into service. It is possible that a number of missiles of this type are in reserve.

In 1984, together with Iraq and Egypt, a new Condor-2 missile program was launched with the aim of creating a two-stage solid-propellant mobile missile with a firing range of up to 750 km with a 500 kg warhead. It is quite possible that this missile was considered as a carrier of nuclear weapons (in the 1980s, Argentina was also implementing a military nuclear program). In 1990, under pressure from the United States, both programs were terminated. At the same time, some potential in rocketry was preserved.

It is obvious that the current missile potential of Brazil and Argentina, even if the respective programs are resumed, in the period up to 2020 does not pose a missile threat to Europe.


1. At present and until 2020, there is no real missile threat to the whole of Europe. Those states that are working on the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (Israel, India) or can do so (Japan) are such close partners for Brussels that they are not considered at all as a warring party.

2. Iran's missile potential should not be exaggerated. Its capabilities to create liquid-propellant rockets have been largely exhausted, which forces Tehran to use the scientific and technical groundwork it has received exclusively in the space sector. The solid-propellant direction of development of ballistic missiles is more preferable for Iran, but it is limited for the entire prospect under consideration by medium firing ranges. Moreover, Tehran needs such missiles only to deter Tel Aviv from a possible missile and bomb strike.

3. In view of the high degree of internal instability in the countries of the Near and Middle East, which is intensified by the short-sighted and sometimes adventurous regional policy of NATO member states, a local (limited in scope) potential threat to Europe from this direction is possible, but it is terrorist, not rocket character. If the radical Islamists are able to seize and use short-range missile systems, then the deployment of an American SM-3 anti-missile base in Romania is sufficient to contain them. The creation of a similar base in Poland and a significant increase in the speed of movement of anti-missiles, and even more so giving them a strategic status, that is, the possibility of intercepting ICBM warheads, will indicate the desire of the American side to change the existing balance of forces in the field of strategic offensive weapons. Against the background of the deepening Ukrainian crisis, this will contribute to the further deterioration of Russian-American relations and push Moscow to take adequate military-technical measures.

4. The process of proliferation in the world of missile technologies continues, which poses a serious threat to such unstable regions as the Near and Middle East, Northeast Asia. The deployment of American missile defense systems there only provokes other states to create more modern ballistic and cruise missiles and build up their own military potential. The flaw in this approach, which presupposes the priority of national interests over global ones, is becoming more and more obvious. Ultimately, this will boomerang the United States of America itself, whose military superiority over other states has a limited time frame.

5. An extremely high threat of uncontrolled proliferation of missile technologies now comes from Ukraine due to both the possibility of seizure of missile systems by radical nationalists for the purpose of political blackmail of the leadership of Russia and neighboring European states, and illegal export of missile technologies by Ukrainian organizations contrary to the current international legislation. It is quite possible to prevent such a development of events, but for this in Europe it is necessary to think more about its own, and not American national interests. Not to look for a reason to impose new political, financial and economic sanctions against Moscow, but to really create a unified system of European security with the aim, inter alia, of preventing any attempts at missile proliferation.

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