On June 28 this year, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia published a draft strategy for the development of the shipbuilding industry until 2035 (Order No. 2553-r dated October 28, 2019). This document is very difficult to read as it is replete with general phrases and an almost complete lack of specificity.
And this can be considered normal, since our ship engine building is still, since the beginning of the century, if not in a state of clinical death, then coma.
Someone may disagree, but read the document, there you will find in a sufficient number of wording such as "critical", "causing concern" and the like.
Personally, upon closer examination, it caused a lot of negativity that in the federal target program "National Technological Base" (2007-2011) there was a whole section with the burning title "Creation and organization of production in the Russian Federation in 2011-2015 of diesel engines and their new generation components ".
On the creation and organization of production from the budget, 8 billion rubles went down. Everyone knows the result.
Office games such as the creation of a kind of "Coordination Council for the development of piston engine building" under the Ministry of Industry and Trade did not bring expected results. A mechanism of special investment contracts (SPIC) was introduced, but last year the Cabinet of Ministers suspended work through the SPIC "until the instrument is improved."
However, as part of the work on the SPIC, still something was done in the direction of solving the problem. Prior to the suspension of work on the SPIC, 33 contracts were concluded for the amount of 434 billion rubles. Including money for development was allocated to leading companies in the field of diesel engine building. And Kolomensky Zavod, Zvezda and Ural Diesel Engine Plant eventually began work on the creation of new lines of diesel engines.
Three lines of medium-speed and two lines of high-speed engines of the new generation were in operation at once. However, where they are most needed, that is, the United Shipbuilding Company (USC) and further into the fleet, diesel engines did not get there. More precisely, they were simply not produced. There was not enough money.
And the development of engines with a capacity of 1–20 MW had to be postponed altogether.
Within the walls of the plant in Kolomna, tests of diesel engines of the D-500 family continue. For the fleet, the 16SD500 modification is intended, which was demonstrated a year ago as a model at the annual army show in Alabino.
And now it finally happened: after only 11 years from the start of the ROC, the D500K engine went for testing.
But the problem of the urgently needed medium turnover workers has not yet been resolved. And here it is not even a matter of completing the new ships. We have in stock in all fleets a lot of ships that require replacement of engines. This is the Soviet legacy, ships and vessels with a service life of 25 years and older.
Alas, the engine does not last forever, and the absence of a new engine at full depletion of the resource definitely puts the ship in a joke.
Soviet marine diesel engines are a thing of the past, including in Zaporozhye and Nikolaev, so if they change, then for something modern and really domestic.
And here the “new Russian” D500 was from the very beginning very conditionally Russian. At least the crankshaft, cylinder block, pistons and much more were manufactured by German and Austrian firms.
Nowadays, the times have gone harsh, and it is wonderful that the plant was able to improve the situation and modernize production to produce the necessary components. So import substitution in the field of engines for ships is very, very serious.
The position is binding. Either we replace the German, Austrian, Dutch, Swiss with our own, or we bow to China. And if there is (not always), then sometimes it is of such quality that it is better not.
And, of course, the problem requires decent funding. Marine diesel engineering should be funded as one of the most important, and then destroyers and frigates will not stand idle waiting for at least some engines.
In general, during the times of Russian reality, too much was destroyed, including the “shameful Soviet legacy” represented by “Soyuzdieselmash”, which existed under the USSR Ministry of Heavy and Transport Engineering. Accordingly, production and service chains were destroyed at all stages of the diesel engine's life cycle.
Eliminating the consequences of democratic violence will take many more years, solely because breaking is not building.
In the meantime, the fleet will continue to suffocate from the lack of diesels …
And to say, for example, how long it will take for the Kolomna diesel engineers to solve all the problems to start producing ship machines in the proper volumes is still very, very difficult.
How difficult it is to say how, apart from a licensed engine from MAN, another old and proven manufacturer of marine diesel engines, PJSC RUMO from Nizhny Novgorod, can help the fleet. There, too, due to a lack of funding, they can in no way organize the production of engines of their own design.
In general, sometimes we have strange things taking place. The fleet needs engines. Large and small. Domestic manufacturers are in debt, and Chinese cars are being purchased. And then ships (new) are shredded to completely replace the jammed Chinese miracle diesel engine.
And the debts of the same "RUMO" in 2018 alone amounted to more than 250 million rubles …
It is good that at least they have not forgotten how to repair and capitalize a diesel engine. At least we can do something. While we can still, it is not known how it will go on there.
Yes, dozens of ships and vessels still use Soviet-designed diesel engines in the Navy. These units are quite reliable and have repair and modernization potential.
But alas, diesel is such a thing … not endless. It will not be possible to repair it forever, so sooner or later they will say “everything”. And then problems will begin, especially with those ships that so far simply have nothing to replace.
These are BDK projects 1171 and 775, rescuers of submarines of project 537, tankers of the Dubna type, missile ships of project 11661 and many other things that are in use, but the engine still has a resource.
And nowhere to go. Therefore, the command and the relevant services of the Navy extend the service life of old ships.
In general, our fleet can in no way be called new and modern, the average service life of ships has crossed the 25-year line. This is not a very scary indicator, but it says that one ship served 2 years, and the second - 40. And just with those who are "over 30", all sorts of things usually happen. They start to smoke, for example. And they barely swim. Somehow they don't even talk about walking.
Therefore, something must be done, and it was necessary to start the day before yesterday. When problems with ship machines had just appeared. There are 10 enterprises left in Russia that can produce diesel engines. Few? Many? They are. But our new ships are equipped with Chinese diesels, which are far from the best.
Moreover, it is no longer possible to count on “Europe will help us”. Everything. Licenses, joint development, modernization - all this was covered by sanctions and remained in the past.
MAN, SEMT Pielstik, Wärtsilä - this is no longer about us. Forgot.
There are only two options left: either to urgently reanimate their own, or to buy what they are selling. They sell a little and at a high price. Here is the whole alignment for you.
It is worth considering: we have TEN marine engine factories, and we are buying Chinese engines. Well, what can you call this if not a shame?
But the fact that our engines are developing very slowly is only part of the problem. Because, in addition to R&D, the development of production is immediately drawn, all sorts of improvements, modernization, plus service maintenance and scheduled repairs.
All this would be good if our fleet ordered diesel in real lots, like Russian Railways for diesel locomotives.
But we get at the exit exclusively small-scale production "to order". That is, something that is completely unprofitable for the plant.
This means that the problem must be solved through a state order with normal funding. Since we got on the rails of a market economy, it is in the interests of the state to pay for the fleet to receive engines for ships and vessels on time.
The Russian manufacturer of marine diesel engines must be rescued. And we are losing it in the truest sense of the word.
Yes, now, when we can safely forget about Western brands of diesel engines, because they remained behind the sanctioned fence, and our own did not appear, then the situation is so-so. It is clear that the market demands to follow the path of the least cost, that is, to buy diesel engines in Asia.
Or vice versa, if the enterprise is not able to produce SO MUCH engines (an allusion to the St. Petersburg plant Zvezda, which is really sewn up), because the production capacity is simply not calculated.
Is Zvezda to blame for not being in time, or are those who dumped all orders for small missile ships and boats onto one plant?
A coordination center similar to the one created under the Ministry of Industry and Trade should have been created 15 years ago. But to create not under the ministry, but under the same USC, because who, if not shipbuilders, is interested in engines? And who is breaking the deadlines for the State Defense Order?
It is necessary to revive the design school, revive the production of marine engines, revive the system of maintenance and repair. I had more yesterday.
But the first violin in this should be played by the state, having properly financed not the creation of incomprehensible and indistinct superstructures, namely, manufacturing enterprises should be the first to feel the state support on themselves.
The factories cannot be extended on their own in small-scale production. Only a state order, and not for the creation of a diesel engine for MRK project 22800, but for the creation, construction and maintenance of a line of engines for the needs of the fleet.
In the meantime, the operational independent creation of competitive marine diesel engines at Russian enterprises is impossible. First of all, because it is not necessary / unprofitable for the factories themselves, which, for the sake of maintaining their pants, would be better off producing anything, just not an engine under a one-time contract, albeit within the framework of the state defense order.
So, we will develop design bureaus and manufacturers in Asia?
I would not want to. Especially considering the fact that we still have ten diesel manufacturers of our own.
There is a prospect. It must be realized in the government. And then there will be much fewer problems in "tomorrow".
