Throughout the history of the development of tanks as the main striking force of the ground forces (Land Forces), there was also an active development of means for their destruction. From a certain point, the greatest threat to the tank began to be posed not by enemy tanks, but by combat aircraft, primarily helicopters with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and infantry with ATGMs and hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs).
Since no alternative to tanks in the ground forces has yet been invented, the question of their protection from threats posed by aviation and camouflaged infantry has become acute. The solution to the problem of protecting tanks from an air attack can be effectively carried out by mobile anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) or anti-aircraft cannon-missile systems (SAM), such as the Tor air defense system, the Tunguska air defense system or the new Sosna air defense system (the successor of the SAM "Strela-10").
With ground tank-hazardous targets, such as infantry with ATGMs and grenade launchers, everything is more difficult. To increase the tank's survivability, it must act in conjunction with the infantry, which has an incomparably better view, and is capable of quickly identifying and hitting tank-hazardous targets. However, if the infantry is dismounted, then the speed of movement of the tank is limited by the speed of movement of the person, which nullifies all the advantages of the high mobility of armored forces. In order to provide the infantry with the ability to move at the speed of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) were developed.
Infantry fighting vehicles
The first BMP (BMP-1) was created as a new class of armored combat vehicles in the USSR and was adopted by the ground forces in 1966. According to the doctrine of a full-scale war with NATO, for which the USSR was preparing, the BMP-1 with the motorized infantrymen who took refuge in them were supposed to follow the tanks. Since it was believed that the war would go on only with the use of nuclear weapons, the first BMP-1 had minimal protection against enemy weapons, as well as the ability to defeat the enemy. In these conditions, the main task of the BMP-1 is to protect soldiers from the damaging factors of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Local conflicts, in particular the war in Afghanistan, have made their own adjustments. The weak armor protection of the BMP-1 turned it into a mass grave with almost any enemy fire effect. Side projections made their way from large-caliber machine guns, RPGs pierce the BMP-1 armor from any angle. The limitation of the elevation angle of the gun to 15 degrees did not allow firing at high-lying targets. The appearance of the BMP-2 with its rapid-firing 30-mm automatic cannon 2A42 of 30 mm caliber, with an elevation angle of up to 75 degrees, increased the ability to defeat tank-hazardous targets. But the problem of weak armor, vulnerable to the effects of anti-tank weapons, remained on both the BMP-2 and the BMP-3.
Weak armor did not allow the use of infantry fighting vehicles at the front line along with main battle tanks (MBT). If a tank could withstand several shots from an RPG, then for an infantry fighting vehicle, the very first hit meant almost guaranteed destruction. In Afghanistan, and in other subsequent conflicts, soldiers often preferred to be placed on top of the armor, rather than inside the car, since this gave a chance to survive a mine explosion or an RPG shot.
The landing force placed on the armor becomes vulnerable to any enemy weapon, and the weak armor of the BMP does not allow them to safely move in the same formation with the tanks, which again brings us back to the need to ensure the defense of tanks from tank-hazardous targets.
Heavy infantry fighting vehicles
Another solution was the creation of heavy infantry fighting vehicles (TBMP), usually created on the basis of main tanks. One of the first to develop and adopt the TBMP was Israel, which, due to the specifics of its geographical position, is in a state of almost continuous war of varying degrees of intensity. The need to conduct hostilities in densely built-up areas, where the threat from enemy infantry with RPGs is maximum, forced the Israeli armed forces (Armed Forces) to take measures to protect the military. One of the solutions was a small amphibious compartment in the main Israeli tank "Merkava", but this was a partial solution, since the tank does not provide any comfortable accommodation for the infantry.
Another decision was the creation of a TBPM based on the Soviet T-54/55 tank. A significant number of T-54 / 55 tanks were captured by Israel during the 1967 Six Day War. As the main battle tank, these vehicles were already not very effective, nevertheless, their armor protection exceeded the armor protection of BMPs in service with all the armies of the world.
On the basis of the T-54/55 TBMP "Akhzarit" was created. The turret was removed from the tank, the engine-transmission compartment was replaced, reducing its size, which made it possible to ensure the exit of the landing force through the aft ramp. The mass of the T-55 is 36 tons, without the tower, 27 tons. After equipping the hull with overhead elements made of steel with carbon fibers and a set of dynamic protection "Blazer", the mass of the TBMP "Akhzarit" was 44 tons.
The subsequent use of the Akhzarit TBMP in limited conflicts confirmed the high survivability of this type of armored vehicle. The positive experience of creating the Akhzarit TBMP led to the development of a new Namer TBMP (sometimes classified as a heavy armored personnel carrier) based on the main Israeli tank Merkava, with improved tactical and technical characteristics.
In the future, the idea of TBMP was repeatedly returned to other countries of the world, including in Ukraine, where several TBMP models were developed based on Soviet tanks, and in Russia, where a heavy armored personnel carrier BTR-T based on the T-55 tank was developed.
The most modern representative of heavy infantry fighting vehicles can be considered the Russian TBMP T-15 based on the Armata platform, which implements the latest layout achievements and design solutions to ensure the safety of the crew and the landing force. For installation on TBMP T-15, weapons modules are being considered with both a 30-mm cannon and a 57-mm cannon. The presence in the ammunition of the cannons of shells with remote detonation on the trajectory will provide high capabilities to defeat tank-hazardous manpower. In addition, the 57-mm guided projectile being developed for this gun will make it possible to effectively deal with aerial tank-hazardous targets.
The only known drawback of the T-15 TBMP at the moment can be considered its high cost, like all vehicles based on the Armata platform, which will certainly affect the volume of equipment supplied to the troops. However, taking into account the high coefficient of technical novelty inherent in the Armata platform machines, the actual operation experience may reveal other design flaws.
Tank support combat vehicles
In addition to the creation of a heavy BMP, in Russia, the Uralvagonzavod Corporation (UVZ) developed another vehicle to combat the enemy's tank-hazardous manpower - the Terminator Tank Support Fighting Vehicle (BMPT) (sometimes referred to as BMOP - fire support combat vehicle).
The main difference between a heavy infantry fighting vehicle and a tank support combat vehicle is that the crew of the latter does not dismount, and carries out the defeat of tank-hazardous targets with BMPT weapons. On the first BMPT model, presented in 2002, one 30-mm 2A42 cannon was installed with a 7, 62 PKTM machine gun paired with it and four Kornet ATGM launchers, 2 30-mm AGS-17D grenade launchers were installed in the fenders.
The crew of the first generation BMPT consisted of five people, of which two crew members were required to work with grenade launchers. Subsequently, the weapon module was changed, two 30-mm cannons 2A42, 7, 62 mm PKT machine gun and four ATGM "Attack-T" were installed. As the basis for the BMPT, the hull and chassis of the T-90A tank with an additionally installed reactive armor "Relikt" were initially provided.
BMPT "Terminator" of the first generation did not arouse interest among the ground forces (Land Forces) of Russia, a small number of BMPT "Terminator" (about 10 units) was ordered by the Ministry of Defense (MO) of Kazakhstan.
On the basis of solutions tested on the first generation vehicle, UVZ developed the second generation BMPT “Terminator-2”. Unlike the first vehicle, presumably to reduce the cost of the product, the T-72 tank was chosen as a platform. The missiles were covered in armored casings, increasing their survivability under enemy fire, it was decided to abandon the installation of automatic grenade launchers, as a result of which the crew was reduced to three people. In general, the concept and layout of the BMPT "Terminator-2" is comparable to that of the first vehicle.
How effectively can BMPT perform tasks to combat tank-hazardous targets? To understand this, let's digress from armored vehicles for a while.
John Boyd's OODA / OODA Cycle
The OODA: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act cycle is a concept developed for the US Army by former Air Force pilot John Boyd in 1995, also known as Boyd's loop. Observation is the acquisition, collection, study, reflection of situation data, orientation is the analysis and assessment of the situation data, the decision is the decision-making on an operation, its planning and assignment of missions to the troops, action is the direct command and actions of the troops in the performance of their combat missions.
There are two main ways to achieve competitive advantages: the first way is to make your cycles of action in quantitative terms faster, this will force your adversary to react to your actions, the second way is to improve the quality of the decisions you make, that is, to make decisions that are more appropriate to the current situation. than your opponent's decisions.
John Boyd's OODA cycle is quite versatile and can be adapted to many areas of human activity.
In relation to the resistance of the tank and tank hazardous manpower, the classic NORD loop can be considered. The interacting, within the framework of the task of mutual destruction, the tank and the anti-tank crew (grenade launcher / ATGM operator), perform the same subtasks - target detection (observation), formulation of scenarios for its destruction / refusal to destroy (orientation), selection of the optimal scenario (solution) and its execution (action).
For a grenade launcher, it may look like this - detecting a tank (observation), forming scenarios - shoot immediately / let the tank closer / skip the tank and shoot at the rear (orientation), choosing the optimal option - a shot at the stern (solution) and directly attack (action) … For a tank, everything is the same.
Why does a tank-hazardous manpower pose a significant threat to a tank, especially on rough terrain and in urban areas, as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya have shown? With regard to the OODA cycle, the anti-tank crew will have an advantage in the "observation" phase, since a tank is a much more noticeable target than a camouflaged soldier with a grenade launcher, and in relation to close range, an infantryman has an advantage in the "action" phase as well, since aiming and shooting from the grenade launcher can be carried out much faster than turning the turret and aiming the tank's cannon. The greater amount of information received by the infantryman who has a better overview allows improving the quality of decision-making in the "orientation" and "decision" phases, that is, to increase the efficiency of the cycle.
What does this mean in relation to BMPT? Reconnaissance means - observation devices of the BMPT are similar to those installed on the MBT of the T-90 type, therefore, there are no advantages in the "observation" phase of the BMPT compared to the tank, which means there are no advantages in the "orientation" and "decision" phases.
As for the “action” phase, there is no definite answer. The turning speed of the turret of the T-90 tank is 40 degrees per second. I did not succeed in finding the turning speed of the BMPT "Terminator" turret, but it can be assumed that, given that the commander and gunner of the BMPT are located in the tower, the speed of its turn cannot be significantly increased, since the crew will have a negative centrifugal force that occurs when rotation.
In this case, almost everything that the BMPT can do within the framework of solving the problem of destroying tank-hazardous manpower can be carried out by the tank itself. The defeat of anti-tank crews can be effectively carried out with 3VOF128 "Telnik" -type fragmentation-beam projectiles. Depending on the installed installation, the projectile can carry out a trajectory rupture on the approach to the target (at a pre-emptive point) with the target hit by the axial flow of ready-made destructive elements (GGE), the trajectory rupture over the target, with the target hit by the circular field of hull fragments, the ground shock with the installation for instant (fragmentation) action, impact ground break with setting for high-explosive fragmentation action (low deceleration), impact ground break with setting for penetrating-high-explosive action (large slowdown). The only thing that a tank cannot do in comparison with an BMPT is to hit targets on elevations due to the limitations of the angle of the gun.
Information is circulating in the open press about the development of the Terminator-3 BMPT based on the Armata platform with an unmanned module and an automatic 57 mm cannon. In discussions about the need for the armed forces to switch to the 57 mm caliber, many copies have already been broken. It cannot be denied that there are certain problems with the defeat of lightly armored enemy vehicles "head-on" with 30 mm projectiles, and the presence of ATGMs in the combat vehicle, including those fired from the 125/100 mm barrel, does not solve the problem due to the possibility of intercepting the latter complexes of active protection (KAZ) of the enemy. It will be much more difficult to intercept a high-speed armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectile - a BOPS 125 mm caliber, or a queue of a BOPS caliber 57 mm KAZ will be much more difficult. However, the potential of 30 mm projectiles is also far from being exhausted, as evidenced by promising developments appearing on the arms market.
Returning to the task of defeating tank-hazardous manpower, it can be assumed that it can be approximately equally effectively solved by both automatic cannons of 30 mm caliber and automatic cannons of 57 mm caliber, provided that the ammunition load contains shells with remote detonation on the trajectory. As mentioned earlier, for a promising TBMP, two variants of unmanned combat modules have been / are being developed, both with 30-mm and 57-mm automatic cannons. In this context, it is generally not clear why a separate Terminator-3 BMPT is needed, if there is a TBMP capable of both supporting the MBT with the fire of a 30-mm / 57-mm automatic cannon, and delivering infantry to the front line.
Finally, we must not forget about one more option, which was considered in the article 30-mm automatic cannons: sunset or a new stage of development? - creation of compact remote-controlled weapon modules with a 30 mm cannon to be placed on MBT instead of a 12, 7-mm machine gun. This will allow the MBT to independently engage highly located tank-hazardous targets in the entire range of angles, reducing its dependence on TBMP / BMPT support.
Based on the OODA cycle of John Boyd, it should be noted: neither the installation of a module with a 30-mm automatic cannon, nor the support of the TBMP / BMPT tank will help to fully solve the problem of significantly increasing the protection of MBT from tank-hazardous manpower. This will require new solutions in terms of building weapons modules, increasing the situational awareness of the tank's crew, and solutions in the field of automation, which we will talk about in the next article.
