The birthday - or, more precisely, the "conception" - of the BB-1 / Su-2 aircraft should be considered December 27, 1936. It was on this day that the resolution of the Labor and Defense Council was issued (hereinafter - a quote from the Khazanov-Gordyukov monograph):
on the construction of a high-speed long-range reconnaissance attack aircraft according to the low-wing scheme. The basic requirements for the aircraft were determined, which should have been submitted for testing in August 1937:
Maximum speed at an altitude of 4000 … 5000 m - 420 - 430 km / h;
Maximum speed at the ground - 350 - 400 km / h;
Landing speed - 90 -95 km / h;
Practical ceiling - 9000 - 10000m;
Normal cruising range - 4000 km;
With overload - 2000 km;
Armament - 3 - 5 machine guns and 200 - 500 kg of bombs"
On August 25, 1937, the chief pilot of TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - G. K.) Mikhail Mikhailovich Gromov, who had just returned to the USSR after the famous flight over the North Pole to San Jacinto, took off the first copy of the ANT-51 aircraft, he the same "Stalin's assignment-1" - SZ-1, aka "Ivanov", aka - in the future - BB-1, aka - Su-2. According to Doyenne of the Soviet pilots, "the plane was simple and easy to fly, had good stability and controllability."
From February 21 to March 26, 1938, the aircraft successfully passed State tests in Evpatoria.
In March 1939, the State Defense Committee issued a GKO decree on the launch of the Sukhoi Ivanov aircraft into series production under the BB-1 brand - "first close-range bomber."
On December 9, 1941, by a joint decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Su-2 was discontinued.
From the beginning of the series until the end of production, 893 Ivanov / BB-1 / Su-2 aircraft of various modifications left the factory stocks.
This is the extremely brief history of the aircraft, which served as the first, and not the steepest, step to the Glory Pedestal for one of the best aircraft designers of the 20th century - Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi.
This is the extremely brief history of the aircraft, which served as the object of the most powerful propaganda provocation.
1. Su-2 and "Day M"
It will, of course, be about a terrible tale of a certain Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun, aka Bogdanych) called "Day M". More precisely, about the 6th ("About Ivanov") and 11th ("Winged Genghis Khan") chapters of this epoch-making collection of fairy tales. I cannot say for whom I am more offended - for J. V. Stalin or for the plane. In any case, let's try to figure it out. The "Bible" of Soviet aviation history will help us in this - the book by VB Shavrov "History of aircraft designs in the USSR, part two, 1938-50" and the excellent monograph "Su-2: close-range bomber", written by two remarkable modern historians - Dmitry Khazanov and Nikolai Gordyukov, as well as a number of books, reference books and magazines listed at the end of the article.
"… once, in 1936, Stalin gathered aircraft designers at his nearby dacha, treated them with all Caucasian hospitality, and then set the task of building an airplane (the best in the world, no need to explain this) called" Ivanov ".
Work on the project "Ivanov" was carried out simultaneously by many teams, including under the leadership of Tupolev, Neman, Polikarpov, Grigorovich. In those days, under the general leadership of Tupolev, the design groups of Petlyakov, Sukhoi, Arkhangelsky, Myasishchev worked, under the leadership of Polikarpov - Mikoyan and Gurevich, Lavochkin and Grushin worked for Grigorovich. Everything that Stalin ordered Tupolev, Grigorovich or Polikarpov automatically extended to the vassal design groups."
Let's leave the "nearby dacha" on the conscience of Rezun and his brisk imagination: not a single designer remembers anything like that, and the author, as usual, did not bother to confirm his verbal passages with a reference. Let's take a closer look at the composition of the participants.
According to Rezun, it turns out that since Tupolev himself took part in the competition, it means that the entire Design Department of Experimental Aircraft Building of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, KOSOS TsAGI, headed by him, abandoned everything and collapsed with his chest on Ivanov. Petlyakov and Sukhoi, Myasishchev and Arkhangelsky - all are working together to design "Ivanov", and each - his own, and jealously cover the drawers with their palms - no matter how a neighbor spies … Competition, adnaka!
Strongly. Impressive. Only this is not true.
The fact is that KOSOS, headed by A. N. Tupolev, really consisted of several brigades, being the main forge of aviation developments in the country. And each team was engaged in its development. For the period described, Petlyakov's brigade brought the ANT-42 project, aka TB-7; Arkhangelsk brigade - ANT-40, aka SB; the rest of the brigades also fulfilled their tasks. The phrase "a team under the leadership of Tupolev" in practice means the following: Andrei Nikolaevich, having received TTT (tactical and technical requirements) for "Ivanov" by his official mail, got acquainted with them - and conveyed, along with his general considerations, to one of the leaders of the brigades. Namely - P. O. Sukhoi. And here I have to slow down and start a long explanation.
Today, even a person who is far from aviation at the mention of the surname "Sukhoi" or at least the abbreviation "Su" somehow denotes understanding. This is natural: KB im. Sukhoi is now one of the most authoritative in the country and, perhaps, the most famous. Therefore, the idea that P. O. Sukhoi "from the beginning of time" was the largest figure in the domestic aircraft industry seems to be natural and, as it were, taken for granted. Accordingly, everything that left its drawing board was, at the time of its creation, the most important task and the "spearhead of the main blow" of the Soviet aviation industry.
That is, the authority of today's "Su" is automatically transferred to all "drying" in general. And this is fundamentally wrong. The aircraft designer P. O. Sukhoi did not suddenly appear to the world in glory and splendor. At the time of the beginning of the development of "Ivanov" in the asset of Sukhoi was, frankly, a little.
1. Aircraft ANT-25, aka RD, aka "Stalin's Route" - the one on which Chkalov and Gromov, with their polar flights from the USSR to the USA, showed the world what Soviet aviation meant. The main one, of course, was Tupolev, but it was Sukhoi who led the project.
So what? RD is an experimental, record-breaking aircraft serving to provide breakthroughs in the high-tech field, but not a combat one, not a serial one.
2. Fighter I-4. It seems to be a combat vehicle, but again produced in a small series, the person of the Red Army Air Force did not in any way define. The reason is simple: it was the first Soviet all-metal fighter, that is, in fact, again, an experimental aircraft. The mere fact that it was made according to the "parasol" scheme and had a casing made of corrugated duralumin says a lot. Few of the machines produced were used for experimental purposes: development of Kurchevsky's dynamo-reactive cannons; experiments on the "plane-link" program by Vakhmistrov.
What happens? It turns out that, with the light hand of A. N. Tupolev, the "super-important Stalinist task" (yes, such a super-important task that no more, no less depended on its implementation, the fate of Stalin himself and the entire USSR - this is not I say, this is Rezun) in the hands of a then little-known employee of TsAGI. If we accept Rezun's assertion that "Ivanov" is the most important instrument of the aggressive war planned by Stalin, it turns out that Comrade. Tupolev reacted to the Stalinist assignment without due reverence. Formally, one might say, reacted.
Rezun's attempts to protect the honor and dignity of N. N. Polikarpov look even funnier:
“Look, among those present at the Stalinist dacha is Nikolai Polikarpov. In the previous year, 1935, at the aviation exhibition in Milan, Polikarpov's I-15bis was officially recognized as the best fighter in the world, and Polikarpov's I-16 series was already in development. Polikarpov is the leader in the world race for the best fighter. Leave Polikarpov, do not interfere with him, do not distract him: he knows how to make fighters, just do not derail him. There is a race, and every hour, every minute is worth the weight of blood. But no. Digress, comrade Polikarpov. There is work more important than building a fighter. Comrade Stalin is not interested in a fighter for a defensive war."
Let's agree - it's impressive. Nikolai Nikolayevich is all in fighters, he cannot and does not want to think about anything else, but here - on you! Two semi-literate semi-sober security officers with the mandate of the People's Commissar N. I. Ezhov: drop everything, bastard! Do "Ivanova"! Otherwise …
Readers of the site rossteam.ru have already seen this: in the same way evil semi-literate Chekists (already under Beria) forced A. N. Tupolev to build a four-engine dive bomber. Upon closer examination, the saga "About the vile Beria and the brave Tupolev" turned out to be a forgery. So, about the competition "Ivanov" Rezun told even more tales …
Let's go back one quote: "under the leadership of Polikarpov - Mikoyan and Gurevich …" That's right. At that time, N. N. Polikarpov headed the second largest aircraft design association in the USSR - after KOSOS TsAGI, the Tupolev team - the Special Design Bureau, OKB. And he also had several design teams under his command. And one of them was engaged in "Ivanov".
But Mikoyan and Gurevich were just working out the calculations for … a fighter! Why: "Comrade Stalin is not interested in a fighter for a defensive war." Apparently, it was precisely because of I. V. Stalin's disregard for fighters that the Mikoyan-Gurevich brigade was a little later allocated to a separate design bureau with the task of bringing the I-200 high-altitude fighter, the future MiG-1 / MiG-3, to the series.
But the matter is by no means limited to the I-200 fighter. Let's open the book of Shavrov, which Rezun advertises to us in this way, and see what N. N. Polikarpov was doing in the late 30s, i.e. then, when, according to Rezun, all Soviet designers at the gun of the Chekist revolver did nothing but race to make "Ivanov".
It turns out that at this very time, the Polikarpov Design Bureau is developing and building the first Soviet fighter with a liquid-cooled Hispano-Suiza engine and a ShVAK-I-17 motor-gun. A little time will pass, and the fighters of this scheme will fill the sky of the Eastern Front - LaGG-3 and "yaks" of all numbers …
At this very time, the OKB is developing a fighter with a star-shaped engine, a promising successor to the I-16 - the I-180 fighter.
At this very time, the OKB is working on a very promising family of twin-engine vehicles MPI (multi-seat cannon fighter) - VIT (high-altitude tank destroyer) - SPB (high-speed dive bomber).
All this can be read both in Shavrov and in the fascinating book of test pilot, front-line soldier, PM Stefanovsky "300 unknown". And here's the thing: Rezun cites both of these books in the bibliography of his work and even quotes a little from there. But so as not to hurt yourself. If you start reading Shavrov and Stefanovsky as a whole, and not in strictly measured pieces, the picture changes 180 degrees! Pyotr Mikhailovich flew Polikarpov's fighters just at the time when Polikarpov (according to Rezun) was categorically forbidden to do anything other than Ivanov …
This is how the evil Yezhov did not let Polikarpov build fighters!
We look further. The design bureaus of Grigorovich, Kocherigin, and Neman also took part in the competition under the slogan "Ivanov".
No offense to Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, be it said, in the 30s he was already clearly out of print. Strictly speaking, after the flying boats of the "M" series during the First World War, he did not do anything worthy at all. The I-Z fighter, which came out of the drawing room of his design bureau, turned out to be a more than mediocre machine and quietly went into oblivion. Alas, D. P. Grigorovich is a clear outsider on this list.
Rezun is driving Lavochkin and Grushin into the ranks of the designers allegedly involved in the work on "Ivanov". On the grounds that they worked for Grigorovich. Let's take a look at them too.
Grushin. Who knows at least one Grushin serial aircraft? That's right, nobody. Because those do not exist in nature. There were some interesting projects, but nothing was embodied "in metal". And we note with a sigh of chagrin: Grushin is also an outsider. And what to do? In the world of creativity, you cannot do without this: someone is on a horse, and someone is not very good.
S. A. Lavochkin. Calca from the history of P. O. Sukhoi: there is a reverse transfer, only even more illegal and crude. In 1936 the young engineer Lavochkin was nothing more than a trainee. He has not yet designed a single aircraft at all. He will become "Leading Designer" only in four years, and Chief - in five years.
Kocherigin. Tracing paper from Grushin, practically one to one. Another outsider.
Professor Neman. To begin with, we note that the Neman Design Bureau is, let's say, semi-handicraft. It operated on a voluntary basis and consisted of teachers and students of the Kharkov Aviation Institute (KhAI). We agree that the design bureau chose a very strange choice to work on "the most important instrument of an aggressive war." We will return to Neman and his "Ivanov" later, but now we will move on to the actual competition - both in the description of Rezun and in real life.
Word to Rezun:
"Each Soviet designer, regardless of his competitors, chose the same scheme: a low-weight monoplane, one engine, radial, two-row air-cooled. Each Soviet designer offered his own version of Ivanov, but each version is strikingly similar to its unfamiliar counterparts and the distant Japanese brother. and this is not a miracle: just all the designers were given the task: to create a tool for a certain type of work, for the very work that in a few years Japanese planes will do in the skies of Pearl Harbor. then each constructor will create a tool for its implementation approximately the same."
We open the boring book of Khazanov - Gordyukov, look at the draft designs presented by the "competitors" … And we are surprised. It turns out that Polikarpov and Grigorovich proposed a "high-wing" scheme! Grigorovich even managed to carry the engine above the fuselage - on a pylon, like flying boats. And what really does not go anywhere, every single designer chose the V-shaped liquid-cooled engine AM-34 as the power plant. For a very simple reason: at that time it was the most powerful and promising Soviet aircraft engine. Our "intelligence officer, historian and analyst" has failed again! But the most interesting thing in the history of the supercompetition is Ilyushin's behavior.
Formally participating in the competition, Sergei Vladimirovich did not even bother to present a projection of his "Ivanov". Calling a spade a spade, Ilyushin simply “scored” the competition! And this is completely natural! By that time, Ilyushin had already developed his own views on the appearance of the battlefield aircraft, and it is quite understandable that he did not want to be distracted by the development of an apparatus, in his opinion, a deliberately outdated and unpromising scheme. Interesting (in terms of compliance with the stories of Rezun) and the behavior of "chekists-sadists". According to Rezun, Soviet designers were obliged to make the "Ivanovs" almost on pain of being shot. But here Ilyushin chuckles contemptuously and makes it quite unambiguously that "Ivanov" is up to him to a certain place. So what? And nothing. No "black crows" rushed to him, no one grabbed him by the tsugunder and did not drag him to Butyrka. Don't like "Ivanov"? Okay, try it your own way. We'll see. Ilyushin did - and did not do anything, but "Schwarze Todt" - the legendary Il-2.
On consideration of draft designs, the competition ended. Everything! None of the projects presented was recommended for development to the stage of working drawings. There is no doubt that the competition was not intended to immediately receive a project suitable for implementation in a real apparatus. It was of an evaluative nature - what can a design idea give today on the topic "single-engine two-seater reconnaissance bomber"? According to the results of the competition, the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry, which then included the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (SUAI), proposed to build a car in three versions: all-wood, composite (mixed construction) and all-metal. According to the first option, the chief designer was appointed prof. Neman, with a production base at plant No. 135 in Kharkov, on the second - by NN Polikarpov (plant No. 21, Gorky / Nizhny Novgorod), and on the third - by P. O. Sukhoi (experimental design plant - ZOK GUAP). The choice of Sukhoi to the post of Chief for "metal" is quite logical: he has just returned from an overseas business trip to the United States, during which he got acquainted with the advanced methods of design and construction of all-metal aircraft. Moreover, as a member of the Soviet trade and procurement mission, Pavel Osipovich in the States bought something just on the topic of the Ivanov project - but more on that later. So let's go, comrade. Dry, introduce, teach.
So the "icebreaker" myth about the supremely important "Ivanov" competition has burst. It turns out that it was quite an ordinary, working organizational event, in which by no means the masters took a direct part. In the light of what we have learned, Rezun's conspiracy theories have somehow imperceptibly faded and faded.
But this is just the beginning! "Icebreaker Tales" continue to gain power, color and juice. We look further.
Listen to Rezun, so the result on the topic "Ivanov" was the only and only BB-1 / Su-2. It is on him that he attacks with all the force of accusatory talent. But the fact is that the Neman plane was also built, put into service, produced in a relatively large series - 528 aircraft, more than half of the production of the Su-2 - and was used on the fronts of the Second World War until the end of 1943. We are talking about the KhAI-5, aka P-10. The question is logical: why Rezun bypasses him with deathly silence? It’s very simple. The propagandists (the British Einsatzkommando "Victor Suvoroff" are not historians, but precisely propagandists) need one vivid image, single and indivisible, in which, like in a drop of water, everything that needs (ordered) to expose or glorify would be concentrated. This is the iron rule of PR technologies. Below we will encounter it again. Therefore, the "Suvorovites" preferred to remain silent about the R-10, so as not to explain that there were two "winged jackals" (actually, not even two, but even more) and, most importantly, not to smear the impression, DO NOT CRUSH THE EFFECT.
"Ivanov" Polikarpov was not lucky. In connection with the reorganizations of the SUAI-NKAP, Polikarpov temporarily lost his production base and could not meet the deadlines for working out a prototype of his machine. At the same time, in order to reduce the cost of production, it was decided to produce the Sukhoi aircraft in a series not all-metal, but composite - with a wooden fuselage. It was considered impractical to tinker with a second similar machine, and the topic was closed. By the way, Grigorovich's "Ivanov" was also under construction. But due to the illness and death of Dmitry Pavlovich, his design bureau was disbanded and all work, of course, was closed.
Another portion of lies - in the description of the design features of the "winged jackal". Here it remains only to throw up his hands. He, apparently, is fundamentally not on friendly terms with reality, and Rezun's "cranberry" blooms immediately, as soon as he undertakes to educate the reader about the design features of the Su-2 (then still BB-1):
“And, in addition, during the work on the Ivanov project, someone's invisible but domineering hand guided those who deviated from the general course. At first glance, top-level intervention in the work of designers is just a whim of a capricious master., some designers put two firing points on prototypes: one to protect the rear upper hemisphere, the other - the rear lower hemisphere. These were corrected - we will manage with one point, there is no need to protect the rear lower hemisphere. Some covered the crew and the most important units with armor plates from all sides. They were corrected: cover only from below and from the sides. Pavel Sukhoi made his "Ivanov" in the first version all-metal. Simpler - said someone's menacing voice. Easier. Let the wings remain metal, and the body can be made of plywood. Will the speed drop? Nothing. Let it fall."
Everything is not true here.
1. The near bomber BB-1 went into series with two defensive shooting points: the upper turret of Mozharovsky - Venevidov MV-5 and the lower hatch mount LU. Where did the statement that someone's "powerful hand" removed the LU came from? And here's where. The report of the Air Force Research Institute on state tests of the second prototype BB-1 (product SZ-2) says that "the hatch mount gives aimed fire in a small sector of firing angles from -11 to -65 degrees, which ensures its use only for firing at to ground targets, because enemy air attacks are possible here in exceptional cases and are the least effective. The presented hatch installation does not at all provide protection of the rear hemisphere in the sector of corners close to the axis of the aircraft, where the most effective long-term fire of the enemy, who got into the tail of the aircraft on level flight or on bends ".
Thus, the hatch installation of the LU brand did not correspond to its purpose and, in fact, was an ordinary ballast. In September 1940 (serial production of the BB-1 was already in full swing), the LU was, yes, liquidated. But they did not fundamentally eliminate the lower firing point, but simply its unsuccessful model. Instead, LU Mozharovsky and Venevidov developed a lower installation MV-2, which completely covered the rear lower hemisphere. But then the military was visited by a new insight. It was decided to remove the installation, and leave the hatch to make it easier for the navigator to leave the emergency vehicle. Yes, comrades in the military - with the best of intentions - dumped the big fool; but where does the "invisible formidable hand"? A common mistake that people of all countries have made, are and will continue to make. Only the one who does nothing is not mistaken. With the beginning of the war, the erroneousness of this decision became obvious, and the factory brigades immediately restored the MV-2 with the help of sets of parts taken from the warehouses.
There is such a nuance here. In the photographs of the appearance, the installation - both LU and MV-2 - cannot be seen. In the stowed position, it retracts into the fuselage and closes flush with the hatch flaps. But with the threat of an attack by fighters, it moves into the stream, but there was usually no one to photograph the Su-2 with the machine gun extended, a minute before the attack of the Messerschmitts … for some reason.
2. About armor. You can shovel at least a ton of literature on WWII aviation, but there were only three aircraft in nature that had armor "from the sides": the Soviet Il-2 and Il-10, and the German Hs.129. On all the rest, the armor "from the sides" was either absent altogether, or was hung in the form of separate small tiles designed to cover one or another important unit: for example, a projectile container. Or the pilot's left hand. In addition, the planes of all belligerents began to overgrow with such tiles only in 1940, after the pilots were personally convinced of the lethal effect of rapid-fire machine guns and especially air cannons. For September 1939, the maximum that the aircraft of all the belligerent countries had at their disposal was the pilot's armored back, and sometimes the front armored frame and a couple of armor plates for the air gunners. Moreover, many cars did not have this either! So, for example, Spitfire, Hurricane, R-40 Tomahok went into battle absolutely “naked”.
The English pilot and aviation historian Michael Speke in his book "Aces of the Allies" (Minsk, "Rusich", 2001) tells the astonishing case when the engineers of the "Hauker" company refused to book a "harricane", doubting the very possibility (!) Of such alteration … The squadron leader Hallahan, the commander of the 1st RAF Squadron, flying the "harricanes", had to handicraftly adapt the armor back from the Battle bomber in the cockpit of his fighter, drive the car to the Hawker factory airfield and demonstrate it to the bosses there. Only after such a visual demonstration did the engineers admit that they were wrong and straighten the situation.
If the lack of reservation or its insufficiency is a sign of the aggressiveness of the state, then the British are the undisputed leaders in this regard. German fighter pilots, following the results of the first battles with the British, were unanimously surprised at how easily their opponents caught fire. No wonder - it took the Wilhelmshaven massacre and the Sedan massacre for the British to begin equipping their aircraft with gas tank protectors and a neutral gas filling system. And vice versa: in the Luftwaffe, the systems of passive protection of aircraft were given before the war, perhaps, the most attention. Using Rezun's logic, we come to the conclusion: it was Britain that was plotting a "treacherous attack on the sleeping German airfields" and subsequent flights "in the clear sky"! And these are just the flowers of "unbridled British aggression"! Below I undertake to present the "berries".
As for the Su-2, it was no different in this respect from its other peers, both Soviet and foreign. The pilot has an armored back, the navigator has nothing. Neither from below nor from the sides. This shortcoming of Soviet production workers, like their foreign counterparts, had to be urgently eliminated already in the course of hostilities. But the protectors and the neutral gas system on the Su-2 were originally available - in contrast to the same British.
3. Finally, plywood and speed. Here, strictly speaking, there is no relationship at all. The famous British multipurpose aircraft "Mosquito" was completely wooden, both along and across, but this did not prevent it from becoming the absolute champion in its class in terms of speed, rate of climb and flight ceiling. The BB-1 / Su-2 flight data did not deteriorate from the transition to a composite structure:
a. All-metal BB-1 (SZ-2):
maximum speed at the ground - 360 km / h
the same, at the border of an altitude of 4700 m - 403 km / h
time to climb 5000 m - 16.6 min
practical ceiling - 7440 m
b. Composite BB-1 (serial):
maximum speed at the ground - 375 km / h
the same, at the border of an altitude of 5200 m - 468 km / h
time to climb 5000 m - 11.8 min
practical ceiling - 8800 m
Ay! Again, the comrades from MI6 got through. The fact is that, firstly, the rich experience and high level of working with wood at Soviet factories ensured a very clean surface and a high weight culture of wooden structures. And secondly, simultaneously with the transition to composite, the 820-horsepower M-62 engine (Russian Wright "Cyclone") was replaced by the 950-horsepower M-87 (Russian Gnome-Ron "Mistral-Major"). And with duralumin in our country at that time it was not easy. And with the outbreak of the war, it only got worse. So the transfer of BB-1 to composite was quite justified, especially since it did not entail a decrease in flight performance.
This concludes the analysis of Chapter 6, simultaneously noticing to ourselves that throughout all its 9 pages Rezun did not bring a single quote or reference related to the topic, in other words, not a single objective proof of his verbose reasoning. We pass to chapter 11 - "Winged Genghis Khan". Maybe the author (s) will be more informative here?
Oh yeah! As many as 10 quotes, not counting the epigraph. And again, almost everything is out of topic. Rezun writes that Lieutenant General Pushkin, Air Marshal Pstygo, Major Lashin, Colonel Strelchenko praise the Su-2, its flight performance and high survivability. So what of this? Where is the evidence of the preparation of an aggressive war here? If the plane is good, does it automatically fall into the category of "winged jackals"? But in both chapters Rezun goes out of his way to prove that the indisputable aggressiveness of the Su-2 is precisely its ordinary characteristics! The comrade contradicts himself, but this does not seem to bother him at all. The main thing is more emotions!
Field Marshal A. Kesselring: "The terrible psychic impact of 'Stalinist organs' is an extremely unpleasant memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern Front."And where is the aggressiveness of Stalin, his Air Force and the Su-2 itself? The German talks about the power of Soviet rocket artillery, nothing more.
Colonel Sivkov: "By the end of December 1940, the formation of the 210th near-bomber regiment was completed … the pilots arrived from the civilian navy." Horrible! A whole regiment! The country was prepared to attack the peacefully sleeping enemy airfields, not otherwise! 13 light bomber regiments are preparing for work on the Su-2. At the same time, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the Air Force of the Red Army" No. 2265-977ss of November 5, 1940, thirteen divisions of long-range bomber aviation are deployed! And they were recruited largely at the expense of the selected personnel of the Civil Air Fleet and the elite of the elite - the aviation of the Northern Sea Route. What names, what faces! Vodopyanov and Kamanin, Cherevichny, Akkuratov, Mazuruk!
Stop! Wait a minute! According to Rezun's logic, light bomber aviation is an instrument of aggressive war, long-range bomber is an instrument of the holy defensive. Backfill question: which is more - 13 regiments or 13 divisions? A division - roughly - is three regiments; Taking Rezun's logic, we have: Comrade Stalin prepared for a holy defensive war three times more energetically than for an aggressive offensive one. He's a strange aggressor. Non-offensive …
Let's go further. "Krasnaya Zvezda" of 12/15/92 allegedly (Rezun does not quote himself) writes that in 1942 the pilots "… with rifles in their hands were thrown in thousands at Stalingrad to reinforce the infantry." They say that half-educated pilots were baked like pancakes, specifically for the Su-2 (what does this mean ??), of which it was planned to set up as many as 100 - 150 thousand, but … they refused to release the Su-2, and the half-educated ones were thrown into the trenches it's a pity.
Here we come close to a big and tasty topic - production plans for the production of the Su-2. But first - about the "dropouts" pilots. So, no one drove the pilots into the trenches. In the critical autumn of 1942, cadets from several schools found themselves in the German offensive zone at the front. These were the guys who went through 2-3 months of training, the maximum - the course of initial flight training. As, for example, the future pupil of Pokyshkinsky, Hero of the Soviet Union Sukhov. But the pilots were taken care of, evacuated to the Caucasus, beyond the Volga, to the Urals. Examples - DGSS Skomorokhov, DGSS Evstigneev, and the same Kozhedub, in the end.
We look at the quotes further. L. Kuzmina "General Designer Pavel Sukhoi": "Stalin formulated the problem as follows: the plane must be very simple to manufacture, so that as many copies of it can be made as there are people with the surname Ivanov in our country." Where did Madame Kuzmina get this phrase? And God knows her. Stalin had no jury stenographers to record every word. But after his death, an unexpectedly large number of them was suddenly found, which attributed to him so much all sorts of nonsense, which he could not say in principle, that now there is no and cannot be trust in any, allegedly, a glimpse of a "Stalinist" phrase that was not documented … Therefore, let's leave the phrase about "Ivanovs" on the conscience of Madame Kuzmina and look at the "simplicity" of BB-1.
The simplicity of a device is expressed primarily in its cost. Rezun repeats annoyingly at every step: the Su-2 was simple. Very simple! And as cheap as an aluminum spoon! It could be made anywhere and by anyone, almost schoolchildren in labor lessons. We read Khazanov-Gordyukov and once again we are surprised: a single-engine composite bomber Su-2 manufactured by plant No. 135 cost 430 thousand rubles, and manufactured by factory No. 207 - 700 thousand. Wow "simpleton"! But the twin-engine, all-metal bomber SB of the plant №22 cost only 265 thousand rubles, the twin-engine composite BB-22 of the plant №1 - 400 thousand rubles. And where is the ingenious simplicity here? And phenomenal cheapness? It is clear that as production improves, it becomes cheaper, but even taking this factor into account, it is clear that there is no question of any extraordinary simplicity and cheapness. Again, Mr. Rezun lied.
Ibid: "for aircraft factories that are preparing to produce the Su-2, the workers are supplied by military enlistment offices, like soldiers to the front …"
Strongly! But this statement is not confirmed by absolutely anything. Here is the practice of booking skilled workers in the defense industry from being drafted into the army - yes, it was. But it concerned the entire defense industry and there were no special conditions for the production of the Su-2 and for the NKAP in general. And yet - this is such a nice detail: at the trilateral negotiations in Moscow in 1939 regarding the creation of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet anti-Hitler bloc, the head of the French delegation, General Dumenk, told the Soviet representative Marshal Voroshilov that every worker of the French defense industry has a mobilization card similar to the mobilization instructions of those liable for military service., and with the beginning of the war must arrive at the enterprise indicated in this card. That is, following the "Suvorov" logic, France is a notorious, undoubted aggressor.
In fact, the chest, as usual, opens simply. Preparing for any war means putting industry on a war footing. It does not matter whether we are expecting an attack or are preparing ourselves to attack - if we want to win, we must mobilize industry.
Chapter 11 is full of speculation. According to Rezun, it turns out that the Soviet Air Force had plenty of bombs, rockets, and ShKAS machine guns solely because their production was previously focused on ensuring the release of a monstrous horde of 100,000 - 150,000 Ivanovs …
Let's take a look.
1. The ShKAS machine gun was developed by Shpitalny and Komaritsky in 1932, and went into production in 1934, when there was still no mention of the Su-2. They were armed with absolutely all Soviet aircraft: I-15, I-16, I-153, TB-3, DB-3, SB, DI-6, R-5, R-5SSS, R-Zet, R-9, R -10 … In 1940, mass production of Lavochkin, Yakovlev and Mikoyan fighters began, each of which was armed, among other things, with two ShKAS, and a Pe-2 bomber (four ShKAS). Consequently, TOZ was focused on the production of huge batches of the ShKAS machine gun. But with the beginning of the war, the insufficient effectiveness of rifle-caliber machine guns as an "air-to-air" weapon quickly became apparent, and the "specific weight" of ShKAS in the system of aviation weapons began to plummet. By the middle of the war, it was almost universally replaced by a large-caliber UB. So there is nothing surprising in the fact that the capacity of TOZ was quite enough to meet the sharply reduced "demand" for ShKAS.
2. Rocket projectiles. First, Rezun's chronology is lame. V. Shunkov's reference book "The Weapons of the Red Army" indicates that the RS-82 missile was put into service as early as 1935. Again - before at least a design assignment was issued for the BB-1! And, secondly, the RS-82 was originally considered as an air-to-air weapon and had a fragmentation warhead with a remote fuse, unsuitable for firing at ground targets, which was revealed in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol.
And finally, the most important thing. Launch beams and pipes (RO-82 - rocket gun, cal. 82 mm) were provided as standard armament for all Soviet fighters, attack aircraft and even SB bomber. This explains the "abundance of missiles" in the Red Army Air Force. Moreover, the Yaks and SB almost never used missile weapons.
But for the Su-2, the installation of missile weapons was not provided! Exactly for him - it was not provided, period! For the first time, as an experiment, one car was equipped with 10 beams for the RS-132 only in September 1941, three months after the start of the war. And only in mid-October, the production of the Su-2 began with attachment points for launching beams, and only every fourth was equipped with standard beams. Comrade Rezun, you lied again.
3. About bombs - the same story. The use of aerial bombs was provided for all Soviet aircraft, starting with the smallest and oldest - I-15. By the mid-1930s, the assortment of Soviet bombs was, on the whole, worked out, the release was fine-tuned, the bombs went in thousands to Spain and tens of thousands to China … What does the Su-2 have to do with it? This secret is deep and unknowable …
And Rezun continues to compose fairy tales with inspiration.
There are enough indications that the Soviet industry was in full readiness for the mass production of "Ivanov" For example, in a defensive war, fighters were needed first of all. To modernize the LaGG-Z fighter aircraft designer S. A. Lavochkin urgently needs a powerful reliable engine, and in huge quantities. No problem, the industry is ready to produce the M-82 engine in any quantity, which was intended for the Su-2. The industry is not only ready to produce them, but also has thousands of these engines in stock - take them and put them on the plane. Lavochkin staged, and the result was the famous and beloved La-5 fighter.
Once again, the brisk Bristol analyst and historian is summed up by both chronology and factualism, as in the case of MS. The first copy of "Ivanov" from Sukhoi flew on August 25, 1937 with the M-62 engine; in the production process, the Su-2 was equipped with either the M-87A, the M-87B, or the M-88 …
… And at this time Anatoly Shvetsov was just developing, testing and refining the M-82 engine (later - ASh-82). When the development became successful, the newest twin-engine bomber "103U", aka Tu-2, was identified as the priority "buyer" for it. M-82 "got on its feet", or, if you like, "on the pistons" far from immediately: the required level of reliability and at the same time a certain backlog of finished products was achieved by the plant No. 33 only in the fall of 1941.
And then a paradoxical, very rare situation developed. For objective reasons, the launch of the Tu-2 was temporarily stopped; as a result - there are motors, but no planes for them (usually the other way around). By the same time, it became clear that the only real opportunity to dramatically raise the performance characteristics of the Su-2 is to increase the power of the power plant. Sukhoi tried to adapt the "ownerless" engine to his plane - it turned out well. However … By 1942, the optimal battlefield aircraft had already been identified with the utmost clarity; it was, of course, IL-2. On November 19, 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the production of the Su-2 was discontinued, and the plant No. 135 that produced it was disbanded in order to strengthen factories No. 30 and 381 with people and equipment.
So, in the fate of the M-82 engine, "Ivanov" again did not play any significant role. Again, Mr. Rezun casts a shadow on the fence. Well, at least a piece of truth - for a change. There is nothing.
Aircraft production is not about stamping clay whistles or wooden spoons with Khokhloma roosters. It is inconceivable without clear planning, which is reflected many times in hundreds of documents. What are these strange numbers that the Bristol Einsatzkommando is annoyingly pushing under our nose? 100,000 - 150,000 aircraft! No, not even that. In capital letters, like this: HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND! Horror!
Let's start with Rezun's meaningful message that "in August 1938" Ivanov "Sukhoi under the BB-1 brand (first close-range bomber) was put into production at two plants at once."
As Goebbels said, you need to lie on a grand scale. Rezun fully agrees with the Reich propaganda minister of the Third Reich. Therefore, the breaches are unstoppable.
In fact, the GKO decree on the launch of the BB-1 in series at two plants was issued not in August 1938, but in March 1939. Is there a difference or not? But that's not all. The order to launch the series and the beginning of mass production are noticeably different things.
“Then it [Su-2 - author] began to be produced at the third: a gigantic fourth plant was under construction, and, in addition, the plants that produced other types of aircraft were ready to switch to the production of Ivanov by order.
This is nothing more than an attempt to make "scary eyes" by telling the child about Buka, Koshchei and Babu Yaga. We look at those factories:
1. Plant No. 135, Kharkov (head office). Before switching to the Su-2, the 135th built solid-wood P-10s, had neither rigging nor experience in working with metal. This is an aircraft factory, but it is a second-rate factory.
2. Plant "Sarcombine", Saratov. The name speaks for itself. This is an agricultural machinery plant, on the eve of the war, transferred to the NKAP (later - plant number 292).
Then, in the People's Commissariat, they "redefined the cards" - they transferred "Sarcombine" to the production of Yak-1 fighters, really simple to the point of indecency, with which yesterday's specialists in winnowing and threshing machines also coped. Instead, Sukhoi was allocated …
3. Plant No. 207, Dolgoprudny. This is not an aircraft factory either. It was called "Airship" and built airships accordingly. These, of course, are not mowers, but they are far from being planes. Finally, 4. Plant No. 31, Taganrog. Yes, this is an aircraft plant, but, firstly, again, it is far from leading, and secondly, it is a traditionally "marine" plant. He worked for the Navy and at the same time produced MBR-2, MDR-6, GST and KOR-1, not counting spare parts for R-5SSS and R-Zet. And here on it - not in exchange, but in addition - they load BB-1 / Su-2. There was a reason for the director not to climb the wall …
I wonder why the People's Commissar Shakhurin did not entrust the fulfillment of "the most important Stalinist order of all times" to one (or two, or all four) of the 4 leading Soviet aircraft factories - Nos. 1, 18, 21 and 22? In 1940, they provided 78% of the total production of the NKAP. Any of them could provide a single-handed solution to production tasks for the Su-2. If we accept Rezun's point of view about the arch-importance of the Su-2 program, the attitude of the NKAP leadership to its implementation looks at least strange, if not sabotage. And if we also recall the "general democratic" point of view about the a priori Stalinist bloodthirstiness, then the heads of directors and officials of the NKAP should have flown like rain, and Shakhurin's head - the very first. But this is not observed. Someone, yes, they removed. And some of them sat down. But not Shakhurin! And at the 135th, and at the 207th, and at the 31st factories, too, they did not twist anyone's hands and did not drag them into jail.
Moreover, it is very curious, what is this "giant fourth plant", which was "under construction"? I know of only two of them: in Kazan and in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The first was intended first for TB-7, then for PS-84 and Pe-2. the second - under the DB-3 / IL-4. Su-2 never figured in their production plans. Again, Rezun "molds a hunchback" to us?
But really, what were the production plans for the Su-2? In 1939, no Sukhoi aircraft were built; in 1940, by order of the NKAP No. 56 of 15.02.40, it was ordered to release 135 cars in the first half of the year; in the middle of the year, the aircraft-building program was revised based on the experience of battles on the Western Front - and the 31st plant was taken from Sukhoi and reoriented to LaGG-3. As a result, the total production of the Su-2 in 1940 was 125 aircraft. On December 9, 1940, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars, a program for the production of combat aircraft for 1941 was adopted, which provided for the release of 6070 bombers, of which only 1150 were Su-2. Hmmm. Not a lot: 18, 9% - even less than every fifth … But this is 1941! "Comrade Stalin prepared to attack" … In fact, they released 728; well, it doesn't matter anymore. It is important that the government's plans do not smell of any "hundreds of thousands" or even "tens of thousands" of the Su-2.
We see that there was no "super-priority", "paramount" production program for the Su-2. He was one of many, nothing more and nothing less. This is as it should be: a balanced air force has a wide variety of aircraft, some need more, others less, but this does not mean that some are more important than others.
And it also happens that over time, the conditions of armed struggle change and some concepts that were still workable yesterday are now being circulated. This, in general, is exactly what happened with the Su-2.
2. Su-2: how? What for? Why?
To understand how and why this or that construction was born, it is very useful to trace its genesis. Understand, so to speak, and what was "before"? In this case, to find out if the Su-2 in the Soviet Air Force had a predecessor, ideologically and conceptually close to it?
Of course it was! There is no need to look for him. This is the R-5 / R-5SSS / R-Zet family. They were entrusted with exactly the same functions that were redirected by the Su-2, just technically these requirements were implemented at the level of the previous generation of aviation: a biplane box, a composite with a predominance of wood and percale, non-retractable landing gear, an open (on R-Zet - half-closed) cockpit, from 3 to 6 ShKAS, bombs up to 500 kg, crew - 2 people. Find out? Of course. Many of them were built - 4914 R-5, 620 R-5SSS and 1031 R-Zet. But! The first flight of the R-5 took place already in 1928. It turns out that even when the insidious Stalin planned a blitzkrieg against peacefully sleeping Germany! Here is the villain!
But the fact is that at that time Germany did not have any aviation at all, not even any noticeable civilian, and there was still no leader, Comrade Stalin, but there was a "secretary" Koba, who had just, to everyone's surprise, thrown off the sworn enemy from the sky-high heights of the Russian people, the maniac-cannibal Trotsky. And Comrade Stalin still had a very long way to the levers of state power. And so far he did not have the party party to the required extent …
In Spain, the R-5 and R-Zet, acting as light attack bombers, repeatedly inflicted crushing blows on the Francoists. But by the end of the campaign, it became clear that the age of these machines was over.
It was to replace these machines that the "Ivanov" - BB-1 - SU-2 was intended. That's all!
And we will try to look even deeper into the fog of the past. And "up to R-5"? A whole string of: R-4, R-3, R-1 - all the same. In turn, the R-1 is a Soviet replica from the English De Havilland DH.9, the famous aircraft of the end of the First World War, strike, reconnaissance, spotter and even, if necessary, a heavy fighter. After the war, he became a role model for a long time in many countries of the world, not only in the USSR.
How deeply the infectious idea of the "winged jackal" has penetrated deep into the times! But that's not all.
The ancestor of this class is again the British aircraft, reconnaissance bomber AVROE504K, a single-engine two-seater biplane of the classical scheme with a pulling propeller. All other schemes - gondola, with a pushing propeller, etc. - over time were cut off and eliminated as unviable, and the 504K, having entered the war on August 1, 1914, lived long after its end.
What happens? That back in 1913 (the year 504K was created), the British planned an aggressive war, planning insidiously, despicably, treacherously to fall on someone's sleeping airfields one fine Sunday morning, putting into practice the idea of a fix of the Imperial General Staff: the concept of a blitzkrieg in "clear skies" …
Rave? Yes. Only this is not my delirium, because the logic is not mine. This is the logic of the Bristol magician, the creator of the "virtual past", which, as is typical, each time enters into an insurmountable contradiction with the facts.
Aircraft, almost identical to the 504K, bred in all belligerent and non-belligerent countries like cockroaches. British RAF Be.2 and De Havilland, French Potez and Breguet, German Albatross and Halberstadt of different brands - they all look alike, like twins, both in appearance and in their flight technical data. All of them are classic, single-engine, two-seat reconnaissance bombers. What is that supposed to mean? In the midst of the world meat grinder, the British, French, Germans, Austrians are planning treacherous strikes "on sleeping airfields" ??? I wonder for whom? Maybe in Paraguayan?
Of course no. It's just that at that time, at that technical and tactical level, this concept best met the requirements for a reconnaissance and strike aircraft. There has been nothing better yet.
There is another very important nuance that has led to the long-term commitment of the military to the single-engine reconnaissance bomber scheme. We are talking about its combat stability, defense capability.
At the technical level of PMV, the flight data of a reconnaissance bomber and a single-seat fighter did not differ fundamentally. The reason for this was the difference in the power plant. For a long time, the subtle design of the fighter did not allow placing on it a powerful engine, which at that time was only an in-line liquid-cooled engine. Star-shaped rotary air-cooled engines, which had less weight, had less power, as well as a number of other disadvantages. So, for example, these motors were not regulated by … rpm. The engine was either running at full throttle, or it was spinning idle. No more, no less. It was with such engines that the vast majority of fighters were equipped.
And as a result, it turned out that the two-seat reconnaissance bombers, despite their greater mass and geometric dimensions in comparison with fighters, thanks to a more powerful power plant, were not so inferior to fighters in flight performance as to be a "sitting duck" in battle. All of them had one or two machine guns for firing forward "fighter" and, of course, a tail turret. So in a maneuvering battle, a reconnaissance bomber could very well stand up for himself. This moment must be remembered …
… And now let's go back, up the time scale, but already - along the foreign air force.
And we see what was expected: in the interwar period, all aviation powers built such machines in hundreds and thousands. It is clear that aerodynamics and aviation technology did not stand still, and the appearance of the reconnaissance bomber was gradually changing. Pine slats gave way to steel tubes and profiles, percale was gradually replaced with veneer, veneer - with metal panels, the biplane first turned into a strut-braced parasol monoplane, then into a cantilever low-wing plane, but absolutely nothing changed conceptually.
So, according to Rezun, Hitler has a Junkers Ju.87 single-engine bomber, therefore, Germany is the undisputed aggressor. Divine Hirohito has a single-engine Nakdazima B5N "Keith" bomber, hence Japan is the undisputed aggressor. Accordingly, since Stalin has a single-engine Su-2 bomber, then..?
In fairness, it should be noted that the hardened aggressor Mussolini has the same bomber. This is Breda Va.64 - yes, a copy of the Su-2. Well, everything is natural: Italy is sheer aggression. Do not feed bread - give it suddenly, on sleeping airfields … True, the Italians for some reason never did this their signature number …
But here we have before us a peaceful, long-suffering Poland, the main victim of the war. In our time, it has become commonplace to depict Polish Poland as a kind of innocent suffering victim, torn apart by the claws of the bloodthirsty predators of Hitler and Stalin. Writing about Poland otherwise than with a compassionate sob is considered "politically incorrect". And, meanwhile, in 1938 the noble gentlemen took an active part in the seizure of Czechoslovakia. Don't blame poor Hitler: Czechoslovakia was divided by Hitler, Horthy and - the proud nobleman Rydz-Smigly, at that time a Polish dictator, no better than Adolf. He snapped off a not weak piece.
But this is by the way. And on the case we have the following: in September 1939, the basis of the Polish army aviation was made up of light single-engine bombers PZL P-23 "Karas". This is the brother of the Su-2, only "senior". The "bast shoes" are still not removed from him and the cabin is half-closed. The rest is one to one. Characteristics, of course, are worse - for age. Released in a decent, by Polish standards, series - 350 copies. Whether anyone wants it or not, we will have to, thinking in "Suvorov" categories, write Poland into the hardened aggressor. Now everything is clear - Hitler barely managed to forestall the irrepressible rush of the gentry to Berlin!
We look at a peaceful patriarchal Britain. By the fall of 1939, the backbone of the front-line bomber aviation of the Royal Air Force was made up of light single-engine Faery "Battle" bombers. This is generally the identical twin of the Su-2, a cantilever low-wing aircraft with a closed cockpit and retractable landing gear, only worse. Here are his brief performance characteristics:
Empty weight - 3015 kg, maximum takeoff - 4895 kg, Maximum speed at an altitude of 3960 m - 388 km / h, Time to climb 1525 m - 4.1 min, Practical ceiling - 7165 m, Armament: 1 7, 71 mm machine gun - forward, 1 7, 71 mm machine gun - up and back, Bomb load - up to 454 kg.
The maximum speed is 388 km / h.
According to Suvorov's logic, the worse the plane, the more aggressive it is; hence, the "Battle" is noticeably more aggressive than the Su-2. I wonder if there are a lot of them configured? Many! 1818 only combat, not counting training.. But that's not all. To the same class on the eve of the war belonged to the British Vickers "Wellesley" (produced 176 copies) and Westland "Lysander" (1550 copies). Compare with 893 Su-2. Let's add 528 P-10 here. Hmmm, and their king, together with Sir Neville Chamberlain, is 2.5 times more aggressive than Stalin! Actually, and "Wellesley" with "Lysander" - this is also not all, but about the rest of the British "relatives" of the Su-2 - a little lower. So far, these are enough.
But maybe in beautiful, peaceful France, things are different? by no means. On the one hand, even in May 1940, the Armee d'la Air still had many old devices of the previous generation - Breguet Br.27, Muro 113/115/117, Pote 25, Pote 29, biplanes and parasols with fixed landing gear. On the other hand, the basic aircraft for interaction with ground forces were the Pote 63.11 (925 produced) and Breguet 69 (382 copies). These are twin-engine aircraft, but this is where their difference from the Su-2 and the rest of the light-bomber fraternity ends. Here, for example, the performance characteristics of the most massive machine - Pote 63.11:
empty weight - 3135 kg, maximum takeoff - 4530 kg, maximum speed - 421 km / h
time to climb 3000 m - 6 min
practical ceiling - 8500 m
armament - 1 - 4 7, 5-mm machine gun - motionless forward, one 7, 5-mm machine gun - up and back, another one - down and back;
bomb load - up to 300 kg.
Well, how does it differ from the Su-2? Yes, nothing. Moreover, it is noticeably worse. The low design level of the then French aircraft industry did not allow to realize any of the advantages of the twin-engine scheme. Thus, it can be considered indisputably proven that by the fall of 1939, dear, extremely democratic France was prepared to attack someone mercilessly. No joke - 1207 newest "winged jackals", not counting the old! It was precisely by revealing these intentions of France that Hitler was forced to deliver a preemptive strike. Let us emphasize - I inflicted it, suffering from my soul! Reluctantly! Through "I can not"! He just had no other choice …
And what is there, overseas, in the land of popcorn and Charlie Chaplin? It seems that there is no one to attack with this. Canada is already looking into its mouth, even though the British dominion, it is indecent to talk about Mexico.
However, the white-toothed smiling Yankees are forging a dagger at an accelerated pace for a treacherous and sudden blow to sleeping airfields … however, for this they will first have to cross somewhere across the sea, but this does not bother them. Forge so that where there is brutally aggressive Albion and a lone handicraftsman
Stalin:
Curtiss-Wright CW-22 - 441 copies;
Northrop A-17 - 436 copies;
Vout SB-2U "Vindicator" - 258 copies;
Valti A-35 "Venjens" - 1528 copies;
Douglas A-24 "Banshee" - 989 copies.
The total output of the listed models alone is almost 3600 cars! In short, Stalin is resting. But especially comical against the background of Rezun's angry denunciations is the fact that the prototype for the BB-1 was … the American light bomber Valti V-11. They even bought a license for it, but, after thinking it over and weighing it, we decided to build our own, and the documentation, equipment and samples of materials were used to master the advanced plaza-shabolon method of building aircraft.
Another comical touch. The first aircraft of the today famous aviation company SAAB, produced for the air force of neutral Sweden, was none other than the licensed American Northrop A-17. 107 copies were produced for the peaceful Swedish Air Force. Not otherwise, the svei were aiming in the 40th to pounce on Norway. Thank God Hitler preempted. Otherwise we would have to add Sweden to the lists of notorious aggressors …
So, "progressive" and "peace-loving" countries massively churned out "winged jackals". This absurdity makes us go back a little and take a closer look at the seemingly indisputable and unambiguous "jackals" - the Ju.87 and B5N "Keith". Maybe not everything is so simple there too?
Of course! It's just Rezun here too shamelessly deceiving us. He has such a job that you can do.
First of all, comparing the Su-2 with the Ju.87 is completely incorrect. "Junkers" - a dive bomber, both constructively and tactically it differs from the Su-2. That is why he survived the Su-2 on the fronts: the Germans used Ju.87 on a massive scale until the end of 1943, and occasionally - until the end of the war, despite the heavy losses of the "laptezhniki". The effect was painfully good if they broke through to the goal. Well, and the FW.190F / G did not come quickly enough to replace him …
And with B5N "Keith" is completely forgery on forgery. Rezun enthusiastically paints the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, rewarding "Kate" with more and more creepy epithets. The calculation is clear: this is an analogy work. Pearl Harbor is a stamp, a symbol of deceit and treachery; We firmly fasten the "Keita" to it, to the "Keith" - the Su-2, and push the reader to the conclusion: that the Su-2 should have created its own Pearl Harbor! But Hitler struck first. The world was saved from Stalin's tyranny … Eternal memory to Comrade Hitler!
Why not erect a monument to Adolf Hitler in every European capital?
Comparison of the Su-2 and the Keith is completely unnatural for the simple reason that Keith is a carrier-based torpedo bomber; aircraft carrier. He had a partner, the Aichi D3A Val dive bomber, even outwardly very similar to the Junkers. Following the golden rule of "one yardstick", we look at the aircraft carriers of the American Navy, which is peace-loving to tears. And we see on their decks exactly the same duet: the torpedo bomber Douglas TBD "Devastator" and the dive bomber Douglas SBD "Downtless".
The analogy is complete. Moreover, "Devastator" is even worse than "Keith". According to Rezun's mysterious logic, the worse the plane is, the more aggressive it is. Ergo, the Yankees at the end of 1941 were more aggressive than the Japanese!
By the way, another little-known fact fits perfectly into this scheme. The creators of the classic dive bomber are by no means the Germans, as is commonly believed, but the Americans. The first full-fledged dive bomber is the Curtiss F8C-4. In 1931, General Udet, while on a visit to the United States, at one of the airshows was completely fascinated by the demonstration dive bombing performed by the Curtiss, and upon his return to Germany secured the purchase of two such aircraft for the study and development of his own dive-bomber. This is where Ju.87's legs grow.
Wherever you throw, everywhere a wedge. Guided by the criteria of Rezun, even if you crack, we have to admit that the most gloomy aggressor in the 30s was the United States.
Just in case, let's look at the third carrier power - Great Britain. But there, too, the picture is the same, only everything is badly neglected. There is the same strike duo: the Swordfish Fairey torpedo bomber and the Skua Blackburn dive bomber. "Suordfish" is an anachronism of the 1920s - a biplane with a fixed landing gear and an open cockpit. But "Skua" is a copy of "Val" and "Dountless", at least constructively. Comrade British king is clearly planning some kind of Pearl Harbor!
But the miracles don't end there. The war goes on as usual, the battles are boiling more and more fiercely. There can be no talk of any "treacherous attacks" without declaring war "on sleeping airfields" - everyone has already fought, right up to Brazil. Meanwhile, in 1940-44 new aircraft entered service with the carrier-based aviation of Britain, the USA, Japan: Fairy Falmer, Fairy Firefly, Fairy Barracuda, Grumman TBF Avenger, Curtiss SB2C Helldiver, Yokosuka D4Y "Sussei", Nakajima B6N "Tenzan", Aichi B7A "Ryusei".
And these are again single-engine two-three-seat monoplanes, combining the functions of scouts, torpedo bombers, bombers, with ordinary (against the background of modern fighters) flight data. It's just that by the middle of the war, aircraft engines significantly increased in power, and the flight characteristics of the aircraft equipped with them increased accordingly. What kind of "sleeping airfields" were going to attack the British, Americans and Japanese in the middle of the war in the Pacific? Not otherwise, Chilean.
Along the way, we disavow one more fable of Rezun. The B5N Keith torpedo bomber has not gone anywhere since Pearl Harbor. Together with his partner Val, he fought for a long time and successfully. Raids in the Indian Ocean, battles in the Coral Sea, at Santa Cruz, at Midway, a long campaign in Guadalcanal and New Guinea - they all adorn his track record. Yes, by 1943 it clearly did not meet the requirements of the war. But this is not a personal collapse of "Keita" - it is the complete and all-encompassing collapse of the Japanese military. Why should "Kate" be the best?
Of course, all this is nonsense. The ordinariness of naval percussion vehicles is forced. Just a carrier-based strike aircraft of the 30s - 40s physically could not be anything else. The dimensions of ship hangars and flight decks imposed severe restrictions on its weight and dimensions. The designer would be happy to give the sailors a high-speed, well-armed and armored aircraft, but the power of a single engine is not enough for this. Land designers logically and simply switched to a twin-engine scheme, but naval designers could not afford it: too few twin-engine aircraft would have entered the hangars of aircraft carriers, which did not suit the military: they have their own tactical calculations. The naval designers had to do it, and the naval pilots had to take what they got. And it turned out that a single-engine aircraft carrying two or three pilots, 450 - 900 kg of bombs, 3 - 5 machine guns, aircraft carrier takeoff and landing equipment, a wing folding mechanism, a reinforced landing gear for hard landings typical of carrier-based aircraft, radio navigation devices (without them you don't fly much over the sea), a lifeboat - willy-nilly it turns out to be overweight, which means that the LTH is unlikely to shine. And this situation changed only with the transition to jet thrust.
Interestingly, the Japanese Army Aviation had - and in many! - its light reconnaissance bombers, analogues of the Su-2: Mitsubishi Ki-30, Kawasaki Ki-32, Tachikawa Ki-36, Mitsubishi Ki-51, Tachikawa Ki-55. I wonder why Rezun didn't insert them into the line? It's very simple. Japanese army "winged jackals" fought in "forgotten wars" - in China, in Malaya, in Burma. Who today remembers the bloody long-term campaign in China? Who remembers the battles on the Ayeyarwaddy River and the Arakan ridge? Nobody. There is no vivid propaganda image, like Pearl Harbor, understandable to both the professor and the auto mechanic. There is nothing to tie army "jackals" to, to sneak! And since there is no - there is nothing to strain.
I repeat: the Icebreaker trilogy - Day M - The Last Republic is a classic of PR technologies. A tutorial if you like.
And now it is high time to return to VB Shavrov's phrase quoted by Rezun that "… Although everything possible was taken from the Su-2 and there is nothing to reproach its authors, the plane met the real requirements only before the war." And again let us compare the fate of the Su-2 and its foreign counterparts.
In September 1939, Germany basely and treacherously attacked Poland. True, it was not possible to catch Polish planes at the airfields, but it doesn’t matter: the Messerschmitts successfully shot the crucians in the air like sitting ducks.
In May 1940, Germany did not meanly or treacherously (England and France themselves declared war on her), but simply competently attacked in the West. A major aerial battle broke out over Sedan and the Meuse crossings, during which the Messerschmitts smashed the British squadrons armed with the Battles to smithereens. After this carnage, "Battle" left the first line forever. The surviving vehicles were handed over to RAF Training Command.
The same fate befell the French light bombers, who tried to delay the advance of the German mechanized convoys with air strikes. The Messerschmitts did whatever they wanted with them.
In September of the same year, the famous "Battle of Britain" began. And then the British fighters with percentages returned the favor to the Germans for the Meuse and Sedan: the beating of the Ju.87 took on such proportions that Goering issued an order prohibiting their use over England - even if accompanied by fighters, or without.
But in the Far East and Pacific theater of operations, the situation was different. There, light bombers were actively used by the Allies from the first to the last day of the war. Firstly, because the size of the field sites, reclaimed from the jungle and rocks by titanic labor, did not always allow landing on them a "real" bomber like the B-25 "Mitchell", and secondly, because the Japanese Air Force never did not come close to showing the allies the resistance that the Luftwaffe had in Europe and Africa. By the end of 1942, the Allied air supremacy had become undeniable. Fly on a broomstick. They flew - on "Venjens", "banshees", "boomerangs" and even "Harvards".
The collapse of the Su-2, Battle, Pote 63, and Karasya is the collapse of an outdated concept that found itself in unacceptable conditions. Recall: in WWI conditions, when the gap in flight data between a light bomber and a fighter was relatively small, the bomber could well stand up for itself. But since then, conditions have changed. The single-seat fighter of the late thirties was already so superior to the light bomber that the latter simply had no chance on the battlefield. Therefore, the decline of his concept was a foregone conclusion. And it has nothing to do with someone's aggressiveness or peacefulness, real or imaginary. The military of all countries held on to the proven practice of WWI and the seemingly reliable concept of a light multipurpose single-engine aircraft until collision with reality crumbled it like a house of cards. Regardless of whose identification marks this or that "winged jackal" carried.
We must pay tribute to the gentleman from Bristol. He showed remarkable ingenuity and enviable skill of verbal balancing act, making up an honest flying Su-2 soldier as a treacherous bandit, who loves to attack sleeping on Sunday mornings. Well, well - such is his new and exciting job now. For this he receives money. But if we want to competently build our future, if we want to maintain self-respect, we must correctly understand our past. Including - to deal with "sensational" discoveries-revelations of all the "Suvorovs", Bunichs and Sokolovs. But at the same time, everyone - everyone, without exception! - once it turns out that all "discoveries-revelations" are simply an impenetrable heap of lies.
