Fans of military history will remember that Nazi Germany at some point became obsessed with the idea of creating superweapons. "Superweapons" and "Weapons of Retaliation" became the pivotal concepts of German war propaganda.
I must say that the Germans did a lot. They massively used cruise and ballistic missiles, massively and at first successfully used guided aerial bombs to destroy surface targets, and with a rather destructive effect, they also used jet combat aircraft. It was Germany that was the first to introduce an automatic machine based on an intermediate cartridge into mass production, it was the Germans who first tested anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided missiles, and were the first to use tank night vision devices with infrared illumination. German submarines of the XXI series were a real revolution. The first photo of our planet from a mark above the "Karman line" is Germany. The canceled projects are also impressive - a suborbital rocket-plane bomber, an intercontinental ballistic missile …
The Germans were a little short on nuclear weapons, if they had a little more foresight in the late thirties, things could have gone differently. No, they would have been crushed anyway, of course, but the price would have been significantly higher. They lacked a little …
And serial weapons were made according to the same canons. Take, for example, the Tiger tank - the cannon could reach the T-34 or KV at a distance of a couple of kilometers, the armor excluded the tank from being hit "head-on" by the tank and anti-tank guns available at the time of its appearance at the enemy, despite the enormous weight, the tank could well move along the wilting fields and roads of the Eastern Front in spring and autumn. Yes, I had to have spare plate rollers and carry a set of narrow tracks. But what a power! And "Panther" was made according to the same criteria.
The result, however, was not very good. Yes, the Russians paid for each "Tiger" and "Panther" for several lighter "thirty-fours", and then the Americans with their "Shermans" experienced the same. But there were too many Shermans and T-34s. More than the technically sophisticated "Tigers" and "Panthers" could win in battle, more than the huge and heavy 88-mm cannons could destroy, more than the German grenade launchers could burn from the "Faustpatrons".
The number won. The Russians made more weapons out of a ton of steel than the Germans, the Americans did too, the military economy of the allies was much more efficient, and they also had a numerical superiority. But most importantly, their commanders and soldiers learned to resist the German superweapon. Yes, the King Tiger had 180 millimeters of frontal armor. But the tankmen of the guard of Colonel Arkhipov "carried out" the first battalion of "Royal Tigers" "dry". On the T-34. And the staff bus from the surviving Germans was taken away, as in a mockery. Human will and intelligence can neutralize the power of any weapon.
Superweapon doesn't work … Or almost doesn't work. For example, a hundred atomic bombs from the United States in 1944 would have gone off. And in 1962, no. What matters is the number and "overall average" level of troops or forces. Many tanks and guns, many ships, many planes and soldiers. Lots of ammo. A powerful economy capable of supplying all of this. Trained personnel who know how to apply all this.
It is important. And a separate sample of superweapons will not give anything if it does not raise the destructive power of a blow to the enemy by orders of magnitude, as in their time firearms and an atomic bomb. History gives us such a lesson.
No, it, this sample, can be made. But not to the detriment of what constitutes the basis of military power.
Fresh news that the previously known as "Status-6" nuclear submarine unmanned vehicle "Poseidon" will be put on alert in the amount of 32 units, for which 8 will be specially built (or modernized for this super torpedo, which is less likely) submarines, are forced to recall the experience of the strategists of the Third Reich, who bet on the wrong horses, wherever possible.
What good will the creation of a grouping of such devices give Russia? What opportunities will it take away? Let's think about it.
But first, a technical caveat.
Poseidon is small compared to submarines. For this reason, its detection by radar methods, which were mentioned earlier, will apparently be difficult. However, if you believe the information about the gigantic speed of the torpedo, then it should be admitted that its detection and relatively accurate localization will be quite possible by acoustic methods - the noise from a torpedo traveling at a speed of 100 knots will be heard from great distances, as the Poseidon approaches the arrays bottom sensors of the American SOSUS / IUSS system, it will be possible to send anti-submarine aircraft to the intended area of movement of the torpedo and determine its exact location. Further, the question of hitting the target arises. It must be admitted that technologically the West is already capable of quickly and inexpensively creating weapons for this.
For example, the European MU-90 Hard kill, an anti-torpedo capable of hitting targets at a depth of 1000 meters, can become a base for an anti-torpedo capable of reaching Poseidon when dropped from an aircraft on a head-on course. There are other candidates for anti-torpedoes, the same American CAT (Countermeasure anti-torpedo), already tested from surface ships and also optimized for the destruction of high-speed deep-sea targets (interestingly, to the detriment of its main purpose - we will return to this later). She, of course, will have to be "taught" to be used from an airplane first, but this is not a big problem, after all, in the United States there are uniform torpedoes used both from surface ships and from aircraft, they are able to solve such problems. And the MU-90 can fly from an airplane.
Naturally, the Poseidon's speed will complicate interception, but basing anti-torpedoes on an airplane will make it possible to attack an underwater drone on a head-on course, which will still allow it to "reach", and the huge distance to the target, which the drone will have to cover, will give the Americans hundreds of attempts.
Of course, it is possible that this device will actually sneak at a low speed, for example, at 10-15 knots, in the “problem” zone of depths - no more than 100 meters, near the boundaries of the “jump layer”, or, in the presence of several such layers, between them. Then its detection will become much more difficult - the ocean is huge, and it will not be possible to provide the necessary forces and means everywhere. Again, a little below we will see that geography "plays" on the side of the enemy. If the Poseidon goes along the route at great depth, as promised, but at a low speed, then this will reduce to zero the possibility of detecting it by non-acoustic methods (by radioactive trace or by thermal radiation, or by other known methods), but it will somewhat simplify detection by acoustic, although, at low speed, it will be difficult to detect.
We will not build our conclusions in the absence of accurate information about the performance characteristics of a nuclear drone. In the future, we will proceed from the fact that the mode of its movement provides the required level of secrecy, that is, in any case, it is a small stroke.
Now let's evaluate the usefulness and justification of this superweapon.
First. When and if the Poseidons take off off the American coast, we will all be dead. This, in a sense, devalues the investment. In reality, the point of deterrence, weapons, and the armed forces is that we still remain alive, preferably in such a quantity that our culture is preserved. The bet on "doomsday machines" even from the point of view of logic looks flawless. According to some comrades in uniform, theoretical research on such a torpedo has been going on since almost Soviet times, and the final "go-ahead" for the project was given immediately after the Americans left the ABM Treaty. Elementary logic required those in power to ask themselves two questions. First, will the Americans be able to repel the strike of our Strategic Missile Forces with the help of their missile defense system? Second, under what circumstances will the answer to the first question be yes?
There is only one answer, and it is known - ABM is only ABM when the United States managed to deliver a sudden disarming nuclear strike against the Russian Federation. Otherwise, missile defense is meaningless. But with a missed hit - it has, because a very small number of missiles will fly in the opposite direction.
Then, the powers that be should have thought, the Americans must be preparing such a blow to the Russian Federation - otherwise, why would they need all this?
At this point, the only real way to resolve the "American question" should have been not spending on a new deterrent, a plus to the existing ones, but a political decision to destroy the United States, and to begin preparations for such an operation … Let's not speculate on how to do this - the Americans are planning a disarming and decapitating strike in the first round, and, within about twenty minutes, a counterforce, with the destruction of all Strategic Missile Forces deployed on the ground, and the destruction of our SSBNs with the help of anti-submarine aircraft and their submarines … The last teachings on this topic known to the author took place in 2014. Probably, they also pass now.
The problem here is that even though a counter-force strike against our strategic nuclear forces and TNW, they will have to tear their warheads to destroy silos near the surface of the earth, and this will cause radioactive contamination of such a force that the strike can be equated to counter-value (against the population) on consequences. And it will make no difference to us whether these drones work or not.
In general, we can be guided by the same logic and throw all our resources into solving the same tasks: a decapitation strike to gain time, a strike on communications facilities with SSBNs, on silos of ICBMs, air bases of the Strategic Aviation Command, on naval bases of SSBNs, on airbases of the Air Force, capable of covering the areas of combat patrol of SSBNs with their aircraft, and, over the next few hours, the destruction of the SSBNs themselves. So that the Americans simply DO NOT have time to attack in response. It is certainly not easy and very dangerous, but it is not impossible either.
By the way, the Americans with their equipment, by the way, all the time during the exercises “do not succeed” - one or two Russian submarines manage to “shoot”, the mission is failed. But they train, study. We could, too, if we focused on the main task. On the other hand, American society is now seriously split, full of contradictions, and, perhaps, the "American question" could have been resolved not by a direct military strike, but somehow else, by organizing some kind of "get-together" inside their country and throwing " fuel "to all parties to the conflict to maximize losses. One way or another, if your neighbor is a mad cannibal who has firmly decided to kill you when the opportunity presents itself, then it is your duty to slap him first, and the tactics of showing him more and more new guns and carbines stored in your home is wrong - he- it just waits for you to turn your back on him. And one cannot help but wait one day, in fact.
We, with our super torpedoes, act exactly the opposite.
Second. Poseidon doesn't really add anything to our deterrent potential. Our missiles, in a preemptive or retaliatory strike against the United States, are quite capable of demolishing their country from the face of the Earth. They will actually survive there, but after that even Mexico can conquer them. What does a super torpedo also give? Maybe it increases the combat stability of the NSNF? No, it does not, the Americans graze at the exits from our bases, and for a long time insolently hang on the tail of the SSBN. What will prevent them from “spilling” several Poseidon carriers as well? Nothing.
Our PLO forces have practically died, there are practically no underwater lighting systems (SOS) left, we cannot even provide the deployment of existing submarines, several new ones will not change the situation from the word "absolutely". It's just that the last money will be spent on them, and it will be possible to solve the Poseidon problem even by banal mining of the water areas around the bases, against which we have no funds. SSBN can fire even from the pier, and the carrier of the "Poseidon" will have to go through the mines. Or Poseidon himself.
If we do not miss the first strike from the United States, then the existing means will allow us to inflict unacceptable damage on the Americans. If we skip it, the Poseidons will not solve anything - we will not be there, and they are not certain that they will work. As James Mattis rightly noted, all these systems (Dagger, Avangard, Poseidon) do not add anything to the Russian containment potential, which means that they do not require a reaction from the United States. In the latter, he was cunning, but spoke about containment very accurately.
And really, is there a difference - a salvo of one submarine in the cities of the United States, or an attack by a flock of super torpedoes? The number of dead Americans will be comparable. Destruction, however, from the "Poseidons" will be greater, but here the third "but" comes into play.
Third. Poseidon is a completely intercepted system. Contrary to what the press claims, the search and detection of such an apparatus is possible. If we assume that he goes to the target at low speed, then the Americans will have several days for the active part of the search and counter operation. Even frankly, up to two weeks. If the device moves quickly, the hydroacoustics will begin to hear it with all that it implies. At the same time, a significant part of the US anti-submarine forces can be deployed in advance. Geographically, Russia is located in such a way that Poseidon can only reach important cities in the United States through narrows or simply limited water areas, which the enemy either controls now, or can take control with the beginning of the conflict - the English Channel, the Faroe-Icelandic barrier, Robson Strait in the Atlantic theater of operations; The Bering Strait, the Kuril Passages, the Sangar and Tsushima straits, the Northwest Passage and a number of other narrow straits in the northwest of Canada in the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, NATO countries, collectively possessing huge navies, are at the service of the United States in the Atlantic, and Japan, with its huge numbers and very powerful anti-submarine forces, is in the Pacific theater of operations. In fact, we have only one naval base from which you can go directly to the ocean - Vilyuchinsk. But it is there that the Americans are very intensively monitoring our nuclear submarines, and slipping past them with our current state of the Navy is a serious problem.
Currently, the number of ships that can be mobilized by both the US Navy and the allies to combat the underwater threat is in the hundreds. Also, the fleet of anti-submarine aircraft is counted in hundreds of units, and these are truly effective and modern aircraft with very experienced crews. Helicopter landing ships of the fleets of the USA, NATO, Japan and Australia, allow deploying hundreds of anti-submarine helicopters at sea, plus those deployed on destroyers and frigates. Overlapping a few narrows with such forces is quite real. In conditions when some of the listed places are covered with ice, it is quite possible to mine them with submarines from under the water, and try to intercept the drone with them, only then, in case of a hypothetical failure, "transferring" it to other forces. Again, this task doesn't look easy, but it doesn't look insoluble either. Well, you need to understand that some of those cities in the United States, about which we say that they are "on the coast", are actually on a "specific" coast - it is enough, for example, using the Google maps service to take a look at how Seattle is located (and the largest US Navy base Kitsap there, nearby), or another naval base - Norfolk.
There it will be even easier to control the tightness.
On the one hand, the final part of Poseidon's attack can be facilitated where the sea is deep enough to create an artificial Tsunami. Then he will jerk far from the coast. On the other hand, these places will be under the special scrutiny of the enemy, including with the possible deployment of additional bottom sensors on the way to approach them in peacetime.
Thus, in order to use the Poseidon, the carrier boat, like the SSBN, will have to dodge the hunter boat hanging on its tail and survive the patrol aircraft raids, then the super torpedo itself will have to get away from them, then it will have to break through the combs anti-submarine ships and hydrophone fields in narrow areas, and in some cases the United States has the opportunity to resort to the use of low-frequency acoustic "illumination" over these fields, which makes distinguishable any object under water, even absolutely silent, then survive a long-term hunt for itself by anti-submarine planes, it is possible to slip through the minefields, and only after that the last defense circuit will remain in front of the drone - the ASW forces near large cities, breaking through which, he will be able to fulfill his task. All this looks, to put it mildly, more difficult than launching a ballistic missile from an SSBN.
So, the question is, how do the Poseidons change the military situation at sea in our favor? The fact that they can explode under the AUG? But in the conditions when nuclear weapons, and even high power, were used, aircraft carriers will not be our biggest problem, and to put it mildly. In addition, claiming that the Poseidons will drown the AUG, we must abandon the fantasies about the 100 megaton warhead and the initialization of the man-made Tsunami, because it will wash away us too - the AUG will strive to be closer to the attacked country even before the start war.
There is a feeling that it would be easier and cheaper to invest in the existing NSNF, in increasing the operational stress coefficient and increasing the time on alert (this is not particularly difficult, since second crews have been formed for many boats, and, generally speaking, it is not clear what keeps them in bases), and their anti-submarine and anti-mine support, in the training of crews of multipurpose nuclear submarines "insuring" SSBNs, in ice torpedo firing exercises, in modern hydroacoustic countermeasures, in new guided torpedoes, in anti-submarine aircraft and tanker aircraft for them, in a squadron of interceptors to protect the airspace over the deployment areas of SSBNs, and a full modernization of Kuznetsov and its wing, for the same.
In the end, on the "Caliber" missiles, so that the fleet can work them out on the bases of anti-submarine aircraft identified by reconnaissance.
Instead of something from this list of useful things, we got a thing-in-itself. And worst of all, they are going to spend extra money on it. Thirty-two Poseidons are from four new nuclear submarines. Inapplicable in conventional war. And just as vulnerable as now, in the conditions of the collapse of the Navy, the submarines we already have are vulnerable.
The Maritime Nuclear Containment Force is one of the pillars of our security. Unlike ground-based ballistic missiles, submarines, when used correctly and properly supported by combat services, have true stealth. The enemy, if we organize everything correctly, either will not know at all where the submarine is, or will know approximately, and will definitely not be able to approach it. As a last resort, it will not be able to approach all of them and disrupt the missile strike completely. The Poseidon nuclear torpedo does not in any way increase the potential of the NSNF, but it requires large expenditures of state money, which, frankly, does not exist. It is these funds that may not be enough to reduce the vulnerability of our NSNF to a level at which the Americans will no longer be able to fantasize about disarming strikes against our country. But they will be wasted on Poseidons, which in themselves do not reduce this vulnerability, and do not increase the deterrent potential. For all its destructive power (theoretical).
And now what is NATO lying about?
In reality, they knew and knew about the project for a very long time, most likely even when the tactical and technical assignment for this drone was released, and maybe even earlier, when various research and development projects on the topic were still underway. In any case, pictures of the "future unmanned nuclear submarine of the Russians" were drawn in the United States even before 2015. And they knew a number of parameters. Considering how many admirers of the American way of life are among the intelligentsia (including the technical one) (remember the recent "leaking" of information about hypersonic weapons in the USA - I hope the plummer dies in prison in some bad way) expect something the other was very naive. And by a strange coincidence, for Western anti-torpedoes, the defeat of high-speed deep-sea targets has become a kind of "commonplace". Given that such an anti-torpedo is not optimal for hitting "normal" torpedoes. This is true for both the CAT and the MU-90 Hard Kill. Did they conspire?
No, just before Vladimir Vladimirovich announced the existence of our miracle robot aloud, the West already knew everything, and was preparing to intercept these torpedoes. Moreover, it is inexpensive to intercept. And this, among other things, may mean that they are really afraid of the use of these devices. This means that they consider the situation when we will launch them very likely, and in the near future. So, they are planning … well, then think for yourself that they are planning this that will cause the mandatory launch of Poseidons in the foreseeable future. However, this may indeed be some kind of fatal coincidence.
How, in theory, is it necessary to properly dispose of this miracle weapon? Well, first of all, the money that has already been spent on it cannot be returned. At the same time, it must be admitted that the largest technological breakthrough has been achieved. In the correct version, you need to limit yourself to the number of Poseidon carriers that are already available or laid down, especially since those boats and in addition to the Poseidons are full of tasks of particular importance. At the same time, the drones themselves must, of course, continue to be tested and brought to readiness for mass production, but not so much in order to build it, but in order to develop the obtained technologies into something useful - for example, we did not really interfere would be a small-sized low-noise nuclear turbine generator for diesel submarines. The combination of such a device with a diesel-electric power plant and a lithium-ion battery would make the autonomy of diesel-electric submarines comparable to that of nuclear submarines, at a disproportionately lower price. Of course, such boats would not be able to replace full-fledged nuclear ones, but at least they would no longer have the need to get up under the RDP and "beat the charge", roaring to the whole ocean. This would be an important step in the development of diesel-electric submarines. And unmanned combat vehicles with a small-sized nuclear power plant are a very promising direction. Especially armed. And the technological groundwork for "Poseidon" may well be used to work on their creation.
Yes, and it is quite possible to push against the United States with the help of several built prototypes. Send the KUG to the Carbibian Sea, and there it is indicative to catch such a "fish" from the water, not far from Florida. The effect in some cases could be good - before the meeting of our president with the American, for example. In order not to forget with whom he is talking.
But building a whole fleet of such drones, and carriers for them, as well as re-equipping existing submarines for this superweapon (taking them out of service for a long time - and for what?) Would be a monstrous mistake. This program received funding in the most difficult years and "ate" a lot of what our Navy is now very badly lacking - with zero, as we can see, the result. This mistake cannot be repeated by replicating and scaling it up in the face of a shrinking budget.
Superweapons do not exist and cannot be invented. Remember this phrase. I would like to hope that we will remember this lesson of history and will not waste the last money on projects that have no military significance.
Although in the light of the present epidemic of completely irrational decisions related to naval development in the past five to six years, this hope seems very weak.
