The German commander of the group of ships, Admiral Gunther Lutjens, received the order to carry out Operation Rheinubung on 22 April. On May 5, Hitler himself visited Bismarck, and Lutyens assured him of the complete success of the forthcoming operation in the Atlantic.
The battleship, commanded by Captain 1st Rank Ernst Lindemann and on which the headquarters of Admiral Lutiens was located, left Danzig on the night of May 18-19. The battleship's crew was informed of the objectives of the operation only at sea. Near the Arkona Peninsula, a meeting with the destroyers Friedrich Eckold and Z-23 arrived from Swinemünde, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen (Captain 1st Rank Brinkman) approached from Kiel. They were joined by the minebreaker Sperrbrecher 13 to navigate through the Great Belt.
At about 15:00 on May 20, after passing the Great Belt, the formation unexpectedly encountered the Swedish cruiser "Gotland". Its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Agren, immediately reported this fact to Stockholm.
The British naval attaché in Stockholm, Commander H. Denham, was having a routine meeting that day with his Norwegian counterpart, who among other news told him this one. Returning to the embassy, Denham, marked "very urgent," transmitted the encrypted message to the Admiralty. By 3.30 the next day, the operational intelligence center informed the naval and coastal command.
All these events marked the beginning of a large-scale hunt for the German "pocket battleship" by the British fleet in May 1941.
British heavy cruiser "Suffolk". Danish Strait, 1941
Having received a message early on the morning of May 21 about the departure of the battleship (LC) Bismarck and the heavy cruiser (SRT) Prinz Eugen from Kattegat, the battle cruiser (LKR) "Hood", LC "Prince of Wales" and 6 destroyers (EM): "Electra", "Anthony", "Echo", "Icarus", "Achates" and "Antelope".
Commander of 1st Cruiser Squadron Rear Admiral William F. Wake-Walker held his flag on the Norfolk, commanded by 1st Rank Captain Alfred J. L. Phillips. Captain 1st Rank Robert M. Ellis stood on the command bridge of the Suffolk.
The compound, heading for the Danish Strait from the main base of the Metropolitan fleet, was commanded by Vice Admiral Lancelot E. Holland, who flew the flag on the Hood LCR. The ship itself, the pride of the British fleet, was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Ralf Kerr.
The KRL Manchester (Captain Herbert A. Parker) and Birmingham (Captain Alexander C. G. Madden) were ordered to guard the strait between Iceland and the Faroe Islands.
In Scapa Flow was AB "Victorious" (captain Henry C. Bovell), which, accompanied by LKR "Repulse" (captain William G. Tennant), was to leave on 22 May with convoy WS8B to the Middle East. The exit of both ships had to be canceled, they were placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the Metropolitan Fleet, Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, who led the operation to capture the German LK.
Since the beginning of the operation, the right to broadcast was strictly limited - in fact, all British ships observed radio silence.
The search has begun
After receiving a message about the discovery of a German formation by coastal command aviation in Kore-Fiord (on May 21 at 13:15, a reconnaissance officer who was making a search flight over Bergen photographed the ships at the anchorage - the deciphering of the picture showed that they were Bismarck and Prinz Eugen), Admiral J. Tovey dispatched Hood, Prince of Wales and 6 EMs to the Icelandic Hwalfjord. Under the guise of an air raid * on Bergen, the British took several more photographs, confirming their assumptions that the ships were ready to enter the Atlantic.
* - Even in secret reports, the British wrote that "an attempt to bomb the Norwegian coast, undertaken" at random "on May 21, failed - because of the dense fog that enveloped the coast, only two aircraft reached the fiords, but they did not find the enemy either."
German battleship "Bismarck" in Grimstadfjord. May 21, 1941
At 19.00, Admiral G. Lutyens, confident in the disclosure of the operation by the British, interrupting the bunkering of the MRT, gave the order to leave the fiord. This happened at 19.45 on May 21.
On the next day, the weather worsened: cloudiness over the North Sea dropped to an altitude of 600 m, it was pouring rain in the Danish Strait, visibility did not exceed half a mile.
Under such conditions, aerial reconnaissance seemed useless, but the commander of the Hatston naval station in the Orkney Islands, Captain 2nd Rank H. L. St. J. Fancourt, nevertheless sent - on his own initiative - one plane across the North Sea. Pilot Lieutenant N. N. Goddard and Observer Commander G. A. Rotherdam reached Bergen, took aerial photographs under heavy anti-aircraft fire, and returned safely to Hatston. No German ships were found in the fiords - information about this was reported to Admiral J. Tovi at 20.00 on May 22.
Meanwhile, German ships, following a 24-knot course, passed Trondheim at about 7:00 on May 22. Earlier, at about 4.00, Admiral G. Lutiens released the escort EMs to Trondheim, and the unit headed for about. Jan Mayen, where a meeting with the tanker "Weissenburg" was planned. By 21.00 the German ships had reached 68 ° N.
After requesting the command about the presence of British forces in Scapa Flow and receiving an answer (based on the data from aerial reconnaissance, the Germans believed that there were 4 LK, 1 AB, 6 KR and 17 EMs), at 23.20 Admiral G. Lutiens refused bunkering and turned to W, intending to enter the Atlantic by the Danish Strait.
Admiral J. Tovi, not having accurate data on the whereabouts of "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen", proceeded from the assumption that German ships were sent to the Atlantic to destroy merchant ships. Having clarified the orders to his forces - having sent the KRL "Arethusa" (A.-C. Chapman) to the aid of "Manchester" and "Birmingham" and ordered to organize continuous air patrols in dangerous directions - at 22.45 on May 22, the Commander-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Fleet left Scapa Flow accompanied by AV "Victorious", the 2nd cruising squadron and five EVs. * He intended to take a central position. Admiral J. Tovie's flag flew on the halyards of the King George V LC commanded by Captain 1st Rank Willfrid L. Patterson.
* - The commander of the 2nd cruising squadron, Rear Admiral A. T. Curteis, raised his flag on the Galatea cruiser, commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Edward W. B. Sim. The rest of the RCs were commanded by Rank 2 Captains William GAgnew - Aurora, Michael M. Denny - Kenya, Rory C. O'Conor - Neptune. The squadron also included Hermione, commanded by Jeoffrey N. Oliver.
Destroyers: Flagship Inglefleld - Rank 2 Captain Percy Todd, Commander of 3rd Flotilla EM, Intrepid - Rank 3 Captain Roderick C. Gordon, Nestor - Rank 3 Captain Konrad Ahlers- Hankey (Conrad B. Alers-Hankey), "Punjabi" - 3rd Rank Captain Stuart A. Buss and "Active" - Lieutenant Commander Michael W. Tomkinson.
In the morning they were joined by LKR "Repulse". The entire day of May 23, the formation followed to W. Air reconnaissance was not carried out due to bad weather.
Enemy detected
The weather in the Danish Strait was unusual: the air was clear over the pack ice extending up to 80 miles from the coastline, and about 10 miles from the ice edge, while the rest of the body of water and Iceland was shrouded in dense fog. At 19.22, the Suffolk, which was traveling at 18-knot speed, detected large surface targets at a bearing of 20 ° at a distance of 7 mildew with its radar. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, skirting the pack ice, were 55 miles N-W from North Cape.
Immediately radioing about the detection of the target, Captain 2nd Rank R. Ellis turned to S-O so as not to be detected himself. At 20.30, Norfolk also established radar contact. *
* - Although Suffolk was the first to spot the enemy, the message from Norfolk in the Admiralty was received earlier - at 21.03 it was handed over to the Commander of the Home Fleet. Hood received the first message from Suffolk at 20.04.
View of the LK "Bismarck" from the board of the SRT "Prinz Eugen"
Also possessing the radar "Bismarck" detected and classified "Suffolk" at 18.20 ship time (on German ships the time was 1 hour ahead of English) at a distance of 7 miles. Having prepared the data for firing the main caliber and informing their command about the detection of the English CD, after 10 minutes. The LK was ready to open fire when its radar recorded another target at a distance of 6 miles - soon the Norfolk at full speed appeared for a moment out of the darkness behind the LK, but immediately retreated.
The radio message about the discovery of "Bismarck" went on the air at 20.32.
"Bismarck" managed to make 5 volleys, but did not hit the Englishman, but only disabled its own radar. Ordering the Prinz Eugen to take a place in front, Lutyens increased the speed to 30 knots and changed course, trying to get away from the British CRs. It succeeded - at about midnight the contact was lost; Norfolk and Suffolk, confident that the Germans had turned back, headed for the strait, but soon returned to their previous course.
As soon as the first message from "Norfolk" was reported to Admiral J. Tovi, he turned to W and lay down on a course of 280 °, increasing the squadron speed and intending to intercept the enemy near Iceland the next morning.
Vice Admiral L. Holland received the first message from the Suffolk at 20.04, being 300 miles away from the enemy. He ordered Captain 1st Rank R. Carr to lie on a course of 295 ° and increase the speed to 27 knots. After completing the new course for about 50 minutes. and observing the efforts of the six EVs to keep up with the flagship on a very fresh wave (winds reached 5 points), Holland allowed them to slow down and follow "at optimum speed." However, the EMs kept the maximum possible speed all night long.
LK "Bismarck" in Grimstadfjord. Photo from a British reconnaissance aircraft, May 21, 1941
At 23.18 they received an order to line up in "order number 4", i.e. take positions ahead of LC and LC. At midnight, a report was received that the enemy ships were about 120 miles away, following a course of 200 °.
Soon the British ships reduced their speed to 25 knots, and at 0.17 they laid the course for N.
It was expected that the enemy would be at an opening range of about 1.40, so by 0.15 all preparations for battle were over, and the ships raised their battle flags. Just at this time, the CD lost radar contact with the target.
Vice Admiral L. Holland was visibly nervous. At 00.31 he gave the order to transmit to the "Prince of Wales": if the enemy is not detected by 02.10, he will lie on the opposite course and will follow them until contact is restored; LK and LKR will pursue Bismarck, and he leaves Prinz Eugen for Norfolk and Suffolk. It remains unknown for history whether this order was transmitted and whether the RC received it …
On the Prince of Wales, the Walrus reconnaissance aircraft was prepared for take-off, but at 1.40, due to the deterioration in visibility, the ejection had to be canceled, the fuel was drained from the tanks and the aircraft was fixed in a marching manner. After 7 minutes. the flagship raised the flag signal: if at 2.05 the LKR turned to the course of 200 °, the EV should continue patrol with the course to N. The visibility was such that the flagship did not have any confidence in receiving the order from all EVs. At 2.03 "Hood" went on a course of 200 °.
Since a meeting with the enemy before dawn was unlikely, the team was allowed to rest.
* * *
British battle cruiser "Hood"
The Admiralty at that time was most concerned with the safety of the convoys. In the North Atlantic, there were at least 11 of them (6 went to the metropolis, 5 followed in the opposite direction). The most important was the convoy WS8B: 5 transports with British infantry, en route to the Middle East, guarded by KPT Exeter, KRL Cairo and eight EVs.
Since the LKR "Repulse", which was supposed to follow as part of the cover, was at the disposal of the commander-in-chief, the order to go to sea to protect the convoy of transports with troops that had already made more than half the way along the coast of Ireland, or to take part in a battle with German ships, at 0.50 Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville received Force H commander on 24 May.
By 2.00 am, all of his ships had left Gibraltar.
* * *
Throughout the night from 23 to 24 May "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" pursued the German LK, which maintained the speed of 27-28 knots.
"Hanging on the tail", from time to time, the British SRT still lost visual contact with the enemy in a shroud of rain or in a blast of snow. Then on "Suffolk" the radar was switched on.
At 2.47, when the Suffolk radiometrists again saw the target marks on the screen of their radar and the radiogram about this reached Vice Admiral L. Holland, the Hood increased its speed to 28 knots.
At 4.00 the distance between the main opponents was approximately 20 miles. At 4.30, visibility improved to 12 miles, after 10 minutes. followed by the order to prepare for departure the seaplane "Walrus" to the "Prince of Wales". The execution of the order was delayed. * "Hood" was on the maximum possible 28-knot speed on the S-O course 240 °. At 4.50 the more seaworthy Prince of Wales stepped forward and the Hood took a position in its left stern shell at 230 ° bearing.
* - Aviation gasoline turned out to be watered, and this cost the life of the car - it was never taken into the air before the start of the battle, and then, damaged by shell fragments and posing a danger to the ship, it had to be thrown overboard.
"Prinz Eugen" after leaving Gothenhaven for the Atlantic together with LC "Bismarck"
A quarter of an hour later, the Hood again took over as the flagship.
Meanwhile, signalmen on Norfolk and Suffolk peered out at the horizon to the south, waiting for the Arctic twilight to turn into day. If this had happened at 3.25, the Bismarck would have been detected visually at a distance of 12 miles. At this moment LK began to turn to the right, and when the Suffolk also turned to maintain its distance, a sudden strong gust of wind picked up the plane on the catapult and disabled it.
At 4.45, the Norfolk radio operators intercepted a radiogram from the Icarus EM, in which he gave his place and the place to the Achetes - the EMs accompanying Hood were at the stern of the SRT. This was the first message from which Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker could know that the line forces were nearby.
At 5.16 am Norfolk's signalmen found smoke aft left, and soon the Prince of Wales and Hood appeared on the horizon.
The first combat contact. The death of "Hood"
On both ships, as early as 05.10 on May 24, 1941, when dawn began, the highest degree of combat readiness was established.
The British were the first to spot the enemy, establishing contact at 335 ° at 5.35 at a distance of 17 miles. Two minutes later, "Hood" and "Prince of Wales" at the same time, on the blue pennant raised on the halyards of the flagship, shifted left to side 40 ° in order to be on the starboard side of the enemy.
At 5.41 "Hood" had a target at a bearing of 80 °, but at 5.49 at the next signal the ships lay down on a course of 300 °.
At the same time, the flagship raised the “G. S. B. 337 L1 ", which meant" Fire on the German ship located on the left at bearing 3379 ". The left-hand ship turned out to be the Prinz Eugen, and just before the opening of fire on the Prince of Wales's halyards the G. O. B. 1 "-" Move the target by one to the right ", ie shoot at "Bismarck".
Hood on the go in fresh weather
Radar "Prinz Eugen" detected a target from the left side at about 5.00, but at 5.45, when the signalmen saw the smoke of the British ships, the artillery officer of the German ship mistakenly identified them as an MRT. An order followed to load the 203-mm guns with the high-explosive shells normally used by the Germans for zeroing.
At dawn at 5.52, when the range was reduced to 25,000 yards (22,750 m), Hood opened fire on Bismarck, who immediately responded.
The fire "Bismarck" was directed by the senior artillery officer of the frigatten-captain Paul Ascher. He already had combat experience - in the same position, Asher commanded the gunners "Admiral Graf Spee" during the battle at La Plata.
"Bismarck" achieved coverage from the 2nd salvo - a fire broke out on the "Hood" in the area of the 102-mm aft cannon on the left side, the fire quickly engulfed the entire central part of the ship. The flame had a pink tint, and thick smoke poured from the hearth of the fire.
LK "Bismarck" is firing at the British LKR "Hood". Danish Strait, May 24, 1941
"Prince of Wales", whose commander Captain 1st Rank John Leach (John C. Leach) ordered his artillery officer to control the fire independently, opened fire a minute later than the flagship, but achieved coverage only with the 6th salvo (1st leg with flight).
At 5.55 on the blue pennant, the flagships Hood and Prince of Wales turned 2 points to the left, which opened the firing angles of the main battery's bow turret for the latter. The LK fired the 9th volley. Five minutes later, two blue pennants appeared on Hood's halyards - he intended to turn another 2 rumba.
At that moment "Bismarck" had just fired the 5th salvo - "Hood" was split in two by a powerful explosion, which got between the stern tube and the mainmast. The bow, having turned over, immediately began to sink, and the aft, shrouded in smoke, kept afloat.
After just 8 minutes. after the start of the battle, the LKR, for many years the pride of the Royal Navy, disappeared between the waves, and only a cloud of smoke blown away by the wind reminded of the handsome ship.
British battleship "Prince of Wales" before the battle in the Danish Strait, 1941
"Prince of Wales" changed course to the right so as not to collide with the remnants of "Hood", and passed close to the place of its death: 63 ° 20'N, 31 ° 50'W.
The distance was reduced to 18 thousand yards, (16380 m), and "Bismarck" did not fail to take advantage of this, introducing into the business and its universal artillery.
Having received 4 hits from 380-mm shells of the main caliber of the German LK, Captain 2nd Rank J. Leach, who miraculously survived the explosion of one of three smaller-caliber shells that destroyed the bridge at 6.02, considered it good to temporarily withdraw from the battle - an underwater hole was reported in aft, the ship took a significant amount of water into the damaged compartments.
At 6.13, the British LK, covered by a smoke screen, turned on a course of 160 °. The aft tower of the main caliber continued to fire, but during the turn it jammed (it was possible to put the tower into operation only by 8.25). The distance to the German LC was 14,500 yards (13,200 m). The Prince of Wales managed to fire 18 salvoes with its main caliber and five with its universal caliber.
Bismarck, who made no attempt to chase the Prince of Wales or continue the fight, also received hits. *
* - According to a survey of the surviving members of his crew, the German LK was hit three times by British shells: one of them hit the starboard side in the bow, making an underwater hole (water flooded three compartments); 2nd - more stern, in the main armor belt, displacing the plates (one compartment is flooded); The 3rd pierced the deck without exploding and only destroying the motor boat. Some of those interviewed claimed that the hits were from Hood's 3rd salvo, while others believed that the 2nd hit on Bismarck was the work of Prince of Wales.
The British assess the situation
The explosion of the LKR "Hood", observed from the board "Prinz Eugen"
After the death of Vice-Admiral L. Holland, the command had to move to the next in rank flagship - Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker, who was holding the flag on KPT "Norfolk", who at that moment was 15 miles to N and went to the battle site 28-knot travel.
"Suffolk" and "Norfolk", of course, could not stay away from the battle, but they were too far away. At 6.19, "Suffolk" fired 6 volleys with its main caliber, however, as it turned out later, due to erroneous target designation, the shells did not reach the target.
At 0630 hours the Norfolk approached the Prince of Wales, Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker informed the LC that he had assumed command and allowed him to follow a course that would maintain the ship's condition. Captain Rank 1 Lich replied that he could give 27 knots. The flagship then ordered EM of the deceased Hood's escort to begin searching for people. *
* - “Anthony” and “Antelope” were released by Vice Admiral Holland to Iceland back at 2 pm on May 23 for refueling. At 21.00, after receiving information about the detection of the enemy, they again went to sea. Hood remained with Echo, Electra, Icarus and Achates. When the fight began, they were about 30 miles to N and N-W.
At 6.37, EM received an order from the commander of the 1st cruising squadron to look for surviving sailors from the sunken LKR and at 7.45 approached the place of Hood's death. Various wooden debris, balsa life rafts, cork mattresses floated in the large oil slick. Electra located and brought three sailors aboard.
From Iceland, Malcolm approached the site of Hood's death and continued the search all day. At 9.00 "Echo" sent a radiogram that he was heading to Hvalfjord with "Icarus", "Achates", "Antelope" and "Anthony". EM arrived there at 20.00.
British SRT "Norfolk"
At 7.57, Norfolk reported that Bismarck had reduced travel and might be damaged. Soon the assumption was confirmed: the flying boat "Sunderland" that took off from the Icelandic airfield at 8.10 found the German LK and reported that it was leaving behind an oil plume.
Admiral J. Tovi and King George V were 360 miles away. Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker had to make a decision: either to continue the battle with available forces, or, while continuing to track, wait for reinforcements.
The decisive factor was the condition of the LK - it took more than 400 tons of water into the damaged aft compartments, two main battery guns could not fight (two guns in the aft tower were put into operation by 07.20), the ship could not develop a course of more than 27 knots.
In addition, the LK entered service quite recently - the captain Leach reported about the ship's readiness to engage in battle no later than a week before the events described. The main caliber turrets of the LK were of a new model, they, of course, had "growing pains" - the last volleys during the morning battle fell undershot and with a wide spread across the whole.
So Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker decided to wait. All day the Prince of Wales and Norfolk continued their pursuit without engaging in combat.
After 11.00, visibility deteriorated, and at noon, in a shroud of light rain, visual contact was lost.
The enemy escapes
Even at night (at 1.20), in order to prevent any possibility of an unnoticed return of German ships, the KRL "Manchester", "Birmingham" and "Arethusa", patrolling between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, were sent to the northeastern tip of Iceland.
Explosions of LKR "Hood" shells near the "Prinz Eugen" SRT. Danish Strait, May 24, 1941
The Admiralty dispatched the LK Rodney to the staging area, which was about 550 miles away from the S-O, escorting the Britannic troop transport along with four EVs.
At 10:22 am, Rodney's commander, 1st Rank Captain Frederick H. G. Dalrymple-Hamilton, was ordered to leave one EV in the escort, and to follow the other three to W.
Leaving Eskimo (lieutenant JV Wilkinson) with Britannic, Rodney with Somali (captain Clifford Caslon), Tartar (commander Lionel P. Skipwith) and Mashona (commander William H. Selby) moved in full swing to the aid of the pursuit forces.
There were two more English LCs in the Atlantic - "Ramilles" and "Revenge".
The first was in cover of the HX127 convoy leaving Halifax, and was 800 miles S from Bismarck.
At 11:44 am, the commander of the LK Ramillies, Captain 1st Rank Arthur D. Read, was given a decoded Admiralty order: to leave the convoy and go to N to cut off the Bismarck from the western direction. At 12.12 the order was executed. The Revenge Commander, Captain 1st Rank E. R. Archer, complied with the order to immediately leave Halifax and also go for rapprochement with the enemy.
Smoke from a burning Prince of Wales (center) and smoke from a sinking Hood (right) as seen from a German ship during a battle in the Danish Strait. On the right are two bursts from German shells next to the Hood. May 24, 1941
Commodore Charles M. Blackman, who was patrolling between 44 and 46 degrees N in order to intercept German merchant ships, was ordered to intensify surveillance at 12.50 pm, the commander of the 18th Cruiser Division, also the commander of the Edinbourgh KRL …
At 14.30 Commodore C. Blackman radioed his position: 44 ° 17 ′ N, 23 ° 56 ′ W; “I ice with a 25-knot course at 320 °.
Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker was ordered to continue pursuit of the Bismarck, even if the remaining fuel on his ships was insufficient for joint action with the Home Fleet.
In poor visibility, the Norfolk and Suffolk were in extreme tension, constantly expecting a sudden turn and attack from the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. At 13.20, when the German ships changed course to S and reduced their speed, "Norfolk" suddenly found them through a veil of rain at a distance of only 8 miles and was forced to retreat, covered by a smoke screen.
At 15.30, a radio message from Admiral J. Tovi was brought to the Norfolk flagship bridge, in which he gave his place * at 8.00 on 24 May. After reading it, Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker was able to conclude that the Home Fleet would be able to approach the combat distance with the enemy by one in the morning, but this was no longer true - at 1.00 the ships of Admiral J. Tovi did not appear, but at 21.56 a radiogram was received from him with a more realistic forecast: at best, the admiral will be here by 9.00 on May 25 …
* - 61 ° 17 ′ N, 22 ° 8 ′ W
Admiralty in thought
During the day, British reconnaissance aircraft were active. At 3.35 pm, the Catalina, which could have been seen from the Norfolk but probably not found with the Bismarck, clarified the situation: the Suffolk is 26 miles from the aircraft and the German LK is 15 miles ahead.
In 10 minutes. London asked the commander of the 1st cruising squadron for answers to the following questions that worried the Admiralty most of all:
1) what percentage of its firepower retained "Bismarck";
2) how much ammunition he used;
3) what are the reasons for his frequent change of course.
The radiogram also contained a question about the rear admiral's intentions regarding the Prince of Wales and an urgent recommendation to beware of enemy submarines.
About half an hour later, Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker radioed:
1) unknown, but high;
2) about 100 shots;
3) incomprehensible - perhaps with the aim of confusing the CD pursuing him.
"Prince of Wales" after the battle in the Danish Strait. In the area of the stern tube, combat damage is visible
To the last question, he answered as follows: LK will not restore its combat effectiveness until the main forces join, unless the interception fails; he considers it inappropriate to engage in combat while the LOC is able to maintain a move.
Having received a radiogram from the commander of the 1st cruising squadron, the Admiralty realized that Bismarck was still very dangerous.
Evening was approaching. Bismarck and Prinz Eugen continued on the S, while Suffolk, Norfolk and Prince of Wales followed closely without losing visual contact.
At 17.11 in case of a sudden attack by the Germans, the British ships rebuilt: "Prince of Wales" stepped forward, and "Norfolk" took a place behind it, covering the LK from the side of the "out of service" aft tower. During this rebuilding, the SRT did not see the German LK, but they reported from Suffolk: Bismarck is at 152 ° at a distance of 16 miles, you (ie Norfolk) - at 256 ° at a distance of 12 miles.
At 18.09 signalmen from the flagship of Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker saw the Suffolk, the flagship ordered to signal it to approach 5 miles.
"Bismarck", as the British believed, tried to look for "Suffolk" in the fog and, when he began to turn on Ost, opened fire. This happened at 18.41.
As it turned out later, Admiral G. Lutiens acted to cover the flight of "Prinz Eugen".
Second combat contact. Getaway "Prinz Eugen"
The salvo of the German LK fell shortly enough, but close enough to knock out the rivets of the side plating in the stern of the English MRT by the bursting of the shell.
LK "Bismarck" is firing in the Danish Strait. May 1941
Before disappearing behind the smoke screen, "Suffolk" managed to respond with nine shots from the side.
Seeing that the Suffolk was under attack, the Norfolk immediately changed course and charged towards the enemy, opening fire at 18.53.
Guns "Prince of Wales" started working five minutes earlier, and in 8 minutes. he managed to fire 12 volleys without reaching a single hit. However, this firing was enough for the two main battery guns to be out of order (due to defects in the turret gun).
"Bismarck" showed no intention of resuming the battle, and Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker hastened to inform the Prince of Wales that he also did not intend to enter into combat contact with the enemy before the approach of Admiral J. Tovi.
So, the skirmish turned out to be fleeting: "Bismarck" again began to move away, and released without any instructions "Prinz Eugen", taking advantage of the snow charge, fled from pursuit.
The British cruisers went further with an anti-submarine zigzag - they entered the area of operations of the German submarines.
The alignment of forces on the evening of May 24
On deck "Prinz Eugen"
At 20.25 the Admiralty sent a radiogram to the ships describing the situation at 18.00 on May 24. It looked like this.
Enemy - 59 ° 10 ′ N, 36 ° W, course - 180 °, course - 24 knots; Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales maintain contact with him. Home Fleet Commander - King George V, Repulse, Victorious and the 2nd Cruising Squadron (the latter separated from Admiral J. Tosi at 15.09) - 58 ° N, 30 ° W.
KPT London, escorting the Arundel Castle transport from Gibraltar and located at 42 ° 50 ′ N, 20 ° 10 ′ W, was ordered to leave the transport and follow to approach the enemy. LK "Ramilles" - approximately 45 ° 45 ′ N, 35 ° 40 ′ W - bypasses the enemy's course from W.
The KRLs Manchester, Birmingham and Arethusa left their position off the northeastern tip of Iceland to resupply fuel.
LC "Revenge", which left Halifax at 15.05, follows a 6-knot speed with a slow-moving convoy HX 128 (44 vehicles). KRL "Manchester" is located approximately at 45 ° 15 ′ N, 25 ° 10 ′ W.
So, not counting the destroyers, 19 warships (including Force H) - 3 LC, 2 LKR, 12 CR and 2 AB “worked” to capture the German LC.
Attacks "Victorious"
KRT "Suffolk"
Admiral J. Tovey, striving first of all to detain the enemy, sent forward AB "Victorious" so that he would try to force "Bismarck" to reduce the speed by attacking his torpedo bombers. On AB, which had not yet acquired combat experience, there were only 9 strike aircraft - these were the Swordfish of the 825th squadron. There were 6 more Fulmar fighters from 802 Squadron, while the rest of the hangar space was occupied by partially disassembled Hurricane fighters that were to be delivered to Malta.
Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker read the message from the commander-in-chief that at about 2200 aircraft from the Victorious would attempt to attack the Bismarck at 14.55 at 20.31. He began to expect with hope the appearance of aircraft, which, according to his calculations, could be over the target at about 23.00.
They lost sight of the enemy for some time, but at 23.30 "Norfolk" momentarily "caught" the target at a distance of 13 miles. After 13 minutes. torpedo bombers appeared in the sky.
* * *
After a short battle between the ships of Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker and Admiral G. Lutyens, it became obvious that by 2300 hours the Victorious would not be able to approach Bismarck for 100 miles.
Then the commander of the 2nd cruising squadron, Rear Admiral E. Curtis (ATBCurteis), who was holding his flag on the Galatea cruise ship, decided to raise the aircraft at about 22.00, when the distance to the target would be 120 miles, and gave the corresponding order to the commander of AB Captain 2 rank G. Bovilu.
A fresh north-westerly wind was blowing when at 22.08 the Victorious changed course by 330 ° and reduced speed to 15 knots for the torpedo bombers to take off. The weather was, as they say, "worse than you can imagine." It was daylight, but dense clouds and rain created twilight. The flight deck swayed between the frothy crests of the waves and the low clouds in the leaden sky, poured by the cold rain.
British aircraft carrier "Victorious"
At 22.10 from the AB deck, nine torpedo bombers of the 825th squadron took off heavily and disappeared into the clouds. They were led by Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde.
Having gained an altitude of 1.5 thousand feet (about 460 m), the squadron lay on course 2258. The aircraft flew at a speed of about 160 km / h, but the squadron covered 120 miles, separating the British AB and the German LK, for almost two hours.
In conditions of dense low clouds, the very approximate coordinates of the target, which the pilots received before departure, were clearly not enough.
Fortunately for the British, an aviation radar had already been created for the Swordfish torpedo bombers. The radar antenna ASV Mk.10, placed in the fairing, was suspended under the nose of the fuselage, in place of the torpedo, so the radar-equipped aircraft could not play the role of shock.
At about 23.27 a radar operator, bending over the display screen in the second cockpit of one of the Swordfish of 825 Squadron, found a target mark on the right at a course of 16 miles. Three minutes later, the Bismarck was seen heading 160 ° through the break in the clouds, but was immediately lost sight of again as the clouds quickly closed in.
The British ships pursuing the Germans had to be to W from them, so the squadron changed course to N-O, then turned to the left.
Soon the radar "caught" two ships, left and right on the course - it turned out to be a pursuit group, and "Suffolk" sent torpedo bombers to "Bismarck", which was 14 miles ahead of it.
At 23.50 the radar operator saw the target straight ahead. The squadron began to descend and, breaking through the clouds, prepared for the attack. However, instead of the German aircraft, the pilots saw in front of them the US Coast Guard ship Madoc, which was drifting. The Bismarck, 6 miles to the south, spotted the planes and immediately opened up intensive barrage of fire.
There was no time left to rebuild. All eight * aircraft, each carrying one 18-inch torpedo equipped with a two-channel proximity fuse and mounted at a depth of 31 feet (9.46 m), rushed into the attack from one direction.
* - A note was made in the Admiralty's secret reports on the number of aircraft attacking Bismarck: "One aircraft lost contact (with the others) in the clouds." Probably, this was done in order to hide the "disarmament" equipped with the radar "Swordfish"
Volley LC "Bismarck". Danish Strait, May 1941
Exactly at midnight, three vehicles simultaneously dropped torpedoes, directing them to the left side of the LK in the midship area. The next three, dropped a minute later by the 2nd group, which went a little further, went to the bow of the hull, "Bismarck". The 7th vehicle aimed its torpedo at the area of the bow superstructure of the LK, and the 8th Swordfish, bypassing the Bismarck, dropped the torpedo from the starboard at 0.02.
It was this torpedo, dropped by the last, struck the starboard side of the LK in the area of the navigating bridge: two Fulmar fighters, lifted from the Victorious at 23.00 and observing the results of the attack, reported that they saw black smoke rising from the bow of the LK, and he himself reduced the speed …
Although the armor belt survived, gaps appeared between the plates and in the side skin, forcing Bismarck to temporarily reduce its travel to 22 knots.
The second pair of fighters, taking off from Victorious at 1.05, could not detect the enemy despite their best efforts.
When at 0.52 the sun disappeared behind the horizon, the squadron of Lieutenant-Commander Y. Esmond passed less than half of the way back. Unfortunately, the Victorious's locator beacon failed and the planes passed the AB without seeing its landing lights in the rain. I had to use a radio rangefinder and signal searchlights for the drive.
Finally, at about 2.00 am, the planes requested a landing. On AB, landing lights and illumination of the flight deck were turned on. At 2.05, all the vehicles landed safely - despite the fact that the three pilots had never landed on AB at night.
But the fate of the two Fulmar fighters turned out to be sadder. They were expected until 2.50, giving circular radar pulses and rotating beams of searchlights, but the planes never showed up. The darkness was already complete, and Rear Admiral E. Curtis. fearing German submarines, had to give the AV order to stop waiting and count the fighters dead. The planes did indeed die, but the pilots, after several hours of being in the water on liferafts, were lifted aboard by an American ship.
Third combat contact. The enemy slips away again
Bismarck in the Danish Strait. View from board "Prinz Eugen"
While torpedo bombers attacked Bismarck, Norfolk spotted the ship in the direction of S-W.
Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker immediately ordered fire on the detected target, believing it to be Bismarck. However, "Prince of Wales" had the opportunity to make sure that the target was the American cutter "Madoc". Fortunately for the Americans, contact was lost while the British prepared to fire.
At 1.16, turning to course 220 °, Norfolk suddenly spotted Bismarck at 204 ° bearing at 8 miles. A short artillery duel followed.
The Norfolk and Prince of Wales turned left to open up a firing zone for their guns and aimed them at the enemy. At 1.30, using the data of the radio rangefinder, the English LK fired two volleys from a distance of 20,000 yards (18,200 m). Bismarck also responded with two, and his shells were overshot.
After that, the British again lost the enemy, and Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker ordered KPT "Suffolk", whose radar station had the most reliable readings, to search independently, and he followed behind with the LK.
At 2.29, Suffolk sighted Bismarck at 20,900 yards (19,000 m), bearing 192 °.
The German LK was heading 160 ° in a 20-knot course.
The night was clear, visibility reached 6 miles, and the Suffolk went in an anti-submarine zigzag - probably, its commander decided that the risk of losing contact with the target * again was less than the risk of being torpedoed by a German submarine.
* - Execution of the anti-submarine zigzag (30 °) took about 10 minutes.
In his order issued after the end of the operation (С. В.04164, р.18), the Commander of the Metropolitan Fleet wrote that the loss of contact with Bismarck was “… mainly a consequence of overconfidence. The radar worked so steadily and gave such accurate readings that the commander had a false impression of safety … "Suffolk" pursued at the limit of the radar detection range and lost contact in that part of the zigzag that took him even further from the target. At that moment, when the cruiser turned to the left, the enemy turned sharply to the right and broke away from the pursuit."
Indeed, at 03.06 the radiometrists recorded Bismarck on the same bearing. But this contact turned out to be the last - the British lost the German LK. They last observed Prinz Eugen on May 24 at 19.09.
However, this fact did not immediately fit into their heads. Only at 4.01 a semaphore was transferred from "Suffolk" to "Norfolk", the content of which boiled down to the following: the enemy either turned to Ost, being behind the cruiser, or changed course to W; acting on this assumption. After another 10 minutes. Captain Ellis ordered a cipher to be sent informing the flagship that it had lost contact at 3.06. The commander of the 1st cruising squadron read it at 5.15.
At 5.52 am Rear Admiral W. Wake-Walker asked Admiral J. Tovie and Victorious for the possibility of aerial reconnaissance.
After analyzing the navigator's strip, W. Wake-Walker came to the conclusion that about 3.10 Bismarck made a right turn. Based on this, at dawn he ordered Suffolk to search for W and at 06.05 sent a message to Admiral J. Tovi: “The enemy is lost at 03.06. Suffolk aims to find W. In the afternoon, Norfolk will join Suffolk, and Prince of Wales will move closer to the Home Fleet.
The encryption was received on King George V two minutes later. It became obvious that the “hot meeting” expected by 9.00 would not take place …
Uncertainty again
Having lost the Bismarck before dawn on May 25, the British found themselves in a very difficult position. There were several assumptions about the intentions of the enemy, and in order to verify each of them, it was required to send ships. But the main thing is time, it could not be wasted.
At 6.30 am, when it was finally dawn and visibility was good, the Norfolk set off after the Suffolk, which, in search of W, was on a 25-knot course at 230 °. "Prince of Wales" went to S, to join with Admiral J. Tovi, considering that "King George V" and "Repulse" were at 54 ° N, 34 ° 55 ′ W. In fact, they were much further to SW …
In accordance with the Admiralty instructions received at night, Rear Admiral E. Curtis on the Galatea cruise ship changed course at 5.58, heading to the point where Bismarck was last seen, and at Victorious, by 7.30 am, aircraft for aerial reconnaissance were prepared for takeoff at direction to East.
AB "Victorious" off the coast of Norway
However, the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet forced the plan to be corrected: the ships of the 2nd cruising squadron and "Victorious" were ordered to search for N-W from the point of last contact with the enemy.
Fighters "Fulmar" have already flown at night (the last aircraft landed at 4:00), moreover, two of them did not return to AB.
The fighter pilots did not change, therefore, having received an order from the commander of the 2nd cruising squadron at 7.16, Captain 1st Rank G. Bovel was forced to decide to send Swordfish aircraft for reconnaissance, the crews of which could be replaced.
At 08.12, seven vehicles, one after another, took off from the flight deck and began searching in a sector of 280-40 ° at a distance of 100 miles. Victorious himself, as well as his accompanying RCLs Galatea, Aurora, Hermion and Kenya, also monitored this sector.
So having found nothing during the almost 4-hour flight, at 11.07 the planes returned to their AB, moreover missing one machine that made an emergency landing on the water. Fortunately, the unfortunate Swordfish was brought alongside a drifting liferaft, which was empty of people, but emergency supplies of food and water were found. The crew of the aircraft spent 9 days on the raft before being taken aboard a passing vessel.
At 10.30 am, the "King George V" en route to SW received a radiogram from the Admiralty with a series of radio bearings, which, as it was reported in the encryption, may have given the position of the German LK - the intercepted signals were identified with those that came from the "Bismarck" immediately after the torpedo attack * of the aircraft with "Victorious".
* - The transmission of a long radiogram from the LK was recorded by British ships at 2.58 on May 25.
Only an even longer radiogram, the transmission of which began from the Bismarck at 8.52 and lasted more than half an hour (Admiral Lutyens was sure that the tracking of him was not interrupted, and therefore decided to report in detail to his command about the situation), allowed the direction finding to approximately determine his place …
Torpedo bombers "Swordfish" on the deck of AB "Victorious" awaiting launch for the attack "Bismarck" on May 24, 1941. These are all nine aircraft that the ship could lift into the air
Having plotted them on the map, the marching headquarters of Admiral J. Tovi received coordinates significantly different from those obtained on the basis of the assumption that "Bismarck" goes to the North Sea.
Having described a circle around the point 57 ° N, 33 ° W, the radius of which corresponded to the distance that Bismarck could travel from the moment of direction finding, we got the area of its equiprobable location. In order to intercept the enemy, the commander-in-chief, having notified all the ships, turned on a course of 55 °, making 27 knots towards the "Faroe-Icelandic hole".
"King George V" walked alone - back at 09.06 the commander of the "Repulse" Captain 1st Rank W. Tennant received permission to go to Newfoundland for bunkering. KRL "Galatea", "Aurora" and "Kenya" with the receipt of information from Admiral J. Tovi immediately turned on the course of 85 °.
At 10.23 am, a clearer instruction was finally sent from London to the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, the Commander of Force H and the Commander of the 1st Cruising Squadron: to proceed from the assumption that the Bismarck was going to Brest.
On Renown, located at 41 ° 30 ′ N, 17 ° 10 ′ W, this message was rehearsed at 11.00, and after 8 minutes. Rodney has been instructed somewhat differently: to act on the assumption that Bismarck is heading for the Bay of Biscay. Doubts did not leave the high command of the British fleet.
The Admiralty, using one-way radio communication, at this stage of the operation did everything possible to provide the ships with the most accurate data as soon as possible. The preservation of the radio silence regime depended on this.
At 2:28 pm, by another radiogram, the Admiralty canceled its order given earlier to Captain 1st Rank Dolrymple-Hamilton, and this time ordered Rodney to act on the condition that the German LK was sent back to Norway through the strait between Iceland and Ireland. *
* - At 13.20 a stable radar contact was established with the enemy, this gave his coordinates, however, with an accuracy of 50 miles - 55 ° 15 ′ N, 32 ° W.
At 14.19 a message to the commander-in-chief left London, which he received at 15.30. But even this did not become the basis for an unambiguous order - doubts still remained. Only at 19.24 from London was another encrypted message sent to Admiral Tovey, stating that the Admiralty considered the west coast of France to be the target of the movement of the German LK.
Another 2 hours later, at 4:21 pm, London received a question from Admiral J. Tovey, who was still heading for the East with a 25-knot course, heading 80 °: "Do you think the enemy is heading for the Faroes?"
With the onset of evening, the version of the "Bismarck" movement in Biscay strengthened, and at 18:15 the Admiralty canceled the directive sent at 14:28 and stated that the enemy's "destination" was a French port.
When at 18.10 Admiral J. Tovey ordered Captain 1st Rank Patterson to turn to S-E, he still did not have accurate information about the enemy.
At 21.10 "Victorious", located at the point with coordinates 57 ° 59 ′ N, 32 ° 40 ′ W, lifted 6 Swordfish into the air, which searched in the 80-180 ° sector within a radius of 100 miles from AB. The planes returned the next day, at 0.05.
Seaplanes of the Coastal Command aviation made several reconnaissance flights along the possible route of the German LK to Brest, but also found nothing.
British LC "King George V"
By then, the lack of fuel had become the most serious problem for British ships. The Repulse had already left for Newfoundland, the Prince of Wales was on its way to Iceland; "Victorious" and "Suffolk" reduced their speed and went in economic modes. KRL "Hermion", which had less than 40% of the fuel, had to be sent to Khvalfjord, the rest of the cruisers were forced to limit the course of 20 nodes to save money. In the tanks of the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Fleet, about 60% of the oil reserves remained.
At about midnight, Admiral J. Tovey ordered all commanders to save fuel, which meant a directive reduction in speed.
By the morning of May 26, the lack of fuel on the British ships acquired a decisive importance - they had been at sea for four days. Exotic projects were already being born in the Admiralty, like shuttle flights of PBY Catalina flying boats equipped with fuel tanks …
The problem of fuel most of all affected ship security. AV "Victorious" needed an EM escort, but LC "Rodney" risked even more.
The attention of the Admiralty was attracted by the ships of the 4th flotilla EM, which escorted the convoy WS8B. At about 2.00 am on 26 May, the flotilla commander, 1st Rank Captain Philip L. Vian, who was holding the flag on Cossack, was ordered to leave the guarded convoy of transports with troops and head to N-O, to join the Rodney. EMs "Zulu", "Sikh", "Cossack", "Maori" and "Piorun" were to play a very important role in the next phase of the operation.
Force H - LKR "Renown", AB "Ark Royal" and KRL "Sheffield" - also followed without an escort, which was released back to Gibraltar at 9:00 am on 25 May.
Two hours later, after receiving a radiogram from the Admiralty that Bismarck was going to Brest, Vice Admiral J. Somerville ordered preparations for the rise of reconnaissance aircraft. "Force H" was located at the latitude of Brest, and the latest information about the German aircraft "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" located there was dated May 23. *
* - The Admiralty had air reconnaissance data from Brest at 19.30 on May 25, which reported that both ships were still there. The corresponding radiogram to Gibraltar, intended for transmission to Renown, left London at 21.08. When at 22.26 it was received in Gibraltar, "Renown" already half an hour ago switched to another wave and could not receive it. The radio session on another wave took place only at 0.34.
The weather had worsened since last evening, the wind was more than strong, and the squadron speed had to be reduced to 17 knots. AB went through the stormy northwest, the height of the waves reached 15 m. The planes raised from the hangar were dragged on their hands through the streams of water to the starting positions. At 7.16, combat air patrol fighters took off from the Ark Royal, and at 8.35 - 10 Swordfish, which began the search. They landed at 9.30 am, finding nothing.
The enemy's general course has been determined
View of the Bismarck (center) from the Swordfish
At 10.30 am, a PBY "Catalina" Z209 seaplane piloted by Dennis A. Briggs, taking off from Lough Erie in Ireland, discovered an oil trail left by the German LK due to damage sustained by two shells from the "Prince of Wales" May 24. Soon the 2nd pilot, American Leonard B. Smith, saw the Bismarck itself five miles away, heading 150 °. The Catalina came under fire from the LK anti-aircraft guns and was damaged. As a result, the contact was lost at 10.45. But now his general course was precisely known - "Bismarck" went to Brest.
At 10.43 this report was received by the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, and the Renown five minutes earlier.
About two hours later, at 11:15 am, two Swordfish with Ark Royal confirmed the information, finding Bismarck 25 miles East from its previous recorded position. True, one of the pilots reported the discovery of a cruise missile, not an aircraft.
So Admiral G. Lutiens was about 690 miles from the target. If "Bismarck" kept the 21-knot travel, it could reach Brest at 21.30 on 27 May.
Admiral Dzh. Tovi on "King George V", which separated from the German flagship 130 miles, had a real chance to catch up with the elusive LK. But it was only a matter of distance and speed - the position of the opponents changed every hour, and not in favor of the British.
Bismarck was approaching its coast and therefore could produce the fuel remaining in its tanks with minimal risk. He could also count on air support. The British, on the other hand, went to the enemy coast, being forced to economize in every possible way the fuel necessary for the return, being exposed to the increasing risk of becoming targets of attacks by German aviation and submarines.
Of the major combattants, Renown was the closest to Bismarck, but after the loss of Hood, no one wanted to throw it into battle until Rodney and King George V arrived - just in case, it was forbidden to fight alone radioed to Vice Admiral J. Somerville at 10.52 (he received it at 11.45).
Somerville could not ignore him, so, taking up a position 50 miles from Bismarck, he sent out planes for reconnaissance throughout the day. Three times (from 12.30 to 15.53; from 16.24 to 18.50 and from 19.00 to 21.30) aerial reconnaissance aircraft from "Ark Royal" established and maintained visual contact with the target. All this time, the AV was in readiness for an immediate torpedo-bomb attack.
Coastal Command aircraft also continued reconnaissance flights. At 12.20 p.m. Catalina M420 spotted 4th Flotilla EVs.
Having received a message from the Z209 board at 10.54 about contact with the German LK, Captain 1st Rank F. Wayan, who was in a hurry to join the ships of Admiral J. Tovi, decided to sharply change course to S-E, rushing to intercept.
Ark Royal attack
British torpedo bomber "Swordfish", nicknamed by the pilots for its archaic design "string bag"
At 13.15 Vice Admiral J. Somerville semaphore ordered the commander of the KRL "Sheffeild" Captain 1st Rank Larcom to separate from "Force H" and come closer to the enemy.
This signal was not duplicated for Ark Royal, which led to very serious consequences. Half an hour later, the flagship radioed to the Admiralty about this order, the radio was also received at the Ark Royal, but they were in no hurry to decode, because the report came from Admiral Somerville and was not intended for AB.
One way or another, the pilots of the planes patrolling in the air did not suspect that Sheffield had left the Force H order. Confusion appeared in their reports about the discovered ships - LK or KR? Let us recall that the British did not yet know about the flight of "Prinz Eugen", and any KR found in the area of movement of the enemy was quite "legally" identified as an enemy.
Nevertheless, the aircraft torpedoes on the Swordfish torpedo bombers prepared for departure were set at a depth of 30 feet, which, according to the British, corresponded, more precisely, exceeded * the draft of the Bismarck - if the Mk. XII torpedoes had magnetic proximity fuses, then they should have exploded, passing under the keel of the target.
* - This circumstance requires a separate careful consideration.
The fact is that the Germans launched disinformation about the true draft of the Bismarck through all channels. And if the initially underestimated value of the LK draft only "justified" the underestimated official displacement of the ship, then for weapons specialists this value, "legalized" in the secret combat manuals, determined the setting of torpedo modes before the attack of the LK.
It becomes clear how serious the difference has become between the true and "legalized" draft - maybe even in a fraction of a meter. After all, damage from a non-contact explosion of a torpedo under the keel of the LK could be immeasurably greater than from a contact explosion in the cheekbone region. This was the situation when AB "Ark Royal" was torpedoed - in fact, he died from a non-contact explosion of one German torpedo.
At 14.50 Captain 1st Rank Loben Mound gave the command to take off the strike group. From the flight deck of the Ark Royal, 15 Swordfish climbed one after another and headed for S. One plane was immediately forced to return due to a malfunction that was discovered after takeoff.
Since the weather and cloud height did not allow counting on timely visual target detection, all hopes were pinned on aircraft radars. They then played a cruel joke with the pilots.
Having found on the indicators the mark of a large target, which was located approximately 20 miles from the expected position of the German LK, the squadron, on command, went on the attack without hesitation, being in full confidence that “Bismarck” was in front of it. Only after the torpedoes were dropped, which happened at 15.50, the pilots were surprised to find that they had worked … on the Sheffield KRL!
The matter consisted in the fact that at the briefing before departure the pilots were informed that there were no other ships between the KP Norfolk and Suffolk, which continued to pursue the Bismarck, and the LK itself. Therefore, they attacked on the move the Sheffield, which happened to be "in the wrong" place, which was saved only by timely and very energetic maneuvering.
LC "Prince of Wales"
One can only marvel at the skill and endurance of Captain 1st Rank Charles Larkom, who, not forgetting to order his gunners not to open fire on the planes, managed to save the ship, onto which 11 (!) Torpedoes were dropped. True, three of them exploded when dropped into the water, but three others - near the stern of the KRL. From the rest, "Sheffield", immediately increasing the speed to full, managed to dodge.
Frustrated and angry, the pilots had to return to AB to hang torpedoes and refuel, which they did at 17.20. Returning, the planes spotted approaching 4th Flotilla EMs 20 miles to W of Forte H.
About half an hour later, Sheffield spotted Bismarck at 48 ° 30 ′ N, 17 ° 20 ′ W and, having informed Vice Admiral J. Somerville of his position, took up a position 10 miles aft of the enemy.
A pair of Swordfish that took off from Ark Royal confirmed that Bismarck was indeed the target this time around.
In view of the failure with the Duplex fuses, the torpedoes, again suspended from the aircraft, were equipped with conventional contact fuses, and the stroke depth was set at 22 feet (6.7 m). 15 aircraft were prepared for take-off: four - 818 squadron, the same number - 810th and seven - 820th squadron.
Command of the strike group was entrusted to Captain 2nd Rank T. P. Could.
An almost hurricane 6-point northwest whistled over the sea, it was raining. The height of the clouds was about 600 m. At times, 15-meter waves rose above the flight deck, AB experienced a strong pitching motion. The deck crew had to act very quickly, otherwise there was a strong risk that the planes would simply fall overboard.
At 19.10, Captain 2nd Rank T. Kud reported on the group's readiness for takeoff. One by one, the 15 Swordfish, risking to plunge into the wave as the AB bow sank down, and getting a good "kick" from below when the ship climbed to the crest of the wave, took off. In the air, the planes were divided into two detachments, three flights in each.
According to the orientation transmitted from Sheffield, the target was at a bearing of 167 ° from the Ark Royal at a distance of 38 miles. The strike team was ordered to fly to the cruiser, which will direct it to the "Bismarck".
Aircraft carrier "Victorious"
Due to the strong wind, the flight took more than half an hour. The Sheffield was discovered at 19.55, but the planes immediately lost it. Again, contact with him was established only at 20.35 - a visual signal was sent to the aircraft from the radar: the enemy was at a bearing of 110 °, the range was 12 miles.
The strike group, lined up in links in a line, approached the target from the stern. Having met a small accumulation of clouds on the way, the planes went into climb, dividing into groups.
At 20.47, the 1st flight (three vehicles) began to descend, hoping to get out of the clouds and clarify the course. When the aircraft's altimeters passed the 2,000-foot mark, the group leader became worried - the cloud cover should have ended. However, a dense cloud surrounded the machines at an altitude of 1,500 feet (450 m), and only at the 300-meter mark did the torpedo bombers fall out of the dense gray shroud, and the pilots saw Bismarck four miles ahead of the course.
One Swordfish from the third was with the 1st flight. Convinced that the distance was still too great, Commander T. Kood ordered his flight to gain altitude again and enter the clouds. At 20.53, four torpedo bombers began to dive on the target, dropping their torpedoes under very intense barrage fire and having time to notice that one of them reached the target and exploded.
The 2nd flight, in which two aircraft remained, lost contact with the 1st flight in the clouds. Having climbed to an altitude of 9000 feet (2750 m), the pilots orientated themselves according to the radar data and launched an attack on the LK from the starboard side, dropping two torpedoes that went into the middle of the Bismarck hull.
One torpedo may have hit the target.
The third plane of the 2nd link, "lost" in the clouds, returned to the Sheffield KRL, again received target designation and attacked the target on its own. He entered the Bismarck from the bow and laid down on a combat course from its port side, directing a torpedo into the middle of the LK. Despite heavy fire, the pilot kept the vehicle on a combat course, and the torpedo hit the left side of the target.
The 4th link, following the 3rd, entered the clouds with an ascent, but icing began at 2000 m. Having entered the peak, at an altitude of 600 m, the aircraft of the 4th flight found a "window" in the clouds, where they were joined by the second "Swordfish" from the 3rd flight. In a moment, the pilots saw "Bismarck", which was attacked from the starboard side by the 2nd flight.
British LC "Repulse"
Four aircraft bypassed the LK from the stern and began to dive at it through a small low cloud, simultaneously attacking the 2nd flight from the opposite side. The torpedoes dropped by them missed the target, but the planes themselves came under the most severe shelling - the car, which had number 4C, received more than a hundred holes, both crew members were wounded.
Two aircraft of the 5th link were also "lost" in the clouds. Having risen to an altitude of more than 2100 m, the planes began to be covered with ice. The 4K machine descended to 300 m, finding a target directly below it, then under the fire of anti-aircraft artillery it rose again, having time to notice a torpedo hit on the starboard side of the LK. Then, five miles away, this Swordfish took up a position to attack the bow of the Bismarck from the starboard side and, flying over the very crests of the waves, dropped a torpedo from a distance of about 1800 m, but to no avail.
The second "Swordfish" of the 5th flight lost its leader while diving through the cloud, "falling out" from there directly above the LC tank, came under concentrated fire and after two unsuccessful attempts to attack was forced to get rid of the torpedo …
One of the two aircraft of Flight 6 attacked the Bismarck from the starboard side and dropped its torpedo from a distance of 1800 m, aiming at the middle of the hull. The torpedo did not explode. The second vehicle lost its target, but, having flown to the Sheffield for target designation, returned and tried to attack the starboard side of the target on low level flight from a traverse direction. Intense and accurate fire forced the pilot to deviate from the combat course …
The attack ended at 21.25. The aircraft attacked "Bismarck" with 13 torpedoes (two were dropped unintentionally), three torpedoes hit the target: the first damaged the left propeller shaft tunnel, the explosion of the second jammed the rudders in the 12 ° position on the left side. The Bismarck lost control and began to describe the circulation. * The third torpedo exploded in the area of the stern superstructure. It was a success!
* - Reconnaissance aircraft flying in pairs throughout the day of May 26 (8 Sworfish in total, the last pair landing at 23.25) observed Bismarck describing two complete circulations.
"Bismarck" snaps
The Sheffield was still hanging on the tail of the German LK when at 21.40 Bismarck, turning left, opened fire and fired 6 highly accurate salvos with the main battery. There were no hits, but a close gap killed three and seriously wounded two sailors. KRL turned away, noticing EM "Cossack" approaching from W and other ships of the 4th flotilla at the retreat. "Sheffield" gave them the approximate coordinates of "Bismarck", and he himself moved a decent distance and began to follow a course parallel to it.
* * *
The King George V, with 32% of its fuel left by noon on 26 May, making 25 knots, went to the S-E. When Rodney joined him at 18.26, there were still about 90 miles to the enemy.
Captain 1st Rank Dolrymple-Hamilton informed Admiral J. Tovi that due to lack of fuel, he reduced the speed to 22 knots from 05.05 pm and would be forced to turn back no later than 08.00 the next day. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet already understood that if the torpedo bombers from the Ark Royal did not force the Bismarck to slow down by 24.00, he would turn back himself.
At 21.42, the British LC turned "all of a sudden" to S - in the hope that in the rays of the sunset they would see the enemy.
At 22.28, a message from Vice Admiral J. Somerville was received: "Bismarck" received torpedo hits.
* * *
The main caliber of the LK "Rodney"
The tiller compartment was flooded on the German LK. The diver who descended into the compartment examined the stock of the damaged rudder and found out that it was impossible to repair it in field conditions.
The Bismarck crew, overwhelmed with glee after the sinking of the Hood, only realized from May 25th what forces were being sent to destroy the LK.
Half a day was lost due to unrealistic reports from German aircraft. Captain 1st Rank Lindemann headed for Brest on the orders of Admiral Karls, who promised to meet the LK with powerful air and submarine forces. There was almost no fuel left in the Bismarck oil tanks, and tremendous efforts were made by the crew to repair the damage sustained from the torpedo explosion.
At 22.42 Bismarck spotted British EVs and opened fire on them.
At 10.50 pm Lindemann received a radiogram signed by Hitler: "All our thoughts are with our victorious comrades." At 1.40 a message was received that bombers flew to the rescue, submarines were approaching the area (one of the boats, having used up its torpedoes, on the afternoon of May 26 was in a very convenient position for the Ark Royal attack).
When EM Captain 1st Rank F. Wayan discovered the target, LCR "Renown" and AB "Ark Royal" were to NW from the enemy. Although the third attack of the day was no longer possible, 12 torpedo bombers were prepared to take off at dawn. Force H changed course to N, then to W, and at 1.15 turned to S.
Soon Vice Admiral J. Somerville received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to stay 20 miles south of Bismarck, awaiting the approach of the line forces.
* * *
Throughout the night, the compound moved along a course parallel to the enemy, observing the firing of lighting shells during the torpedo attacks of the EM of the 4th Flotilla.
They surrounded Bismarck all night, attacking it with torpedoes at every opportunity. *
* - At 1.21 a four-torpedo salvo was fired by "Zulu" (captain 2nd rank Harry R. Grahem), at 1.28 - "Sikh" (captain 2nd rank Grahem H. Stokes), at 1.37 two torpedoes were fired by "Maori" (captain 2nd rank Harold T Armstrong), three minutes later Cossack fired a three-torpedo salvo. At 3.35 am the flagship EM repeated the attack, firing one torpedo. The last attempt took place at 6.56 by "Maori".
LKR "Renown"
Having expended 16 torpedoes, the 4th Flotilla did not achieve significant results. At the same time carrying the Polish flag "Piorun" (commander E. Plavsky) and "Maori" came under fire, but EM still recorded one torpedo hit in the bow of the aircraft - more precisely, they observed a fire in the area.
"Bismarck" temporarily lost speed, but soon gave 8 knots.
At 5.09, still in complete darkness, the Walrus took off from the King George V. Due to strong wind and rain, the plane did not find the enemy.
A dozen Swordfish waited for a signal to take off, but due to lack of visibility after dawn, the attack was canceled.
At 8.10 on N appeared "Maori", from which the "ratier" was informed that the enemy was 12 miles from the EM. Renown, 17 miles from Bismarck, turned towards S-W.
* * *
On the morning of May 27, "Bismarck" met surrounded by British EMs, who followed literally every step he took.
Admiral Lutyens ordered the Arado-196 to be prepared for departure - the pilot had to take the LK logbook, the film filmed during the battle with Hood, and other classified documents. The bailout ended in failure - the plane fell into the water. The search for the drowned documents was ordered to produce U-556 and then U-74.
North-West, blowing at dawn, cleared the horizon, and good visibility was established. Reports that Admiral J. Tovi received during the night indicated that, despite the decrease in speed and damage to the rudders, the Bismarck retained the effectiveness of its artillery.
The commander-in-chief, believing that the fight on a windward course would be the least profitable, decided to approach the enemy from W-N-W bearings and, if "Bismarck" continues to go to N, start a fight on the counter course from a distance of about 15 thousand yards (13650 m). Further actions - as appropriate.
Between 6 and 7 am a series of messages were received from the Maori in which he was giving radio bearings to Bismarck. This allowed the headquarters of Admiral J. Tovey to plot the relative course of the enemy and find out that the German LK was heading 330 ° at a speed of 10 knots.
At 7.08 am "Rodney" was ordered to keep a distance of at least 6 cab. and permission to fight by maneuvering independently. In half an hour "Rodney" took a position with respect to the flagship at a bearing of 10 °.
At 7.53 am, Rodney received a message from KPT Norfolk that Bismarck, on the 7-knot on the N-W, was 9 miles away.
After 37 minutes. visual contact was established at a distance of 24 km.
At 8.43, after the direction of approach was corrected twice by course changes, the target was at 118 ° bearing at a distance of 25 thousand yards (22,750 m).
The English LC, which was separated by 8 cabins, were heading 110 °.
The battle
At 8.47, Captain 1st Rank F. Dolrymple-Hamilton ordered to open fire on the enemy LK, a minute later "Rodney" supported the "King George V".
Rodney (right) is firing at Bismarck, which is burning on the horizon (smoke on the left). May 27, 1941
The first Rodney missile lifted a 45-meter column of water and exploded. The next volleys were fired by armor-piercing shells, which gave a much smaller splash when dropped into the water.
The German ship, which discovered the enemy at 8.40, did not respond immediately, opening fire 10 minutes later, but covered the Rodney with its 3rd volley. He skillfully maneuvered, on the 2nd salvo, having achieved the fall of his shells with an 18-meter undershoot. On the 3rd volley, at 8.54, a hit was achieved.
Smoke from burnt cordite interfered with visual observation and fire control, but artillery radar helped.
The opponents have already drawn so close that the "Bismarck" has earned its auxiliary caliber. At 8.58, Rodney did the same. At 9.02 a.m. from "Rodney" a 16-inch projectile hit the bow of the deck of the German LK, in the area of the 1st turret of the main caliber, and after about 10 minutes. on the German LK, the bow KDP was disabled.
"Bismarck" turned to S and concentrated its fire on the flagship of Admiral J. Tovi, which was 14.5 km away from it.
At 9.05 am the universal artillery "King George V" entered the battle, but because of the strong powder smoke, which interfered with the control of the main caliber fire, within 2-3 minutes. the order was given to cease fire.
For five minutes, between 09.05 and 09.15, the British flagship held a combat distance of about 11 km.
Moving with the enemy on S, "Rodney" from 10 km fired six torpedoes, and "Norfolk" fired a 4-torpedo salvo from an even greater distance - about 14.5 km. At 0916 the Bismarck's bearing began to shift rapidly aft, and Rodney turned 16 points to get around it from the bow.
The King George V did the same a minute later, and both British LKs, at 7,800 and 10,900 m respectively, resumed fire from the starboard side.
"Bismarck" shifted fire to "Rodney" - several shells fell close, almost destroying the port of the starboard torpedo tube. However, at that moment only the 3rd tower of the main caliber of the German LK was firing, the rest were already silent. A fire was visible in the midship area, and the Bismarck leaned noticeably to the port side.
A view of the burning Bismarck from a British ship (black smoke on the right). Explosions from shells are visible to his left. May 27, 1941
Continuing on the N, "Rodney" found herself in a very advantageous position not only for artillery combat, but also for a torpedo salvo. Not failing to take advantage of this, he fired two torpedoes from a distance of about 6.800 m, but both of them passed by.
The position of the King George V, which had moved further downwind, was less advantageous - smoke interfered with fire control. But much more serious were the unfortunate malfunctions in the mechanisms of the 14-inch turret installations of the main caliber - three of the four towers went out of order for different times (the 1st - for half an hour, the 4th - for 7 minutes, the 2nd did not work for about 1 minute.).
As a result, within 23 minutes. the flagship could use only 60% of its firepower, and within 7 minutes. - only 20%.
At 9:25 am, the King George V turned to 150 ° and reduced its speed so as not to stray too far from the target. At 10.05 he again approached and from a distance of about 2700 m made several more volleys.
Meanwhile, "Rodney" was maneuvering in an artillery zigzag, firing with the main and auxiliary calibers from about 3600 meters. He fired 4 more torpedoes, one of them hitting was recorded.
The denouement came at 10.15. So, half an hour after the start of the battle, concentrated fire from two British LKs, joined by KPT Norfolk (at 8.45; he fired from about 20 km, without determining the distance to the target) and Dorsetshire (at 9.04; due to the long range he was forced to cease fire from 9.13 to 9.20), disabled all the guns of the German LK.
Both of its masts were shot down, it was on fire, and a column of smoke rose into the sky, people were seen jumping overboard - Captain 1st Rank Patterson later noted that if he had been informed about this, he would have ordered a ceasefire.
* * *
At 9.15 am, when the Ark Royal heard artillery cannonade, Captain 1st Rank L. Mound gave the order to lift the strike group into the air, which was in full readiness for take-off from the pre-dawn twilight.
When the planes reached their target, Bismarck was already doomed, and no attack was needed. All planes returned to AB and landed at 11.15. At that moment, a German He-111 bomber flying by dropped two bombs near the ship, but they caused harm to neither the landing planes, nor the aircraft carrier itself.
Agony
By 10.15 all the guns on the Bicmarck were silent, but the order to sink the LK was given a quarter of an hour before that moment. The necessary actions were led by the senior assistant commander of the LK frigate-captain H. Oels and corvette-captain E. Jahreis.
Making sure that the enemy would never return to his base and ordering a ceasefire, Admiral J. Tovi, over whom the sword of Damocles of lack of fuel for the return continued to hang, turned his LKs to a course of 27 °.
KPT Dorsetshire, which approached a distance of about 3000 m, at 10.25 fired two torpedoes at Bismarck, one of which exploded under the bridge, then, approaching another 1000 m, another one, already from the left side.
At 10.36 on the German LK, an explosion of the stern cellars followed, the stern sank into the water, and at 10.40 "Bismarck", turning up keel, went to the bottom.
Dorsetshire approached the site of the death, over which the Ark Royal planes circled. Having transmitted to one of them a request to search for an underwater enemy, the KRT, brutally swaying on the wave, began to take on board the surviving German sailors. After about 80 people were lifted, a suspicious burst of smoke was seen two miles off the windward beam.
His Majesty's ships "Dorsetshire" and "Maori" managed to pick up 110 people from the water, and only the appearance of the U-74 periscope made them stop rescuing …
The scheme of the LC "Bismarck"
APPLICATION
British shipborne radar on the eve of the war
Robots on the creation of a radar in the interests of air defense have been conducted in Great Britain since February 1935, when a special research group was formed in Orfordness under the leadership of R. Watson-Watts. In July, a delegation of officers from the Royal Navy School of Communications located in Portsmouth visited the laboratory of this group, and in October joint work began on the creation of ship stations.
The tactical and technical requirements provided for the fulfillment of the following conditions: warning of the approach of aircraft at a distance of 60 miles, accurate determination of their position - 10 miles; the ship had to be detected at a distance of 10 miles, and accurately determine the coordinates of the target - at a distance of 5 miles.
Research was carried out in different frequency ranges of electromagnetic radiation, but the greatest efforts to create an aircraft detection station were focused on a frequency of 75 MHz.
At the end of 1936, the first prototype of the radar, designated Type 79X, was completed and installed on board the Sultburn (Hunt-type) TSC assigned to the School of Communications for testing.
In December, the first series of tests took place, during which an anchored ship detected aircraft flying at an altitude of 1500 m at a distance of 17 miles. The next series of tests, delayed until July 1937, was carried out using a manually rotated antenna. However, the results were disappointing - a detection range of no more than 8 miles was recorded.
In March 1938, a decision was made to investigate the operating frequency of 43 MHz (which corresponds to a wavelength of 7.5 m), at the same time the entire program was revised and priorities were set: the first place was taken by the Ture 79 radar, from which the aircraft detection range was expected (at an altitude of 1500 m) 50 miles; on the 2nd - a radar designed to guide naval artillery guns at a surface target, which should ensure a bearing accuracy of 1 ° at a distance of 20,000 yards (18,000 m); in 3rd place - an anti-aircraft artillery fire control station, effectively operating at a distance of 5 miles.
In May 1938 g.managed to complete the radar "Type 79Y" with an operating frequency of 43 MHz, after which the Admiralty ordered the installation of two sets of this equipment on the Royal Navy warships. In October, the station was installed on the Sheffield radar, and in January 1939, on the Rodney spacecraft.
The peak radiation power of the transmitter reached 15-20 kW, the station was capable of detecting air targets (VTS) flying at an altitude of 3000 m, at a distance of 53 miles, and at an altitude of 1500 m, the detection range was 30 miles. The station had separate emitter and receiver antennas, which were two parallel dipoles with reflectors. The geometric dimensions of the antennas, installed on the top of the masts, one under the other, were 3, 3 by 4, 35 m.
The improvement of the radar followed the path of increasing the power of the radiation pulse, which reached 70 kW on the Type 79Z model. The bearing determination accuracy did not exceed 5 °. In September 1939, the Type 79Z radar was installed on the Curlew air defense cruiser, and the industry received an order for 30 more sets.
The creation of an artillery radar since 1937 followed the path of using an operating frequency of 1300 MHz, but from March 1937 they switched to 600 MHz. The tests took place on the EM "Sardonyx" in 1939.
With the outbreak of World War II, the new 1st Sea Lord W. Churchill, who was shown an artillery radar station on a coastal battery, paid great attention to providing ships with such equipment. The first step was the acquisition of a GL1 anti-aircraft fire control radar from the army, which at the end of 1939 under the designation Type 280X was installed for testing on the air defense cruiser Carlisle.
The army station was an "addition" to the optical system and provided only early warning and the issuance of a rough bearing. She worked in the range 54-84 MHz. The fleet improved the station, tests were carried out in Malta in early 1940. Although the Admiralty purchased three more sets of such equipment (they were installed on the auxiliary air defense ships Alynbank, Springbank and Ariguani), it was not put into service. Royal Navy followed the path of "hybridization".
The combination of the Ture 280 radio range finder and the Ture 79 detection station made it possible to create an artillery fire control station, which was given the designation Ture 279. Further efforts focused on the development of a universal station, in the fall of 1939 they released the corresponding TTT.
An improved model "Ture 281", distinguished by an increased detection range of up to 22,000 yards (19,800 m), was developed by the end of 1940. The accuracy was 25 yards (22.5 m).
The Ture 281 artillery radar installed in September 1940 on the Dido radar had an operating range of 86-94 MHz, the pulse power reached 350 kW. The tests showed good results: air targets were detected at a distance of 60-110 miles, surface targets - up to 12 miles. Although the detection efficiency of low-flying targets was higher than that of the Ture 279 equipment, it was still unsatisfactory.
In January 1941, the second set of this equipment was installed on the "Prince of Wales" aircraft. Serial production began in February, 59 sets were produced.
At the Ture 284 station, the power of the emitted pulse was increased to 150 kW, the detection range was increased to 30,000 yards (27,000 m). Range resolution was 164 yards (147.6 m), angular accuracy was 5 ′. The first set of serial equipment was installed on the King George V aircraft.
This radar turned out to be the most successful, but its range was still less than the maximum firing range of the main caliber of British battleships. Although four of the "capital ships" that took part in the "hunt" for the "Bismarck" had the "Ture 284" station, it did not prove to be anything special.
Artillery radars "Ture 282" and "Ture 285", created in 1940-1941, did not differ in reliability and required serious revision.
In Germany, work on the shipborne radar began in 1933, and already in 1937 the shipborne artillery radar "Seetakt" (FuMo-39), which operated at a frequency of 375 MHz and had a detection range of about 10 miles (pulse power - 7 kW), passed sea tests … However, after this work slowed down, and by the beginning of the war, the FuMo-22 firing radars had only two German warships (including the "Admiral Graf Spee").
Air surveillance radar "Freya" operated at a frequency of 125 MHz. By the beginning of the war, the Germans had no ship stations.
American specialists have been developing the VTS detection radar since 1934. In 1937, they passed sea trials on the Leary EM, in December 1938 the XAF radar was installed on the New York spacecraft. The station operated at a frequency of 200 MHz, the pulse power was 15 kW. The detection range did not exceed that of the English "Ture 79", but due to a much narrower radiation pattern (about 14 ° instead of 75 °), the angular accuracy reached 3 ° at a higher resolution. The Americans used a co-located antenna from the very beginning, which was a big step forward.
