The US Armed Forces have identified China as their long-term threat, "designated" as a country with which the US military will face serious rivalries in the coming decades. A major challenge for a well-armed US army, but for the country's Marine Corps (ILC), China's reliance on a family of heavily armed amphibious vehicles poses a significant challenge.
For the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), its Marine Corps is a source of pride. The PLA ILC is equipped and ready to defend Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands in the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Japanese Senkaku Islands. As a result, the ILC of the PLA has a higher level of funding and equipment compared to other units of the PLA.
The 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades are based in Zhanjiang City along with the amphibious assault force. The 1st Brigade was formed in 1980, while the 2nd Brigade was relocated from the army in 1998 (originally the 164th Division) and until recently was equipped with used equipment from the 1st Brigade. Both units are currently equipped about the same and almost the entire Corps is part of the fleet based in the South China Sea.
The Chinese Marine Corps has about 12,000 professional marines, and the PLA ILC may be expanded with the addition of PLA amphibious mechanized divisions, which could bring the Corps to about 20,000. It is planned to increase the number of the PLA KMP to 100,000 people by adding other units from the PLA. It is assumed that the Chinese fleet is capable of deploying a division-sized formation for amphibious operations, and this is most likely all of the 12,000 infantrymen mentioned above. However, it is more appropriate to focus on deployments of the size of the brigade - this is about 6,000 people - in order to maintain the surprise effect and maximize the chances of creating an access denial / blocking zone in the South China Sea.
The PLA ILC is somewhat different from most formations of the marine corps of the countries of the world. For example, the British Marine Corps is essentially a lightly armed structure that relies heavily on its combat skills. In contrast, the USMC has far more armored vehicles in service, but its most powerful ground platform, the M1A1 main battle tank, relies heavily on the large and vulnerable Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft.
As for the PLA ILC, the American Marines can reasonably be considered its main competitor in the land segment. Unlike the USMC, the Chinese Marines are equipped with an entire family of Tour 05 tracked amphibious assault vehicles, which includes the ZBD-05 model armed with a 30mm cannon, the ZTD-05 model armed with a 105mm cannon, and the PLZ-07B model armed with a 122mm cannon. mm howitzer.
The machines of the Ture 05 family are designed for deployment at sea from sea-going vessels and disembarkation from the battlefield. When designing these machines, the emphasis was initially placed on their amphibious capabilities. The BMP variant is able to overcome waves up to 2.5 meters high and has a buoyancy margin equivalent to 27% of its total mass of 26.5 tons. Although some sources claim that the vehicle can reach a speed of 40 km / h (21.6 knots) on water, it is believed that it is most likely closer to 25 km / h, but even then this is almost twice the speed of a regular amphibious assault AAV7A1 RAM / RS vehicles of the American infantry.
The Ture 05 amphibious assault vehicle has unique design features. Before entering the water, the wave-reflecting shield in the bow (when folded it gives the nose a characteristic sharp profile) is hydraulically extended, the driver's periscope rises so that he can see over the shield. The bilge pumps are turned on, when entering the water in the stern of the machine, a second flat plate is lowered. When the correct depth is reached, the suspension system raises the track rollers to reduce drag. To provide the engine with air, a snorkel is also raised, installed on the platform at the rear right. Front and rear fenders create a planing effect that lifts the vehicle body off the water while driving and reduces water resistance.
The machine is propelled by two aft water cannons and is controlled by a combination of closing the damper of one of the water cannons and opening one of the sections of the side screen at the front of the machine.
The good amphibious characteristics of the machines of the Ture 05 family mean that they can be used by the PLA ILC to get into a given area from beyond the horizon, for example, on a disputed island. Arriving there, the PLA KMP will be able to organize an access denial / blocking of the zone. In fact, an area with a dense concentration of anti-aircraft and anti-ship forces and assets, as well as the capabilities provided by the PLA ILC and its armored vehicles, will make the prospect of an invasion extremely expensive and unpleasant for many armies.
These capabilities will also certainly be used in what the Chinese navy describes as a "short and sharp war." Speaking of the "return" of the disputed Senkaku Islands (the Chinese name for Diaoyu), they state that "swift action and good planning are the keys to winning the war." This speaks of the importance of the machines of the Ture 05 family, their over-the-horizon abilities are the best fit for such a short and unconventional conflict.
The closest analogue of the Chinese platform Ture 05 for the Americans is the LAV-25 vehicle, which has been in service with the US ILC for almost 40 years. The LAV-25 wheeled vehicle in 8x8 configuration can take part in land and sea operations, although it is not able to overcome the surf zone. As a result, during the landing, the entire calculation is made either on the absence of rough seas at sea, or on transportation from the ship to the coast, which reduces the psychological impact that the sudden appearance of the landing force can have. The vehicle was created rather for the rapid reaction forces, which can be immediately sent to any area of the world to protect the interests of the United States, and not to drop troops in the face of enemy opposition.
The machines of the LAV-25 family, despite the obvious loss to the Tour 05 family in terms of amphibious characteristics, boast significant firepower. This is the LAV-25 variant with a 25-mm cannon and the LAV-M mortar mount with an 81-mm mortar and the LAV-AT anti-tank gun armed with a TOW ATGM.
According to Jane's Armored Fighting Vehicles, it is assumed that the M242 cannon is capable of penetrating the equivalent of 25 mm uniform rolled armor at an angle of 60 ° from a distance of 1,300 meters. The mortar version has a range of 5700 meters and can maintain a rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute for two minutes. In addition, several types of missiles are available for the LAV-AT variant.
The most effective anti-tank version of the missile is the TOW-2B, equipped with two striking elements of the "shock core" type for attack from above. The TOW-2A variant is equipped with a tandem cumulative warhead that can penetrate 1000 mm of rolled armor behind reactive armor. On entrenched infantry or fortified positions, you can use a missile in the TOW-BB version with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, capable of penetrating 203 mm of reinforced concrete with double reinforcement.
Despite the good firepower available to the US Marine LAV series vehicles, there are three main variants of the Tour 05 family that also keep pace in this regard. A variant of the BMP, designated ZBD-05, armed with a stabilized 30-mm cannon with selective power, is capable of firing from a place and on the move. It is reportedly capable of accurate fire from water. The maximum rate of fire is 330 rounds / min and the gun is effective against armored targets of the average weight category at a range of up to 1500 meters. The exact characteristics of the ammunition are unknown, although the Russian armor-piercing sub-caliber analog is capable of penetrating 25 mm of armor at an angle of 60 ° from a distance of 1500 meters.
For comparison: the LAV-25, due to the combination of steel and ceramic armor, is protected only from 14.5 mm bullets. This combination is one of the most widespread and effective methods of defense against ballistic threats up to 14.5mm caliber, but it is unlikely that it will provide reliable protection against 30mm projectiles. The ZBD-05 is also armed with a Red Arrow 73B ATGM launcher equipped with a tandem HEAT warhead. The missile has a maximum range of 2800 meters and is capable of penetrating 200 mm of rolled armor at an angle of 68 °, covered by dynamic protection units.
Direct fire support for the ZBD-05 is provided by the ZTD-05 variant (photo above), which has the same body as the ZBD-05, but is armed with a 105-mm rifled cannon with reduced recoil. As stated, the armament complex of the ZTD-05 machine is capable of capturing targets on the water and remaining effective against stationary targets at wave heights up to 2.5 meters. For moving targets, the vehicle is effective in rough seas up to 1.25 meters. The installation is capable of firing large-caliber ammunition of various types, including armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation. This allows you to fight both armored vehicles and fortifications. The US ILC has no analogue of such a machine in service.
The third version of the PLZ-07B is a combination of the Type 05 chassis and the PLZ-07 howitzer. The PLZ-07B self-propelled artillery mount is armed with a 122-mm cannon, which is found on many platforms in service with the PLA. The gun is equipped with an ejection device and a multi-chamber muzzle brake. The turret rotates 360 ° and has vertical guidance angles from -3 ° to 70 °, which allows the crew to fire direct and indirect fire. The manual loading gun has a rate of fire from 6 to 8 rds / min. When firing a high-explosive fragmentation projectile, the firing range of the PLZ-O7B cannon is 18 km.
In the PLA KMP, the PLZ-07B platform is a standard self-propelled means of support with indirect fire. The US ILC includes powerful and well-equipped artillery units, although the reliance on the HIMARS MLRS and the M777 towed cannons means that the US Marines are theoretically at a disadvantage in terms of mobility compared to the PLA ILC.
Not a single armor
Armored vehicles are just one element of the picture. A complete picture of the battlefield cannot be complete without air assets, and this is what the USMC clearly dominates.
The USMC is scheduled to receive 340 F-35C Lightning II fighters; Marine squadrons on the West Coast will be the first to receive Generation 5 aircraft to replace their AV-8B Harrier multipurpose attack aircraft. The F-35 fighter will significantly increase the capabilities of the US ILC in aerial combat, while the GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II precision bombs will bomb moving ground targets with high accuracy and efficiency. In air collisions, the new AIM-120D AMRAAM air-to-air missiles will be able to engage targets at a maximum range of up to 180 km.
The USMC also operates AH-1Z attack helicopters, which can be armed with 16 Hellfire homing missiles with a maximum range of 12 km. The Harvest HAWK (Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit) for the KC-130J transport aircraft also complements the firepower. The Harvest HAWK kit is a modular horizontal loading weapon system that gives the KC-130JS Corps base aircraft the ability to attack ground targets. It includes the AN / AAQ-30 Target Sight Sensor under the left wing fuel tank and the AGM-114P Hellfire II laser guided four air-to-surface missile launcher mounted on the left fuel pylon. MBDA GBU-44 / E Viper Strike bombs and Griffin air-to-ground missiles can also be fired from a 10-rail ramp-mounted launcher called the Derringer door.
A large fleet of helicopters based on the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor and the CH-53 Sea Stallion multipurpose transport helicopter is a good means of supporting the US ILC operations. The number of vehicles of only these two types is 483 units, they support the ground operations of the US ILC. The Marines can also operate in conjunction with huge air strike groups and thousands of aircraft from the US Navy.
Looking at the superiority of the American fleet in manpower and means, as well as in technology, the Chinese fleet does not intend to retreat. According to the current Chinese doctrine of the Chinese fleet for the protection of sea islands, it is envisaged to conduct hostilities in the area surrounded by the so-called first chain of islands (Aleutian, Kuril, Ryukyu, Taiwan, the Philippine archipelago and the Great Sunda Islands). This means that he must learn to operate at much greater distances and beat the enemy in the open ocean. The Chinese fleet has only one aircraft carrier, Liaoning, converted from the unfinished Ukrainian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.
There is reason to believe that China may seek to achieve temporary maritime superiority even over the United States. It is stated that the Type 052D missile destroyer of the Luyang III project with guided missiles, for example, is comparable in capabilities to the Aegis system of the American destroyer Arleigh Burke. According to some sources, it can simultaneously track a variety of air and surface threats. Analysts estimate that these ships can be used to create an air defense system over support ships and landing craft, that is, in fact, they will be used as part of the Chinese strategy of denying access / blocking the zone. Combined with the use of ships to counter other vessels, such as the Project Houbei Tour 022, which are armed with long-range anti-ship missiles, this will allow the Chinese navy to control the area of operations and counter the United States without the need to create or manage large aircraft carrier strike groups.
In essence, the strategy of the Chinese navy for warfare in an asymmetric naval conflict could give the PLA ILC an advantage in establishing land control over the island. After that, its ground forces and assets will be difficult and expensive to displace.
Air support
The main aircraft of the Chinese fleet is the J-15 multipurpose fighter, which also has a variant for the J-16 army based on the SU-30MK2. According to Jane's World Navies, the Chinese fleet is estimated at about 600 aircraft, most of which are based on land and are not standard equipment of the PLA ILC.
The main air-to-air missile in the armament complex of Chinese fighters is the PL-12, which entered service in 2005. According to some reports, the launch range is 60-70 km, and the maximum speed is approximately 4 Mach numbers. The armament also includes a KD-88 air-to-surface missile with a turbojet engine and several guidance options. It is equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead and has a range of 100 km.
The small number of air forces and assets (compared to the combined forces and assets of the ILC and the US Navy) makes the ILC of the PLA dependent on the fleet and most of this air support relies on runways to maintain combat effectiveness. The latter component is offset to some extent by a 3,300-meter runway built on one of the islands. Runways were also built on the islands of Subi and Mischief, allowing China to gain three air ports in the region. The Ministry of Defense noted that "the infrastructure being created in China will strengthen the projection of power in the South China Sea." According to American intelligence, the Chinese have built fortified hangars at all three airfields, each providing shelter for 24 fighters plus 3-4 larger aircraft.
The construction of forward air bases could be a short-term solution to the problem of China's lack of naval forces and capabilities compared to the US Navy and provide sufficient air cover for the PLA ILC in order to establish control over the region. However, one of the drawbacks of the Chinese system is the lack of interaction between the navy and other types and branches of the Chinese armed forces. The Chinese government is trying to overcome this feature, but in the short term, the problems with the conduct of combined arms operations, most likely, will not be resolved.
The United States has chosen China as a long-term main threat with many challenges. As for the USMC, it has a clear advantage in the air, especially if we also take into account the forces and assets of the US Navy. The ILC's primary focus on the aviation component ensures that its superiority in the quantity and quality of aircraft will remain in the long term. However, in the ground sphere, the Marines may be lagging behind the PLA ILC and therefore must work to ultimately eliminate the inequality of capabilities of combat forces and assets.
The ACV 1.1 amphibious armored vehicle program can potentially increase the combat capabilities of the US ILC, although the most important changes for it lie in the doctrinal plane. Its reliance on LAV-25 armored vehicles to act as a reconnaissance formation rather than a traditional armored unit means it lacks the infantry support needed to effectively counter mechanized units. Likewise, units equipped with AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles and M1A1 main battle tanks are rather slow and cumbersome to deploy in a timely manner, the purpose of which is to prevent the opponent from taking decisive and unexpected actions.
This can become a problem in the event of a conflict with the PLA ILC, since in the first place it is an infantry unit. The history of military conflicts knows no precedents for the successful actions of a purely armored unit against mixed infantry and armored formations. From this we can conclude that it will be difficult for LAV vehicles alone to withstand the combined combat potential of the Ture 05 family of vehicles and the infantry they carry.
The PLA KMP is not the most powerful amphibious force in the world. It does not have sufficient funds to compete with its closest rival - the USMC - in open conflict. However, this is the area where the Chinese fleet plans to send its forces in the near future. The ability to attack one or more carrier strike forces is the goal of building a modern Chinese navy. In this regard, the Chinese military literature extensively analyzes the weaknesses of aircraft carriers and depicts the most favorable moments for their attack.
Apparently drawing inspiration from the Soviet Cold War-era anti-aircraft carrier strategy, the Chinese Navy intends to coordinate massive anti-ship missile attacks from aircraft.surface ships and submarines on American aircraft carriers and accompanying ships. As a result, the Navy and the PLA ILC may not need parity in the number of surface ships or aircraft to conduct hostilities with the United States, instead they will be able to choose weapons of destruction that are in full combat readiness to achieve their goals.
