The positional nightmare of the First World War is known to everyone. Countless lines of trenches, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery - all this, combined with the ability of the defenders to quickly transfer reinforcements, cemented the war tightly. Hundreds of thousands of corpses, tens of millions of shells, the exertion of forces in the rear - nothing could move the line of the Western Front in either direction. Each side tried to find its own solution. And the Germans were no exception.
Birth stains of the past
In terms of infantry tactics, the German army of 1914 remained largely a product of a bygone era. The philosophy of the victorious Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 prevailed - dense ranks of soldiers, under the supervision of non-commissioned officers, move forward, maintaining the formation for the "Teutonic rage" - a strong bayonet attack that decides the outcome of the battle.
This situation was preserved by the class factor - the army, as a social institution, paid close attention to the origin of the officer candidate. The traditional officer caste sought to preserve itself, so the pre-war army was more likely to endure a shortage of junior command personnel than to accept “just anyone” for these positions. As a result, a single lieutenant was forced to command an infantry platoon of 80 people.
Of course, he had non-commissioned officers. But they also performed the duties prescribed by the "aristocratic" vision. "Unther" was not supposed to lead the soldiers in the attack, to command - on the contrary, they walked behind the lines deployed for the attack. Everything in order to catch and return to the ranks of deserters. All according to the canons, the attitude to the soldier, as to a peasant recruit, and not a citizen from the era of developed cities and political nations.
All this once again pushed the German army to the tactics of dense bayonet attacks - so all the soldiers would be "under supervision." The formation, designed to keep the main mass from desertion, extended to the very best - the imperial guard. Moreover, it was an object of their pride, a tradition passed down through the generations of soldiers. But when this valiant tradition was interbred with a great industrial war, with the world of machine guns, artillery and magazine rifles, the result was sad.
Typical attack pattern in the German army at the beginning of the war
Take, for example, the well-known attack of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division near Ypres in November 1914. The brave guardsmen marched bravely under the bullets in close ranks. There were so many of them that, even in spite of the terrible fire, the Germans managed to capture the first trench of the enemy. But only by that time there were so few of them that the enemy recaptured the trenches with the first counterattack.
Need to do something
Similar stories in the first year of the war happened not only with the guards. It became clear to the Germans that it was necessary to move away from the dense formation. As well as from a bayonet attack - in zigzag trenches with a bayonet, in any case, you will not turn around. Fortunately for them, there was a reserve for this - its roots lay in the federal structure of the German Empire.
Throughout its history, the Germanic lands were still a patchwork quilt. The Second Reich, which took part in the First World War, gathered from this blanket not so long ago - less than half a century before the war. The consequence of this was the autonomy of some lands (for example, Bavaria) and a fairly decentralized army structure. For example, in peacetime, each regiment was quite autonomous, and its commander had rather broad powers and serious freedom in matters of training his soldiers. And he could practice even loose formation, even dense bayonet attacks. Many, of course, out of inertia chose the latter. But the light did not converge on them like a wedge.
But in itself the loose system only slightly reduced losses. This was only the beginning, but important - the huge losses from the "old-fashioned, aristocratic" tactics made the officers trust the soldiers more. Now it was not assumed that the fighters would almost automatically scatter. And the non-commissioned officers, along with the most determined soldiers, can now be used for more than just finding and keeping cowards.
One of the first innovators was Captain Wilhelm Rohr. He guessed to endow the most decisive and courageous fighters with the right of direct command on the battlefield. This made it possible to divide the huge clumsy platoons into small groups of 3-10 people. Each of them was assigned its own tactical mission.
The most effective weapon in trench combat was grenades. The more you managed to take them into the attack, the better. Therefore, the best friend of the stormtrooper was special grenade bags.
The philosophy of the assault groups was, at first glance, paradoxical. Instead of the concentration of forces prescribed by the basics of military affairs, they were fragmented. But this is what made it possible to overcome the "no-man's land" as quickly as possible.
Moreover, the large unit moved predictably even in loose formation. It had a clearly readable front, flanks, and so on. As a large group of people, it would not move very quickly. On it, it was possible to focus the fire of the entire unit defending the trench, including reinforcement equipment such as heavy machine guns. And in the case of a large number of small groups, in parallel, without communication with each other, breaking through to their specific goals, everything took a different turn. It is almost impossible to pay equal attention to all of them at once from the point of view of conscious fire control.
And if such groups act quickly and decisively, they have a good chance of a successful attack with little casualties. After all, an adversary controlled "in the old fashioned way", whose share of personal initiative is inevitably less, simply will not have time to undertake something intelligible.
Wonder weapon
Rohr's assault battalion was actively training - a mock-up of a specific position was being built in the rear, which was to be assaulted, and the actions were worked out to the smallest detail. The first serious test of these trainings, and indeed of the new tactics, took place in January 1916 - the French position was taken quickly and with minimal losses.
The next month, the Battle of Verdun began. By this time, Rohr's success had managed to impress other parts as well. His tactics were imitated by other battalions, which created their own assault units. And in September 1916, the glory of the stormtroopers reached General Ludendorff himself.
He understood that the war had gone somewhere wrong - a quick victory according to Schlieffen's plan did not work out. In a prolonged confrontation, the Central Powers did not have a chance - the potentials were painfully unequal. All that remained was to look for some kind of "miracle weapon" that would change the balance of power. And the new assault tactics seemed to be quite a promising option.
The rate of retraining of the army under the "assault" standards grew. If by the beginning of 1917 it was about 15 assault battalions, then by the next year the Germans began to commission whole shock divisions. In the future, it was planned that the "assault" will be a whole quarter of the German army. These units will gather the youngest, hottest, enthusiastic and willing soldiers to change the course of the war. And, trained in accordance with the new strike tactics, they will finally break through the frozen front, and transfer the war back to a maneuverable channel.
Something went wrong
By March 1918, the German rear was on its last legs, and the command was well aware of this. The last chance, if not for victory, then at least for a draw in the war, was a successful offensive. The stake in it was made, just on the attack aircraft.
The task was not easy - to break through the 8-kilometer thickness of the enemy defense. Impossible, at first glance. But the stormtroopers did it. However, the main problems began later.
The attacking Germans made a gap 80 kilometers wide. Had it happened 20 years later, tanks, motorized infantry divisions, supported by the Stukas, would immediately have been sent there. And also a horde of auxiliary equipment, from briskly carrying heavy guns of 18-ton tractors to trucks with ammunition and fuel.
The image of a motivated, active and willing to change the outcome of the war came to the court in the Third Reich. One of the most famous examples is the 1934 film "Stoßtrupp 1917"
But that was 1918, and the blitzkrieg infrastructure in Germany was still a long way off. Designed for a fierce but short-lived force, modeled after assault battalions, the divisions quickly fizzled out. They could not move forward at the speed of the maneuvering units of the Second World War, and the enemy managed to build a new line of defense, albeit not so strong. But the attack aircraft were already far from "fresh". For 6 days they tried unsuccessfully to break through it, but without any visible result.
The offensive failed. The war was actually lost. The assault battalions had a significant impact on the development of infantry tactics, but did not save Germany. Humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles, but not crushed, she will return in 20 years. Replacing Rohr's stormtrooper methods with something even more groundbreaking.
