The army tried desperately to adapt tactics for the new war. Although the most famous were the German assault units, similar units were equally successfully used by other armies. Moreover, in the Russian army, which fully experienced the bitterness of the defeat of the Russo-Japanese, the necessary conclusions were drawn back in 1908. A quote from the brochure "Self-entrenching of the infantry in an offensive and defensive battle":
Ҥ 9. The frontline commanders on the night before the assault are obliged to carry out close reconnaissance of the enemy location in order to determine:
1) the relative position of the sites of the position, the distances to the control points and their nature;
2) the kind of obstacles in the path of the attacker and dead spaces;
3) the nature of artificial obstacles and their locations. Having determined the type and place of the artificial obstacle, one must try to arrange passages in it.
§ten. Destruction of obstacles before the assault is possible only in rare cases. In addition to night time, you can take advantage of fog, snow, heavy rain, dust and the like.
There is no need to wait for an order from above, because, until it comes, the opportune moment may be missed, so the company commander needs to show personal initiative and send a team of hunter-workers who, stealthily approaching an obstacle, for example, to a wire net, lie on their backs, crawl under the wire and cut it with special scissors, which are supplied to the assault units. You should try to pull out and knock down the stakes.
If there are sappers with assault units, they are assigned to assist the infantry.
§ 11. It is not always possible to arrange passages in the obstacles before the assault, therefore one must be able to overcome them.
In order to successfully overcome the obstacle and at the same time incur the smallest possible losses from enemy fire, it is necessary to appear in front of the obstacle covertly and unexpectedly and overcome it without noise and shooting.
The methods of overcoming must be so simple and learned that any ordinary can independently overcome the obstacle, therefore, peacetime practice is imperative.
The obstacle should be overcome quickly and on a wide front, and not crowded, otherwise the attacker will suffer heavy losses.
To facilitate overcoming obstacles, assault units are supplied with axes and scissors.
§ 12. In cases where the attacker managed to dig in or lie down in a dead space near an obstacle, you can use to facilitate overcoming it with light auxiliary means delivered secretly (at night or along the communication routes) to the pre-assault position. Such auxiliary means are: light bridges, fences, earthen or straw bags for throwing obstacles.
While overcoming an obstacle, you should keep the ridge of the fortification or trench under machine-gun fire, and also throw hand grenades at defenders.
If the assault was unsuccessful, then one should not retreat far back, but lie down and try to dig in, so that one can repeat the assault from as close a distance as possible until the enemy's position is captured.
Having burst into the fortification, you should immediately adapt it to your advantage: block the exit, occupy the gorja [the back of the fortification. -E. B.], arrange closures (traverses) from the flanking fire of neighboring areas, inspect dugouts, find guides from landmines, place machine guns and make them closures.
The retreating enemy from the fortification is pursued by fire"
In fact, much of the subsequent tactics of the assault groups is presented here in a concentrated form. Then why the Russian army was not able to quickly take the Austrian Przemysl ", not the strongest fortress, and the fortifications of East Prussia? The answer lies in the instruction itself - you need qualified personnel, proper training in assault tactics in peacetime, and the necessary equipment. As we will see in the corresponding chapter, the Russian Empire had serious problems on all three points. Therefore, the Russian army had to learn new techniques not so much according to their instructions as from the allies and opponents. Moreover, it was the allies who called the closed glanders "Russian".
However, the British even earlier closely watched the battles from the Japanese side and also drew up reports. For example, Colonel Hume, British attaché in Tokyo, provided valuable information on digging trenches in wet soil, protecting underground structures from gas and mine warfare. Many techniques, as we have seen, were practiced in pre-war exercises in England. But the British were not ready for a big war either.
Already in the battle of Iprom in 1914, situations of “puff pie” often arose, when the attacker, having jumped over the line of trenches, fled further, and the defenders hid in the dugouts. At the same time, the headquarters lost operational communication with the attackers. Then the defenders again took up rifle positions and cut off those who had broken through. This "cake" lasted for days and even weeks. And sometimes those surrounded at the forefront were unaware of their fate. Therefore, it became necessary to "cleaners of the trenches", finishing off the hiding. For example, according to V. Klembovsky, on December 21, 1915, during the attack of Hartmanweilerskopf, the cleaners of the 5th rifle battalion did not take a single prisoner, while the 21st battalion of the neighboring 153rd regiment, where there were no cleaners, captured 1,300 prisoners.
Russians
The first "raid" into enemy trenches on the Western Front took place on October 4, 1914, when an English platoon under the command of Lieutenant Beckwith Smith attacked a German trench. Raids were usually carried out for the purpose of reconnaissance, studying the terrain, enemy obstacles, troops, capturing prisoners, eavesdropping on conversations … In addition, they raised the morale of the soldiers. The infantrymen learned to act at night, to use knives, clubs, brass knuckles, soft shoes and clothing more suitable for trenches, darkened their faces …
In addition to artillery and mortar fire, elongated charges from a pole with pyroxylin bombs or tol charges attached to it were considered the best infantry means of destroying the wire. Also used were grenades, long-handled axes, hand scissors, more convenient than rifles, harpoons, pull-up strips of obstacles, tarpaulin and wire bridges thrown onto the wire.
Back in August, according to the notes of Ya. M. Larionov, forward points, false trenches and additional artillery positions were used, which impeded aerial reconnaissance.
Battles near the Neman, November: “The distance between the positions did not exceed 600-700 steps, but we had to take a system of wire barriers and hidden guns, and machine guns in the valley, and barriers in front of enemy trenches on the mountain and almost impregnable trenches with dugouts, fortified with stakes and cemented … Artillery on both sides was behind the mountains, under cover, but at first it did not work so as not to betray its location …
Be that as it may, but it turned out to be impossible for large columns to approach the obstacles and it was necessary to prepare for attacks and the transition to the bottom of the valley to wire obstacles with the help of "glanders", spiral-shaped, snake, trenches along the slopes of the mountain, which would have led our considerable forces to the first a number of wire fences”.
The surprise attack was successful: “At 5 1/2 o'clock. in the morning one of the Siberian rifle regiments rushed to the attack. They quickly crushed the first half-destroyed wire barriers, at the bottom of the valley they seized heavy guns and machine guns, which did not manage to fire, and rushed to the barriers destroyed by artillery near the dugouts, penetrated into the excellent several-tiered trenches, knocked out the Germans with bayonets, then fell into the corridors trenches, took excellent ring dugouts with bayonets (around the entire mountain) and went into the rear of the German batteries …
Totally as many as 21 heavy guns were taken, and I carried 15 myself, 16 machine guns (many guns and machine guns were loaded), thousands of shells, a lot of machine gun belts, a searchlight, I found a device for launching missiles in the form of a large revolver, loading a cartridge, like our shot, Zeiss pipes, many telephones with microphones, a dressing station in trenches with materials, etc."
However, in the order to the troops of the 4th Army on May 1 (April 18) 1915, No. 668, it was noted that the Russian troops had not yet sufficiently learned the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war, reflected in the regulations, and the experience of the first months of the World War: there is a tendency towards a continuous line of trenches. Even in those cases when it was necessary to occupy positions prepared in advance in engineering terms, from a number of strong points that were in the closest fire contact, the troops immediately, as if afraid of gaps, began to connect strong points with long trenches, and again a solid line was obtained. Meanwhile, such continuous lines of fortifications in a field war are extremely unprofitable. They do not strengthen, but weaken the defensive capability of the position, since the trenches absorb many troops, resulting in a thin line and weak reserves. In the event of a breakout in one place, the entire line easily surrenders. From a continuous line of trenches, it is almost impossible to meet the enemy's blow with a decisive counterattack, since you have to run out of the trenches only along the arranged exits. It is a completely different matter when the position does not consist of continuous trenches, but of a number of strong points, which are in close fire communication."
And in France on August 20 of the same year, it was noted that it was inadmissible for the troops of the first line to erect trenches with outside help, considering the excavation work beneath their dignity.
According to the results of the battles in Champagne in the fall of 1915, advancing in waves of infantry, when approaching the enemy, it was recommended to move forward in gradual leaps, stopping in convenient folds of the terrain to restore in units of order.
On January 16, 1916, a new instruction of General Joffre appeared, in which the following additions to the previously issued instructions were made:
1. An offensive operation should provide for several enemy defensive zones. You don't have to set goals for breaking them all at once.
2. Without changing the artillery positions, it is possible to capture only the first zone, after which new preparations can be made to capture the second zone, etc.
3. The offensive is conducted according to the principle: artillery destroys, infantry floods.
4. An attack can be crowned with victory if it is conducted with the superiority of the material and moral forces of the attacker.
It was noted that "people cannot fight against dead matter," the infantry "is very quickly depleted in battle," "morally, it is very impressionable."
At the same time, Captain André Lafarge (or Lafargue, Laffargue) published a pamphlet Infantry Attack in the Present Period of the War. Impressions and conclusions of the company commander”. Back in August 1914, being a platoon commander, he spent it practically without losses under artillery fire, using shelters and dashes one by one, although companies were almost completely destroyed nearby.
By 1916, German positions consisted of two or three lines of trenches, with barriers and barbed wire in front of each. The defense units, where the covered machine guns and guns were installed, were located 800-1500 m from each other.
Therefore, instead of gradually capturing the fortified positions, one after another, Lafarge proposed a breakthrough along the entire front to a depth of about 3 km, then not giving the enemy time to linger in the rear trenches and prepare a defense.
Germans
"A modern attack is a grandiose, boundless assault, launched instantly along the entire front of the offensive, led with frantic persistence right in front of itself, and can stop only when the last enemy line is crushed."The attack should not be methodical: “It consists of one irresistible impulse and must be completed in one day, otherwise the enemy with his defense will not allow the offensive to triumph over his destructive, all-devouring fire. You cannot gnaw a little one after another frightening defensive lines - you have to make up your mind and swallow them at once. " The second wave would rise the moment the first hit the first line of trenches.
The support artillery was supposed to: destroy the barriers; neutralize or destroy the defenders of the trenches; to conduct counter-battery combat; cut off reinforcements; destroy the machine guns that have discovered themselves. The complete destruction of the obstacles was not required, since this would require too many shells - for the passage of the infantry, 75-mm shells would be enough. To defeat the sheltered infantry, "air torpedoes" were required. To destroy machine guns, mountain cannons would be placed directly in the trenches. Previously, the artillery officers had to study the enemy positions, looking for places suitable for installing machine guns.
The infantry, to increase the effectiveness of the attack, could begin to advance during artillery barrage, simulate attacks by opening fire from rifles after the cease of artillery fire, or smoke out the defenders with tear gas.
Particular attention was paid to isolating the center of the defended sector and protecting the attackers from flank fire. The fire of field, heavy and trench artillery was combined by the minute with the movement of the infantry.
If the distance to the enemy trenches was less than 100 m, the attackers had to quickly break into the trenches before the enemy got out of cover. If the distance was greater, the attack was in waves of mouth. Ahead - skirmishers from experienced and cold-blooded soldiers, good shooters, forcing the defenders to take cover with rifle fire. This role was played by Lafarge himself. Behind the line were officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of the battle, not running ahead of everyone else. After capturing the first trench, the soldiers lay behind them, a new line was formed, shelling and then attacking the second trench.
The second echelon of attackers was supplied with machine guns, light weapons and support batteries. He moved out at the moment when the first echelon reaches the trench. At the same time, the soldiers of the second echelon were not supposed to get involved in the battles of the first. The task of the second echelon was to prepare positions for a new attack, including with the help of sandbags, and to ensure fire superiority. It would be preferable to fire the best shooters out of cover, rather than all the soldiers. Machine guns and light guns were pulled up to the new position as quickly as possible, automatic rifles could facilitate the task.
Cavalry, guns, machine guns and infantry in cars, plus sappers to clear the terrain, were introduced into the breakthrough.
Thus, Lafarge anticipated many of the actions that formed the basis of subsequent infantry tactics. It remained "just" to work them out in practice.
N. E. Podorozhniy noted that in order to practice the skills of assault actions in the rear, special training grounds were built, recreating sections of fortified zones, with trenches, loopholes, message trenches, machine-gun and mortar installations, with shelters for light and camouflaged positions for heavy artillery. The infantry was trained to pass through barbed wire, move along the dilapidated enemy trenches, clear them of enemy units using a grenade, bayonet and shovel; "Overturn" the enemy's trenches, adapting them for firing into the enemy's rear; learned to interact with artillery, maintain communications along the front and in depth. So, in the lesson on the capture of a prisoner (Gerasimov) “at first, the movement to the location of the enemy post and the methods of covering the movement were studied. This part of the lesson included all types of movement: overcoming the wires, covering with fire, taking the starting position for capturing a prisoner. Then the very capture of the enemy observer was studied. When the scouts sufficiently mastered all this, the return with the prisoner was practiced: passing the barbed wire, covering the retreat, moving to their location, taking out the wounded."
On the night of November 16, 1915, a Canadian infantry raid was carried out when conventional and trench artillery interacted with the infantry. The infantrymen themselves, according to Stephen Bull, were divided into two groups, 70 men each. In each group, a subgroup of 5 wire cutters, two subgroups of grenade launchers and blockers - 7 people each, two covering subgroups - 3 people each, a group of 10 shooters, support "listeners" - 13 and a reserve - 22 were allocated. attacked the enemy, and the blocking groups protected them from counterattacks. One of the groups was discovered and forced to retreat, but the other completed the task of destroying the harassing machine-gun point, captured the prisoners and successfully retreated under the cover of artillery. The losses of the Canadians amounted to only one killed and one wounded. This raid served as the inspiration for many future operations.
By 1917, the British infantry platoon consisted of 36 people, forming an attack group, a support group and a reserve. The Lewis machine gun, supported by 8 ammunition carriers and a squad of 9-man rifle grenade launchers, constituted the main firepower of the platoon. The attacking group consisted of 9 grenade launchers with hand grenades. A mixed reserve with a commander, if necessary, reinforced one group or another.
British
In the battalion, the groups were also divided according to tasks. The first groups - garrison - were given the task of breaking through the enemy's position and gaining a foothold to repel enemy counterattacks. The second groups - the cleaners - were to eliminate the enemy in the trenches and shelters and spread to the flanks of the captured section of the German position in order to establish contact with neighboring units. The third groups - blocking ones - were intended to combat individual strong defensive structures, these groups were supplied with flamethrowers, smoke bombs and reinforced with mortars. Depending on the situation, the blocking groups either moved forward to capture the structures, or made up the company commander's reserve.
According to Captain Waldron's description, the grenadier team consisted of a front line - two bayonet man, a grenade launcher and a group leader (observer), and the rear - two grenade carriers and a barricader. The total number, according to Notes on grenade warfare, could vary from 6 to 16 or more people. All members of the team (and platoon) were interchangeable, they had to be able to throw grenades (first training, then combat) from any position - standing, kneeling, lying, from a trench, through traverses, and also quickly build barricades from sandbags and any other available material, etc. Required at least 50% hits on a standard target (trench - a yard wide and deep, 3 yards long), the same number of correct answers on the device of grenades, their use and tactics. The observer had to be an expert in working with the periscope and give clear unambiguous instructions so that the next grenade after the adjustment hit the target. It took at least 65% to qualify as a grenadier. The expert answered the questions of the special course, plus he had to have the necessary, in the opinion of the commission, physical and mental abilities. Grenadiers and expert grenadiers (of the latter, grenade launchers were usually recruited) wore a special chevron and received an additional payment.
In the battle trench, the arrows in front of everyone used the demoralization of the enemy after the explosion of grenades, clearing the way and informing about the situation. The grenade launcher behind the traverse, with both hands free, threw four grenades - into the first section of the trench, into the next, after the second traverse - farthest, again into the first, but a little further than the first grenade and into the knee of the second traverse. The commander was usually behind the grenade launcher. The barricadiers carried sacks, a trenching tool for filling them, and as many grenades as possible (all members of the group tried to carry grenades). In a more free communication trench, the grenade launcher threw a grenade into the near and far ends of the next section in front of the shooters. Then, during the attack, each deuce moved to the section of the trench occupied by the previous deuce (barricade - carriers, etc.). To avoid losses, no more than three people were in the trench section at any given time.
The grenade launchers were additionally armed with a knife and a pistol, the rest hung a rifle over their left shoulder. The attack with rifles for open areas with good preparation was faster and "cheaper", while grenades were more useful in close combat and in trenches. In night reconnaissance, two members of the group had rifles with bayonets, the rest - only backpacks with grenades. It was necessary to move silently and use grenades only in an emergency. In order not to lose direction, the soldiers even contacted each other.
In the battle of Amiens, meeting machine-gun fire, the Canadian attack aircraft lay down, and the machine-gunners, with the help of scouts, secretly advanced to the flank for fire, which reduced losses. There were cases of destruction of two or three machine-gun nests by one or two soldiers.
In the French assault groups, the soldiers of the first waves were given 150 rounds of rounds, scissors, hand grenades and two bags of earth. Grenade launchers must be provided with grenade bags, a rifle and a Browning, 50 rounds. Cleaners must have, in addition to a rifle, a Browning with a significant amount of cartridges and hand grenades. All soldiers must be without knapsacks, but have with them a daily food supply and a flask of water. In open terrain, attack aircraft moved in a chain, arrows took place on the flanks, and grenade launchers - in the center. In battle, the chain quickly regrouped to deliver a powerful, quick blow. Whenever possible, they approached the trenches covertly and threw grenades on command. When clearing trenches, the arrows went ahead, observing the enemy and adjusting the fire of the grenade launchers. The grenade launchers destroyed the enemy in dugouts and dugouts, around the bends of trenches and in the communication passages. Grenade carriers replenished ammunition and replaced out-of-order grenade launchers.
By the end of 1917, in a company of 194 people, 4 non-commissioned officers and 28 soldiers were using hand grenades, another 24 - rifle grenades. In the last battles of 1918, the French infantry platoon was divided into two half-platoons, with two light machine guns in each, in October - into three combat groups, in turn, divided into teams of machine gunners and grenade launchers.
On October 17, 1918, a surprise attack by a French company that infiltrated under cover of fog captured 4 officers, including the battalion commander, 150 privates, eight 77-mm cannons and 25 heavy machine guns. The French have not lost a single person.
The first German assault group was created on March 2, 1915 to practice new tactics and test new types of weapons, including steel helmets, from December of the same year. It was Major Kaslov's group from the 15th engineer battalion. In August, Kaslov was replaced by captain Willie Martin Ernst Pop (Rohr). The first attack aircraft went into battle at the Battle of Verdun on February 21, 1916, and by April 1, the group had grown to a battalion.
In May, the High Command ordered each army to send two officers and four non-commissioned officers to the Popa battalion to train in new tactics.
In the first echelon of the offensive, or breaking wave, there were soldiers armed with rifles, hand grenades, flamethrowers and earthen bags. They carried the rifles behind their backs. Spare clips for the rifle, up to 70 rounds, were carried by attack aircraft in a cloth bandolier thrown over their necks.
A wave of cleaners provided the first wave from the rear and flanks, destroying the remaining pockets of resistance, withdrawing prisoners to the rear and repelling counterattacks from the flanks. The second wave followed the first at a close distance (about 50 m) in order to more easily pass the veil of enemy fire. The soldiers were supplied with a large number of hand grenades, flamethrowers, explosive bombs and large shovels.
Italians
The third, or nudging, wave amplified the losing first wave. The soldiers carried supplies of hand grenades, earthen bags and shields.
By the end of 1916, assault battalions were formed in all the armies of the western front. In their composition, the soldiers served for a certain period of time, and then returned to their units. By mid-1917, officers and non-commissioned officers trained in assault battalions served in almost any infantry battalion. The tactics were honed in repelling the Nivelle offensive, the Riga operation, the Battle of Caporetto in Italy, and was based on the widespread use of hand grenades, infiltration in small groups with the support of mortars and machine guns. Ernst Jünger described the equipment of stormtroopers by his own example: “On the chest - two bags with four hand grenades, on the left - a primer, on the right - a powder pipe, in the right pocket of his uniform - pistol 08 [Luger - EB] in a holster with a long belt, in the right pocket of his trousers - a Mauser, in the left pocket of his uniform - five lemons, in the left pocket of his trousers - a luminous compass and a signal whistle, at the harness - a carabiner lock for breaking the ring, a dagger and scissors for cutting the wire … the distinctive sign of the division. - EB] we removed so that the enemy could not determine our identity. Each had a white bandage on his sleeve as an identification mark."
1918 became the finest hour and at the same time the swan song of the German stormtroopers. Yes, they repeatedly broke through the front for tens of kilometers, but could not ensure the development of success and suffered huge losses.
And what happened on the Russian front?
After the battles of 1915, it was established that the defense, especially with small forces on a wide front, should not be built on stretching "in a string", but on the occupation of the most important centers of resistance, echeloned in depth. The gaps between the nodes of resistance would be fired at with cross machine gun and artillery fire. Then it would be possible to single out strong strike groups and justify the defense on counterattacks.
By 1916, using the French experience, in the offensive, each unit was built in several lines, in the back of the head. Ahead are rare chains of scouts. A team of sappers and 1renadiers with hand grenades moved with the head companies. The front of the hull breakthrough was assigned at least 8 km. According to Oberyukhtin's description, when attacking on a small front, a deep formation of the infantry was required: for an infantry division - 1-1.5 km with two regiments in front and two in a reserve of 600-800 m; for a regiment - 0.5-1 km, with two battalions in front and two in the back of the head at 400-1500 m; for the company - in two lines, up to one and a half at a distance of 150-200 m. The depth of the initial bridgehead for the regiment was 300-400 m, along the front - 1 km. Between the cracks - 35-50 m, between the battalions - 100 m. Unlike the French, the infantry did not have their own firepower. The attack was carried out in waves, continuously and rapidly moving forward. Behind them, simultaneously with the head companies, reserves had to move in the form of a continuous stream.
The enemy's defense system was carefully studied: “Here are the passages in our barbed wire entanglements. See some of them have red lines? These passages were discovered by the Germans and shot. Therefore, we do not use them. Here are the passages in our wires, marked with green strokes: they are closed at the top, you can only crawl through them. In the space between our wires and the wires of the Germans, you see a row of yellow circles and crosses. These are prepared and natural shelters where you can wait out enemy fire. The circle also denotes a convenient vantage point. Now look at the opponent's wires. Passages in them are also marked with red lines, since the Germans cover them well with machine-gun fire. But these arrows in the trenches indicate active machine guns, the dotted arrows coming from them are approximate sectors of fire. Please note that some areas between our and the German trenches are shaded. The strongest cross-machine gun fire and mortar barrage were usually observed here.
Italian assault troops, arditi, were formed in June 1917, but esploratori (scouts) have been recruited and trained since 1914 July 15, 1916 to raise the morale of an army exhausted by the bloody confrontation on the Isonzo River and the successes of the Austrians, the distinctive signs of "brave soldiers" and the official army term "arditi" were introduced. In 1917, units armed with light machine guns were added, usually carbines, daggers, hand grenades, flamethrowers and support artillery - 37-mm and 65-mm mountain guns were also used.
It is curious that, according to Alfred Etginger's opinion, in the summer of 1918, two divisions of the American army in France had regiments, over 40% of the soldiers in which never fired a rifle. Even in August-October, US infantrymen, moving on the battlefield in columns by two or in platoon, choosing the wrong direction, losing contact, not knowing how to use machine guns, etc., often fell under the devastating fire of artillery and machine guns and were forced to lie down until dark in the tradition of August 1914, the companies were reduced to the size of a platoon. One of the battalions in the first battle lost 25 officers and 462 privates. One of the machine-gun companies lost 57 people without firing a single shot, the other lost 61 people and used up only 96 rounds.
However, in a number of cases tactical improvisations were successful. According to Lieutenant Kurt Hesse: “I have never seen so many killed. I have never seen such terrible pictures in the war. On the other side the Americans destroyed in close combat two of our companies entirely. Lying in the wheat, they let our units go 30-50 m, and then destroyed them with fire. "Americans are killing everyone!" - such was the cry of horror on July 15, and this cry made our people tremble for a long time. " On September 26, two regiments took about five prisoners for each soldier out of action. On the night of November 2, the 9th regiment passed 10 km deep into enemy positions, taking groups of Germans prisoner - this was the degree of their demoralization by the end of the war.
An excerpt from the book "Myths of the First World War" by Yevgeny Belash.
