On March 26, the American edition of RealClear Defense published an article on the military-political situation in Europe. The article was written by Sam Kanter, a retired US Army officer who is currently involved in the development of the defense sphere. His publication received the self-explanatory title: "The United States Army in Europe: Roadblock, Speedbump, or Something Else Entirely?" ("US Army in Europe: checkpoint, artificial unevenness or something else"?). As the name implies, the topic of the publication was the current state, tasks and prospects of the American army contingent in Europe.
At the beginning of his article, S. Kanter notes that a "vicious cycle" of development of the armed forces has been outlined in the last century. The US Army was built to fight a specific enemy, won a victory (Pyrrhic or better), and then changed to confront a new threat - but it soon became clear that the old challenges remain relevant. Russia is now turning out to be a new repetition of this cycle.
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the United States began to reduce conventional weapons, and then focused on fighting illegal armed groups for several decades. Only after that did the United States again notice the need for armed forces in Europe. 7 years after the disbandment of two ground brigades in European countries, the US army again enters the old cycle. The Pentagon intends to ensure the possibility of victory over the enemy in the field of conventional weapons. However, S. Kanter doubts the advisability of such a course in the context of the Russian threat.
The author asks important questions. Do the more powerful forces in Europe intend to defeat Russia, or are they only going to delay its advance? Is a reinforced grouping a deterrent or a political instrument? The correct answers to these questions will help in the further planning of the development of the armed forces.
At the same time, the author suggests recalling the history of the development of the army after the Second World War. Historically, the utility of the American military in Europe has been in dealing with political issues and deterrence, but not in the direct creation of a force capable of stopping Russian troops. Instead of the simplest approach, which foresees the priority of numbers, S. Kanter proposes to solve problems in Europe in other ways, more subtle and less expensive.
Post World War II and New Look strategy
The author recalls that the victory in World War II was given at a great cost, but no other country can compare with the USSR in terms of human losses. At that time, a proposal was being considered abroad to use the depletion of a former ally. It was proposed, as Winston Churchill said earlier, "to strangle Bolshevism in its own cradle." General George Patton supported this position and proposed that the Soviet issue be resolved with the forces of one army in a few weeks. However, the cradle remained strong. In 1945, the Soviet armed forces numbered 11 million, about the same as the United States. Also, Soviet troops were concentrated in Europe, could withstand heavy losses and quickly make up for them. All this was an advantage, and therefore a new war did not happen. However, many believed that this was only a temporary respite.
The US Army remained in Europe and pursued a containment policy, but there were doubts about its ability to win a major war. After 1945, the numerical gap between the USSR and the United States widened as the Russians trained troops and equipment for a major land conflict. But, despite all the gloomy predictions, American troops continued to serve in European lands.
Soon after taking office as President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower realized that ambitious strategies did not coincide with military-political reality. Having extensive experience in the war in Europe, D. Eisenhower criticized the current European strategy of the United States from the point of view of logic and morality. If the army cannot repel the Soviet land offensive, then what is the significance of the number of troops on its way? Why sacrifice the lives of soldiers in a war they cannot win?
Eisenhower's new strategy, New Look, was designed to address both of these problems. The strategy involved the use of non-military means such as covert operations, economic pressure, and information warfare. In addition to this, the doctrine of Massive Retaliation was proposed. She offered to respond to any attack in Western Europe with a crushing nuclear strike from the United States. In this concept, ground forces remained on the sidelines, and nuclear forces turned out to be the main deterrent.
Any war in Europe could turn into a nuclear one, and this, as S. Kanter notes, deterred the USSR from attacking. In addition, New Look has provided some new features. Funding for ground forces, doomed to heavy losses, was cut in favor of developing air and nuclear forces - more convenient means of deterrence. This badly affected the spirit of the army, but created a new strategy in which it ceased to be a barrier on the way of the USSR troops to Western Europe.
In fact, D. Eisenhower did not indulge in bloody fantasies about a major non-nuclear conflict, which was proposed to be prevented by a nuclear threat. New Look's plan was to some extent a lottery, but it worked.
In the future, President Eisenhower continued to criticize the idea of increasing the contingent in Europe. He believed that the army in this situation turns out to be not a checkpoint, but a signaling system - in this case, several divisions and one could demonstrate the flag with equal efficiency. D. Eisenhower assigned the task of preparing troops in the event of a major non-nuclear conflict to European countries. He argued that "the United States has the right and responsibility to insist that its NATO partners take on more responsibility to protect Western Europe." S. Kanter notes that the current US President Donald Trump is now promoting the same ideas. Thus, Eisenhower's strategy to counter the USSR assumed the use of allies to protect their interests. This strategy was realistic; nor was it based on the need to stop the Soviet offensive.
Counterbalance strategy
New Look's strategy was relevant for the next two decades. During the reign of John F. Kennedy, it was criticized, but it was not abandoned. The military situation in Europe remained stagnant, since the USSR had a tenfold advantage in active divisions stationed along the future front. This imbalance persisted until the late seventies, when the United States decided to use its economic and technological superiority.
In 1947, the transistor was invented, and this opened up new horizons for military technology. By the seventies, such technologies made it possible to create high-performance guided weapons. After Vietnam, the so-called. the doctrine of combined weapons, which, together with new types of weapons, could become a real means of effectively countering the USSR.
The United States first tested guided weapons in Vietnam. Laser-guided systems made it possible to hit the target, saving ammunition, time and resources, as well as reducing collateral damage. The appearance of such weapons coincided with the development of a new military doctrine for Europe. The new Assault Breaker strategy provided for the widespread use of high-precision systems to destroy key targets of the Soviet army.
The United States believed that the Soviet offensive doctrine provided for the concentration of efforts on a single point of NATO defense with the organization of several waves of offensive. Then the tank fist that had broken through had to enter the breakthrough and develop the offensive. In 1982, this was answered with the AirLand Battle strategy - one of the results of the Assault Breaker program.
According to new US plans, parity in the number of conventional weapons was impossible. Instead, it was proposed to gain an advantage in quality. The "air-ground battle" offered active defense in the area of the enemy's offensive with the simultaneous destruction of his equipment and objects with high-precision weapons. If the advancing "waves" manage to inflict damage in the rear, before reaching the leading edge, the offensive should fail. Thus, the development of technology for the first time allowed the United States to count on victory in a land clash with the USSR without the use of nuclear weapons. An important feature of AirLand Battle was the fact that the American side did not try to compete with the enemy in an area where he had a serious advantage.
Could the AirLand Battle strategy stop the Soviet offensive? S. Kanter believes that this issue is not of particular importance. More important is the fact that the command of the Soviet army considered it possible. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff in 1977-1984, believed that new strategies of a potential adversary could disrupt the implementation of existing plans. New American developments made the Soviet approach, based on quantitative superiority, obsolete. During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, N. Ogarkov promoted ideas designed to respond to American technological superiority. In fact, he was one of the first Soviet military theorists to recognize the changing nature of modern warfare. At the same time, the General Staff under Marshal Ogarkov understood that an offensive in Europe was extremely dangerous. Thus, the United States managed to create a new deterrent, the effectiveness of which does not directly depend on the victory over the enemy.
Lessons learned and future paths
After the collapse of the USSR in the nineties, American forces in Europe were reduced and NATO expanded, which did not contribute to maintaining a stable situation. At present, according to S. Kanter, the United States and NATO are once again confronted with the specter of a land war in Europe - no matter how fantastic such a scenario may seem. The armed forces of Russia are seriously different from the army of the USSR. With fewer human resources, Russia developed doctrines and technologies, primarily in the field of high-precision systems. For the first time in the history of Russia, the number of contract employees exceeded the number of conscripts.
At the same time, in the 21st century, the Russian army is beginning to move away from the traditions of using the number and concentration of forces in the main directions. Using regional influence and ethnic "rifts", Russia has mastered the so-called. hybrid warfare. Thus, the author points out, mercenaries, militias and other "irregulars" are operating in Ukraine. In this strategy, servicemen perform the functions of advisers and solve the tasks of artillery support for "proxy forces" from remote positions.
Thus, Russia is currently using developments on the concepts of New Look and AirLand Battle even more than the United States itself. She learned to use inexpensive and low-risk ways to solve her problems, as well as to use the inability of Western armies to effectively respond to such threats. Any invasion of Europe will almost certainly be based on such approaches, which will reduce the effectiveness of large concentrations of enemy ground forces, suitable for work only in "normal" conflict.
However, S. Kanter believes that new factors are unlikely to seriously change the fundamental provisions of the situation. The history of the past decades clearly shows that the development of American technologies, the development of countermeasures strategies, as well as the transfer of part of the defense tasks to NATO allies can really have the desired effect. All these measures can lead to the same results as a simple increase in the number of troops in Europe.
If the US intends to demonstrate its determination to defend its interests in Europe in the face of the "Russian threat", then it is worth recalling D. Eisenhower's theses. One team can solve such problems with the same efficiency as several. Russia will always have an advantage in the part of Europe that has traditionally been its "backyard" and where the terrain is optimal for rapid attacks. S. Kanter considers direct competition with such an opponent in areas where he has advantages as stupidity.
The author suggests that the United States should explore less expensive and more sophisticated options for countering Russia before launching a simple troop build-up in the region. Perhaps, in this case, the American army will be able to break out of the previously described development cycle, which has been the basis of military planning over the past several decades.
