I. With humor
Not so long ago I wrote on "VO" about how Estonia and Latvia were competing with … uh … armies: which is more powerful, which is richer, which is more militant, which, finally, is more in number and skill. In their bragging rights, the Estonians went so far as to contemptuously “sentenced” the Latvians to guard the carts in the rear. Then it turned out that the large percentage of Tallinn spending on arms and troops was a bluff. There is no money in the Estonian budget for a strong army. No, it won't. The dispute about the power of the armies ended with the fact that both Baltic republics (at the suggestion of the Latvians) started talking about brotherhood. And now, in order to raise the morale of the fraternal microscopic troops (three tanks for two countries), the army political instructors and civilian propagandists have to scare the soldiers with the black plans of the neighboring tyrants - Putin and Lukashenko, not forgetting to praise the heroic SS past, buried by the "occupiers" in the ground in forty-fifth.
In early January 2013, the defense ministers of Finland and Sweden began a dive on the theme "Whose army is stronger". True, these guys did not quarrel, but, having measured their defenses with pipisky, leaned towards a defense alliance. However, they did not succeed.
Karl Haglund, Minister of Defense of Finland
On January 8, rumors leaked to the press that Karl Haglund, the Finnish Defense Minister, had spoken out about what would happen if a military conflict broke out. And then he explained: his home country will be able to defend itself without foreign help longer than neighboring Sweden.
As it turned out, these were not rumors, but the truth. The minister gave an interview to the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, in which he said bluntly:
"Finland has not weakened its defense capabilities to the same extent as Sweden."
Along the way, it turned out that the words of the Minister of Defense did not arise from scratch. Mr. Haglund commented on the statements of his Swedish colleague Sverker Goranson. He, with Swedish frankness, earlier told the press that Sweden would be able to resist the enemy interventionists for only one week, and then she would need external assistance.
It is curious that the Finnish minister did not specify how long his long-suffering homeland can hold out, fighting the invaders. According to the assumptions of other anonymous analysts, citing even more anonymous sources, no more than eight or nine days. On the tenth day, even less of the Swedish army will remain than on the second day of the war with the Russians, the Latvian army will remain. Or Estonian, who likes what better.
To Mr. Haglund's credit, he stated that a surprise attack on his country was highly unlikely.
And then the solo voice of the Minister of Defense gained chamber support. The Haglundu duo was composed by Jussi Niinistö, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for National Defense. He noted, sprinkling the melodious Finnish speech with numbers:
“Finland will be able to withstand much longer than Sweden, if only because we have a large army of reservists. Sweden has only a paid army of 50 thousand people."
Of course, there is some truth in the words of Mr. Niinistö. Nine days is significantly more than seven. But why is fraternal Sweden so shrunken? Niinistho knows what the matter is:
“Sweden has been weakening national defenses for a long time with its reforms in this area, and the consequences are appalling. This discussion is still ahead of us."
The duo turned into a trio, and an unexpected dissonance sounded. Professor of the Higher School of State Defense of Finland Alpo Juntunen in the newspaper "Ilta-Sanomat" said that the forces of certain parts of Finland may well be exhausted in a matter of hours. What days are there!
This professor's Niinistö quail:
“Yuntunen's script is weird. None of us can imagine that Finland will come into conflict only with Russia. It could certainly be part of a larger conflict."
This is how it turns out. What is Russia, when the Finns are going to fight no less than half of the world! Although, probably, Niinistö had in mind Russia and Belarus, yearning for the times of the USSR and for free spaces. Of course, comrades Lukashenko and Putin, planning an operation against Finland and, possibly, Sweden on Skype in the evenings, not only recall the glorious past, the KGB, the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, but also dream of the Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (FSSR). With Sweden, everything is much simpler: it will not resist for more than a week.
The Finns' talks with the Swedes led to the fact that the defense ministers of both countries decided: it's time to build a common defense policy. The initiative came from the valiant Swedes. Not surprisingly, the weaker tend to care about the community of interests.
Dmitry Semushin, a European columnist for IA REGNUM, analyzed an article dated January 13, 2013 entitled “Defense May Require Joint Ownership of Military Technology in the North,” published in Dagens Nyheter. The article appears to contain items included in the government report on Sweden's foreign and security policy. One way or another, Swedish Foreign Minister Karl Bildt and Defense Minister Karin Enström outlined their vision of the common defense policy of the Nordic countries, including the Scandinavian states and brotherly Finland. All these states need to unite their efforts in the field of foreign policy, national security and defense.
In this article, the Swedish ministers explicitly stated:
“We will step up our efforts in the Arctic Council. At the same time, Sweden is currently also taking over the chairmanship of the Nordic Council of Ministers, as well as participating in informal foreign policy cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic countries … Our goal is to further develop cooperation based on proposals for cooperation in the field of security and foreign policy, which in 2009 were presented in the so-called Stoltenberg report”.
The two ministers proposed neither more nor less, but a kind of defensive communism. Joint ownership of military resources, technology and equipment is the cornerstone of the northern defense project. Dmitry Semushin believes that this proposal is behind the military-industrial complex of Sweden, interested in expanding orders and uniting defense enterprises and laboratories of other Scandinavian countries and Finland under its leadership.
We can add to this that while the Finns and Scandinavians are busy building up their armed forces - both in number and skill - wise Swedes, who still doubt their military resilience (recall: no more than a week), will earn money. That is, against the background of the war communism they have proposed, they will live completely in a capitalist way. And, in which case, brothers Norwegians or Finns will protect them from aggressive, toothy Russians.
As for the Russians mentioned, this, again, is not a rumor.
Swedish ministers did not hesitate to hint at Russia, calling it the main enemy in the Arctic region of the northern countries:
“Sweden is interested in strengthening the values that we associate with a modern democratic society. It's about human rights, freedom and the rule of law. In cooperation with our northern friends, we can have a greater impact on our shared values."
It is known that the infringed “values”, the affected “human rights” and the lost “rule of law” are all synonyms for “undemocratic Russia”. Therefore, the phrase sounds extremely suspicious: "In cooperation with our northern friends, we can get a greater influence on our common values." Personally, I am confused by the possessive pronoun. Why is it frightened - "ours", that is, yours?
Comrade Semushin also cites the reaction to the Swedish statement of the Finnish side, which, incidentally, followed immediately. On the same day, Finnish Defense Minister Karl Haglund gave an interview to the Finnish portal of the Yle TV channel. He declared:
"Of course, in practice, this means that we should have some kind of defense agreement with Sweden, since we are talking about the most important capabilities, for example, in the navy or the air force."
Then he started talking about a government agreement or even a defense alliance. The Finnish Defense Minister also highlighted the problem here: "the main question of principle", because the northern NATO member states should not participate in this kind of cooperation. But this is Norway, Denmark and Iceland, and Sweden and Finland just should and can. All you need is political will!
Apparently, not realizing that the Swedes were going to take Finland into an industrial grip and thereby overcome the difficulties of the economic crisis, Haglund enthusiastically continued to give interviews to the media.
On January 15, in the morning program of the same TV channel, he announced that he hoped to receive additional information from his Swedish colleague about the proposed cooperation.
Other Finns also went on the air. Skype and telephony are probably not very developed in Finland, and ministers have to communicate with their foreign counterparts through televisions.
On Finnish TV screens the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland Erkki Tuomioja appeared. This man also believes in Swedish War Communism and is ready to talk about the invigorating topic of joint ownership of technology and their joint application. Moreover, the minister believes that many common measures have already been implemented by Finland and Sweden: joint military exercises and military training, joint procurement, cooperation in the field of crisis management and patrolling.
The enthusiasm of his subordinates was suddenly cooled by Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen. In his opinion, it makes no sense to raise the issue of creating a defense alliance between Finland and Sweden - neither today nor in the future. Another thing is that it is necessary to develop cooperation between the two countries in the field of acquiring military technologies.
The President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, did not remain silent either. On January 16, during a visit to Lappeenranta, he flatly rejected any talk of a defense alliance between Finland and Sweden. Niinistö went so far as to say: the Swedes, they say, did not offer anything of the kind.
An Estonian unexpectedly got into the discussion between the Finns and the Swedes.
Urmas Paet, Estonian Foreign Minister, at a seminar on Swedish defense and security policy in Sälen on January 14, expressed the opinion that Finland and Sweden should join NATO. Sweden has made a "promise of solidarity" and is therefore obliged to provide assistance to the EU and the Nordic countries in the event of an attack. Paet explained that he only trusts Sweden's commitment 99.9%. But if Sweden were a NATO member, the level of trust would rise to a round number.
In general, it is not surprising to understand Paet: Estonia, with its dwindling military budget (as well as Latvia's "train"), would not be hurt by guaranteed northern defenders. The Russian-Belarusian threat is no joke to you.
II. Seriously
The analysis of the possibility of concluding any kind of defense "pact" between the Finns and the Swedes was recently conducted on the resource "Nordic Intel". Here, among other things, we are talking about the so-called "information operations" (IO), divided into strategic and tactical (or operational). The unnamed author of the material clarifies that the strategy includes coordination and synchronization of IO policies, procedures and other efforts aimed at achieving international influence in order to achieve certain national goals.
For example, one of Finland's strategic goals in the field of AI may be to facilitate the country's participation in multilateral defense cooperation within the framework of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defense Cooperation).
Once the goal is defined and approved, each of the foreign ambassadors and military attachés, politicians and bureaucrats, orators and all others, having assimilated the tasks and intentions, raises those topics and publishes those messages that would be aimed at the effectiveness of the adopted program. Here it is also important, the author clarifies, that in order to achieve the goal, it is also important to learn what is not necessary to say, so as not to undermine the effectiveness and not to distort the previous information messages.
However, the author believes that the described systematic approach is either absent in the Finnish government, or key ministers are not able to pay due attention to it in their information strategy.
The main reason for the flaws in Finnish "information operations" policy is the coalition government. On the one hand, we, the author writes, have the consensus necessary for effective governance, achieve moderation by avoiding the "left" or "right" extremes, promote awareness and, it is believed, can provide political solutions in the name of long-term stability when one government is replaced by another. (it is assumed that the other will continue the policy of the previous one). Indeed, in countries with a strong bipartisan political system (for example, in Australia or the United States), where each new government often "overturns" the policies of the previous administration, society, on the contrary, becomes more vulnerable: political and social polarization occurs.
The government coalition, however, also has its drawbacks: a tendency to consult and discuss issues indefinitely, indecision fraught with missed opportunities. In addition, ministers, who often represent different political parties, are not necessarily effective in communication. All of this explains Finland's recent failure to provide clear, concise and consistent messages addressed to external stakeholders, including the EU and its Nordic partners.
The author writes that in order to reach consensus on the national goals of the IO, to establish a clear delineation of responsibilities and linkages between strategically important initiatives and concepts, a question should be asked about how to ensure that agreed themes and messages are respected. If the president and prime minister are unable to express condemnation or otherwise pursue their line among ministers, then other possibilities should be explored to increase their accountability.
Turning to examples of failures of information operations, the analyst singles out as failures of Finnish ministers: lack of communication with national leaders and relevant ministries, ie, inability to coordinate and synchronize all national efforts of the IO; the use of terminology, which, depending on the interpretation, can have a very specific meaning and consequences that do not necessarily coincide with the established policy and goals of the IO (not understanding what needs to be said and what not needs to be said); making statements that are then challenged by other members of the government (failure to ensure clarity and consistency of all topics and messages).
The author believes that ministers should be held accountable. They should explain the reason for poor communication between ministries, find out why their position contrasts with that of their colleagues, explain the points of divergence and justify the appropriateness of statements that are clearly consistent with official policy.
As one of the examples, the analyst cites the same "defense pact" between Finland and Sweden, which was launched on January 13th.
Swedish Foreign Minister Karl Bildt and Defense Minister Karin Enström argued in a newspaper article that the Arctic and northern regions, along with the Baltic Sea, are becoming more and more important from two points of view: economic and security. Therefore, in the future, the northern countries should strengthen defense cooperation - to unite and jointly use military equipment.
Swedish Defense Minister Karin Enström
Probably, Sweden, motivated by budgetary constraints and the lack of popular support for the country's accession to NATO, wants to further develop military cooperation with partners from the Nordic countries - in order to ensure collective security and at the same time cover the lack of internal capabilities.
But who is threatening Sweden? The only significant military threat to this country, the analyst writes, is Russia, which also threatens other Scandinavian countries. It is considered a threat in part because of the historical legacy and suspicion (Finland), tensions between Moscow and the US / NATO (Denmark, Norway and to some extent Iceland as NATO members). We can also talk about the growing importance of resources, in particular, about access to oil and natural gas in the Arctic (Norway's claims in the Barents Sea) and sea routes in the Baltic Sea. Other factors of "threats" include Russia's border proximity with Finland and Norway, Moscow's increased military spending and aggressive rhetoric, which includes recent attacks on Finland (in 2012, for cooperation with NATO) and Norway (this year - on NATO and missile defense). This, the author believes, must certainly be taken into account in the defense plans of the northern countries.
The Swedish military, the analyst recalls, argue that Sweden can only defend itself for one week. Speaking about the defense of Sweden, they primarily think about the Russian attack. Therefore, Bildt and Enström's comments appear to have been influenced by statements made by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, General Sverker Goranson, who reported Fr. And then there is NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, a Dane, recently reminded Sweden that it cannot count on NATO support without being a member of the alliance.
In reality, the author writes, it is extremely unlikely that someone will attack Sweden. Unless there is a broader conflict. But here, given its participation in NATO programs, Sweden can quickly integrate into the operations of the alliance, even without being a member of the organization. An example of this already exists: participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
Following the "week" announced by the Swedes, Finnish Defense Minister Karl Haglund entered the geopolitical arena. He supported the proposal of Bildt and Enström and even negotiated a military alliance between Sweden and Finland. And this proposal (rather surprising, the analyst notes) was clearly not approved by the Prime Minister and denied by the President of Finland.
The reason why Haglund came out publicly with such an important statement, which could have strategic implications, without prior consultation with Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, Prime Minister Katainen and President Niinistö is not known. Publicity would have saved the governments of the two countries from confusion and awkwardness.
At the end of an extensive article, the analyst concludes that Finland and Sweden are unlikely to enter into a formal military alliance and "socialize" military equipment. Of course, Nordic defense cooperation remains important for every country, especially for those who are not NATO members. But we are only talking about interaction. Combining the technical component of the two armies is, in the author's opinion, easier said than done. Even for brigades, he writes, many problems arise when combining equipment, not to mention national armies. The analyst casually criticizes "Sweden's dependence on a homegrown defense industry," despite the fact that Finland also has the United States among its suppliers. How to prioritize access to technology? What to do in case of a military conflict with equipment - and what to do in peacetime? Breakdowns, repairs, drills, ammunition costs? Who will be responsible for what? In addition, the question of what to do, say, Sweden will have to decide if Finland gets involved in a war not supported by Sweden.
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In conclusion, it should be noted that the northern fears of Russia are now additionally materialized in the form of "Mistrals". The Lithuania Tribune reports that for Finland and Sweden, the interest in defense cooperation between the northern defense countries largely depends on changes in the balance of power and in the Baltic Sea region. Russia is accelerating the pace of modernization of its armed forces and is taking an "assertive" attitude towards former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the budgetary defense funds of the Swedes and Finns are very limited. Russia is strengthening its Baltic Fleet by acquiring several modern Mistral-class ships from France. These ships are intended for air and amphibious assault operations, and the first of them is due to be delivered in 2014. Mistrals will give Russia the opportunity to influence the weak defense of the coasts of the Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which will make the strategic isolation of these states more acute. Sweden and Finland should also consider supporting their defenses …
