Mock-up of a chemical cluster warhead of an operational-tactical missile
In the second half of the 20th century, chemical weapons became a cheap alternative to nuclear weapons for the third world countries, where all sorts of authoritarian regimes came to power. Chemical weapons on the battlefield are valuable only if they are used massively. For this, cluster bombs, jetting aircraft devices, multiple launch rocket systems, and large masses of cannon artillery are best suited. A special threat is posed by the warheads of ballistic missiles, filled with toxic substances when they are used in large cities. In this case, the number of victims among the civilian population may be in the thousands.
The threat of use against civilians, the least protected from BWW, non-selectivity, unnecessary suffering caused by chemical weapons, and the end of the Cold War - all this led to the conclusion in 1993 of the International Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which entered into force on April 29, 1997 of the year. But the main reason for the abandonment of chemical arsenals in the United States and Russia was that chemical weapons created for the "big war" became too troublesome and costly, in the absence of obvious advantages over conventional weapons. Specially trained storage facilities and specialists were required, containers with mustard gas and lewisite, refueled during the Second World War, corroded and were unsafe, the military was under great pressure in the form of negative public opinion, and as a result, it became too burdensome for the military to contain BOV. In addition, in modern conditions, when the risk of a global war has dropped to a minimum, nuclear weapons as a means of deterring a potential adversary have become more abundant.
Preparation for disposal of 250 kg of chemical aerial bomb
As you know, the largest volumes of CWA were available in Russia (40 thousand tons of toxic substances) and the United States (28 572 tons of toxic substances). Most (32,200 tons) of war poisons accumulated in the USSR were FOV: sarin, soman, an analogue of VX, and the rest consisted of blister poisons: mustard gas, lewisite and their mixtures. Nerve toxic substances in the USSR were loaded into the shells of ammunition ready for use. Mustard and lewisite were almost entirely stored in containers, only 2% of lewisite was in ammunition. About 40% of mustard-lewisite mixtures in the USSR were stored in ammunition. In the United States, more than 60% of CWA (mustard gas and mixtures based on it, VX, sarin) were in containers, the rest in loaded ammunition. By now, the parties have practically completed the destruction of their chemical arsenals, which was confirmed by mutual inspections of the enterprises where the disposal was carried out and the places of storage of CWA.
188 countries have acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which entered into force on April 29, 1997. Eight states remained outside the Convention, two of which - Israel and Myanmar - signed the Convention but did not ratify it. Six more countries - Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, South Sudan - have not signed. To date, North Korea has the largest reserves of toxic substances, which, of course, causes concern among its neighbors.
Among the world community there is a well-founded fear of chemical weapons and their complete rejection as a barbaric means of armed struggle. The presence of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic almost became a pretext for the West to unleash aggression against this country. In Syria, the presence of chemical arsenals and delivery vehicles was seen as a kind of insurance against an Israeli attack with nuclear weapons. In 2012, the Syrian military had at its disposal about 1,300 tons of military weapons, as well as more than 1,200 unloaded aerial bombs, missiles and shells. In the past, accusations by the Iraqi leadership of the presence of weapons of mass destruction have already become a formal pretext for an attack on this state by Western countries led by the United States.
With the mediation of Russia, on September 13, 2013, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad signed an act on the renunciation of chemical weapons, their complete disposal and subsequent ratification by Syria of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in full. On June 23, 2014, it was announced that the last batch of CW was removed from the territory of the SAR for subsequent destruction. On January 4, 2016, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced the complete destruction of Syria's chemical weapons.
It would seem that the topic of Syrian poisonous substances should be closed, but the Western media have repeatedly published materials about the alleged use of poison gases by the Syrian government forces. Indeed, international experts have repeatedly documented the use of neuroparalytic BOV in Syria. In this case, the number of victims went to dozens of people. Western countries, as always, were quick to blame the regular Syrian army for all their sins, but detailed studies at the sites of the use of poisonous substances showed that homemade shells were equipped with a poisonous substance sarin. In addition, in the course of a laboratory examination of ammunition fragments filled with sarin, it turned out that this substance was of low purity and contained a large amount of extraneous chemical compounds, which clearly indicates a non-industrial, artisanal nature of production. In July 2013, information appeared about the discovery in Iraq of several clandestine laboratories, where Islamists were working to create toxic substances. With a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that homemade missiles loaded with sarin came into Syria from neighboring Iraq. In this regard, it is worth recalling the detention by Turkish special services in the summer of 2013 of Syrian militants who were trying to transfer containers with sarin across the Turkish-Syrian border, and the phones found on the killed Islamists with video recordings on which terrorists are testing poisonous substances on rabbits.
Syrian representatives have repeatedly shown video footage of illegal BOV production laboratories seized from terrorists. To all appearances, the provocations of the militants with sarin failed, and they failed to accuse the government forces of using chemical weapons against the “civilian population”. However, the terrorists are not abandoning their attempts to use toxic substances. In this respect, Syria serves as a kind of testing ground for them. Manufacturing sarin and equipping ammunition with it requires technological and laboratory equipment of a sufficiently high level. In addition, the unauthorized leak of Sarin is fraught with very serious consequences for the "technicians" themselves. In this regard, according to the Russian media, militants have recently been using chemical ammunition filled with chlorine, mustard gas and white phosphorus. If the first two substances, although with certain restrictions, which will be discussed below, can really be considered poisonous, then how white phosphorus got into this company is completely incomprehensible. However, the point is most likely in the ignorance of the journalists who undertake to cover the issue of chemical weapons and the ongoing information and psychological war.
Perhaps for the layman who does not understand the difference between mustard gas and white phosphorus, everything is the same, but for people who have ideas about weapons of mass destruction, or at least knowledge of the school chemistry course, the classification of phosphorus as combat poisons is simply ridiculous. White phosphorus is really poisonous and, when burned, forms smoke, which, when combined with water, turns into a strong acid, but it is impossible to poison a significant number of people with phosphorus or its combustion products within a short time. Choking smoke is only a minor damaging factor. However, anyone who has been to the artillery fire or in a full-scale hostilities zone will confirm that gunpowder smoke and TNT do not add to health either.
The damaging effect of phosphorus munitions is based on the tendency of white phosphorus to self-ignite in the open air, its combustion temperature, depending on the additional components of the incendiary projectile, is 900-1200 ° C, and it is impossible to extinguish it with water. There are several types of phosphorus ammunition: aerial bombs, artillery shells, rockets for MLRS, mortar mines, hand grenades. Some of them are intended for setting up a smoke screen, since phosphorus, when burned, gives a thick white smoke. For example, white phosphorus is used in the Tucha smoke grenade launcher installed on domestic armored vehicles, but no one considers it a chemical weapon. The Soviet army was armed with incendiary bombs, as well as shells and mines, where the igniting element was white phosphorus.
The moment of the explosion of a phosphoric grenade
White phosphorus was used on a noticeable scale during the First World War, then all the opposing sides actively used phosphorus bombs, mines and shells during the Second World War. For example, in the USSR, glass bottles and ampoules used against German tanks were equipped with a solution of white phosphorus in carbon disulfide (a self-igniting liquid KS). In the post-war period, incendiary phosphorus ammunition was available in the armies of all militarily developed countries and was repeatedly used as a powerful incendiary weapon in hostilities. The first attempt to limit the use of phosphorus munitions was made in 1977 under the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims. These documents prohibit the use of white phosphorus ammunition if civilians are thereby endangered. However, the United States and Israel did not sign them. When used against military targets located “inside or in the vicinity of populated areas,” weapons containing white phosphorus are prohibited from use under international agreements (Protocol III to the 2006 Geneva Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). It is in this context that the use of phosphorus shells and mines in populated areas by the Syrian armed opposition should be viewed.
In contrast to white phosphorus, chlorine is indeed recognized as a chemical warfare agent with a suffocating effect. Under normal conditions, this greenish-yellow gas is heavier than air, and as a result it spreads along the ground and can accumulate in ground folds and basements. However, in order to achieve a significant combat effect with the help of chlorine, the use of this gas must be carried out on a large scale. During the First World War, chlorine was mainly used by the gas balloon method. Equipping them with artillery shells and mines was considered ineffective, since to create the necessary concentration of gas in the area, a simultaneous salvo of hundreds of large-caliber guns was required. Why the terrorists are filling them with shells is not clear, because they do not have at their disposal hundreds of heavy artillery barrels concentrated in a narrow sector of the front. When using shells, mines and rockets alone, equipping them with conventional explosives has a much greater damaging effect. In addition, chlorine, due to its chemical activity, destroys the metal walls of shells equipped with it in artisanal conditions, which leads to leakage and limits the shelf life of such ammunition.
Mustard gas is a much more dangerous poisonous substance in comparison with chlorine. For a long time, mustard gas, also known as "mustard gas", was considered the "king" of chemical warfare agents. At 20 ° C, mustard gas is a liquid. Due to the fact that the evaporation of mustard gas under normal conditions occurs very slowly, it is able to maintain its damaging effect for several days, infecting the area for a long time. Mustard gas is chemically stable and can be stored in metal containers for a long period of time, and it is also cheap to manufacture.
Mustard gas is called a blistering poisonous substance, since the main lesions occur when exposed to the skin. But this substance acts slowly: if a drop of mustard gas is removed from the skin no later than 3-4 minutes and this place is treated with a neutralizing compound, then there may not be a lesion. With mustard gas lesions, painful sensations - itching and redness - do not appear immediately, but after 3-8 hours, while bubbles appear on the second day. The damaging effect of mustard gas is highly dependent on the temperature at which it is applied. In hot weather, mustard gas poisoning occurs much faster than in cold weather. This is due to the fact that with an increase in temperature, the rate of evaporation of mustard gas rapidly increases, besides, sweaty skin is more susceptible to the damaging effect of its vapors than dry skin. With a strong degree of damage, bubbles form on the skin, then deep and long-lasting ulcers appear in their place. Ulcers can take weeks to months to heal. In addition to the skin, mustard gas can have a toxic effect when inhaled. Large concentrations of mustard gas vapor in the air can cause general poisoning of the body, nausea, vomiting, fever, cardiac disorders, changes in the composition of the blood, loss of consciousness and death. But mortality in case of mustard gas poisoning in combat conditions is small (a few percent). In this regard, many experts in the field of CWA classify mustard gas as a "crippling" poisonous substance: a significant part of those affected by the effects of this poison remained disabled for the rest of their lives.
Compared with nerve toxic substances, mustard gas is quite easy to obtain in several ways and does not require complex laboratory and technological equipment. Manufacturing components are available and inexpensive. For the first time, mustard gas was obtained in 1822. In the modern history of Russia, cases of the manufacture of mustard gas at home have been recorded. It is quite predictable that the Syrian "barmaley" showed great interest in this BOV. However, the militants do not have the necessary funds for the competent use of mustard gas. Mustard gas, in comparison with FOV, requires more massive use to achieve combat effectiveness. Aviation pouring devices are best suited for spraying mustard gas. In this case, infection of large areas is possible. When equipping artillery shells, mines and rockets with mustard gas, an obscene amount of shots is required to achieve the same effect.
It is clear that the Islamists do not have aviation and a large number of artillery systems and significant reserves of mustard gas. Projectiles with this substance can be used in urban environments to dislodge the enemy from their positions, because being in a hotbed of infection, even if a slowly acting poisonous substance, is deadly. But in any case, the use of single ammunition with mustard gas, which we observed during the battles for Aleppo, cannot bring any military benefit. On the contrary, the use of war poisons in urban areas takes those who use them beyond the rules of warfare and turns them into war criminals. It is difficult to say whether the “fighters of the armed opposition” understand this. As practice shows, extremists and militant religious fanatics are able to take any step to achieve their goals.
Under existing conditions, the chemical weapons at the disposal of the armed Syrian opposition, due to their small number and the impossibility of competent use, are not capable of influencing the course of hostilities. However, toxic substances as a sabotage and terrorist weapon are of great interest to various terrorist groups and extremist organizations. Poisonous substances pose a particularly great threat in the event of a chemical attack in a large metropolis with a high concentration of the population.
You can recall the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995, carried out by members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect. Then they, imperceptibly placing one liter sacks with liquid sarin on the floor of the cars, pierced them, leaving the car. Thirteen people were fatally poisoned, more than 5500 people were injured. The poisoning was caused by vapors of sarin, but if the terrorists managed to spray it, the number of victims would be immeasurably higher.
At the same time, despite the accession of most states to the Convention on the Prohibition and Elimination of Chemical Weapons, research in this area has not stopped. Many groups of substances that are not formally CWA but have properties similar to them remained outside the framework of the agreement. At present, irritants are widely used by "law enforcement agencies" to combat mass protests - tear and irritant substances. At certain concentrations, irritants sprayed as aerosol or smoke cause intolerable irritation to the respiratory system and eyes, as well as to the skin of the entire body. This group of substances was not included in the composition of chemical weapons as defined in the text of the 1993 Chemical Convention. The convention contains only an appeal to its participants not to use the chemicals of this group in the course of hostilities. However, the newest irritants, due to their high efficiency, may well be used as functional analogues of asphyxiant toxic substances. In the case of the use of tear and irritating gases in combination with emetics - substances that cause unrestrained vomiting - enemy soldiers will not be able to use gas masks.
Narcotic analgesics - derivatives of morphine and fentanyl - are the closest to neuroparalytic poisonous substances by the nature of the lesion among the non-prohibited drugs. In small concentrations, they cause an immobilizing effect. At a higher dosage, the most active of the narcotic analgesics, in terms of their level of action, achieve the effect of nerve agents, and, if necessary, are quite capable of replacing unconventional BOV.
The case of the use of narcotic analgesics associated with the seizure of hostages by terrorists on October 26, 2002 at Dubrovka in Moscow, also known as 'Nord-Ost', received a wide response. In the course of the special operation, according to an official statement from the FSB, a "special recipe based on fentanyl derivatives" was used at Dubrovka. Experts from the Laboratory for Scientific and Technological Safety Fundamentals in Salisbury (UK) believe that the aerosol consisted of two analgesics - carfentanil and remifentanil. Although the operation ended with the destruction of all terrorists and the explosion was avoided, of the 916 hostages taken, according to official figures, 130 people died as a result of the gas.
It is safe to say that, despite the declared renunciation of chemical weapons, poisonous substances have been used, are being used and will be used as weapons. However, from a means of destruction on the battlefield, they turned into a tool for "pacifying" the protesters and a tool for conducting covert operations.
