The coming to power of M. Saakashvili was marked by the rise of nationalist sentiments in Georgia. The already not very friendly policy towards Russia has become openly hostile. Wanting to go down in history as a "statesman" and "collector of lands" M. Saakashvili unleashed hysteria in the media about the alleged "aggressive intentions of the northern neighbor" and "the return of the primordial Georgian territories."
The information war was accompanied by unprecedented military preparations. The military budget was increased several times, the army began to be transferred to a contract basis, and large-scale purchases of weapons and military equipment abroad began. The largest partners in the supply of weapons were Ukraine and Israel.
The United States provided significant gratuitous military assistance in equipping the Georgian army with modern communications equipment, small arms and helicopters. And also in the training of personnel. The states of Eastern Europe also took part in updating and strengthening the Georgian air defense system.
The situation in the zone of presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces began to escalate long before the transition to the stage of a full-scale conflict.
Regular shelling and provocations were accompanied by reconnaissance flights over the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, an Israeli-made Hermes-450 UAV.
Until June 2008, five Hermes-450s were received from Israel, and two were shot down by Russian fighters.
Georgian Air Force and Air Defense Before the War in Ossetia
By the beginning of August 2008, the number of Georgian Air Force personnel was 1,813 people. The main striking force consisted of 12 Su-25 attack aircraft (of which 10 were in single-seat and two in two-seat combat training versions).
Most of them were collected from the Soviet reserve at the Tbilisi plant "Tbilaviamsheni", the rest were bought in Macedonia, which in turn acquired them in Ukraine.
Since 2001, Georgian attack aircraft (according to various sources, from 6 to 10 pieces) have been modernized at the Israeli firm "Elbit Systems" with a complete replacement of onboard electronic equipment.
The updated aircraft received the Su-25KM index and the Scorpion name. However, the Georgians themselves call them "Mimino" but not in honor of the character of the famous comedy, simply "mimino" in Georgian means "falcon".
In addition, there were several military transport vehicles An-24, An-32 and An-72, 12 Czechoslovak combat training aircraft L-39 Albatross (six of them are also former Ukrainian) and nine older combat training L- 29 "Dolphin".
The helicopter fleet was represented by one Mi-35, three Mi-24P, four Mi-24V (most of the Mi-24 family attack helicopters were received from Ukraine), two Mi-14, sixteen Mi-8, six American Bell-212, the same number UH-1H "Iroquois" and two Mi-2.
Mi-24 Georgian Air Force
The main location of the Georgian Air Force was the Marneuli airbase with a developed infrastructure, inherited by the Georgians since Soviet times. Su-25 attack aircraft and combat training vehicles were permanently located there. The helicopters were based partly at the Novo-Alekseevka airfield near Tbilisi and partly at Senaki.
The Georgian military airbases have strong, well-protected reinforced concrete aircraft shelters. However, they were built back in the 60s - 70s of the last century and were designed for the dimensions of combat vehicles of those times, such as the MiG-21, Su-7, Su-17, MiG-23 and MiG-27, with the last three could only fit in them with folded wings.
The Su-25 can be “squeezed” into such a shelter only by undocking its wing consoles. Therefore, Georgian "mimino" and "rooks" constantly stood in the open air, and relatively small training "dolphins" and "albatrosses" were kept in shelters.
After the collapse of the USSR, Georgia got the stationary air defense systems S-75 and S-125, which were in positions in the Tbilisi region. But by the time the conflict began, due to the lack of proper maintenance, they were all incapable of fighting. Repeated reports in the media about the presence in Georgia of former Ukrainian long-range air defense systems S-200 subsequently turned out to be false. However, this is not surprising: there was no point in purchasing an obviously outdated, cumbersome, immobile and difficult-to-operate liquid-fuel anti-aircraft system.
Shortly before the start of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, a separate anti-aircraft missile division (OZRDN) was formed and went into operation, consisting of three much more modern 9K37M1 Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems received in June 2007 from Ukraine. Each complex included four self-propelled firing units (SPU) with four missiles each. It was this mobile division that took the most active part in the hostilities.
The second division of the Buks was never formed. The materiel and the stock of missiles for him arrived from Ukraine on the ferry "Heroes of Plevna" on June 12, 2008, but the Georgians did not have time to train the calculations and put the division into operation. It was subsequently captured by Russian paratroopers.
The military air defense consisted of two batteries of the 9KZZM2 "Osa-AK" air defense missile system and one battery of the 9KZZMZ "Osa-AKM" air defense missile system. A total of 12 combat vehicles with six missiles on each, however, it is not known how many of them were combat-ready. There was information that the Georgians had dismantled part of the "Os" for parts.
SAM "OSA-AKM"
In addition, the Georgians had a number of 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns, 15 23-mm ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", about 20 ZU-23 installations on various self-propelled chassis, 30 MANPADS "Thunder" and about 100 missiles to them (the Polish version of the Soviet 9K310 Igla-1 MANPADS), as well as several dozen 9K32M Strela-2M MANPADS. Georgian "know-how" was equipping MANPADS crews with cross-country ATVs, which significantly increased their mobility and made it possible to quickly change firing positions.
Finally, there are allegations of the acquisition by Georgia in 2008 of one battery of the new Israeli short-range air defense system Spyder-SR. The Rafael Spyder-SR air defense system uses Python 5 and Derby air-to-air missiles as anti-aircraft missiles. There is no official confirmation of any deliveries of the Spyder-SR complex to Georgia, but the Jane's Missiles & Rockets magazine in July 2008, citing a statement from a Rafael representative, said that “the Spyder-SR complex was ordered by two foreign customers, one of which supplied the SAM on alert ".
PU SAM "Spider"
The Israeli authorities have still not officially recognized the sale of "Spiders" to Georgia, and the Georgian leadership at the official level does not react in any way to press reports about their use in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. However, there is information about the head part of the "Python" missile found in the battle zone.
The radar component of the Georgian air defense consisted of radars of types: 36D6, P-37, 5N87, P-18, 19Zh6, PRV-9, -11, -13, ASR-12, as well as various French-made radars in the areas of POTI, KOPITNARI, GORI, TBILISI, MARNEULI and civil radars, united in a single information network.
To control the hostilities, wired communication lines, radio stations operating in a protected mode of information transmission, communications and data transmission for civilian purposes were used.
The post closest to the border with South Ossetia was located a few kilometers from the village of Shavshevebi, Gori region. There, on a hill, a modern Ukrainian-made 36D6-M radar station was installed. This station with a high degree of noise immunity is capable of detecting air targets at a distance of up to 360 km, that is, almost the entire territory of the North Caucasus from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea fell within the reach of the Shavsheveb radar station. At the same time, the station can automatically track up to 120 targets and transmit information about them to operators of anti-aircraft missile launchers. The second such radar was installed near Tbilisi.
Destroyed Georgian radar 36D6-M
Civilian radars of the Georgian Air Communications Department served the airports of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, Poti, Telavi and Marneuli. Of course, after the outbreak of hostilities, all information from them came to the disposal of the military.
Ukraine's participation in the creation of the Georgian Air Force and Air Defense was not limited to the supply of aircraft, helicopters, radar stations and anti-aircraft missile systems. In 2006, Kiev for 25 million dollars sold to Georgia a new, created just three years earlier, the Kolchuga-M passive radio intelligence complex consisting of three reconnaissance stations.
This complex is designed to detect air targets by the radiation of their radars and communications equipment. The three stations included in it, located on a car chassis, are capable of covering the front up to 1000 kilometers. The maximum detection range, depending on the operating mode, ranges from 200 to 600 kilometers.
In addition, in 2007, the Ukrainian corporation Aerotechnica linked all Georgian military and civilian radars, as well as the Kolchuga-M complex, into a single airspace control network ASOC (AirSovereigntyOperationsCenters). The ASOC central command post is located in Tbilisi and since spring 2008 has been connected to the NATO air situation data exchange system ASDE (AirSituationDataExchange).
It is not known how effective Kolchuga turned out to be in practice and what the results of its use were, since the Georgian military command, for obvious reasons, does not disclose such information. There is no information even about whether the Georgians managed to maintain this system or whether it was destroyed in the course of hostilities. Among the numerous trophies captured by the Russian army in the "five-day war", this system and its individual components are not listed.
STARTING COMBAT ACTIONS
In response to the invasion of Georgian troops, the Russian leadership decided to launch an "operation to enforce peace" by forces of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, stationed in North Ossetia.
At about 8 a.m. on August 8, 2008, the first convoy of Russian troops passed through the Roki tunnel and entered South Ossetian territory, and the North Ossetian military aviation received an order to launch missile and bomb strikes on concentration areas, traffic routes and firing positions of the Georgian army in the conflict area. MiG-29 fighters took control of the airspace over South Ossetia. In general, something happened that was not included in the plans of the Georgian leadership, which for some reason hoped that Russia would not seriously fight for the Ossetians, limiting itself to diplomatic protests, economic sanctions and, possibly, “symbolic” actions of aviation.
On the Russian side, the following Air Force units from the 4th Air Army of the North Caucasian Military District were involved in the hostilities:
368th separate assault aviation regiment from Budennovsk (Su-25 and Su-25SM, commander - Colonel Sergey Kobylash);
461st Attack Aviation Regiment from Krasnodar (Su-25, commander - Colonel Valery Kushnerev);
559th Bomber Aviation Regiment from Morozovsk (Su-24M, commander - Colonel Sergei Borodachev);
959th Bomber Aviation Regiment from Yeisk (Su-24M);
11th Separate Guards Vitebsk Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment from Marinovka (Su-24MR, commander - Guards Colonel Vasily Neyzhmak);
19th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment from Millerovo (MiG-29, commander - Guards Colonel Vyacheslav Kudinov);
31st Guards Nikopol Fighter Aviation Regiment from Zernograd (MiG-29, commander - Guards Colonel Oleg Soloviev);
55th separate Sevastopol helicopter regiment from Korenovsk (Mi-8, Mi-24, commander - Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Sergeev);
325th separate transport and combat helicopter regiment from Yegorlykskaya (Mi-8, Mi-26, commander - Colonel Vladimir Grigoryan);
487th separate helicopter regiment from Budennovsk (Mi-8, Mi-24P and Mi-24PN, commander - Colonel Evgeny Fedotov);
In addition, individual aircraft and crews from air units not included in the 4th VA were involved:
52nd Guards TBAP (Tu-22MZ, Shaikovka airfield);
929th GLITs (Akhtubinsk, Su-24MR);
4th pulp and paper industry and PLC them. Chkalov (Lipetsk, Su-24M, Su-25SM) and some others.
However, this rather long list of air units should not be misleading.
Often, from the units indicated here, only a few vehicles were present in the combat zone. The total number of Russian combat and reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters directly involved in the conflict did not exceed hundreds of vehicles.
The ground air defense of units of the 58th Russian army, which entered into battle with Georgian troops on the territory of South Ossetia, consisted of self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", ZRPK 2K22 "Tunguska", and portable anti-aircraft missile systems. In addition to MANPADS, the paratroopers were armed with self-propelled anti-aircraft guns BTR-ZD "Screchet" with anti-aircraft guns ZU-23
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that Russian aviation during the war in Ossetia surpassed the Georgian one both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, Georgian anti-aircraft weapons, supported by a developed electronic detection system, were quite capable of providing very serious opposition to it. Unfortunately, our air command underestimated this threat …
In the morning and afternoon hours of the first day of the war, when a column of armored vehicles of the 58th Army was marching along the mountain serpentine from the Roki tunnel to the south, towards Dzau, the only one who could assist the defenders of Tskhinvali in repelling the Georgian offensive was Russian military aircraft. The first to enter the battle were the Su-25 and Su-25SM from the 368th Separate Assault Aviation Regiment under the command of Colonel Sergei Kobylash.
Su-25 368th OSHAP is one of the most combatant regiments of the Russian Air Force.
Formed in 1984 at the Zhotnevoe airfield, in 1986-87 he fought in Afghanistan, then managed to visit the territory of the GDR as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and since 1993 has been based in the North Caucasus, in Budenovsk.
The regiment went through both Chechen wars, in 1995 it survived the attack of terrorists Shamil Basayev, but never in its entire history has it met such strong anti-aircraft resistance and suffered such heavy simultaneous losses as in the first two days of the "Ossetian" war - August 8 and 9 2008 year.
In one of the first combat missions, during an attack on a convoy of Georgian troops south of Tskhinvali, an anti-aircraft missile shot down the plane of the deputy squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Terebunsky, an experienced pilot who had 120 sorties in the Chechen wars. The pilot ejected and went out to his own. On August 22, by decree of the President of Russia, he was awarded the Order of Courage.
In addition, during the day, attack aircraft of Captain Ivan Nechaev and Colonel Oleg Molostvov were seriously damaged, but both pilots managed to return to their airfield and safely land. On Nechaev's plane, the left engine was completely destroyed, the right one was damaged.
After the plane landed, it turned out that kerosene from the broken fuel hose flowed directly onto the runway, and it had to be filled with fire-fighting foam. On Molostvov's plane, the technicians on their return counted 88 shrapnel holes.
Despite the losses, the Russian pilots by their actions significantly reduced the offensive activity of the Georgian troops and thereby prevented the enemy from establishing full control over Tskhinvali.
The Georgians report very sparingly about their losses from air strikes incurred on the first day of the war in the region of the capital of South Ossetia. In the press release of the Georgian Defense Ministry for August 8, there is information only about the destruction of a truck with ammunition.
While the "rooks" and the Mi-24 were operating on the approaches to Tskhinvali, the Su-24M bombers struck at targets in the depths of Georgian territory.
Their primary task was to isolate the area of hostilities - to prevent the approach of reinforcements from the enemy. Carrying out this task, the "dry" at noon on August 8 attacked the convoy of the 4th brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces, which was moving along the highway from Gori towards Tskhinvali. As a result of the bombing, five trucks and several jeeps were destroyed, more than 20 soldiers and officers were killed, including the commander of one of the battalions of the 4th brigade, Major Shalva Dolidze. Several dozen more people were injured.
On the part of Georgia, these were the largest one-time losses of the Georgian army during the entire war. Most of those who fell under the attack were demoralized and largely lost their combat capability. It is noteworthy that the 4th Brigade was considered the elite of the Georgian army, it was trained by American instructors and armed with American weapons.
Initially, the Georgians claimed that cluster munitions were used in the attack on the convoy. Then their opinion changed and there were reports that a Russian plane had allegedly dropped an ammunition from a volumetric explosion - the so-called
"Vacuum bomb". But our military denies the use of both cluster and volume-detonating bombs in the conflict with Georgia, so the question of the type of ammunition used remains open.
According to Georgian sources, the first Russian bombing was noted at 9.45 am - a Russian plane dropped four bombs near the village of Shavshevebi.
At 10.57, two bombers attacked the base of the Georgian artillery brigade, located close to the residential area of the city of Gori. In nearby houses, the explosions flew out glass, in some places the walls were smashed by fragments.
At 11.45 a Russian reconnaissance aircraft first appeared over the Marneuli airfield, taking photographs.
At 15.00, two bombs were dropped on the Vaziani military base 25 kilometers from Tbilisi, where the reservists' gathering point was located and the American instructors of the Georgian army were stationed. One of the bombs hit the cafeteria building. Nothing was reported about the losses.
16.30 - the first bombing of the Marneuli airbase. Several buildings were destroyed, the runway was damaged, and two Georgian military aircraft of an unnamed type were destroyed. The casualties were reported briefly: "There are casualties."
17.00 - the second airstrike on "Marneuli", which again "caused victims."
17:35 - Marneuli airbase was bombed for the third time. The Georgians admitted the destruction of three more military aircraft and several vehicles, among the airfield personnel one person was killed and four were wounded.
Satellite image of Google Earth: Scamredia airfield
It is likely that as a result of this series of attacks, the airbase was permanently out of order, and most of the Georgian attack aircraft were either destroyed or seriously damaged. In any case, in the further course of the conflict, only one appearance of "Mimino" over Tskhinvali is reliably known. To all appearances, the Georgians did not use Albatrosses at all due to their low combat effectiveness and high vulnerability to modern air defense systems.
Satellite image of Google Earth: Consequences of the air strike on the Vaziani airfield. Non-corrected free-fall bombs were used.
An analysis of the combat use of Russian aviation in the first days of hostilities showed that planning for the support of combat operations by operational aviation and air defense groups in the South Ossetian and Abkhaz directions was carried out without taking into account the capabilities of Georgia's air defense systems and the peculiarities of using their electronic electronic warfare systems to suppress them. Gross mistakes were made in the formulation of combat missions, which could lead to losses of the covered aircraft, which could only be avoided by the competent actions of the commander of the combined EW squadron.
The actions of the Russian aviation were characterized by the following miscalculations:
- the possible location of active air defense systems of Georgia and their zones of detection and destruction was not taken into account;
- the terrain was not used;
- repeated approaches to targets were performed repeatedly (and from the same directions);
- the position of the sun and objects illuminated by it was not taken into account;
- anti-aircraft and anti-missile maneuvers were not performed;
- the flight to the targets and back on August 8 and 9 was carried out along the same route;
- the lack of reconnaissance aircraft capable of conducting detailed electronic reconnaissance in real time with high accuracy in determining the coordinates of the radar;
- discrepancy between the frequency ranges of the CGS of the "air-radar" missiles and the radar of the Soviet-made air defense air defense system, the absence of control and target designation equipment;
- insufficient number of jammers, short time spent in the jamming zone;
- insufficient height of the maximum flight ceiling of helicopters - jammers, as a result of which it was impossible to use them in the mountainous terrain of South Ossetia;
- lack of means of electronic warfare for group protection from battle formations.
The actions of the Georgian aviation were rather passive. At the end of the first day of the war, the Georgians announced that their aviation had already bombed a Russian tank convoy that had left the Roki tunnel at 8 a.m., destroying dozens of armored vehicles, and then destroyed the Guftinsky bridge, making it impossible for the Russian troops to advance from Dzau to Tskhinvali. However, both of these reports turned out to be false. And the column was not damaged, and the bridge remained intact.
The passivity of the Georgian "falcons" at the time when they still had the ability to influence the outcome of the conflict is difficult to explain.
Perhaps the Georgian command objectively assessed the level of training of its pilots in order to give them the order to attack small targets in narrow mountain gorges. Or maybe the Georgians were afraid of Russian air defense systems and
interceptor fighters. Or they simply underestimated the threat posed by the Roki tunnel.
SUCCESSES OF GEORGIAN AIR DEFENSE
Unlike the Georgian Air Force, whose actions can in no way be called effective, Georgian anti-aircraft gunners managed to achieve significant success in the first period of the war. Particularly distinguished was the "Buk" division operating in the Gori region. Already in the morning he managed to shoot down a Russian reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR, which was piloted by the crew of the 929th GLITs from Akhtubinsk, consisting of the pilot Colonel Igor Zinov and the navigator Colonel Igor Rzhavitin. The plane crashed on Georgian territory 17 kilometers from Gori. The pilots managed to eject, but Igor Rzhavitin died. Colonel Zinov, having received head and spine injuries during the ejection, could not move. Georgian soldiers found him and took him to a Tbilisi hospital.
It is still not clear why a crew consisting of two colonels from the flight test center was sent for reconnaissance, especially since the command of the 4th Air Army has the 11th Guards Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment, equipped with the same Su-24MR and staffed with experienced pilots. … Be that as it may, this loss became one of the most painful for our Air Force during the conflict.
But an even heavier blow awaited them at night. Around midnight on August 8, a long-range Tu-22MZ bomber from the 52nd Guards TBAP was shot down over Georgia. Soviet-Russian aviation did not lose bombers of this class in a combat situation since the end of World War II.
The wreckage of the plane, hit by a direct hit from an anti-aircraft missile, fell near the village of Kareli near the Ossetian-Georgian border, in the territory controlled at that time by Georgian troops. Of the four crew members, only one survived - the co-pilot Major Vyacheslav Malkov, who was captured. The commander of the crew, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Koventsov, as well as Majors Viktor Pryadkin and Igor Nesterov were killed.
The most reliable information seems to be that the downed Tu-22M3, specially equipped for aerial photography, closed the group of 9 bombers. The task of the group was to defeat Georgian targets.
The reconnaissance Tu-22M3 also had a bomb load. He had to evaluate the results of the bombing and, if necessary, deliver additional strikes. Anti-air defense of the enemy in this area was not expected.
Most likely, Russian bombers came under fire from the Ukrainian Buk-M1 complex. Attack Tu-22M3, using standard electronic warfare and anti-missile maneuver, were able to evade missile damage, and the reconnaissance officer was shot down.
In total, during the hostilities, the Russian Air Force lost three Su-25s, two Su-24s and one Tu-22M3. It was also established that after the end of the conflict in South Ossetia there was a plane crash - two helicopters Mi-8MTKO and Mi-24 crashed. Perhaps some of the attack aircraft were hit by "friendly fire".
Despite the losses, the Russian aviation was able to fulfill all the assigned tasks, but at the same time, an analysis of the actions of the Air Force during this war forces us to think seriously and draw some and impartial conclusions. And the main one is that the Air Force is not fully ready to conduct hostilities in the face of modern air defense counteraction. In addition, given the weak jamming immunity of their analogous air defense systems (first of all, the RTV radars and the military air defense radio stations are not ready to repel modern air attack weapons.) When opposing the enemy's modern air defense systems, combat losses will be significantly higher.
