1. "Who is to blame for this?" "What to do?", That is, if there is a way to catch up and overtake the vigilant foe?
"The enterprises of the military-industrial complex are to blame!" - there will be an overwhelming answer, which is only partially true. In fact, the work of most defense enterprises is structured as follows.
Despite the reforms carried out in the environment of state defense enterprises, their essence was mostly reflected only in the change of names (for example, JSC instead of FSUE) and the change in the type of management (subordination). Enterprises still do not have a single drop of independence - what to develop or produce is decided by the state, issuing assignments for conducting R&D. It is generally forbidden to trade weapons within the country with private firms or individuals (with the exception of hunting weapons and consumer goods) in the Russian Federation, and it is possible to export their products to a foreign customer only through a single intermediary - ROSOBORONEXPORT, the only enterprise in the Russian Federation, which has the right to international arms trade (not counting aviation). The intermediary is rather mediocre, moreover, that he takes for his "services" not just a percentage, but a real part of the contract value. Often, ROSOBORONEXPORT sells to customers what is no longer produced, and enterprises are obliged to get out of their skin, but fulfill the requirements of the intermediary. It is his word that is law, although he is only a sales representative.
Having a state license for the right to develop and manufacture a certain type of military product, an enterprise, whose brilliant minds come to the bright minds of its staff about promising samples of another type of product, simply cannot implement them, since it does not have the right (legal basis) to do so.
It is possible to implement such ideas by transferring intellectual property to a licensed enterprise. But this path is disadvantageous to neither one nor the other: the former may lose authorship, will not be able to control the quality, make changes or prevent changes in the design documentation, lose the corresponding part of the due payments and profits; the latter get a slap in the face, because their fiefdom is invaded by "amateurs" who intend to block their own ideas. And this is if you do not remember about the financial side of the project.
There is a great variety of regulatory documents governing the development and launching of products (GOST, OST, MI, and so on). In accordance with these documents, designers will have to carry out the most difficult and voluminous waste work, from which foreign manufacturers are exempted. A cloud of papers rolls around the country in pursuit of a ton of signatures, and this time, this is money, it is not a fact that everything (signers) will suit everyone. A simple example - a foreign model of an armored vehicle has an operation manual, like a cell phone: about the same in volume and similar in content; domestic: has several volumes of detailed descriptions with a pseudo-scientific text. Thus, the state only complicates the work of the domestic defense industry.
But now, imagine that somehow a brilliant idea received approval from the “top” or “top” he simply foresaw it, and “our” enterprise received a task for R&D (R&D). Certain funds are allocated for OCD. It is unlikely that all the funds will be spent on targeted spending, because the company still has many other projects for which money was either not allocated at all, or allocated in insufficient quantities, or was simply overspent (the funds were spent, they did not meet the allocated funds, and the result was for the customer it is necessary to present). God forbid, if the management of the enterprise will go towards the "geniuses", and will not try to revive the "dying" project.
But all the money went to implement the idea. The innovators are immediately guided by all the most advanced and modern and … They are at a dead end! For there is also such a blocking abomination as the "List of spare parts and products supplied to the RF Armed Forces" for innovative designers. Such a list (the exact name does not matter in principle) contains all consumables, spare parts and the like that were mass-produced and used in military products already in service. Accordingly, everything that does not fall into this list must either be excluded by the designers in favor of the recorded analogs, or go through the exhausting rudimentary procedure of approval and inclusion in this list. Well, the innovative designer will not be able to change the old wretched unreliable interior lighting lamps with incandescent lamps for ultra-modern LED lamps with motion sensors without losing months of time and millions of nerve cells for adding these lamps to the list and organizing their military acceptance (about which a little below). Again, foreigners have complete indulgence in this matter.
If in the West a manufacturer presents a finished product for testing to the military, who at the end of the tests decide on the suitability and compliance of the presented products, then the domestic system is far from such simplicity, "transparency" and perfection. We have a military acceptance that cynically "takes out the brain" of designers at all stages of development …
Yes, there are many conscientious military representatives, and without them it is sometimes impossible to conduct tests of an experimental product, but the question is that, purely as a structure, domestic military acceptance is organized, let's say, incorrectly.
Namely - all decisions, protocols, design documentation must be consistent with acceptance. We have included a part that is not on the "list" in the product, we have a completely stopped development process. The military representatives do not undertake the acceptance of purchased parts - they must already come to them with a military acceptance organized at the part manufacturer. In general, a positive conclusion of the military representative about a product means that this product meets all the requirements, including in terms of the design and completeness of design and operational documentation, presented by the military department for products of this class. What does this lead to? Instead of high-quality (even domestic) devices for completing on-board equipment, only those that have passed military acceptance are used, albeit inferior in all respects. In addition, the most important effect of such actions deserves a separate paragraph. Namely - the influence of military acceptance on the final cost of the product.
Let "our" enterprise have tested and already prepared for production the "brilliant" armored vehicle unit. The instrumental composition of the product includes 20 devices for various purposes (communication means, observation of the terrain, computers, and so on). Each device has passed military approval. After assembling the product, the process of "handover-acceptance" to the customer (the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation represented by the military representatives) goes through. Any acceptance is not free, and as a result, the product rises in price by the amount of the military representatives' fee. That is, the state pays itself for what it buys (has already bought). In other words, he buys an already purchased product from himself. With a cost price of 10 million rubles. for 1 unit this sample of armored vehicles military representatives are able to "wind up" at least 1 million rubles more. to the final cost.
But this is just the tip of the iceberg. After all, the purchased devices also passed acceptance, and, therefore, they also increased in price at their manufacturing enterprise. But the acceptance of armored vehicles increases the cost of not just a new body of armored vehicles produced by "our" enterprise, but with all the devices. That is, the state buys from itself twice. And this is not the limit.
Imported products do not pass the military acceptance procedure, they only undergo incoming control and tests, the same ones that “our” sample has already passed before it was put into production. Who does not believe - an example from my own experience. The cost of the APU (auxiliary power plant, power plant) is 400 thousand rubles. After acceptance - 700 thousand rubles. After its installation on the armored vehicle, the complete assembly of the armored vehicle, the armored vehicle passes acceptance and its cost increases, that is, the cost of the APU is already about 750 thousand rubles. What the state gets for these extra 350 thousand rubles, I hope everyone understands. But you could take it for 750 thousand rubles. Such an APU … To simplify with an example, when you buy a cell phone and check its functionality, compliance with the package contents (approved by the manufacturer) of the package contents, then neither you from the store nor the store take money from you for this work (acceptance). In the defense industry, the situation is the opposite.
How is this "event" called in the language of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation? That's right - money laundering. If the military mission would only be engaged in escorting and conducting tests, there would be no disputes and questions - there would be only gratitude and admiration, and so - a mess!
Completely private companies in the Russian Federation can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Their situation is even more complicated - the state does not like competitors and it is incredibly difficult to obtain licenses for the right to develop and manufacture "popular" types of products. Therefore, they have to disguise their products as consumer goods (for example: not a “machete knife for survival”, but a “household knife”) or find a partner enterprise abroad and transfer production there.
Output: for the idea to be born in Russian metal in the native land, its designers will have to carry a difficult cross, and this path will be thorny and treacherous.
Domestic models of armored vehicles were intended for full-scale combat operations. When the need arose to act against partisan ambushes, the military did not issue a task to the designers to develop special equipment. The command considered it acceptable to use standard armored vehicles. Well, our designers (especially in Soviet times) cannot proactively develop new models (completely new, not modifications). Who will give them money? Production area? The enterprises are state-owned. The fact that they are OJSC (and the like) are the same balls, only in profile. After all, private capital implies investment in profitable production. Manufacturing for the needs of the RF Ministry of Defense is associated with insane risks and costs, which, most likely, will not pay off. Now I think it is clear why the lineup of our defense plants is not updated with the same frequency as, say, the Mitsubishi Lancer.
War chariots and tours were very good for their time, but demanding resistance to RPG shots from them is simply shameless. In other words, complaining about BMPs and armored personnel carriers, created according to the requirements presented in the 60s and 70s of the last century, that they cannot withstand being hit by RPGs and large-caliber bullets, is like making a claim to an elephant that it does not fly, asking an astronomer the sequence of removal of a vertebral hernia. The designers coped with the task assigned to them. They made a technological sample of armored vehicles for specific (presented by the military) purposes.
What can be done here? As in all times - to educate everyone, give way and transfer experience to the young and talented, and not blame their "leakage" abroad. It is very difficult for a person with ideas and a desire to create a new tank to live with the prospect of their implementation after several years of “successful” participation in the project to create an “iron cap”. Many simply resign themselves to the inevitable self-realization, many "flow away", and still others go to other spheres of activity.
2. Time passes, nothing remains the same … So why do we scold the technology of the late 60s of the last century? The new generation of warriors needs new weapons. Why not criticize arrows, reeds, broadswords for weak armor penetration? That's right - this is a weapon of another era. The Cold War is also a whole era. Modern realities make modern demands.
And what are the modern requirements for armored vehicles? Correct if I'm wrong:
1) High security (within the class and type).
2) High mobility, maneuverability.
3) Sufficient firepower to carry out the assigned tasks.
4) Transportability and mobility (modern brigade structure of rapid deployment).
5) Computerization and application of modern optoelectronic, computing and television and radio equipment.
And how do these requirements differ from the “outdated” ones? Nothing. The BTVT has always tried to use advanced devices and equipment. Just the adding machine at one time was the limit of perfection, like atmospheric engines … The aircraft fleet has not changed at all and will remain so for the next at least 20 years. That is, nothing new is presented to armored vehicles, but only the obligation to keep up with progress in the element base and in the corresponding information technology equipment.
But the trouble is, some specific requirements, not described in the five points above, tend to prevail over each other as modern requirements. These are included: in point 1 - increased security, in point 4 - requirements for limiting the mass and dimensions of the tank, designed for a typical railway cargo platform.
Of course, many will argue, but what about mine protection? What about the resistance to RPGs from all sides and the roof? The answer is simple - it is the special requirements of local conflicts for specialized equipment.
How does a local conflict stand out so much? Firstly, by the limited space, as a rule, covering one or two theaters of military operations. Again, one of them is urban fighting. The second is more often mountainous or desert terrain. Secondly, the limited military contingent in the conflict zone. Thirdly, the information and material superiority of one side over the other, as a result of which direct clashes of the same type of equipment do not occur. It is destroyed by the more developed side by means inaccessible to the enemy (aviation, missile strikes). The lagging side is left behind only one tactic - guerrilla warfare, which is characterized by sabotage activities and the organization of various prepared ambushes.
The first example is two US wars of different nature against Iraq. In the Desert Storm, American mechanized units suffered losses from engineering obstacles (minefields), aircraft and armored vehicles of the enemy. In the second campaign, losses were inflicted only as a result of ambushes. Again, it is not correct to consider a controlled land mine a minefield. This is a pure ambush when a visually observed object of interest is affected.
Example two. During the Five-Day War, not a single unit of armored vehicles was lost from a mine explosion. With a swift oncoming battle, the minefields simply did not have time to put.
And now the technical issues. The average mass of explosives in an anti-tank mine is 7 kg. Until the middle of the last century, they were filled with TNT. Now it is at least TG-50, PVV or A-IX-I. There is a requirement to increase mine protection to the level of withstanding a detonation on a mine with a capacity of 7 kg in TNT equivalent (TE) became obsolete even before its appearance.
Yes, the rebels more often make IEDs from TNT sticks, and the average mass of explosives of such IEDs was 6-8 kg in fuel cells (according to US statistics in Iraq). And what to do in the event of a war with an industrialized enemy producing modern mines with special armor-piercing warheads equipped with high-powered explosives? And what will prevent the rebels from adding an extra pair of TNT to the IED? And what will limit the partisans in the production of home-made explosives and equipping them with IEDs, also in larger quantities? Those who like to rely on the dimensions - the dimensions of a standard TNT 200 gram stick are approximately equal to a pack of cigarettes. Let the homemade explosive be less powerful, let its volume in the equivalent of the power of the previously described checker be greater. This larger volume will result in two or three extra shovel movements? Redo already converted samples of armored vehicles? Thus, to speak of the requirement for mine protection as a modern requirement for armored vehicles, to put it mildly, is incorrect.
The technique, which must withstand a mine explosion, is primarily intended for occupation, and not for military operations. Most of the armor protection of the vehicle is used to protect against the explosion of mines in the bottom, and not to arm the rest of the hull from at least small-caliber shells.
It is practically impossible to fulfill the requirement of protection against mines with the maximum distance of the bottom from the surface (increase in clearance) in the case of tracked vehicles (openness of tracked tracks, tension and drive sprockets to enemy fire from small arms and artillery weapons, significant lengthening of tracks, causing an increase in their mass and, accordingly, the load on the chassis).
The protection of the bottom from the action of mines of tracked vehicles will be associated with the necessary strengthening of the armor protection of the bottom, which, accordingly, will lead to a significant increase in the mass of the vehicle, in comparison with wheeled vehicles of the same class and type.
Undermining a tracked vehicle on a mine in the overwhelming majority of cases is associated with a loss of mobility. Therefore, it is necessary to pay special attention to the protection of the crew from the subsequent roundabout fire from small arms, including large-caliber weapons, after the vehicle was blown up by a mine. This will add additional weight to the machine.
In urban conditions, it is easier to deprive a tracked armored vehicle of mobility by damaging the tracks, due to the short distance of the fire collision. Also, no protection can save an armored vehicle from a Molotov cocktail, the compounds of which can burn through armor. And the use of incendiary mixtures is most important in urban conditions.
Let us put the following. A typical RPG plant produces 60,000 RPGs per year. The Armored Plant produces 200 armored personnel carriers per year. The question is: will the armored personnel carrier be able to withstand the hits of at least a tenth of its 300 RPGs, or is it easier to destroy the RPG plant, cut off the supply channels of weapons to the militants, than to increase its armor?
Output: Local wars requirements are requirements for a special type of armored vehicles. Supplementing the requirements for all models of armored vehicles with the requirements developed on the basis of the experience of local combat operations is possible, but impractical in full. The problem of mine protection can be easily solved with the help of KMT.
3. In general, the best way to protect armored personnel carriers from RPG hits and explosions of landmines is not to come under RPG fire and not run into non-neutralized landmines. This does not mean that the equipment should be buried deep underground under the concrete floor of the bomb shelter. On the contrary, the armored personnel carrier must be able to find threats in advance, at a safe distance, and destroy them or avoid their action. That is, the equipment of the SAZ armored vehicles (which are "Soft-kill") is a modern requirement that is relevant for newly developed armored vehicles and for the modernization of those in service.
A roadblock in a city from an APC lined with concrete blocks and sandbags, of course, can be easily destroyed with an RPG from the roof or window of the nearest house. The same armored personnel carrier without any fortification standing in the middle of a large field (or in a desert with flat relief) will become an insurmountable obstacle for the infantry, even if all the fighters are hung with various RPGs. The parity of the effective firing range of its KPVT over the RPG is hundreds of meters, moreover, it can relatively quickly change its position if necessary, in contrast to the infantry. Suddenly appearing armored vehicles can be hit with your own anti-tank weapons or artillery support.
It is impossible to avoid an ambush. It is impossible to avoid losses by falling into a professionally and competently prepared ambush. Reducing the percentage of losses to a minimum at the moment is achievable in practice (and has already been confirmed) with standard armament on the armored vehicles currently in service by rational control of the unit by commanders based on the experience of combat operations.
No hanging armor will give such an effect as one sensible commander, who will save the unit from the “do not care” and “relax”, which begins at a desk in training sessions. Example. One of my colleagues thought for a long time about the situation I described: “How can you accidentally shoot at your own guys from a machine gun. How does one have to be down? " The answer was found when, right in the sanitary "loaf", he himself became the same down. Thank God, it was a training exercise, and a machine gun shot me from half a meter in the leg with a blank cartridge, although in class they said that the finger should be removed from the trigger, especially if it was removed from the safety catch.
In addition, when a tank rushes at you or next to you, from which you cannot hide behind the walls and not get lost on two floors of the house, no matter what you have in your hands: RPG, DShK, ATGM, heroism quickly evolves into outstanding earth-moving qualities. The tank does not frighten - the tank presses. And if he has a thermal imager or RNDC radar … Then you have 2200 meters to live, referred to the projectile flight time (5000 if the tank has a KUV).
Output: there are no effective means and methods for protecting convoys from ambush attacks that guarantee a close to 100 percent probability of avoiding losses among the personnel moving in the convoy. The emergence of a new technical means or method of advancing the columns will cause a similar response from guerrillas and terrorists. Non-contact methods of dealing with typical threats to armored vehicles are promising ways to increase their security.
4. Options for improving the protection and increasing the survivability of armored vehicles (based on materials from various publications and authors)
1) Additional hinged armor
The use of additional mounted tank armor can have a significant undesirable effect on the overall characteristics of the tank. The maximum travel speed and mobility are reduced, the power density decreases and the load on the suspension increases.
Special attachment kits appear to increase survivability in urban environments, although initially the tank was not intended for conducting battles in populated areas (especially with dense buildings of high storeys), since its weapons cannot perform typical combat missions, being in close contact with the infantry. It is irrational to compensate for the disadvantage in the form of improper use with additional armor plates.
2) Modular design
It is especially worth noting that this property of armored vehicles is offered by the designers-developers as an advanced, profitable, mandatory for modern technology. But, not a single country, even one that has adopted and purchased equipment with a modular design, does not use or even think about using this advantage. No module was purchased separately! For example, the Bundeswehr of Germany (and the Dutch Armed Forces) purchasing Boxer purchased variants of KShM, APC and ambulance vehicle, although logically they should have purchased all Boxers in the APC version and buy the required number of required modules (KShM and medical).
Thus, this property allows only changing the modules of the fighting compartments (cargo, ambulance, command), removing them from vehicles with damaged control compartments and installing them on vehicles with damaged modules of fighting compartments. Which actually makes this property useless. The acquisition of equipment, for the development of a modular design of which funds were spent, is unprofitable. It's like buying a car for operation in the Far North with a powerful two-zone air conditioning, and in hot climates with a pre-heater, heated windows and mirrors, heated seats.
There were no special problems in the conversion of the BTR-80 into the KShM. And the design, which implies the installation of modules, naturally leads to a heavier structure (universal frame of the base chassis; additional fastening nodes to impart rigidity, since the body is no longer supporting, and the common frame is absent; stiffeners of the module body; module floor and attachment points). Do not forget also that part of the vehicle equipment (spare parts and other accessories) are attached to the sides and stern of the armored vehicle, additionally serving as protection elements. All this "good" must now be placed on the base chassis, if there is no desire to constantly outweigh it from module to module or to purchase in quantities equal to the number of modules.
There is an option for modular protection, that is, hanging thicker plates in place of thin ones, selected in accordance with the task. As well as screens, mine trawls, modules of reactive armor units and so on. As the manufacturers assure, "gizmos" - it takes less than half a day to install the entire set on a tank. Very handy! And how will it look in the same mountainous desert area? - Yes, the same as with the modules of the fighting compartments.
Any tank commander who loves life with a sufficiently developed instinct for self-preservation will, by default, hang armor all the way until "the bottom of the road will not cling to the road." Or, for example, like this. An order for fire support for the offensive of motorized riflemen and the suppression of the firing points they identified in the village in the valley from a dominant height from a decent distance. Powerful defense blocks are superfluous for this task, but armor is not needed here at all - you can at least use an ordinary "naked" mortar, and all modules will remain in storage. After 10 minutes, an order is received to develop successful offensive actions of the infantry and knock the enemy out of the settlement. When will motorized riflemen get help? When will the armor modules be delivered, or will the motorized riflemen be exchanged for several burned-out tanks with tankers? The author supports the position of a cheerful commander - armor protection should initially ensure the fulfillment of any assigned combat missions related to the type of armored vehicles.
3) Increasing the thickness of armor protection Rational angles of inclination
From the 1970s to the present, requirements for protection against fire of a 14.5-mm machine gun have been introduced in the TTZ for armored combat vehicles of the types BMP, BTR, BRDM and a light tank being created in NATO countries. Moreover, for BMP - to protect the side projection of the vehicle from a distance of 100-200 m (STANAG 4569 Level 4). Accordingly, the thickness of the sides of combat vehicles in a monolithic version of steel armor is 35-45 mm (the last figure is the lower side of the BMP "Marder 1"). This was one of the reasons for the almost two-fold excess of the combat weight of the main NATO BMPs "Marder A3" (forehead - 30 mm steel) and M2A3 "Bradley" (forehead - 6.5 mm steel + 6.5 mm steel + 25 mm aluminum alloy) relative to Soviet BMP.
Such armor protection will no longer cope with 30-mm cannons. I immediately remember: "If there is no difference, why pay more?"That BMP-1, that M2A3 "Bradley" after shelling from thirty will turn into a colander. Akhzarit looks like a winner. But due to the lack of its own weapons, it will still be a target with infantry locked inside it. And against the fire of tank guns, even the protection of "Akhzarit" will be powerless.
Output: it is advisable to increase the armor of an infantry fighting vehicle or armored personnel carrier up to a certain limit - to the level of protection against typical means of fighting against light armored vehicles and weapons of enemy light armored vehicles, that is, from shells of 30-mm automatic SS cannons of long and medium distances.
4) Layout
Design options for armored vehicles, when the MTO is located in the front of the hull, the vehicles are now considered as the most advanced and promising. But how does such a solution improve security? The answer is only in frontal projection from artillery ammunition and missiles. Such a solution does not save from mines. As already noted, you can press the button to detonate the radio fuse at any time, for example, directly under the fighting compartment or the control compartment. The situation is similar with magnetic and pin fuses of anti-bottom mines, in which there is a moderator.
There are opponents of such a layout, claiming that a machine made according to such a scheme loses mobility when hit in the forehead. The bias of such judgments is visible. When a vehicle is hit in the forehead with a front control compartment, mobility is also lost - either the bow fuel tanks light up, or the driver is affected. Since the problem is in the protection of the crew and the landing force, the answer to the question of which layout is better is obvious - with the front MTO location.
5) Remote controlled auxiliary weapon module
The fact that a machine gun paired with a cannon is a large zone of low armor is no longer a secret. Therefore, the desire to remove it away is only worthy of encouragement. He can fight only with the manpower of the enemy. Of course, there is only one rational place for installing such a module - on the roof of the tower (hull), but you have to choose between the caliber of a coaxial machine gun or the caliber of the turret (anti-aircraft) machine gun of the tank commander, since even one module for one machine gun will take up space for two.
However, the module reduces the tank's capabilities in the fight against manpower, since the coaxial and anti-aircraft machine guns could act in different directions. But we have already talked about the tasks of tanks. Infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers work to "kill" manpower behind the tank and along the flanks, and infantry in the settlement. Also, nothing prevents the installation of a "full-size" combat remote-controlled module with a variety of missile and cannon weapons, which are already being installed on light armored vehicles.
6) "One of the options for further improvement of a simple armored personnel carrier is to leave this basic vehicle virtually unchanged, but supplement and support it with a second support vehicle on the same chassis on which powerful turret armament is installed."
The advantage of this order would be that each type of machine would perform only one task, in which it would specialize, so that the combat control of this pair would be easier than the control of a powerful multipurpose strike complex. These machines could be used together, if required, or be separated and would perform their different tasks in different parts of the battlefield."
Once again we remember what an infantry fighting vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, a tank is. There is no need to produce armored personnel carriers with tank armament and tanks without armament for the landing. Everything is already invented. The main thing is to properly dispose of them.
5. Some experts believe that tanks have lost their meaning. Being only an offensive weapon of close (contact) combat, moreover, it is not always effective enough (sensitive losses in individual local conflicts), tanks have no prospects on the future battlefield.
The arsenal of anti-tank weapons, which have become very effective and turned into a mass weapon, is constantly expanding and improving. Overcoming the enemy's defenses, saturated with such weapons, will turn into an intractable problem for tanks. Tanks will suffer unacceptably high losses, and their use will become impractical. True, it does not indicate how to replace the tanks if necessary to conduct active hostilities. Since the existing parity in the range of tank armament over anti-tank armament is not stipulated. It is all the more unclear how to do without tanks if the enemy has not abandoned them. It is one thing to mine explosives and bombardment of columns from RPGs from ambushes, and quite another to repulse a frontal attack.
“Main tanks are quite versatile weapons, but in difficult conditions on the modern battlefield, their capabilities are not limitless. Having a small crew, functionally tied to the vehicle, tanks are of little use for completing missions at the end of a battle: destroying the remnants of the enemy's forces and capturing his territory. Possessing powerful, but essentially single-channel armament, tanks are not efficient enough to deal with the "tank-hazardous" manpower. " But it is for these purposes that light armored vehicles supporting tanks are intended: armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles.
"The ammunition load of tanks is relatively small, so they are of little use for performing tasks inherent in artillery - hitting area targets, including areas saturated with poorly observed" tank-hazardous "manpower." Again, special equipment has already been created for these tasks. Why would a tank perform the tasks of towed or self-propelled artillery at all? Do you need multi-layered combined armor, a low silhouette and high mobility for firing from closed positions at a distance of more than 5 kilometers?
"In promising concepts (on the topic of" Armata ") it is proposed to abandon the systems of mechanical duplication by guidance and firing altogether and to withdraw the tank's armament into a separate reserved module." Even if this module is booked at the same high level as the manned control compartment for the crew, it will be the most vulnerable to enemy fire.
"The weapons module will also house the means of target reconnaissance and observation of the battlefield." Then what is the use of maximum protection for the crew if the gun module is suddenly hit? The crew becomes blind, disarmed, the tank becomes unusable and loses its orientation in space. Each of these properties of armored vehicles (firepower and the ability to detect a target) greatly affects the further survivability of the tank on the battlefield. The crew can either wait for the shooting in an armored capsule, or leave the car. If on the battlefield the enemy, with the help of his firepower, created conditions for the defeat of a relatively weakly protected, but still highly armored tank gun module, then the crew's prospect of leaving the car and reaching a shelter or another tank in a combat-ready state or simply alive seems unlikely. In other words, the crew of such a damaged tank will still be amazed. Depriving the enemy of tankers is much more profitable than a tank that can be repaired or rebuilt. The production cycle of a "new" tanker is much longer. Who is right in the assumptions, as always practice will show in the near future.
For all that, we must not forget that armored vehicles, and primarily tanks, are the most protected component of the ground forces when using nuclear weapons, which has not yet been abandoned by any nuclear power. On the contrary, the number of members of the "nuclear club" has increased and, most likely, will continue to grow. The positions of tanks in terms of protection against weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological) are even more solid.
The arsenal of anti-tank weapons is growing. But it can be used not only against tanks, but against fortifications, buildings and structures, vehicles, manpower, and so on. Designed to combat tanks, these weapons will inflict guaranteed losses on anything that is even slightly weaker protected. The evolution of means of protection, although slower than means of destruction, is developing. At the same time, the development of some areas of means of destruction has practically stopped (the increase in the power of blasting and the effectiveness of propelling explosives).
Naturally, it is impossible to create an absolutely invulnerable tank, as well as an absolute destructive weapon. Tanks will suffer losses that may be higher than in past wars. However, this is a consequence of the changed nature of the struggle on the modern battlefield. Tanks will remain the most protected weapon, the losses of other means of struggle will be much higher.
It is also believed that the threat of the outbreak of hostilities with the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely and the design of armored vehicles with the expectation of combat operations in the context of the massive use of nuclear weapons is not advisable. However, the tense geopolitical situation in the world casts doubt on this thesis. North Korea and Iran have been on the brink for a long time. Pakistan and India have never settled their conflicts. In addition, Pakistan is also not popular in the West, thanks to the assistance of terrorists. China is no longer afraid to threaten Japan and the United States. In other words, we have five nuclear powers, on which Europe and the United States are actively trying to impose their opinions (even two are not confirmed, but they do not have to detonate bombs - it is enough to simply infect the area with uranium). Will these countries not use "nuclei" in an effort to protect themselves from the many times superior coalition forces of NATO?
Until the United States, its henchmen and the like voluntarily become part of the Russian Federation with the best wishes, handing over to us all their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a sign of goodwill and pure intentions, the Russian Armed Forces must have weapons capable of performing any combat missions, to fight in any conditions, including the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy, including nuclear weapons.
Losses were, are and will be. The only way to protect the crews and troops of armored vehicles from the fire of any anti-tank weapons, including tank guns, is to drive them under the armor of the shelter from a nuclear explosion. But you can't stop the enemy, you can't win. The best defense is attack. You cannot win at cards or chess without exchanging cards or pieces. The winner will be the one who will inflict more losses, and not the one who will try to avoid them; who will create more means of inflicting losses, rather than means of protection. There is not a single impregnable fortress. All the fortresses that had once been stormed in wars fell. At the same time, no one built their own fortress around this fortress. Why was the T-72 born when there were already T-64s and even T-80s? To have more means of struggle, cheaper and more popular, albeit inferior in characteristics.
The pilot of passenger airliners understands that in the event of an accident he will fall with the plane “on the very ground”. But this does not prevent crews who are well trained and do not give up in emergency situations with honor to cope with the danger. This is true not only for pilots and divers. If you hope in advance that your tank is much worse than the counterparts of your opponents, then you are not a tanker, but a substance with the letter "G" that does not sink.
The fact that domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and BMDs are escorting convoys and storming cities, while transporting infantry stuck to the roof and weakly protecting the crews is not their fault. There is simply no other technique. It is certainly possible and even worth praising the Hamer, but even the Israelis themselves, whose budget is fed by Germany, are going to create something more budgetary. Compare the size of the RF Armed Forces and the Tsakhal. We can also create heavy armored personnel carriers, but then the rest of the majority of the army will have to move behind the tanks on foot. And how great it would be to convert 50,000 T-55 and 30,000 T-72 into analogs of "Akhzarit" … And ram the whole of Europe!
Well, in modern accessible language, of course, it is incredibly cool to have in service thousands of floating amphibious tank-brahm-imro-armored self-propelled guns, about the same as having in your garage a Ferrari with UAZ cross-country ability, the trunk of a minivan with a cost of not more "Lada" and so that the parking space occupied no more than "Oka". Thus, while agreeing that this is absurd, it is worth facing the truth and drawing an appropriate conclusion.
Domestic BMP, BMD, armored personnel carriers meet the requirements for them. Modern requirements for them do not differ in any way from the requirements of past years. "Modern requirements", so actively imposed on them by the public, are requirements for a new special anti-ambush vehicle capable of overcoming minefields by detonation and independently fighting armored vehicles, manpower and enemy aircraft.
P. S. Once, I learned from a television announcement about the imminent airing of a television program, including a video clip about my "work". When I watched the report, I just didn't know what to do - laugh or cry. Guys! Do not watch propaganda materials such as "Military Secret". In such programs of common sense, at best, ten percent, and then if you know what exactly you need to listen to.
Used sources
Many books are chipboard, but thanks to the "independent" Ukraine, there is a chance to pamper yourself even with a living paper copy, which our neighbors have kindly declassified.
1) Tactics. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1987;
2) V. Belogrud. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1, 2;
3) Yu. Spasibukhov. M1 "Abrams" (to know what these tons of iron death are and no longer make decent people laugh, hinting or speaking openly about their superiority);
4) Journal "Technics and weapons", articles:
- Major General Brilev O. N.;
- S. Suvorov;
- V. Chobitok. Fundamentals of theory and history of the development of the layout of the tank (MANDATORY).
5) Losik O. A. Article: "Do tanks have a future?"
6) Russian melee weapon.
7) Engineering ammunition. T. 1
8) B. V. Pribilov. Hand grenades. Directory.
9) The textbook of the sergeant of the engineering troops (the earlier, the better).
10) BMP-1. TO and RE (various years of release).
11) BMP-3. TO, RE, album of drawings and drawings.
12) T-72B. RE.
13) T-90. TO, RE, album of drawings and drawings.
14) Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 1-8.
15) Experience of military operations in mountainous desert areas. Part 1 - M.: Military Publishing. 1981 year
16) "Features of the conduct of military operations by Soviet troops in mountainous desert areas" (based on the experience of the combat use of airborne troops in the Republic of Afghanistan).
17) Report of the former chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General V. Potapov. Actions of formations, units and subunits of the ground forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed groups in 1994-96. on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
