Very often, when trying to discuss hypothetical military scenarios, one has to face the argument that, they say, Russia has nuclear weapons, and therefore the war with it will be strictly nuclear, so no enemy will dare to attack.
The issue of the military use of nuclear weapons, however, is too serious to be judged on this level. Therefore, it is worth dwelling on this topic in more detail.
The document clarifying the circumstances in which the Russian Federation uses nuclear weapons is the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
In military doctrine, the section says the following:
27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence is threatened. state.
The decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
This phrase should be repeated until complete enlightenment to any citizen who believes that in response to a sunk ship or a downed plane, nuclear mushrooms will bloom over the aggressor. No use of nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation? Is the very existence of the state not called into question? This means that there will be no use of nuclear weapons on our part.
The only question that remains is: what is “the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”? The answer to this is given by banal logic - this is when aggression with the help of conventional weapons is either real or potentially fraught with consequences that will lead to the termination of the existence of the Russian Federation. Either to the loss of statehood, or to the physical destruction of the population.
Of course, this formulation can be interpreted very broadly. For example, a non-nuclear massive strike against the forces of nuclear deterrence is quite included in the list of factors that threaten the very existence of the Russian Federation. And a single one does not hit, but gives grounds for readiness number 1. At first glance, a hypothetical NATO landing in Crimea does not really threaten the existence of Russia, but if it is not nipped in the bud, then different neighbors will have so many temptations about the immense Russian territory that their totality will just be a sufficient threat for the use of nuclear weapons. This is exactly what Putin had in mind when, in the frames of the film about the return of Crimea, he mentioned his readiness to use this very nuclear weapon.
Again, no one will launch an ICBM en masse in response to an anti-ship missile that has flown into a small rocket ship. And if the under what conditions nuclear weapons will be used is specified in the Military Doctrine, then the possible ways of their introduction into the game are described in special publications.
In 1999, in the magazine "Military Thought", in issue 3 (5-6), an article was published "On the use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate hostilities" by Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel A. V. Nedelin and Colonel M. E. Sosnovsky.
The article, of course, reflected (at that time) the opinion of the authors, and this is how they saw the stages of "putting into play" nuclear weapons.
It is proposed to single out the following steps for increasing the scale of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons:
… "demonstration" - the delivery of single demonstrative nuclear strikes on desert territories (water areas), on secondary military targets of the enemy with limited military personnel or not at all served;
"Intimidation-demonstration" - the infliction of single nuclear strikes on transport hubs, engineering structures and other objects for the territorial localization of the area of military operations and (or) on individual elements of the opposing group of enemy troops (forces), leading to a disruption (decrease in the effectiveness) of control of the invasion group at the operational (operational-tactical) level and do not cause relatively high losses of enemy forces;
"Intimidation" - the delivery of group strikes against the main grouping of enemy troops (forces) in one operational direction in order to change the balance of forces in this direction and (or) eliminate the enemy's breakthrough into the operational depth of defense;
"Intimidation-retaliation" - the delivery of concentrated strikes within one or several adjacent operational areas against the enemy troop (forces) groupings in a theater of operations with an unfavorable development of a defensive operation. At the same time, the following tasks are being solved: elimination of the threat of defeat of the group of its troops; decisive change in the balance of forces in the operational direction (s); elimination of the enemy's breakthrough of the defensive line of the operational-strategic formation, etc.;
"Retaliation-intimidation" - the delivery of a massive strike against the group of the aggressor's armed forces in the theater of operations in order to defeat it and radically change the military situation in their favor;
"Retaliation" - the application of a massive strike (strikes) against the enemy within the entire theater of war (if necessary, with the defeat of individual military-economic targets of the aggressor) with the maximum use of the available forces and means, coordinated with the strikes of strategic nuclear forces, if they are used.
It is easy to see that the automatic "whole world in dust" is not even close. It is difficult to say how literally these views were “written” in doctrinal documents closed to the public, however, if we believe the reports of Western intelligence structures and the specialized military press, then this is how the transition from a conventional to a nuclear war will look like in the view of the Russian leadership.
At the same time, two facts are interesting. The first is that the Russian leadership is hiding the "nuclear threshold" - no one knows for sure at what stage Russia will still use nuclear weapons. It is assumed that this will be done in response to a serious military defeat.
The second fact is that in official documents issued by Western structures involved in the development of military strategies, the concept of nuclear de-escalation, attributed to Russia as officially adopted, is called erroneous, and unable to stop the advance of Western countries (and in fact the United States) against Russia, as soon as a decision on that is made. At the same time, the Americans believe that they should not be the first to resort to using nuclear weapons, since with their superiority in conventional weapons, it is more profitable to defeat the enemy without using nuclear weapons. However, one must understand that, according to American views, in response to nuclear de-escalation, it is necessary to resort to nuclear escalation, transfer the conflict to nuclear and then conduct it as nuclear. They will not stop.
All according to Herman Kahn and his "Thermonuclear War": "No one should doubt America's readiness to wage a nuclear war." This fits well with the mentality of Americans, about whom it is known that they simply do not know how to stop in an amicable way, in a war with them they need to be killed in huge numbers and for a long time, and so that they cannot improve their situation, and only then they just start to at least think about what is happening.
Thus, the following intermediate conclusions can be drawn:
1. There will be no nuclear strike in a hurray-patriotic frenzy - hurray-patriots should exhale. The criteria for the use of nuclear weapons will be very far from "righteous anger."
2. Nuclear weapons will be used when there is no other alternative than the self-dissolution of the Russian Federation and the surrender of the surviving population at the mercy of the victor - whatever it may be, or as a response to the actions of the enemy, which has already de facto destroyed Russia along with its population (retaliatory and retaliatory oncoming nuclear strikes by the SNF forces).
3. It follows from this that in the course of a local military conflict (see the term in the "Military Doctrine") or a local war, nuclear weapons WILL NOT be used. Moreover, with a probability close to 100%, even a defeat in such a war, if it does not entail restrictions on Rossim's sovereignty on its own territory, in whole or in part, will not lead to the use of nuclear weapons either.
We are not alone. In the early 80s of the last century, when the world was very close to a nuclear apocalypse, the Americans, who were planning the course of a naval war with the USSR, indicated in their documents that the transfer of the war to a nuclear one was undesirable, it was necessary to keep within the framework of a non-nuclear conflict. On land, the use of nuclear weapons was allowed as a response to large-scale Soviet aggression, and after the breakthrough by the Soviet Army and the OVD armies into West Germany through the Fulda Corridor. And even in this case, it would not be guaranteed at all, NATO would at least try to get by with conventional weapons. Interestingly, the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov adhered to a similar point of view. True, our non-nuclear conflict was viewed as a temporary phenomenon, after which nuclear weapons would still be used. In Soviet tactical textbooks, fire training in the form of a single shot with a nuclear artillery shell was a "commonplace". But that was not guaranteed either.
Researchers of the Chinese naval doctrine Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, relying on Chinese sources, indicate that China proceeds from the non-use of nuclear weapons first in any case (T. Yoshihara, J. R. Holmes, "Red Star over the Pacific").
In practice, the United States is theoretically discussing a preemptive nuclear strike against Russia, but "in an academic sense" (for now), at a theoretical level. It must be admitted that they have gone quite far in their theories, but these are just theories so far.
In fact, even now we can safely say that the nuclear countries have their own "red lines" until the enemy crosses them nuclear weapons will not be used. These "lines" are secret - it is unlikely that we would have lived in peace if the Americans knew for sure in which cases we would use nuclear weapons, and in which exactly not. Our patience might well be tried in this case. So far, only the "lower boundaries" are clear - there will be no nuclear war because of a single incident, albeit with heavy losses. The rest is still unknown.
Let us put ourselves, however, in the place of a country that considers it necessary to punish Russia for this or that with the help of military force. Or achieve something by force.
So, what should such a country not allow attacking Russia?
First, the infliction of large one-time losses on Russia, capable of creating in the VPR a feeling of irreparable military defeat with conventional weapons, fraught with the joining of other countries that have believed in impunity to the attacker.
Secondly, the territorial escalation of the conflict - a conflict over a riverbank is one thing, but a thousand kilometers of the border is another.
Thirdly, it is necessary to avoid a massive attack against the Russian strategic nuclear forces - this can cause the effect that the Americans call "launch or lose", when the failure to launch missiles at the enemy will mean their loss, and, as a consequence, the temporary loss of the ability to contain the enemy rockets still remain.
Fourthly, it is worth avoiding situations when the enemy has no other option than to go with tanks to the attacker's capital - and this is not only a matter of expediency, psychology must also be taken into account - for example, a tank raid on St. Petersburg from the Baltic States may well cause a counterattack with the capture of this very Baltic, and the failure of such a counterattack with large losses and without solving the problem of clearing the territory of the Russian Federation from the attacker will already be fraught with the same. A massive missile and bomb attack on civilians will cause the same reaction.
And here we come to an interesting point. For a country to which Russian tanks can reach by land, the risks of escalating the escalation to the use of nuclear weapons are much higher. You can even reluctantly unleash the conflict "all the way" - contrary to the original plans.
But in the case of a naval conflict, the situation is exactly the opposite - with the correct actions of the attacker, the likelihood of using nuclear weapons against him is near-zero, and for the time being it is possible to get out of the water.
Let's consider the options.
1. The enemy attacks and sinks a Russian warship, claiming that his forces were attacked and defended unprovoked. With the current level of Russophobia in the world, most of the planet will believe that Russia attacked first and got what it deserved, and we will not be able to leave such a blow unanswered. This is roughly how it was with the Georgian attack on South Ossetia. As a result, we will get involved in hostilities in conditions when the attacker portrays us as the aggressor. At the same time, we do not have any reasons for the use of nuclear weapons - our territory has not been attacked, civilians have not died, there is no threat to the existence of the state, according to our own Military Doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the question, and even the whole world believes that it was we who started the war. Thus, the adversary will only be required to conduct combat successfully enough to persuade Russia to peace on terms favorable to the attacker, and not do what, as shown above, could lead to a nuclear strike. And no nuclear war.
2. Blockade from the sea - the enemy stops merchant ships sailing to the Russian Federation, moreover, those sailing under the Russian flag are simply searched and released, which causes serious damage to carriers (a day of anchorage in the port due to the fault of the charterer can cost tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines - in this case, the losses are the same, but no one will compensate them), and ships flying flags of convenience, but belonging to companies affiliated with Russians, are arrested. This will inevitably cause a catastrophic blow to the Russian economy, but we will not have a formal reason to intervene - our ships are not arrested. It is still possible to solve such a problem only by force, but again, there is no room for nuclear weapons in the response. And the enemy may well reduce it to item 1.
3. Raid on the territory. The enemy, carefully monitoring the actions of the Russian forces, lands his military units on the territory of the Russian Federation, at the moment of Russia's reaction, evacuates them. As a result, there is political damage to the Russian Federation - enemy troops rule on its territory, but there is no reason to use nuclear weapons. Generally. In principle, such things can be easily done in sparsely populated regions of Russia, for example, in Chukotka.
4. Suppression of cabotage traffic under the pretext of combating smuggling, drugs and other forms of cross-border crime. For example, the blockade of a port in Chukotka by seizing merchant ships going to it. The goal is to "pull" Russian forces to the place of conflict, provoke the use of force, and conduct a series of clashes with a beneficial outcome for the attacker.
In fact, one can think of hundreds of scenarios for such provocations. Each will bring combat losses to the Russian Federation, economic damage, and politically it will be just a disaster. At the same time, there will be no reason to use nuclear weapons - and they will not be used. At the same time, if on land, you can easily "drag on the tail" of Russian tanks directly to your capital, then on the sea it is not so.
Consider, for example, scenario 4 in the Pacific. For example, the enemy - the United States - hijacks several ships under the pretext of arresting them, they say, the Russians are bringing drugs to the Arctic (whatever that means, their population will "eat" any, even the most idiotic, excuse - how the Skripal poisoning was "eaten", in reality the overwhelming majority of the population of Western countries believes, these people, in general, do not know how to think). Russia sends several PSKR and one destroyer for insurance (there are almost no ships on the Pacific Fleet that could be sent on such a mission, there are only four ships of the first rank on the move) in order to protect the ships from the pirate actions of the United States and prevent the Northern Delivery from being disrupted. The United States, taking advantage of the extremely small number of Russian forces, finds a ship that they will have time to capture faster than help comes to it, do this and leave, taking the ships to their shores, but keeping fighters and AWACS aircraft in full combat readiness at the bases of Alaska, and reinforcing patrols in air.
We have no other options left to wipe ourselves off and express indignation at the UN, moreover, in conditions when the world press has beaten the "Russian aggression" and "drugs".
And then, at the first opportunity, an airmobile raid of a couple of platoons of American special forces somewhere in Meinypylgino, with a demonstrative presence there under a bush of sacks of heroin, with video recording and a quick evacuation back until the Sukhoye from Elizovo or Anadyr flew in to sprinkle snow red. Don't care about the bags with "drugs", but the fact that it is possible to land troops on Russian territory will be noticed in the world, and how.
Such things are a novelty for us today. They don't believe in them. How can you believe this? Meanwhile, these operations will ideally fit into the outline of the concept of a "warm war" being invented in the United States now - not a "cold" one, as was the case with the USSR, when weapons were mostly silent, and not a full-fledged "hot" one, when it is clear what, but this here are wars, not wars. Loss and damage, but on a small, non-hazardous scale.
At the same time, if you limit yourself to the actions of the naval forces, you can always interrupt the escalation, or at least try. Simply stop all clashes and withdraw their forces under the "umbrella" of home air defense, leaving the attacked poor fellows Russians to carry out attacks on the brink of the possible and incur more and more losses.
Or consider a more mundane option - the capture by the Japanese of a couple of the Kuril Islands. Will this provoke a military response from Russia? Definitely yes. Is this the reason for a nuclear strike against Japan? If you believe the Military Doctrine, then no.
And in ordinary forces, they have an advantage at times.
We, perhaps, will beat them in this case. But no nuclear fantasies.
If someone still sees a fog before their eyes, then let us recall the historical facts.
In 1950, fighters from the nuclear power, the United States, attacked the Sukhaya Rechka airfield near Vladivostok, while the USSR was already a nuclear power too. Were not scared.
In the same year, not yet nuclear China attacked the "UN troops", but in fact the troops of the nuclear power of the United States and American allies, and threw them back to the south with heavy losses. The Chinese were not scared, and there was no nuclear war.
In 1969, nuclear China attacked the nuclear USSR on Damansky Island and near Lake Zhalanoshkol.
During the Cold War, pilots of the nuclear USA and the nuclear USSR fired at each other in Korea, American intelligence pilots fired back at Soviet interceptors in Soviet airspace, killing more than a dozen of our pilots, and years later, American deck pilots, although rarely, but disappeared forever together with planes when trying to fly after the Soviet Tu-16 through the clouds. Survivors talked about bright long flashes somewhere nearby, in the fog - and after that some did not return to the ship.
In 1968, the DPRK seized an American reconnaissance ship, not ashamed of the fact that the United States has nuclear weapons, while the DPRK does not.
In 1970, already nuclear Israel shot down Soviet pilots over Egypt.
In 1982, non-nuclear Argentina took over British territory, fearing that Britain had nuclear weapons and that it was a NATO member. This, by the way, is another reason to think about the Kuriles. The analogy will be "one to one" if anything, minus the Japanese superiority in forces in the theater of operations - overwhelming.
In 1988, Iranian ships were not afraid to attack the destroyers of the US nuclear forces, no American nuclear weapons stopped anyone.
In 2015, non-nuclear Turkey shot down a combat aircraft of nuclear Russia in a cynically planned provocation and, with the hands of its militants, committed a demonstrative murder of one of the pilots, trying to kill the other one too. Then another Marine was killed and the helicopter was lost. Nuclear weapons again stopped no one.
As they say, smart is enough.
Let's summarize.
What methods should be used to deal with such a "policy"? Yes, the good old ones: a lot of ships, trained crews, a moral readiness to act autonomously until the arrival or arrival of reinforcements, suppressing any aggression in the bud, even a toy with hijacking of ships, even a real one - on the Kuril Islands or anywhere else.
Even nuclear weapons do not change some things.
