When Ed Heineman, Robert Donovan and Ted Smith of Douglas designed their A-26 Invader strike aircraft in the early 1940s, they hardly imagined what life was in store for their offspring. This was all the more surprising because during the Second World War, for which this aircraft was intended to participate, the aircraft at first showed itself poorly, and significant changes had to be made to the design.
But then, in Europe, the planes have already shown themselves, on the contrary, well. After the war, these aircraft, re-qualified as bombers with the new name B-26 and reconnaissance aircraft RB-26, remained in service and in 1950 successfully proved themselves in Korea on a large scale. The Korean War ended for the United States in 1953, and, as it seemed to many in the Air Force, the era of piston bombers could be closed. Indeed, the "invaders" took their place in all sorts of second-rate and auxiliary units, the National Guards of different states, or simply ended up in storage. They were sold or transferred in large numbers to US allies. It seemed that in the atomic-rocket age, a machine that was not only designed in the early forties, but all existing copies of which were also significantly worn out, had no future.
Of course, various American allies continued to fight on these aircraft en masse - from the Batista regime to the French in Indochina, but the American Air Force, which had set a course for high-tech technology, seemed to say goodbye to rarities forever.
However, in the end, things turned out differently.
In 1950, the CIA formed squads of mercenary pilots to support anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia. These groups existed under the cover of a fictitious airline "Air America" and were actively used by the Americans in covert operations. At first, the main point of US efforts was Laos, but Vietnam after 1954, when two legitimate states arose in its place (the legitimacy of South Vietnam was questionable, but when did this stop the United States?), Also caused concern among the Americans. In 1961, when the success of the communist rebels could no longer be denied, the United States decided to strike. While secret.
On March 13, 1961, US President John F. Kennedy approved the plan of the JKNS to secretly use combat aircraft against the rebels in Laos. This is how Operation Millpond (translated as Watermill Pond) began. Over the next forty days, a small air force was deployed to Thailand, to Tahli base. Pilots were recruited in all types of the US Armed Forces, as well as among the CIA mercenary pilots. The group consisted of 16 Invader bombers, 14 Sikorsky H-34 helicopters, three transport C-47s and one four-engine DC-4.
It was planned that while the Thai military, using artillery and advisers, would help the Lao royalists on the ground, mercenaries on airplanes would strike at the socialist rebels, as well as provide reconnaissance and airlift.
The operation, however, did not take place - and the planes and pilots were urgently needed by the CIA on the other side of the planet - in Cuba, which the United States had planned to invade by mercenaries by that time. And unlike Laos, the "twenty-sixth" had to fight there, and there were the same planes on the Cuban side.
The choice of the B-26 as a weapon of covert operations was due to many reasons. Firstly, these aircraft were available in large quantities. Secondly, they didn't cost a lot of money. Thirdly, there were no problems in finding or training pilots for them, and providing airfield services. And fourthly, in the absence of air defense and fighter aircraft at the enemy, the Inweaders were quite a formidable tool capable of bringing down several tons of napalm tanks, bombs, unguided rockets or thousands of bullets of 12.7 mm caliber - in the assault version in the nose of the aircraft as many as eight such machine guns were installed, and besides them, a suspension under the wings was possible. From the experience of the Second World War, it was known that such flying machine-gun batteries had crushing power.
And, which was also very important, the aircraft allowed pilots to detect small targets in flight. It was in those years that the US Air Force embarked on preparations for a nuclear war, in the creation of high-speed supersonic strike aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons. Such machines were the exact opposite of what was needed when striking an enemy dispersed in the jungle, while a piston striker with a straight wing was much better suited for solving such tasks.
The Vietnam War turned out to be the largest failure of the US Air Force in terms of technical policy - unlike the Navy, immediately, from the very beginning of the war, which had a light attack aircraft A-4 "Skyhawk" and later received very successful A-6 "Intruder" and A- 7 "Corsair-2", the Air Force did not manage to create a powerful attack aircraft, applicable in Vietnam to carry out tasks of direct support of troops. Therefore, the use of old piston aircraft for the Air Force until a certain point turned out to be uncontested.
Another factor was the international ban on the supply of jet aircraft to Vietnam in force since 1954. Pistons did not fall under this ban.
Finally, the use of the B-26 made it possible to hope for the secrecy of operations - there were a lot of such aircraft in the world, the United States sold them to various countries, and their use always made it possible to absolve themselves of responsibility for the consequences of the bombings.
Although Operation Millpond did not de facto take place, the Invaders were soon to arrive in Southeast Asia. This time - to Vietnam.
Almost immediately after the start of Operation Millpond, and then even before its completion, Kennedy signed the so-called National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) number 2, which required the creation of forces capable of withstanding the Vietnam to the Viet Cong rebels. As part of this assignment, US Air Force General Curtis Le Mae, the icon of US strategic bombing during WWII, who by then had taken over as Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff, ordered the Air Force Tactical Command to create an elite unit capable of providing Air Force assistance to South Vietnam.
This is how Operation Farm Gate (translated as "Farm Gate" or "Entrance to the Farm") began.
On April 14, 1961, the Tactical Command created a new unit, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS). It consisted of 352 people, including 124 officers. The commander was Colonel Benjamin King, personally selected by Le May, a World War II veteran with extensive combat experience. The entire personnel consisted of volunteers. At the same time, although formally the tasks included training South Vietnamese pilots, King was directly ordered to prepare for military operations. In the American documents required to take the squadron for supply, she received the codename "Jim from the jungle" - "Jungle Jim". A little later it became the nickname of the squadron.
The squadron received 16 C-47 transport aircraft in the SC-47 search and rescue version; piston training and combat aircraft T-28, in the amount of 8 units, and also eight B-26 bombers. All aircraft were supposed to fly with the insignia of the South Vietnamese Air Force. Servicemen of the squadron flew on missions in uniform without insignia, emblems and without documents. This secrecy was due to the unwillingness of the Americans to demonstrate their direct participation in the Vietnam War.
Everyone who was admitted to the squadron was asked whether the newcomer agreed that he would not be able to act on behalf of the United States, wear an American uniform and that the US government would have the right to refuse him if captured, with all the ensuing consequences ? In order to get into the ranks of the new unit, it was required to agree with this in advance.
The personnel were told that their squadron would be deployed as part of the Special Operations Forces and that it would be classified as "air commandos." This was followed by a series of exercises on the implementation of shock missions, including night, as well as missions for the transfer and fire support of army special forces.
In terms of where it was planned to fight, complete secrecy was observed: the entire personnel was sure that we were talking about an invasion of Cuba.
On October 11, 1961, at NSAM 104, Kennedy ordered a squadron to be sent to Vietnam. The air commando war has begun.
They were to arrive at the Bien Hoa airbase, 32 kilometers north of Saigon. It was a former French airfield, which was in disrepair. The first squadron of air commandos arrived in Bien Hoa in November with SC-47 and T-28 aircraft. The second group in B-26 bombers arrived in December 1961. All aircraft were marked with the identification marks of the South Vietnamese Air Force.
Personnel and pilots soon began wearing unregulated panama hats, similar to Australian ones, as uniforms. Even Colonel King wore it.
On December 26, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, noted for his extremely sinister role in unleashing and waging this war, issued an order that a South Vietnamese cadet must be on board all American aircraft. This was done at first, but nobody taught the Vietnamese anything. Nevertheless, they were taken for cover, since the squadron was formally a training squadron. A little later, the Americans really started the training process too, but initially the actual tasks were completely different and the Vietnamese on board were nothing more than a cover. One of the SC-47 commanders, Captain Bill Brown, directly stated in private conversations after returning from Vietnam that his Vietnamese "passengers" were expressly prohibited from touching any of the aircraft's controls.
"Training" flights of "air commandos" began at the end of 1961. The B-26 and T-28 carried out reconnaissance, air patrol and observation missions, and direct support of ground forces. SC-47 began conducting psychological operations - throwing leaflets, propaganda broadcasting using loudspeakers on board. They also carried out the tasks of transporting the American special forces, engaged in the preparation of anti-Viet Cong irregular paramilitary formations, the number of which was growing rapidly at this time.
In early 1962, King was ordered to switch to night operations in order to maintain secrecy. On the one hand, the existing aircraft were not adapted for this - at all. On the other hand, King had vast experience in such operations and he knew how to perform them. All crews soon began to receive special night training. Soon, night combat missions began.
The standard tactic for night attacks for "air commandos" was the release of flares from the hardpoints or from the doors of the SC-47, and the subsequent attack of targets detected by the light of the missiles - usually Viet Cong fighters. However, according to the Americans, the latter often fled as soon as the Americans "turned on the light" - as a rule, lightly armed guerrillas could not oppose the aircraft, and flight was the only sane decision.
There were many exceptions, however. The Vietnamese often fired back, and the combat missions of the "training squadron" could not be called light.
Over time, instead of flares, napalm began to be used. Nevertheless, as noted by American researchers, such primitive tactics made attacks possible solely due to the extremely high training of the crews.
Since early 1962, the Jungle Jim Group has been subordinated to the command of the 2nd US Air Force Division, in which it was the only combat unit - America officially did not participate in the war. The division commander, Brigadier General Rollin Antsis, saw that the ground troops of South Vietnam could not cope with the Viet Cong without air support, and the South Vietnamese Air Force themselves could not cope with this task due to the low qualifications of the pilots and the small number. The work of the "air commandos" became more and more intensive, forward airfields were equipped for them closer to the front line, but the forces were not enough.
Enzis asked for reinforcements for the "air commandos" and the opportunity to use them more widely in hostilities. In the second half of 1962, he asked for another 10 B-26, 5 T-28 and 2 SC-47. The request was personally considered by McNamara, who reacted very coolly to it, since he categorically did not want to expand the American military presence in Vietnam, expecting that it would be possible to prepare local forces capable of fighting, but in the end, permission was given, and the "air commandos" received these aircraft too, and a couple more light-duty U-10s for communications and surveillance.
The beginning of 1963 saw several major military defeats suffered by South Vietnamese forces from the Viet Cong. It became clear to American military leaders and politicians that the Vietnamese themselves would not fight for the Saigon regime. Reinforcement was required.
By that time, the total number of US Air Force personnel in Vietnam had exceeded 5,000, of which the air commandos were still fighting. Under these conditions, the US Air Force stopped hiding so much and formed a new unit - 1st Air Commando Squadron - 1st Air Commando Squadron. The entire flight and technical staff, aircraft and military equipment for the new unit were taken from the squadron No. 4400, for which, in fact, nothing has changed, except for the scale of combat missions. Squadron 4400 itself continued to exist as a training unit in the United States.
By that time, the intensity of the struggle had become seriously aggravated. The Vietnamese were no longer afraid of aircraft, had heavy DShK machine guns, both Soviet and Chinese, and used them successfully. The commandos suffered their first loss back in February 1962 - an SC-47 was shot down from the ground while it was dropping cargo by parachute. Six American pilots, two soldiers and one South Vietnamese soldier were killed.
As the scale of hostilities grew, so did the losses. By July 1963, 4 B-26s, 4 T-28s, 1 SC-47s and 1 U-10s were lost. The casualties were 16 people.
The technique on which the Americans had to fight deserves a separate description. All aircraft constructively belonged to the types used during the Second World War. Moreover, the B-26 took part in this war directly, and then fought in Korea and other places. After that, they were stored for a long time at the Davis-Montana Air Force storage base. Despite the fact that before entering the squadron, the aircraft were undergoing repairs, their condition was terrible.
This is how one pilot, Roy Dalton, who was then an Air Force captain and piloted a B-26, described it:
“Keep in mind that all these aircraft were apparently used in WWII and Korea. The Iniders had between 1,800 and 4,000 flight hours and were redesigned many times. There was not a single technically identical aircraft. Every repair that these aircraft have seen in life has involved various changes in wiring, communications equipment, controls and instruments. As one of the consequences, there was no correct wiring diagram for any of the aircraft."
The equipment was primitive, communication in the cockpits sometimes did not work, and the navigators had a worked out set of signals in the form of pilots' slaps on the shoulder.
Once, B-26s were delivered to the squadron as reinforcements, which the CIA had previously used in its covert operations in Indonesia. These aircraft were in even worse condition and had never been repaired since 1957.
As a result, the combat readiness ratio of the B-26 never exceeded 54.5%, and this was considered a good indicator. Even at the beginning of the operation, the Air Force naturally swept away all the warehouses with spare parts for the B-26, sending a huge stock of them to Vietnam. Only because of this, planes could fly.
Dalton gives a list of his aircraft's malfunctions for one of the periods of participation in the hostilities in 1962:
August 16 - Bombs in the bomb bay did not detach.
August 20 - The bombs in the bomb bay did not detach.
August 22 - loss of fuel pressure in the pressure pipe of one of the engines.
August 22 - Another engine gives a pop into the intake during sharp gas operation.
August 22 - bite to move the steering wheel when moving "towards yourself".
September 2 - Missiles failed to launch.
September 5 - the breakdown of the radio station for communication with the "earth".
September 20 - spontaneous dropping of bombs when opening the bomb bay.
September 26 - rupture of brake lines during landing.
September 28 - Engine failure when exiting the attack.
September 30 - brake failure during landing.
October 2 - Failure of the left engine magneto while taxiing.
October 7 - a leak from the brake mechanism of one of the wheels during the takeoff run.
October 7 - Failure of the generator of the right engine.
October 7 - two machine guns failed.
October 7 - engine failure at the exit from the attack.
It's hard to imagine, but they've been flying like this for years.
However, some of the aircraft before being delivered to Vietnam received a full-fledged repair and did not cause such problems to the crews. It is also of interest that one of the RВ-26 scouts received a so-called infrared mapping system. It looked rather exotic on an airplane, the first prototype of which took off back in 1942, and did not work very well either, nevertheless, it was used in night operations to observe the terrain and detect Viet Cong boats. The aircraft received the index RB-26L.
However, age took its toll. Back in 1962, overload sensors were installed on all B-26s so that pilots could monitor the loads on the fuselage. On August 16, 1963, a wing of one of the aircraft began to collapse during a combat mission. The pilots managed to escape, but the plane was lost.
And on February 11, 1964, in the USA at Eglin Air Force Base, during the demonstration of "anti-guerrilla" capabilities of the B-26 aircraft, the left wing fell off in flight. The reason was the impact of recoil from firing wing-mounted machine guns. The pilots were killed. At that moment one of the B-26 "air commandos" was in the air in Vietnam. The pilots were ordered to return immediately. The B-26 flights stopped after that.
After checking the aircraft in service, the Air Force decided to simultaneously remove from service all unmodernized B-26s. The only exceptions were B-26K.
This modification, carried out by On Mark Engineering, turned the old B-26 into a completely new machine. The list of changes made to its design is very impressive., and it must be admitted that the combat effectiveness of the aircraft has grown in proportion to the investments in its modernization, as well as the reliability. But there were no such aircraft in Vietnam at the beginning of 1964, and when the 1st Commando Air Squadron put their B-26s on hold, its work stopped for a while. B-26Ks appeared in this war later, and they had to fly from Thailand, striking trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But it will be later with other parts of the Air Force.
Together with the B-26, the 1st squadron had to stop using part of the T-28, for the same reasons - the destruction of the wing elements. In fact, now the squadron's work was limited to flights of transport and rescue SC-47s. I must say that they sometimes achieved outstanding results, finding landing sites directly under Viet Cong fire, in bad weather, at night, and pulling American and South Vietnamese fighters right out of the fire - and this with primitive equipment that has not changed since the Second World War!
However, towards the end of 1964, their flights were also stopped, and in December the "air commandos" received a weapon with which they would go through the entire Vietnam War - single-engine piston attack aircraft A-1 Skyraider. Also, it was the 1st Commando Air Squadron that set up the first American experiments with a new class of aircraft - the Gunship, a transport aircraft with small arms and cannon armament mounted on board. Their first "Gunships" were the AC-47 Spooky, and they also managed to fly the AC-130 Specter towards the end of the war.
However, most of the "air commandos" fought on "Skyraders". Their usual tasks were later added to escort rescue helicopters and protect downed pilots until rescuers arrived. On September 20, the squadron was transferred to Thailand, to the Nakhon Phanom airbase. From there, the squadron operated along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, attempting to cut off supplies to the Viet Cong from North Vietnam. On August 1, 1968, the squadron received its modern name - 1st Special Operations Squadron, under which it still exists.
But that was already a completely different story - after the Tonkin incident, the United States entered the war openly, and the activities of the "air commandos" became just one of the factors of this war. Not the most important one. In addition, it finally became possible for them not to hide and put the US Air Force insignia on their planes. However, even after that their "Skyraders" flew for quite a long time without any identification marks at all.
The history of the 1st Squadron is the starting point from which modern special-purpose air force units used in special operations conduct their "pedigree". And Operation Farm Gate for the Americans is the first step into the abyss of the ten-year Vietnam war. And it is all the more surprising what role the old bombers played in all these events.
