In the course of dialogues regarding how thoughtful the shipbuilding policy of the Russian Navy was, the question of money inevitably arises. Whoever is an opponent who does not want to admit the failed nature of the entire Russian naval development of the last sixteen to seventeen years, whether a corrupt official involved in this impasse, or not an entirely clever officer who has gone too far in upholding the "honor of the uniform," but the argument "About money" will be launched without fail.
“Where would the money come from for what you are offering here? We believed, and it turned out that the collapse could not be avoided, the allocated money would not be enough to maintain the combat readiness of the Navy. Arguments of this kind always come up.
It is worth debunking them once and for all, if only because they are untenable, not only in fact, but even logically.
Yes, there was not enough money allocated for military shipbuilding. Yes, even the money that was allocated was received with constant delays. Yes, it was impossible to keep the available number of ships in the ranks. That's all right.
But the point is different - with all of the above, the money for the fleet, albeit insufficient, was allocated and even used. They were not just given - they were even spent. The question is how. And all claims follow from the answer to this question.
Let's figure it out in more detail.
How much did the fleet spend on surface ships and what did it get in the end?
First, let's list the projects of warships that went into series (auxiliary, rear ships, etc. we do not take - we will focus on warships, moreover, on some, to simplify understanding of the issue).
So, over the past decade and a half, the Navy has laid down and received the following warships:
- Project 11356 frigates, 3 units - we will exclude them from consideration in the future. The construction of these ships for the fleet turned out to be a necessary measure, and with all the disadvantages of this decision, it made it possible to have at least some forces in the Black Sea Fleet. If not for this, then in fact the Black Sea Fleet would have two running patrol boats, useless unarmed trash of Project 22160 and non-seaworthy missile gunboats of Project 21631. It was worth, of course, to pay more attention to the anti-submarine capabilities of these frigates - now they are inferior to their "progenitors" - class frigates "Talwar" for India, and very much inferior. But such ships are better than none;
- frigates of project 22350, 1 commissioned, 3 under construction, can lay still - without comment, a saving project for the country, with all its shortcomings. And having a high combat value;
- Project 20380 corvettes - 6 units delivered, 4 under construction. A very controversial project, the lead ship turned out to be unsuccessful, then alterations began, however, the last corvette can already be considered finished. Almost everything works and almost as it should, and some things are just perfect. The project needs some modernization, after which it will become a quite good warship. So far, the hypothetical modernized 20380 is the only ship that Russia can lay and build on a relatively large scale, and with stable funding and re-laying of ships where they have already been built, the construction speed can be increased;
- corvettes of project 20385, 1 on trials, 1 under construction. Much more powerful ship than 20380, albeit more expensive. The frigate 11356 is superior in shock armament. In anti-submarine warfare, it also surpasses it at long distances, and there is nothing to say about the SAC. A somewhat controversial project, and too expensive, but potentially (if everything works as it should) has a high combat value;
- "underfrigate-corvette" project 20386, 1 under construction. Has already caused serious damage to the country's defense, it may never be built. At least in its current form (according to rumors "from above", the project is now being seriously altered to make it realizable). In principle, everything has been said about him in the two previous articles: once and two;
- MRK project 21631 "Buyan-M", 7 units delivered, 5 under construction. A strange project. On the one hand, the idea of "hiding" the carriers of the Kalibr cruise missiles on inland waterways and in the coastal sea zone is quite "working". On the other hand, it was worth thinking about the fact that the variety of tasks of the Navy cannot be reduced to launching missiles against stationary targets and "working" with a 100-mm cannon. The ships do not have air defense or anti-aircraft weapons in a significant form, any, even the most seedy and ancient submarine can sink them in such quantity as it has torpedoes on board, a meeting with a helicopter armed with anti-ship missiles for this ship is also fatal, about the results a battle with a modern surface ship or a full-fledged air attack should be silenced. The seaworthiness of the ship, in the popular language, is none. Plus imported components, sanctions. The conceptual problem is that the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty deprives its existence of any meaning. Cruise missiles will soon be able to be mounted on vehicle chassis;
- MRK project 22800 "Karakurt", 1 commissioned, 1 on testing, 9 under construction, 7 contracted, but not laid down yet. The result of realizing that the RTO of project 21631 is, firstly, a fiasco in terms of its power plant and performance characteristics, and secondly, it is also an expensive fiasco (more on prices later). Theoretically, "Karakurt" is much more successful than "Buyan-M". It is more seaworthy and has a more varied offensive weaponry. The ship, starting from the third hull, should receive the Pantsir-M ZRAK. Not to say that he was a superweapon, but in general it is much better than a bunch of "Duet" and "Flexible" on 21631. The hard cons of the ship - there is no way to defend against submarines, none at all. However, in the future it will be possible to invent a lightweight version of the Package-NK complex and equip the Karakurt with it. It will not be easy from an organizational point of view, but it is technically possible. In addition, it can be used to make a launch platform as part of a network-centric approach, when other ships that do not have such missiles, but have more advanced radar systems for detecting targets, will fire its missiles. Just like 21631, the ship is a conceptual dead end - after the US withdraws from the INF Treaty, its role as a "Calibron Carrier" becomes questionable. But at least it can be used as a "classic" RTO. And here we have a second problem. The Navy signed a contract for these ships without checking the ability of the power plant supplier, PJSC Zvezda, to manufacture diesel engines in the right time and in the right quantity. The truth was revealed anyway, but when it was too late. It is unclear how to drive out of the situation now, the Zvezda will not provide a diesel engine in the required quantity, and either for a long time or never. Now the creative thought of the Navy ricochets from one rescue plan to another, from the deployment of diesel production at the Kingisepp machine plant, which is not ready for this, to the revision of the project under a gas turbine engine, which will make the cost of its life cycle "golden". Due to the dubious role of RTOs as a carrier of "Calibers", the costs of the project clearly do not outweigh the benefits;
- the so-called patrol ships of project 22160, 1 commissioned, 1 on testing, 4 under construction. Everything has been said about them, there is nothing to add. Absolutely useless project, it would be better if it did not exist. The product of Admiral Chirkov's mental convulsions and some of his then muddy relations with industry. The only result of the presence of these ships in the ranks is that they pull off the personnel in peacetime, and in the military they will instantly and uselessly destroy this personnel. The appearance of this miracle of technology has no other effects.
Let's dwell on this. Bye.
Every time someone says that there was no money for the fleet, you can remember this list - it was quite worth it and is worth the money that has actually been spent on it, and will be spent more.
Now let's estimate the approximate cost of this shipbuilding program. It will be somewhat difficult, since it has been implemented over a long period of time, with serious inflation. The same 20380 at the beginning cost less than 7 billion rubles, and in 2014 prices it was already 17.
But we need to not calculate everything exactly, we need to understand approximately (with an error of 15 or 20 percent it would be quite normal) what could be obtained with this money if they were disposed of wisely, and not like in reality … Therefore, we will roughly and roughly bring prices to a certain general level, for example, to the level of 2014. And let's estimate the order of expenses, realizing that these prices in 2004 were completely different, and will be completely different in 2020, but since they could and could buy “the same amount of ship”, the method turns out to be quite legitimate, though not accurate.
So.
The cost of the ships in our conditional prices. At the same time (IMPORTANT MOMENT) we do not touch those ships that were needed and useful without options, that is, 11356 and 22350. We believe that the money for them was spent correctly and do not take into account in the future, it will be clear below why.
20380. Built - 102 billion rubles, under construction - 68. Here I must say that orders 1007 and 1008 are likely to cost significantly more even in the given prices, since they have a radar complex from 20385, but the order of numbers is important to us, and we can simply ignore this fact, noting for myself that our prices are really low.
20385. The author did not come across an estimate of the cost of these ships. Let's take as a reference the amount of 20 billion with the above acceptable error, one can be satisfied with such a figure completely. Thus, we “assign” 20 billion for the “Thundering”, and the same amount for the “Agile” under construction.
20386. There is confusion with this ship. It is not yet, and how much it will cost, in the end, no one knows. There is announced by PJSC Severnaya Verf the cost of building this ship in the initial project - 29.6 billion rubles in 2016 prices. However, this ship is part of an ongoing R&D project, and R&D funding goes through the developer's company, that is, in our case, the Almaz Central Design Bureau. This means that there does not even smell like 29.6 billion, and the cost of the project as a result is significantly higher. How many? We do not know. Evil tongues claim that the "Daring" is catching up at a cost of 22350. This is probably an exaggeration, but the fact that the cost of this ship is truly huge for a corvette is undoubtedly. Since we want the order of the numbers, we'll just leave 29 billion. We will assume that they have already been spent.
21631. In September 2016, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with the Zelenodolsk plant for three such ships worth 27 billion rubles. This suggests that the cost of the ship in 2016 prices is 9 billion rubles. Since we want to bring everything approximately to the prices of 2014, we reduce this price by the amount of inflation and we get about 7.4 billion rubles per ship.
Thus, in our given prices, the ships already built are worth 51.8 billion, and those under construction - 37.
22800. Everything is unclear with them. It is known that they are cheaper than 21631, and significantly. Let's make the assumption that in 2014 prices they would have cost 5 billion rubles per unit. Then - two built 10 billion, 9 under construction 45 billion and 7 contracted 35 billion.
22160. Here, too, there is no exact data, there is a leak on the part of a person with access to such information, who estimated the cost of each of the ships at about 6 billion rubles without specifying which year this figure refers to. Let's assume that to the one in which the laying of these ships began, that is, by 2014. Then the ships already built cost 12 billion, and those under construction will cost another 24 billion rubles.
In total, the entire shipbuilding program mentioned: ships already built - 237.6 billion rubles, under construction (both in high readiness and low) - 268, 6 and not yet mortgaged, but already contracted "Karakurt" - 35. How much of the cost have you already spent the ships under construction? It is difficult to judge, well, let, for example, half.
Then we "accelerate" all the obtained figures into two categories: already spent by the state - 371, 9, the state is ready to spend - 169, 45.
And in total - 541, 35.
Well, let it be 540 billion. If someone has the exact numbers, then he can repeat with them.
Now let's do a thought experiment.
Let's imagine a certain conventional combat unit - a conventional combat ship. Let it be something higher in price than 20380, let’s say three billion and more effective by the same percentage. For example, this is a large corvette in the dimensions of 20380 and its power plant, with its cannon, with the UKSK, with the Shtil air defense system and only serial electronic and radio-technical weapons. Maybe with a hangar, or maybe not, it will not go into details to such an extent. Everyone can fantasize for himself what he sees as the workhorse of the Navy within the framework of his concept of its application. Then, for 540 billion rubles, it would be possible to buy 27 such conventional warships at 20 billion per unit, taking into account the pace of budget development, 12 of them would have already been built, and another 15 would be in different stages of readiness, or they were waiting in line for bookmark.
And now the last question: what is stronger than 27 corvettes with normal weapons (100-mm cannon, 16 missiles and 8 anti-ship missiles, for example) or a bed of incapable of acting together due to the different seaworthiness and speed of freaks 22160 and 21631, supported by a small number of large corvettes, which are still weaker than our conventional ship? What is more useful - "Karakurt", or ships, with the same UKSK, and maybe even with the same Pantsir but also capable of fighting submarines?
The answers are obvious. Moreover, in reality, if there were not a bunch of R&D projects for all of the above projects, which are also included in their cost, then it would be quite possible to scrape together money for three more "conditional" and get … five full-fledged brigades of BMZ ships, by 2021-2022 ! For the same money! And that would be if our ships cost 20 billion. And they could be 15 each, depending on the design and performance characteristics. Then six brigades.
All this is very rough, of course, but even if we substituted extremely accurate and ideally adjusted sums into the scheme, it would be impossible to get a different picture.
Moreover, all this is just the tip of the iceberg. A trivial example is the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. According to the author's estimates, the project has already reached an amount equivalent to two billion US dollars - and this despite the fact that there is not a single operational torpedo yet, and when (and if!) It appears, then there will be no sense from it, as already it was said more than onceincluding experts in naval underwater weapons with extensive experience in the Navy. But even if we discard these estimates of the cost of the project, then something cannot be discarded. So the carrier of this weapon under construction - the nuclear submarine "Khabarovsk" will roughly cost the country 70-90 billion rubles. One boat, unable to use either cruise or ballistic missiles, almost unable to fight with torpedoes - isn't this too expensive a pleasure in our situation? The boat alone is equal to four warships of 20 billion each, and with ammunition it will be equal to one more brigade. And this money has already been spent.
What about overpriced tankers? Whole broods of communication boats, and in fact - VIP yachts for admirals? And what about periodic statements by officials about the development of ekranoplanes? How much does this development cost? And what about the super-expensive restructuring (the language does not dare to call THIS modernization) of the aircraft carrier "Admiral Nakhimov"? Maybe it was easier to carry out the modernization, cheaper? And the main naval parade, which is even scary to imagine how much money it costs?
No money, right?
It is a lie that the Navy's problems are related to underfunding. There is underfunding, it is foolish to deny it, and it limits the possibilities for replenishing the ship's personnel, and severely limits it. But the main problem is not this, but the fact that the Navy naturally throws to the wind the money that still goes to shipbuilding programs. Throws them out to nowhere.
How did this become possible? For a variety of reasons. Petty tyranny and voluntarism of commanders (see V. Chirkov's decision on 22160 and I. Zakharov's method of coordinating project 20386), who are capable of making decisions under the influence of the factor "urine hit the head." Corruption, allowing dishonest officers to "push through" obviously "drinking" projects for a small share. The illiteracy of the top military-political leadership, which does not allow them to delve into all these issues and put the stupefied executors in their place. Sabotage of foreign agents of influence, as they say, "rubbing" on this topic, and the inability of the FSB to identify and neutralize all of them. The traditionally strong influence of the defense industry on the military and the ability of industry commanders to push through decisions that are beneficial to them (endless development of budgets for development and development work is just from there), and not to the country and the navy.
But all these problems are the product of one, the main one. In our country, both in society and among statesmen, there is a lack of understanding of what the navy is generally intended for. At best, one can state an instinctive conviction that it will work for something, but for the Americans it will do. There is no question of understanding what the fleet can give and what not. In the worst case, there will be a complete inability to understand at all the nature of modern threats to the country and by what forces and means these threats need to be parried, and how. But shipbuilding programs are derived from the tasks of the Navy, which in turn should be derived from the real threats and political goals of the country in the world.
This chain does not work for us, and as a result, instead of a conscious and balanced strategy of naval development, as a result of which we would have, albeit not very large, but balanced and combat-ready naval forces without discounts, we observe wild confusion and hesitation, throwing from project to project and the endless development of budgets by the greedy commanders of the shipbuilding industry, as a result of which, instead of at least some kind of fleet, the country has an accumulation of incomprehensible ships built for incomprehensible tasks, unable to even act jointly and for the most part posing no threat to potential adversaries. And as a scarecrow at the top of the heap - pictures and cartoons with a nuclear mega-torpedo, apparently the most expensive pictures and cartoons in the world.
For the same money.
And all this, apparently, is not even going to end.
