Combat ships are united by a single architecture. A high freeboard, over which a box-shaped superstructure soared, covering the upper deck from side to side. The price of such delights is thousands of tons of hull structures, and the extreme “top weight” and high windage require compensation in the form of additional hundreds of tons of ballast.
Despite the global reduction in the mass of mechanisms and weapons, the ships suffer from chronic "obesity". Analysis of load items indicates an unexplained degradation of the fleet.
80 years ago, the cruiser "Maxim Gorky" was armed with 15% of its standard displacement (1236 tons).
Modern US Navy destroyers have only 6%. In absolute terms, this is ~ 450 tons (missile launchers with ammunition, artillery, aviation).
Another 18% of the Gorky's standard displacement is armor protection.
The destroyer Arleigh Burke has no serious armor at all. There is local Kevlar protection (rumored to be 130 tons) and five one-inch thick steel bulkheads. Less than 4% of standard displacement.
WWII artillery ship: 15 +18 = 33% (one third of the displacement is armor and weapons!)
Modern destroyer: 6 + 4 = 10%.
Where is the remaining 23%, by the way - a quarter of the standard displacement of the destroyer?
Typical answer: spent on radars and computers. This answer is not good. This is madness and absurdity. Even the entire superstructure made of computers would have weighed less than the barrel of a main-caliber 180-mm cannon.
Secondly, if we have already undertaken, let the respected radar specialists calculate the mass of analog computers, stabilized sighting devices and a control tower with a base of 8 meters. And also a lot of calculated fire control devices for the main caliber "Molniya-ATs" and "Horizon-2" (anti-aircraft fire). The transmitting and receiving equipment installed in the radio room on the radio tubes of that era. And, finally, they will take into account the mass of four British-made radar stations (Type 291, Type 284, Type 285, Type 282).
And maybe, with a lot of luck, the mass of this equipment will be at least no more than that of the Aegis radars.
Let's continue the comparison?
Crew - 380 people. against 900.
Power plant capacity - 100 thousand vs 130 thousand hp. in favor of a cruiser of the 30s era.
Full speed - 32 instead of 36 knots.
The full displacement is the same (about 10,000 tons).
I am not now comparing their combat capabilities. I do not consider the issue of the need for a 36-knot speed or retrofitting a destroyer with three hundred cruise missiles (so that its airborne missiles are equal in mass to the turrets of an artillery cruiser).
No!
The question is that it all WAS. And then this load disappeared. So what was the allocated reserve spent on? The answer was given in the first lines: the bulk of this reserve was spent on lengthening the forecastle over almost the entire length of the hull. And partly on a giant superstructure. It is obvious. Otherwise, where would such elements come from while maintaining the original displacement?
But this answer does not give a clue about the reasons for the paradox. It is interesting to understand the logic by which this particular look was chosen for the warships.
The high side provides less splashing and improves working conditions on the upper deck. But is this parameter really necessary?
The WWII cruisers had a side that was 1, 5-2 times smaller in height, but who has the courage to blame them for their low combat effectiveness?
Modern ships have no combat posts on the upper deck. Weapons are controlled from compartments inside the hull. Those who doubt the possibility of firing from UVP splashed with water simply do not understand what kind of power they are talking about. As soon as the airtight lid opens, pour a barrel of water inside. If you want - as many as three. In response, a 10-meter pillar of fire will fly out, in which both the barrel and the water will evaporate.
Why does a ship need a high side? To increase the silhouette of the body and increase visibility?
Now let's move on to the add-in. Why does a modern destroyer need a superstructure?
The helmsmen like to watch the ocean sunset from a 9-story building. But why is this a warship? In the era of 60-inch LCD monitors and HDTV cameras with thermal capability?
Now, attention, the main question: which of the equipment installed in the superstructure cannot be placed on the third deck inside the hull?
Radar installation height. The higher the radar is installed, the further the radio horizon extends, the earlier the detection of targets. But what does the superstructure have to do with it?
In the past, masts with antennas were installed on ships. There are no classic masts on new domestic frigates and projects of new destroyers. Instead, tower-like structures are used, smoothly growing out of the superstructure.
The American destroyers retained their mast, but something was imperceptible, so that the Yankees were striving to ensure the maximum height of the radar installation. The Arleigh Burke foremast (she is the only one) is used to accommodate communications antennas and navigation aids. As a decorative flagpole.
The main combat radar "Aegis" is located right on the walls of the superstructure. Comfortable. Although the superstructure is not a mast. With such a low antenna suspension height, the radar is blind and does not see low-flying targets.
Hence the question. If this is true, then what is the tall superstructure for? Isn't it easier to install the radar in a separate tower? Also, how the horizon tracking radar is installed on the British destroyer "Type 45". Or, as on the test bench - the destroyer "Foster", which tested the radar for "Zamvolt".
The rest of the superstructure is to be demolished.
It only impairs the seaworthiness and increases the visibility of the ship. While absorbing thousands of tons of payload.
If design specialists (there will certainly be some) disagree with my point of view, then I ask for a detailed explanation. Why a modern ship can't do without a superstructure the size of a skyscraper.
Attempts to explain by the phrase “specialists know better” are not considered. Specialists - they are. Two thousand years have repeated after Aristotle that the speed of the fall is proportional to the mass of the object. Although, in order to understand the mistake, it was enough for them to push a couple of stones off the cliff. Damn it, two thousand years!
As for the ships …
Someone will prove that there is not enough volume inside the case. After all, the specific density of modern missiles is less than that of the artillery weapons of cruisers. Multi-ton guns and a powerful clang of bolts against half-empty launch cells. Solid mass of steel with 2% filling factor against cruise missiles made of aluminum and plastic.
The specific values are highly unequal, and the density distribution is too heterogeneous.
Comparison of specific gravity values could still make some sense if the missiles were equal in mass to the artillery weapons of WWII ships.
And the layout and placement of weapons would be SIMILAR.
But none of the above criteria is met. As we have already seen, the weapons of a modern destroyer weigh 2-3 times less (450 versus 1246 tons).
Differences in layout can be legends. To begin with, the cruiser's massive turrets were located outside the hull, above the upper deck. They did not occupy the volumes inside the building (there will be a separate conversation about the cellar). How can you compare such structures with the underdeck UVP of modern ships?
The only thing that can be taken into account at this stage is the barrel sweeping radius. Comparing it with the dimensions of the lids of the launch cells.
The 64-cell launcher covers an area of 55 sq. m.
The sweeping area along the trunks near the tower of the cruiser “M. Gorky”was 300 sq. meters!
The designers of those ships had real problems. It is impossible to place anything near the tower. Dead zone. Additional armament - only at the cost of lengthening the hull by tens of meters. Or limiting the aiming angles.
The tower is just the tip of the iceberg. Under it there is a turret compartment with drives, a cellar and an elevator for supplying ammunition.
According to the data from the presented diagram, the volume of the turret compartment of the MK-3-180 three-gun turret was ~ 250 cubic meters. m. (a pipe with a diameter of six meters, extending 9 meters deep into the hull).
Three main caliber towers - 750 cc meters.
The MK.41 launcher of the longest modification (Strike) has dimensions of 6, 3x8, 7x7, 7 m. The volume of the lightweight truss is 420 cubic meters. meters. The destroyer's armament includes two UVPs, one of which has half the capacity (32 cells).
Total:
The volume occupied by rocket ammunition is about 650 m3.
The volume of the three turret compartments of the old cruiser is 750 m3.
Are there still people willing to argue that modern missiles require more space inside the hull?
For the sake of curiosity, I was asked to compare the volumes given for the placement of weapons on ships of similar size. This heavy nuclear cruiser, project 1144 and the battle cruiser "Alaska".
Orlan's main armament is 12 under-deck drum-type launchers for anti-aircraft missiles and 20 launchers for P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles.
The main caliber of the "Alaska" is three three-gun turrets with 305 mm cannons.
All other weapons (anti-aircraft guns and "Daggers", seaplanes and helicopters) are mutually reduced. In this matter, priority will be given to the main armament of the ships.
On the basis of the presented schemes, it was concluded that 96 missiles of the S-300 complex occupy a volume approximately equal to 2800 m3, and the same amount - launchers for "Granites".
The volume of all three sub-turret branches of "Alaska" is 3600 m3.
5600 against 3600. The missile cruiser is in the lead, its weapons take up more space. But with a couple of caveats.
"Orlan" is a bad example in describing the current situation. The lead "Kirov" was launched 40 years ago. The age of the 1144 project itself has exceeded half a century. The TARKR was designed at a time when radio electronics occupied completely different volumes, technologies were less perfect, and missiles were larger.
Due to the absurd requirement to reduce the number of holes in the deck, the designers had to create rotating (!) Launchers, which “compared to the cellular UVP Mk 41 that appeared later in the United States turned out to be 2-2.5 times heavier with the same capacity, and their volume - 1, 5 times more”.
Here is your answer: if we are discussing prospects, there is no point in focusing on Orlan. Modern weapons are more compact and take up much less volume.
The very difference of 2 thousand "cubes" is negligible on the scale of a giant ship. According to the most conservative estimates, the volume of the Orlan's hull exceeds 100 thousand cubic meters!
As for the equipment of combat posts, the conversation will be brief. We know that the equipment of the most complex S-300 complex is installed on a mobile chassis.
We know that the control panel for loading flight missions is located in the same container as the launcher with “Caliber” (“Club” complex). The same "Calibers" are launched from tiny RTOs and corvettes, on board of which there are no "giant halls with computing equipment."
That with the current level of reliability of systems and mechanisms, as well as the absence of the need for repairs on the high seas (maintenance only in the base, modular repair), there is an opportunity for a global reduction in crews. The reference example is Zamvolt, which requires only 140 people to manage. For comparison, the crews of cruisers of the WWII era, similar in displacement, consisted of 1100-1500 people.
After all this, the "experts" will tell you how demanding modern ships are in terms of volume and what incredible efforts are required to accommodate modern equipment.
The main takeaways from these calculations are:
1. Rockets occupy less space than turret squads of artillery ships.
2. The resulting difference means little. The in-hull volumes allocated for the installation of weapons were insignificant and could not affect the overall architecture of the ship.
The appearance of warships is determined by completely different parameters.
For WWII cruisers - placement of combat posts and weapons on a limited area of the upper deck. The lower freeboard was dictated by the weight of outdated mechanisms and armor - so that there was nowhere to get reserves for building the sides. However, the designers were much more concerned with the issue related to the length of the propulsion system, associated with the need to ensure a speed of 35-40 knots. for large displacement ships.
In the design of modern destroyers, priority is given to things, to put it mildly, strange. For example, a decrease in visibility. There is nothing wrong with the very desire to reduce visibility. Disguise is a basic principle of military science.
Only it is not clear why to pile up a solid superstructure, trying to ensure a smooth transition of its walls to the freeboard. And by combining gas ducts and antennas in its design. Thousands of tons to the wind. Isn't it easier to abandon the superstructure altogether - at least, modern technologies allow it.
Immense reserves allow you to embody all the ideas of the designers. Thanks to the forecastle extended to the stern, it became possible to make all decks parallel to the structural waterline. This simplifies all calculations, communications, installation, installation and replacement of equipment.
But this aspect will remain relevant exactly until fire is opened on the ship in battle.
