“The design of the new destroyer is carried out in two versions: with a conventional power plant and with a nuclear power plant. This ship will have more versatile capabilities and increased firepower. It will be able to operate in the far sea zone both singly and as part of the naval groupings"
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, statement of September 11, 2013
The propulsion system is the heart of any technology. The parameters of all mechanisms and subsystems that make up the structure under consideration are rigidly tied to the energy source. The choice of a power plant is the most difficult stage in the design of a technical system, on the correctness of which (and the availability of a suitable control system) everything depends.
The feasibility of having a nuclear power plant on a promising Russian destroyer raises long discussions. Each of the parties cites noteworthy arguments, while official sources do not provide any specific clarifications about the characteristics and appearance of the future ship.
The initial data are as follows. To date, the need for a nuclear power plant (NPS) has been confirmed on three classes of ships and vessels:
- on submarines (the reason is obvious - the need for a powerful air independent power plant);
- on icebreakers, due to their long-term operation at maximum power. The installed capacity utilization factor for modern nuclear icebreakers is 0.6 … 0.65 - twice as high as that of any naval warship. Icebreakers literally "break down" in the ice, while not being able to leave the route to replenish fuel supplies;
- on supercarriers, where the monstrous size and power make the use of conventional SUs unprofitable. However, British designers have recently denied this statement - gas turbines were preferred on the new aircraft carrier. At the same time, it was planned to equip Queen Elizabeth (60 thousand tons) with an extremely energy-consuming system - the EMALS electromagnetic catapult.
The need to equip ships of other classes with nuclear control systems looks doubtful. By the beginning of the XXI century. In the world, there are practically no combat surface nuclear-powered ships of the cruiser / destroyer class. Moreover, there are no plans abroad to create such ships. The Americans wrote off all their nuclear cruisers back in the mid-90s, with the wording "unreasonably high cost of operation, in the absence of specific advantages."
The only exception is the Russian heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great (which is also considered the largest and most expensive non-aircraft-carrying ship in the world) and its brother, the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR currently being upgraded (the former Kalinin cruiser, launched three decades ago).
It would seem that everything is obvious: a promising nuclear destroyer for the Russian Navy looks like a complete anachronism. But the problem is much deeper than it seems at first glance.
The pros and cons
The argumentation of the opponents of the construction of nuclear destroyers is based on five "postulates" put forward in the report of the operational command of the US Navy headquarters in 1961:
1. The factor of increasing the cruising range at maximum speeds for surface ships is not decisive. In other words, there is no need for naval sailors to cross seas and oceans at a 30-knot stroke.
Patrolling, controlling sea communications, searching for submarines, escorting convoys, humanitarian and military operations in the coastal zone - all this requires much lower speeds. Driving at full speed is often hampered by weather and hydrographic conditions. Finally, it is worth thinking about the safety of the resource of the mechanisms - the head "Orlan" ("Kirov", aka "Admiral Ushakov") finally "killed" its power plant during a campaign to the place of death of "Komsomolets". Four days at full speed!
2. Higher cost of a ship with YSU. At the time when the aforementioned report was written, it was known that the construction of a nuclear cruiser is 1, 3-1, 5 times more expensive than the construction of a ship with a similar armament composition with a conventional power plant. It was not possible to compare the cost of operation, due to the lack of experience in operating nuclear-powered ships in those years.
Currently, this item still raises the most questions. The main secret is the cost of uranium fuel assemblies (taking into account their transportation and disposal). Nevertheless, according to recent estimates, if the current dynamics of oil prices continue, the cost of a 30-year life cycle for surface ships of the main classes will, on average, be 19% higher than the cost of a cycle for their non-nuclear counterparts. The construction of a nuclear destroyer will only be expedient if the oil price rises to $ 233 per barrel by 2040. The existence of a nuclear amphibious assault ship (of the Mistral type) will be beneficial only if the oil price rises to $ 323 per barrel by 2040 (at the rate of 4.7% per year).
The growth of energy consumption and the installation of advanced equipment on board destroyers are also not too worried about the sailors. The capabilities of existing ship generators are sufficient to power superradars with a peak power of 6 MW. In the event of the appearance of even more voracious systems (AMDR, 10 megawatts), the designers propose to solve the problem by installing an additional generator in one of the Orly Burke's helicopter hangars, without fundamental changes in the design and damage to the combat capabilities of the small destroyer.
Stop! Who said that a nuclear power plant should have more power than a gas turbine of similar size ?! This will be discussed in the next paragraph.
3. As of the beginning of the 60s, the weight and dimensions of shipboard nuclear power plants significantly exceeded those of conventional power plants (with the same power on the propeller shafts). The reactor, with its cooling circuits and biological shielding, weighed no more than a water boiler or a gas turbine with a supply of fuel.
A nuclear steam generating plant (NPPU) is not all. To convert the energy of superheated steam into kinetic energy of rotating screws, a main turbo-gear unit (GTZA) is required. It is a bulky turbine with a gearbox, which is not inferior in size to a conventional gas turbine.
It becomes clear why the nuclear cruisers of the Cold War were each time larger than their non-nuclear counterparts.
There is every reason to believe that this situation persists to this day. The declared indicators of promising nuclear steam generating plants suitable for installation on ships (RHYTHM 200, 80 thousand hp, weight 2200 tons) lead to certain conclusions: the NPPU weighs no less than a set of gas turbines (a typical LM2500 weighs within 100 tons, each of the destroyers is equipped with four such installations) and the required fuel supply (the average for modern cruisers and destroyers is 1300 … 1500 tons).
From the presented advertising booklet OKBM im. Afrikantov, it is not clear whether this figure (2200 tons) includes the mass of turbine generators, but it is quite obvious that this value does not include the masses of propeller motors. (approx. YAPPU "RITM 200" was created for the newest icebreakers pr. 22220 with full electric propulsion).
And this despite the fact that any nuclear-powered ship is necessarily equipped with a backup power plant (diesel engines / boilers), which allows, in the event of an accident, the nuclear power plant to crawl to the shore at the minimum speed. These are the standard safety requirements.
The engine room of the amphibious assault helicopter carrier "America".
The ship is propelled by two General Electric LM2500 gas turbines
4. The fourth postulate states that for the maintenance of the YSU it is necessary to have a larger number of service personnel, moreover, of higher qualifications. That entails a further increase in the displacement and cost of operating the ship.
Perhaps this situation was fair for the beginning of the atomic era of the fleet. But already in the 70s it lost its meaning. It is easy to see this by looking at the number of crews of nuclear submarines (on average 100-150 people). 130 people were enough to manage a huge two-reactor "loaf" (Project 949A). The record was held by the inimitable "Lyra" (project 705), whose crew consisted of 32 officers and warrant officers!
5. The most important remark. The autonomy of a ship is limited not only by fuel supplies. There is also autonomy for provisions, for ammunition, for spare parts and consumables (lubricants, etc.). For example, the estimated supply of food on board "Peter the Great" is only 60 days (with a crew of 635 people)
There are no problems with fresh water - it is received directly on board in any required quantities. But there are problems with the reliability of mechanisms and equipment. As with the endurance of the crew, sailors cannot spend six months on the high seas without going ashore. People and technology need rest.
Finally, discussions around unlimited cruising range lose their meaning when discussing actions as part of a squadron. It is not possible to equip every helicopter carrier, minesweeper or frigate with the YSU - the nuclear destroyer, one way or another, will have to drag along with everyone, watching how other ships replenish the fuel supply with the help of the KSS and naval tankers.
On the other hand, supporters of the use of NFM argue that any fabrications about autonomy in food stocks are a cheap provocation. The biggest problem is always fuel. Thousands of tons of fuel! Everything else - food, spare parts - has a relatively compact size. They can be easily and quickly delivered to the ship or pre-stored in compartments (when it is known that a trip to full autonomy is planned).
British destroyer HMS Daring.
Today it is the most advanced destroyer in the world.
Opponents of nuclear energy have their own serious arguments. The best of modern power plants, built on a forward-looking full electric propulsion (FEP) scheme and using a combination of economic diesel engines and afterburner gas turbines (CODLOG), demonstrate impressive efficiency and economy. The modest destroyer Daring is able to cover up to 7000 nautical miles (from Murmansk to Rio de Janeiro) at one refueling.
When operating in remote sea areas, the autonomy of such a ship hardly differs from the autonomy of a nuclear-powered ship. A lower cruising speed, compared to a nuclear ship, is not decisive in the age of radar, aviation and missile weapons. Moreover, as noted above, the nuclear-powered ship also cannot continuously move at a speed of 30+ knots - otherwise, it will need an annual overhaul with a complete replacement of the power plant.
At the same time, one naval tanker (integrated supply ship) is capable of refueling five to ten such destroyers in one voyage!
Destroyers "Guangzhou" (project 052B, board No. 168) and "Haikou" (project 052S, board. No. 171) take fuel from the Qiandaohu space station (board No. 887)
Among other arguments put forward by opponents of the construction of nuclear surface ships, it should be noted doubts about the high survivability of a nuclear destroyer and its safety in the event of combat damage. After all, a damaged gas turbine is just a pile of metal. The damaged reactor core is a deadly emitter capable of finishing off all who survived the enemy's attack.
The facts show that fears about the consequences of reactor damage are greatly exaggerated. Suffice it to recall the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine. A terrible explosion that destroyed several compartments did not cause a radiation catastrophe. Both reactors were automatically shut down and safely lay for a whole year at a depth of over 100 meters.
Blessed memory of the fallen
It should be added that in addition to the local armoring of the reactor compartment, the reactor vessel itself is made of a powerful metal array a decimeter thick. None of the modern anti-ship missiles is capable of disturbing the reactor core.
The survivability of a nuclear-powered ship is hardly very different from the survivability of conventional destroyers. The combat durability of a ship with YSU may turn out to be even higher, due to the absence of thousands of tons of fuel on board. At the same time, his death can cause irreparable consequences for those around him. This risk should always be taken into account when sending a nuclear-powered ship to war. Any emergency on board, fire or grounding will become world-wide accidents (as is the case with nuclear submarines).
The unhealthy attention of the public to nuclear ships, fueled by dishonest pseudo-environmentalists, creates big problems for the development of shipboard nuclear systems. And if the ban on approaching the shores of New Zealand is unlikely to have any significance for the domestic fleet, then the international ban on the entry of nuclear-powered ships into the Black Sea can cause a lot of trouble and problems for the Russian Navy. The basing of destroyers in Sevastopol will be impossible. In addition, there will be problems with the passage of the Suez and Panama Canals. The owners of hydraulic structures will not miss an opportunity and, in addition to lengthy paperwork, will impose a triple tribute on sailors.
Why does Russia need a nuclear destroyer?
On the technical side, nuclear destroyers will not have any serious advantages or disadvantages over ships with conventional power plants (gas turbine or combined type).
Higher cruising speed, unlimited (in theory) autonomy in terms of fuel reserves and no need for refueling during the entire military campaign … Alas, all these advantages can hardly be realized in practice, in the course of real combat services of the Navy. And that is why they are not of particular interest to the fleet. Otherwise, nuclear and conventional power plants have approximately equal weights, dimensions and provide the same power on the propeller shafts. The danger of radiation accidents can be neglected - as the experience of operating the domestic icebreaker fleet shows, the probability of such an event is close to zero.
The only drawback of shipboard YSUs is their higher cost. At least, this is indicated by the data of open reports of the US Navy and the absence of nuclear destroyers in foreign fleets.
Another drawback of ships with nuclear power systems is associated with the geographic location of Russia - the Black Sea Fleet is left without destroyers.
At the same time, the use of nuclear systems on Russian ships has a number of important prerequisites. As you know, power plants have always been the weak point of domestic ships. The destroyers of Project 956 frozen at the piers with "killed" boiler-turbine power plants became the talk of the town, as did the ocean campaigns of the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov" accompanied by rescue tugs (in case of another power plant breakdown). Experts express complaints about the overly complicated and confusing scheme of the gas turbine power plant of the Atlant-type missile cruisers (project 1164) - with a heat recovery circuit and auxiliary steam turbines. Observant photographers excite the public with photographs of the Russian corvettes of the project 20380, throwing out caps of thick smoke. As if before us are not the latest ships, built using stealth technology, but a paddle steamer on the Mississippi River.
And against the background of this outrage - countless world tours of the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great", which rushes around the globe without stopping. Maneuvers in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Tartus - and now the bulk of the cruiser, accompanied by icebreakers, is lost in the fog in the area of the New Siberian Islands. Russian nuclear icebreakers demonstrate no less reliability and efficiency (however, the word "Russian" is superfluous here - no other country in the world has nuclear icebreakers, except for the Russian Federation). On July 30, 2013, the nuclear-powered icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy reached the North Pole for the hundredth time. Impressive?
It turns out that the Russians have learned a thing or two. If we have such successful experience in the development and operation of shipboard nuclear systems, why not use it in the creation of promising warships? Yes, obviously such a ship will turn out to be more expensive than its non-nuclear counterpart. But, in fact, we simply do not have an alternative to YSU.
Also, do not forget that, unlike the American fleet, we have a completely different concept for the development of the Navy.
The Yankees relied on the mass construction of destroyers, with the use of complete standardization and unification of their components and mechanisms (which, however, did not help much - the ships still turned out to be monstrously complex and expensive).
Our surface component, due to different national characteristics, will look different: a couple of large attack destroyers, similar in size to the experimental American destroyer Zamvolt, surrounded by cheaper and more massive frigates. Russian destroyers will be expensive "piece goods", and the use of nuclear systems is unlikely to have a noticeable impact on the cost of operating these monsters. Nuclear destroyer or destroyer with conventional power plant? In my opinion, each of these options in our case is a win-win. The main thing is that the USC and the Ministry of Defense quickly move from words to deeds and begin the construction of new Russian destroyer-class ships.
