I read with great interest the discussion about a promising Russian destroyer in the topic: "Alvaro de Basan" as a collective image of the future Russian destroyer and realized that there was not the slightest opportunity to reply to the respected author of the article and no less respected participants in the discussion within the narrow framework of commentary. Therefore, I decided to express my point of view on the problems raised in a separate article, which I offer to your favorable attention.
So, a promising destroyer of the Russian Federation - what should it become? In order to understand this, it is necessary to answer the question - what tasks are set for a ship of this class? The thing is that the normal development cycle of a ship involves first setting the tasks that this ship will have to solve, and only then - developing the project. Moreover, the development of a project is a search for the most effective way to solve the assigned tasks. Including, of course, on the cost / efficiency scale.
Tasks of the promising destroyer of the Russian Federation
Let's start with the fact that the President, the Security Council and the Government of the Russian Federation adopted fundamental decisions in the field of improving and developing the maritime activities of the Russian Federation (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 4.03.00 "On improving the maritime activities of the Russian Federation", Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14.06.00 "On measures on the improvement of the maritime activities of the Russian Federation ", the" Fundamentals of the Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of maritime activities until 2010 "and" Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until 2020 "were approved). At the state level, an understanding was formed that the XXI century. will be the century of the oceans and Russia must be ready for this.
At the same time, according to the "Fundamentals of the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities until 2010," the Russian Navy is entrusted with the tasks of not only protecting maritime borders and nuclear deterrence, but also conducting combat operations in the world's oceans. Here are some excerpts from the document:
"… protection of the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean by military methods."
"Control over the activities of the naval forces of foreign states and military-political blocs in the seas adjacent to the country's territory, as well as in other areas of the World Ocean, which are important for the security of the Russian Federation."
"Timely build-up of forces and means in the regions of the World Ocean, from where a threat to the security interests of the Russian Federation may come"
"Creation and maintenance of conditions for the security of economic and other types of activities of the Russian Federation in its territorial sea … … as well as in remote areas of the World Ocean."
"Ensuring the naval presence of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, demonstration of the flag and military strength of the Russian state …"
In other words, one can argue for a long time about whether the Russian Federation needs or does not need an ocean-going fleet. But the Government of the Russian Federation (let's hope!) Has decided that such a fleet is NEEDED, and therefore further discussion on this topic of the usefulness / uselessness of the ocean-going fleet is beyond the scope of this article. Well, for a promising EM for the Russian Navy, this means a mandatory requirement - to be an ocean-going ship.
The next step of the leadership of the Russian Federation (or at least the Navy) was the understanding that these tasks, in general, can be effectively solved only with the presence of an aircraft carrier component in the fleet. Hence the development of a project for a promising aircraft carrier of the Russian Federation. As it became known, the Russian Federation is still considering the creation of aircraft carrier groups (naval aircraft carrier systems, MAC) in the medium term. Obviously, the composition of such formations will require four mandatory types of ships - the aircraft carrier itself, the missile and artillery surface escort ship, the nuclear submarine and the supply ship. Optionally, the MAS can be supplemented with amphibious forces (with the involvement of various types of amphibious ships from small to DKVD). Obviously, a promising Russian destroyer should be capable of performing the role of a missile and artillery battleship escorting an aircraft carrier - i.e. be able to provide air defense and anti-aircraft missile defense connections.
But you need to understand that the Russian Federation is not the United States and we will not build a dozen MAS in the foreseeable future. Even if the construction of the first aircraft carrier begins before 2020, God forbid we get it by 2030 (and this is still a very optimistic estimate). And by 2040 (when we, in theory, could have built a second aircraft carrier), the time will come to withdraw Kuznetsov from the Navy … Any ship should spend some time in scheduled repairs - in general, it is not easy to count on the fact that even in 2040, as part of the Russian Navy, 365 days a year, at least one MAS would be in the "ready for march and battle" state. And if, nevertheless, there is one such - will this be enough for all hot spots where the presence of the flag of the Russian Navy is necessary?
And this means that at least the functions of demonstrating the flag and projection of force, our prospective EVs should be able to perform without the support of an aircraft carrier.
And so it turns out that a promising EM for the Russian Navy should:
1) To be an ocean-going ship capable of operating in the world's oceans for a long time, in isolation from its own bases.
2) Be able to deliver powerful strikes against both sea and land targets.
3) Effectively perform the functions of air defense / missile defense / PLO compounds
It turns out interesting. To meet our needs, we need a ship that will be even more powerful than the missile cruisers of the Soviet Union! For the RKR of the USSR had a great strike potential, decent air defense and anti-aircraft defense, but they had almost no opportunities for striking along the coast.
On the other hand, we will not need dozens of such ships. They should be used in our naval aircraft carrier systems - about 4-5 EMs in the MAS, and since in the foreseeable future (until 2050) it is hardly possible to count on more than 2-3 ABs as part of the Russian Navy, then they are required no more than 10-15 units. Of course, one can argue that even the huge USSR was not able to build so many large missile cruisers - however, one should recall the gigantic series of other large Soviet ships - BODs and destroyers, designed to operate in the oceanic zone. We do not need any of this - the promising EM of the Russian Navy should become a UNITED ocean-going missile-artillery ship, and there should be no other ships of the oceanic zone and similar tasks in the Russian Navy. This type of ship is intended to replace, in terms of its functionality, the BOD, destroyers and missile cruisers of the USSR fleet.
It is easy to see that the functionality of the promising EM of the Russian Navy is broader than the tasks of the American EM "Arleigh Burke". But we will dwell on this difference in more detail a little later.
What qualities should a promising EM have? First, let's take a look at weapons.
Cruise missiles
In order for a promising EM to be able to project force on the naval formations of a probable adversary (including those corresponding to the strength and security of the US AUG), the destroyer must be equipped with at least 24 modern Onyx-class anti-ship missiles. In this case, a combination of 2-3 destroyers can create an extremely real threat to the modern AUG (to break through the missile defense of which no less than 60 anti-ship missiles are required).
Here, many participants in the discussions usually give a very serious argument - why focus on equipping surface ships with anti-ship missiles at all, if the modern AUG will never allow the enemy's ship strike group to reach a missile salvo range? They are right in many ways. But only if the hostilities have already begun, and even in the open ocean, where there is room for maneuver, then yes, a group of surface ships not covered by aviation will be destroyed long before the missile salvo reaches the range. But we must remember that surface ships are not only an instrument of war, but also an instrument of big politics. Imagine the Mediterranean Sea (650 to 1300 km wide), remember the narrowness of the Persian Gulf. The ship, which stands in the middle of the Middle Sea and has an anti-ship missile on board with a range of 500 km, is capable of shooting through almost the entire width of the Mediterranean Sea from the African to the European coast! What does this mean? Consider a certain situation.
Libya. The hostilities have not yet begun. British and French ships (including the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle) maneuver off the Libyan coast. But suddenly a couple of EMs with long-range anti-ship missiles enters through Gibraltar - and the NATO squadron has a "rich" choice - either go beyond the anti-ship missile range (but at the same time lose the ability to deliver effective air strikes on the territory of Libya) - or not go anywhere, but stay within the radius of action of the anti-ship missile … in fact, this is what is called - the projection of force.
On the other hand, if the purpose of the projection of force is some kind of land state that does not have significant naval forces, no one bothers, instead of anti-ship missiles and part of heavy missiles, to load cruise missiles into the mines of our EM for work along the coast.
Air defense missiles / missile defense
The only way available to me to somehow calculate the required number of SAMs of all types is to try to simulate a typical battle with a possible enemy, in which the projected ship will participate and calculate the required SAM ammunition based on the resulting model. To the best of my modest knowledge, I tried to make such estimates, as a result of which I reached the following figures - at least 10 long-range missiles (400+ km), at least 60 medium-range missiles (150-200 + km) and about 80 short-range missiles (PRO functions). This, by the way, roughly corresponds to the typical load of "Arleigh Burk" in the air defense version - 74 SAM "Standard" and 24 SAM "Sea Sparrow" (or ESSM) And in total we will need at least 75 cells of UVP. (heavy and medium missiles occupy one cell, but the 9M100 anti-missile missiles currently being developed fit as many as 16 pieces into one Polyment-Reduta cell).
Our destroyer desperately needs long-range missiles. The thing is that the dominance of aviation over surface ships is largely ensured by the "Hawkeye" of carrier-based aircraft - AWACS aircraft. It is they who, from a distant and unattainable air defense ship, detect an enemy order from a distant and unattainable air defense ship, from there they organize and coordinate an air strike. Thanks to them, attack aircraft do not stick out from behind the radio horizon, hiding there from the radars of the ships they attack. As a result, attack planes on ships do not see at all - and they learn about the attack only by detecting on radars the illumination of approaching anti-ship and anti-radar missiles.
But AWACS aircraft have one big potential drawback - they themselves cannot hide behind the radio horizon, otherwise they will lose sight of the enemy. And they have a range limitation - all the same radio horizon, i.e. about 450 km. (the theoretical maximum that can be seen by a radar aircraft at an altitude of 10 thousand meters, and above it can not climb) Usually, the "Hokai" carry out guidance even closer - 250-300 km from the attacked compound. And the presence on the ship of a sufficiently powerful radar to make out an AWACS at 400+ km and an air defense missile system capable of dropping a clumsy "flying radar" from the sky at the same distance can hardly be overestimated - without AWACS, the strike groups will have to look for the ship themselves - go beyond the radio horizon, turn on their own Avionics - and become prey for missile defense ships. Yes, they will most likely destroy the ship anyway - but now they will have to pay the real price for it. I just want to remind you that the average Hornet costs about $ 55 million. The E-2C Hawkeye is about $ 80 million. But the promising deck-mounted F-35 will cost 150 million dollars. a piece. In other words, a dozen Hornets are our frigate Admiral Gorshkov in value, and one Hawkeye and 10 F-35s together cost almost like Arleigh Burke … irrevocably.
PLO
This is a very difficult question. Ideally, I would like to get a universal launcher capable of firing both heavy torpedoes (533-650 mm) and counter-torpedoes (325-400 mm), and at the same time also missile-torpedoes of the "Waterfall" type. An alternative to this could be the placement of a number of missile-torpedoes based on the Kalibr-91RTE2 missiles in the UVP, but this will take away the cells of the UVP, which are already worth their weight in gold. In addition, I have some doubts about the effectiveness of small-caliber torpedoes against modern submarines. I vaguely remember the ancient issue of "Marine Sbornik", which stated that according to American estimates, the guaranteed destruction of SSGNs of the "Antey" type required up to 4 hits from the American 324-mm Mk46 … But, perhaps I am not right.
In general, either at least a dozen more UVP cells for 91RTE2 missile-torpedoes plus the 330-mm Paket-NK anti-torpedo complex (such as on the Guarding corvette), or the universal torpedo launchers described above.
In total, in terms of missile and torpedo armament, we go to:
The first option: one UVP for 24 cells for heavy anti-ship missiles / KR, one UVP for 70-80 cells for missiles, four 533-mm TA tubes for torpedoes, anti-torpedoes and missile-torpedoes.
The second option: One UVP for 24 cells for heavy anti-ship missiles / KR, one UVP for 80-90 cells for SAM and PLUR and 330-mm anti-torpedo "Packet-NK".
Here the question may arise - why am I so stubbornly sharing the UVP for cruise missiles with the UVP for anti-aircraft missiles and PLUR? It would seem that the Americans have long ago indicated the only correct direction of development - a single UVP for all types of missile weapons …
That is how it is, but not quite. The thing is that the Americans, having created their magnificent Mk41, became … its own hostages. The installation is designed to fire approximately one and a half ton rockets. At the time of the appearance of the installation, the most effective missile systems that were in service with the Americans - "Tomahawk", SAM "Standard", ASROK, fit into this limitation. And when the Americans became convinced of the extremely high efficiency of the Mk41 UVP (I am completely without irony. The Mk41 is indeed a very outstanding weapon), they quite logically decided - in the future to develop for the Navy only such missiles that can fit into the Mk41 … But time goes by, NTR unstoppable, and the Americans were stuck on one and a half ton rockets.
This is not critical for the United States. The United States, possessing the most powerful aircraft carrier fleet, many times superior to other aircraft carrier forces in the world put together, assigned strike functions to carrier-based aircraft. The main functions of their surface ships are air defense / missile defense AUG (one and a half ton missiles are quite enough for these purposes), as well as strikes against coastal targets with cruise missiles - for these purposes the Tomahawk CD is still quite sufficient. But the Russian Federation, alas, cannot in any way shift the strike functions to naval aviation - simply because of the extremely small number of carrier-based aviation both now and in the foreseeable future.
And what do we get?
It is obvious that the placement of the S-400 and S-500 complexes on the ships of the "overwhelmed" SAM systems is generally uncontested - it would be insane waste to develop a separate family of SAM systems for the fleet. It is also obvious that these missiles require a new UVP - because the UVPs on our missile cruisers (S-300F complex) are a kind of parody of a revolver - the missiles are placed in a drum that turns after the missile is launched, delivering another missile to the "barrel" from which the "shot" is made. Naturally, such an installation loses in terms of reliability and mass-dimensional characteristics of conventional UVP. In general - we need the most common UVP of the Mk41 type or "Polyment-Reduta" without any revolving cowboy bells and whistles. But the question is - what mass and dimensions of the rocket should the UVP cells be? Obviously, the greater the mass of the rocket, the larger its dimensions and the fewer cells for them will fit in the given size of the air-charge device.
Our S-400/500 missiles have a mass of 1800-1900 kg. "Caliber" in its heaviest hypostasis (naturally, of the modifications known to us) - already 2200 kg. But the anti-ship missile "Onyx" - 3.1 tons.
Therefore, as I believe, there is no point in making a single airborne missile system capable of launching Onyx, Caliber and SAM from the S-400/500. Simply because by creating cells for more than three-ton Onyx, we will reduce the total number of cells and thereby reduce the total ammunition load of the ship - although the Onyx is large, you cannot stick 2 Caliber or 2 40N6E into the cell instead. And you need to understand that even having created a single UVP for "Onyx", "Caliber" and SAM from the S-400/500 universal UVP for all the missiles of the fleet, we will not get all the same. Because somewhere, in the quiet of the design bureau, hypersonic missiles are being developed, and what their mass will be - one can only guess … But certainly not three tons. Therefore, in my opinion, you should not try to grasp the immensity. The most correct, in my opinion, will be the development of a UVP for missiles weighing up to 2, 2 tons - with the ability to use the entire range of S-400/500 as well as the entire family of Caliber missiles.
I believe it is necessary to have two types of UVP on a promising destroyer of the Russian Federation - one UVP, similar to the one installed on the frigate "Admiral Gorshkov", with the ability to carry 24 anti-ship missiles "Onyx" / "Bramos" / "Caliber" and not intended to accommodate missiles) But the second The UVP should be of a new project - with cells for missiles weighing up to 2, 2 tons, for 70-80 cells for S-400/500 missiles of all types and missiles of the Caliber family in the form of anti-ship missiles, KR, or PLUR.
Subsequently, as hypersonic missiles appear, it will be possible to dismantle the 24-cell UVP for Onyx / Bramos / Caliber, replacing it with the UVP for hypersonic anti-ship missiles. Since the developers, unlike me, have a rough idea of both the performance characteristics and the weight and size characteristics of the future hypersound, it is possible to take into account such an upgrade in the destroyer project in advance, greatly facilitating its implementation in the future.
Surely many readers already have a malicious question - why am I dreaming about ultra-long-range missiles, which have not been able to be adopted for a year already? About hypersonic missiles, which are not even close, not even in service, but also in prototypes?
It's like that. But the fact is that planning to keep in the fleet 16 EVs of a new type, and even if we lay down the first EVs no later than 2014-2016, it should be admitted that at a VERY good, downright MAGIC rate, we will get the first ships where- sometime starting in 2020, and we will complete the series in 2035-2040. Because they are not united by destroyers. We still have to build aircraft carriers, and light ships and submarines … And the last ships of the series will serve their term somewhere closer to 2070-2075. It is for this period that we need to figure out the composition of weapons and modernization potential, and not try to live exclusively for today.
But I digress. Meanwhile, it turns out that a promising destroyer of the Russian Federation should have about 94-110 UVP cells. It turns out that the number of UVP cells roughly corresponds to the "Arleigh Burke" with its 96 cells - though you need to take into account the fact that our missiles are heavier. Accordingly, our destroyer should be heavier than the Arleigh Burke.
Now let's see what they write about the real project of a promising destroyer
“The main weapon of the new ship should be universal ship firing systems that can be loaded with a variety of missiles, … The displacement of a promising destroyer, depending on the choice of weapons and power plant, will be from 9-10 to 12-14 thousand tons…. Ammunition of anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine missile torpedoes, cruise missiles for firing at ground targets and medium and long-range anti-aircraft missiles will range from 80-90 to 120-130 units."
For those who believe that the number of missiles also includes small missiles such as the "Dagger" complex or the promising 9M100, I would like to emphasize - "LARGE AND MEDIUM-RANGE anti-aircraft missiles."
In other words, there is some confidence that my guesses and calculations do not differ much from those that guided both the directors of the technical specification and the developers of the project.
Artillery
Here it is extremely difficult to say something for sure. In my opinion, the main caliber of a promising destroyer should be one or even two 152-mm twin "Coalition-SV". Why is that?
Let's try to figure out why large-caliber guns are needed at all on modern warships. In a naval battle, there is little sense from artillery systems of 120-155 mm caliber - insufficient range, coupled with low accuracy, can successfully destroy only non-military ships of the enemy. Guided projectiles are interesting, but only when someone illuminates the target with a laser beam, which is far from always possible at sea. As an anti-aircraft weapon, there is little sense from such a gun - its effectiveness is much less than short-range and medium-range anti-aircraft missiles. But to support the landing and shelling the coast, artillery systems of this caliber have no alternative. A cruise missile is an expensive pleasure, even a guided missile is 10-15 times cheaper - and it is capable of destroying a field fortification no worse, and even better than a CD. Therefore, if we assume that our ocean-going ships should be able to operate against the coast, and that amphibious forces may appear as part of the IAS, then the appearance of a 152-mm caliber on our EMs is more than appropriate.
Opponents of the "Coalition" installation and skeptics say about this that the installation of such heavy artillery systems does not justify itself at all, that the "Coalition" will eat up too much of the ship's payload, but …
Let's take our famous AK-130
The two-gun mount produced an incredible 90 rounds / minute. But this rate of fire was bought at a very high price. The mass of the installation was, according to various sources, from 89 to 102 tons (the most common figure is 98 tons) Moreover, there is a feeling that the indicated mass does not even include the weight of the mechanized cellar (40 tons). This is a payment for the ability to conduct automatic fire, including at high elevation angles of the barrels and for the ability of the artillery system, without interruption, to empty the cellars in one long line.
And the self-propelled unit "Coalition-SV" weighs only 48 tons. With caterpillars and other running gear, which is completely unnecessary on the ship.
The thing is that, although the artillery system provides for a short-term "heavy fire", this is a forced mode used in case of need. Nobody tried to make a 152-mm submachine gun out of the Coalition. Yes, the installation fires no more than 10-12 rounds per minute in normal mode - but this is more than enough for shelling the coast. On the other hand, instead of ONE AK-130 installation, you can install TWO Coalition-SV sparks - and as if not to save weight at the same time.
And finally, the last one is small-caliber artillery. Here, I must admit, the question arose at full height, which is preferable - a small-caliber artillery complex like the AK-630M or "Duet" - or, after all, the ZRAK of the "Pantsir-C1" type. I did not manage to form a final opinion on this issue, but … In my opinion, the future belongs to purely artillery complexes, but those in which the guidance radar is installed directly on the artillery installation itself.
And the missiles … They only make the installation heavier, while the 9M100 antimissiles will probably be more effective than the 57E6-E installed on the Pantsir-C1. I believe it is necessary to place at least three or four such installations.
Helicopters
I believe that the ideal solution would be to base three helicopters on the destroyer. One of which is an AWACS helicopter, the other two are anti-submarine.
Why do we need AWACS? For any anti-ship missiles placed on board a promising destroyer, external target designation is required - a destroyer, even in theory, cannot have equipment capable of discerning enemy ships at a distance of 300-400 km. And the Ka-31, even just flying directly above the deck of a destroyer (and being protected by its missile defense system) is capable of delivering a control center to a range of 250-285 km. Of course, the capabilities of AWACS helicopters are much more modest than AWACS deck aircraft. Nobody argues that while creating aircraft carriers we will definitely have to develop "flying radars" for them. But in an aircraft carrier battle, additional AWACS will not be superfluous. Moreover, (dreaming is not harmful!) If it is possible to modify the radar of the helicopter in the desired direction, then such a helicopter will become an uber argument in the dispute between naval air defense and aviation …
The thing is that modern missiles have either a semi-active or an active seeker. What does it mean? Semi-active seeker is guided by the radar beam reflected from the target. In other words, for semi-active missiles, two radars are needed - one for a general view (for detecting targets) and the second for an illumination radar that forms a narrow and powerful beam (which, due to its narrowness, cannot be used for general search). The illumination radar focuses on the target detected by the general-purpose radar, a strong reflected signal is perceived by the seeker of the missile defense system, whose "dish" is working to receive. At the same time, the general view station cannot replace the illumination radar - it simply does not have enough power.
But SAM with an active seeker in the radar illumination, in general, does not need. After launching, its flight is corrected by the general surveillance radar, the task of which is not to accurately aim the missile at the target, but simply to bring it to the target area. In the immediate vicinity of the target (several kilometers), its own SAM radar is switched on - and then the SAM is guided completely independently.
The conclusion from this is offensive and simple - the missile defense system can have a range of 150 and 200 and 400 km - but if the target is not visible on the ship's radar, then firing at the aircraft is impossible. So it turns out that a ship with long-range missiles flying at 100 plus kilometers can be attacked by an aircraft pressing against the waves from a distance of 40 kilometers - and the ship is not able to do anything, because the aircraft is located beyond the radio horizon. It is not visible to the ship's radar, which means that it is impossible to use missiles on it.
But what if you manage to modify the radar of the helicopter to the point where it will be able to issue controllers not only to cruise missiles (which he is doing now) but also to missiles with an active seeker? This means that when an AWACS helicopter in the air, not a single flying infection will approach unnoticed at a distance closer than 200-250 km - and from these distances it will be possible to use long-range missiles.
Such an AWACS helicopter is capable of a small revolution in naval affairs - with its appearance, carrier-based aircraft will have to be equipped with much longer-range ammunition than now - and this will significantly reduce the ammunition load of attack aircraft and weaken the force of air strikes. By the way, it is possible later on it will be possible to create an AWACS UAV based on a helicopter.
So, ideally - three helicopters, one - AWACS and two anti-submarine. Since the ideal is probably unattainable - two helicopters, an AWACS and a submarine killer.
Chassis - nuclear power plant or power plant?
An extremely difficult question, which can only be answered with all the information about the options available to the Russian Federation today. The fact is that I have never been able to unearth a comparison of the life cycle cost of a nuclear power plant and a power plant. Opponents of nuclear power plants argue that a nuclear-powered ship is much more expensive than a ship with a conventional power plant - and this means not only the price of power plants, but also the cost of their operation. Although uranium rods are rarely replaced, the cost of uranium is extremely high. Plus, one should take into account the costs of disposing of a nuclear power plant that has reached its end of life. The use of nuclear power plants is potentially dangerous for the ship's sailors (well, how does the anti-ship missile system break through the reactor's protection?) The nuclear power plant is heavier and leads to an increase in displacement. The nuclear power plant does not provide a visible advantage for autonomy, since the latter is still limited by the amount of food supplies for the crew.
I would be willing to agree with these arguments. But here's the thing - firstly, there is some evidence of the development of small-sized and relatively inexpensive reactors, the installation of which on a ship does not seem to lead to a significant increase in displacement. And yet - with all its shortcomings, the nuclear power plant has at least one advantage - one, but extremely significant for the Russian Federation.
It is well known that the geographical position of the Russian Federation necessitates the presence of as many as four fleets separated by theaters. And in the event of any threat, the inter-theater maneuver of forces is very, very difficult - simply due to the distance. So a squadron of nuclear ships, for which, in fact, there is no concept of economic progress (it can move constantly at maximum speed) is capable of transferring from theater to theater much faster than ships with a power plant.
From Murmansk to Yokohama via Suez - 12,840 nautical miles. A ship with a nuclear power plant, constantly moving at 30 knots and making 720 nautical miles per day, in theory, is able to cover this distance in 18 days (in fact, of course, more - not everywhere on the route you can scald at 30 knots). But, for example, the same frigate of project 22350 will need more than 38 running days at its front 14 nodes of the economic course - and since even at economic speed it still cannot go more than 4000 miles at one gas station, it will have to refuel three times, and this is also the time …
By creating ocean-going destroyers with power plants, we will also have to create a fleet of high-speed refueling tankers, which is unnecessary in a squadron of ships with nuclear power plants. And this is also money.
Unfortunately, based on the knowledge I have, it is impossible to make a final conclusion about the priority of nuclear power plants over power plants, or vice versa. It is necessary to make the final decision, having all the information on the weight and size characteristics and the cost of construction and operation of both types of power plants and taking into account the full costs for one or another option. But swearing at the atomic lobby in the absence of all the necessary information is probably not worth it.
Price
Information appeared on the network that the new Russian destroyer would cost about $ 2-2.5 billion. a piece. Where does this data come from?
This is an article by Viktor Barantz, published in March 2010 https://www.kp.ru/daily/24454.4/617281/ How correct are these data? Alas, even the most cursory analysis shows that there is no faith in these data.
First, on March 11, 2010, Interfax reported:
“Research work is underway to shape the new ship of the far sea zone, and the technical documentation of the project is being drawn up. This process will take about 30 months."
It is obvious that at this stage it is "a little" too early to talk about the cost of the ship. Even the appearance of the ship has not yet been formed, which means that the main technical solutions have not been determined, the range of weapons and mechanisms is unknown, and of course their price … This means that the named 2-2.5 billion dollars were determined by the "half-finger-ceiling" method corrected for the integral of the North Star azimuth. As a matter of fact, the value of this figure is quite clear even from the context of Barantz's article. Here is the entire passage:
“The approximate price of the ship is $ 2-2.5 billion. The American analogue initially pulled at $ 3.5 billion, and then rose in price to $ 5 billion."
Tell me, do you know of an American destroyer whose cost has reached $ 5 billion? No? And I don't either. Because the cost of the super-expensive DDG-1000 Zamvolt is currently kept at around $ 3.2 billion per ship. And if the author overestimated the price of Zamvolt by more than one and a half times, how many times was the price of our promising Russian destroyer overstated?
The modern "Arlie Burke" is worth about 1.7 billion dollars at current prices. Our promising destroyer matches the Ticonderoga rather than the Burke. I believe (alas, there is no exact data) that the cost of the Ticonderoga in current prices would have amounted to about $ 2, 1-2, 3 billion. But our military equipment is always significantly cheaper than the American one. And our workers do not earn that much, and the domestic prices for raw materials in the Russian Federation are still in many cases lower than in the United States. Our price for the Borei was set at $ 900 million. And in the United States, the cost of Ohio SSBNs built in 1976-1997 ranged from $ 1.3 to $ 1.5 billion apiece - and if we recalculate it in today's prices, so all 2 billion will turn out. The Ohio upgrade alone raised $ 800 million per boat.
Therefore, I believe that even with a nuclear power plant and a displacement of 14,000 tons, the cost of a promising Russian destroyer will not exceed $ 1.6-1.9 billion.
Comparison of the project of a promising destroyer with foreign ships
Well, here we have sketched with broad strokes the approximate characteristics of a promising destroyer of the Russian Navy. They selected him such a composition of weapons that would fully meet the tasks facing the ships of this class. You can also dream up over its appearance. For example, like this:
And now is the time to see how the foreign ships meet our requirements. But alas, since the number of characters allocated for the article has come to an end, you will have to do this in the next article.
A promising destroyer for the Russian Navy - which one and why? (the ending)
