"The Germans will pass through Russia like a hot knife through butter", "Russia will be defeated within 10 weeks" - alarming reports of experts from the Foreign Office worried Churchill more and more. The course of hostilities on the Eastern Front gave no reason to doubt these disgusting forecasts - the Red Army was surrounded and defeated, Minsk fell on June 28. Very soon, Great Britain will again be left alone in the face of an even more strengthened Reich, which received the resources and industrial bases of the USSR. In light of such events, Great Britain and the United States agreed only to the sale of weapons and military materials to the Soviet Union.
On August 16, 1941, when Soviet soldiers fought exhausting battles on the outskirts of Kiev, Smolensk and Leningrad, in London, British politicians signed an important agreement on the provision of a new loan to the USSR for a period of 5 years (10 million pounds, at 3% per annum). At the same time, in Washington, the Soviet ambassador was handed a note of economic assistance, which contained a proposal to place Soviet defense orders on favorable terms with American enterprises. The Big Business rules are simple: Cash & Carry - “pay and take”.
A week later, the situation took a new turn, unexpected for British and American politicians. On the Eastern Front, a miracle happened - the Red Army moved from an unorganized, disorderly retreat to a retreat with battles, the Wehrmacht got stuck in heavy battles near Smolensk, the German army suffered heavy losses - all Blitzkrieg's plans were thwarted.
“The Russians will be able to survive the winter. This is of the utmost importance: England will get a long respite. Even if Germany suddenly wins, it will be so weakened that it will no longer be able to organize an invasion of the British Isles. The new report changed the position of the British government - now everything had to be done to make the Soviet Union hold out as long as possible.
Simple and cruel logic
Over the past half century, "Lend-Lease" has overgrown with many myths and legends - what kind of program it was, what were its conditions and significance for the USSR during the war, these issues are the reasons for heated disputes between convinced supporters of anti-Western policy "paid in gold for worthless trash" and loyal lovers of democratic values "America nobly extended a helping hand." In fact, everything is much more interesting.
The Lend-Lease Bill is just an American law passed on March 11, 1941. The meaning of the document is outrageously simple: it was decided to provide the maximum possible material and technical assistance to everyone who is fighting fascism - otherwise, there was a risk of surrender of Great Britain and the USSR (at least, so it seemed to overseas strategists), and America will be left alone with the Third Reich. The Americans had a choice:
a) go under the bullets;
b) get up to the machine.
Of course, the supporters of the "be" clause won with an overwhelming advantage, especially since the conditions at the American factories were even nothing compared to Tankograd or the factories evacuated beyond the Urals.
Deliveries from overseas were calculated according to the following scheme:
- what died in battle is not subject to payment. As they say, what has fallen is lost;
- after the war, the equipment that survived the battles had to be returned or, otherwise, bought out. In fact, they acted even easier: under the supervision of the American commission, the equipment was destroyed on the spot, for example, "Airacobras" and "Thunderbolts" were ruthlessly crushed by tanks. Naturally, at the sight of such vandalism, Soviet specialists could not hold back a tear - therefore, urgently, taking into account the Russian ingenuity, documents were forged, equipment in absentia was “destroyed in battles”, and “what fell, it was lost”. We managed to save a lot.
You need to clearly understand that Lend-Lease is NOT CHARITY. This is part of a well-thought-out defensive strategy, primarily in the interests of the United States. When signing the Lend-Lease protocols, the Americans least of all thought about the Russian soldiers who were dying somewhere near Stalingrad.
The Soviet Union never paid for Lend-Lease in gold, we paid for deliveries with the blood of our soldiers. This was the meaning of the American program: Soviet soldiers go under bullets, American workers go to factories (otherwise, soon American workers will have to go under the bullets). All the talk about “repaying a billion-dollar debt that the USSR has not wanted to repay for 70 years already” is ignorant chatter. Only the payment of the surviving property that was officially left after the war in the national economy of the Soviet Union (power plants, railway transport, intercity telephone communication nodes) is being discussed. This is a matter of interest. The Americans do not pretend to be more - they know the price of Lend-Lease better than we do.
In the fall of 1941, Great Britain, itself receiving aid from overseas, decided to apply this scheme in relation to the USSR. The Russians are fighting - we are doing everything to keep them as long as possible, otherwise the British will have to fight. Simple and brutal survival logic.
The first wishes of the Soviet Union regarding the volume and composition of foreign supplies were very mundane: Weapons! Give us more weapons! Airplanes and tanks!
The wishes were taken into account - on October 11, 1941, the first 20 British Matilda tanks arrived in Arkhangelsk. In total, by the end of 1941, 466 tanks and 330 armored personnel carriers were delivered to the USSR from Great Britain.
It should be emphasized that British armored vehicles are clearly not what could change the situation on the Eastern Front. For a more sober assessment of Lend-Lease, you should look at other things., for example, the supply of trucks and jeeps (automobile lend-lease) or the supply of food (4.5 million tons).
The value of "Matilda" and "Valentines" was not great, but, nevertheless, "foreign cars" were actively used in the Red Army, and, it happened, remained the only vehicles in strategically important areas. For example, in 1942, the troops of the North Caucasian Front got into a difficult situation - being cut off from the main industrial bases of the Urals and Siberia, they were 70% equipped with foreign armored vehicles that came along the "Iranian corridor".
In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 7162 units of British armored vehicles arrived in the Soviet Union: light and heavy tanks, armored personnel carriers, and bridgelayers. About 800 more cars, according to foreign data, were lost on the way.
The list of arriving vehicles that have joined the ranks of the Red Army is well known:
- 3332 tanks "Wallentine" Mk. III, - 918 tanks "Matilda" Mk. II, - 301 Churchill tanks, - 2560 armored personnel carriers "Universal", - tanks "Cromwell", "Tetrarch", as well as specialized vehicles in quantities unworthy of mention.
It should be noted that the concept of "Great Britain" means all the countries of the British Commonwealth, therefore, 1388 tanks "Valentine" were in fact assembled in Canada.
Also, in 1944, 1,590 repair shops were supplied from Canada to equip mobile tank repair factories and armored units, including: A3 and D3 mechanical workshops, an electromechanical workshop (on a GMC 353 truck chassis), an OFP-3 mobile charging station and an electric welding workshop KL-3 (on Canadian Ford F60L and Ford F15A chassis, respectively).
From a technical point of view, British tanks were not perfect. This was largely due to the wonderful classification of combat vehicles and their division into "infantry" and "cruiser" tanks.
Infantry tanks were vehicles of immediate support: slow, well-protected monsters to overcome defensive lines, destroy enemy fortifications and firing points.
"Cruiser tanks", on the contrary, were light and fast tanks with minimal protection and small caliber guns, designed for deep penetrations and rapid raids on enemy rear lines.
In principle, the idea of an "infantry tank" looks quite attractive - according to a similar concept, Soviet KV and IS-2 were created - highly protected tanks for assault operations. Where high mobility is not required, and priority is given to heavy armor and powerful weapons.
Alas, in the case of British armored vehicles, the sound idea was hopelessly ruined by the quality of execution: "Matilda" and "Churchill" were hypertrophied in the direction of increased security. British designers failed to combine the conflicting requirements of armor, mobility and firepower in one design - as a result, the Matilda, which was not inferior in armor to the KV, turned out to be extremely slow-moving and, in addition, was armed with only a 40 mm gun.
As for the British "cruiser tanks", as well as their counterparts - the Soviet BT series tanks, their intended use, in a war with a trained enemy, turned out to be impossible: too weak armor neutralized all other advantages. "Cruiser tanks" were forced to look for natural cover on the battlefield and to act from ambushes - only in this case success could be ensured.
A lot of trouble was caused by the operation of foreign equipment - the tanks were supplied according to British equipment standards, with markings and instructions in English. The technique was not sufficiently adapted to domestic conditions, there were problems with its development and maintenance.
And yet, attaching the label "useless trash" to British tanks would be, at the very least, incorrect - Soviet tankers won many remarkable victories on these vehicles. British armored vehicles, despite sometimes sounding absurd comparisons with the "Tigers" and "Panthers," were quite consistent with their class - light and medium tanks. Behind the unprepossessing appearance and meager "paper" performance characteristics, there were combat-ready vehicles that combined many positive aspects: powerful booking, well-thought-out (with rare exceptions) ergonomics and a spacious fighting compartment, high-quality manufacturing of parts and mechanisms, synchronized gearbox, hydraulic turret rotation. Soviet specialists especially liked the Mk-IV periscope observation device, which was copied and, under the designation MK-4, began to be installed on all Soviet tanks, starting in the second half of 1943.
Often, British armored vehicles were used without taking into account their design features and limitations (after all, these vehicles were clearly not designed for the Soviet-German front). However, in the South of Russia, where climatic and natural conditions corresponded to those for which British tanks were created, "Wallentines" and "Matildas" showed themselves from the best side.
Queen of the battlefield
In the winter of 1941, the British "Matilda" could ride with impunity across the battlefields of the Soviet-German front, as if it rolled out onto the Borodino field in 1812. 37 mm anti-tank "mallets" of the Wehrmacht were powerless to stop this monster. Opponents of "fire-hazardous" carburetor engines can rejoice - there was a diesel engine on the "Matilda", and not one, but two! Each with a capacity of 80 hp. - it is easy to imagine how high the mobility of this car was.
Some of the vehicles arrived in the USSR in the "Close Support" configuration - infantry fire support vehicles with 76 mm howitzers.
Actually, this is where the advantages of the British tank end and its disadvantages begin. There were no fragmentation shells for the 40mm cannon. The crew of four was functionally overwhelmed. "Summer" tracks did not keep the tank on a slippery road, the tankers had to weld on steel "spurs". And the side screens turned the operation of the tank into an absolute hell - between the screen and the tracks, dirt and snow were packed, turning the tank into an immobilized steel coffin.
Some of the problems were solved by developing new instructions for the operation of the tank. Soon, at one of the factories of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, a production line for 40 mm fragmentation shells was deployed (by analogy with the technological process of 37 mm ammunition). There were plans to re-equip the Matilda with the Soviet 76 mm F-34 cannon. However, in the spring of 1943, the Soviet Union finally refused to accept tanks of this type, but single Matildas were still encountered on the Soviet-German front until mid-1944.
The main advantage of the Matilda tanks was that they arrived on time. In the initial period of World War II, the performance characteristics of the "Matild" were quite consistent with the characteristics of the Wehrmacht tanks, which made it possible to use British armored vehicles in the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Rzhev operation, on the Western, South-Western, Kalinin, Bryansk fronts:
“… Tanks MK. II in battles showed themselves on the positive side. Each crew spent up to 200–250 rounds and 1–1, 5 rounds of ammunition each day of the battle. Each tank worked 550-600 hours instead of the required 220. The armor of the tanks showed exceptional durability. Individual vehicles had 17-19 hits with shells of 50 mm caliber and not a single case of penetrating the frontal armor."
Best in class
One of the most important qualities of the Valentine's riveted armored hull was the special arrangement of the rivets - history knows many cases when a projectile or bullet hit the rivet led to serious consequences: the rivet flew into the hull and ruthlessly crippled the crew. This problem did not arise on Valentine. It's amazing how the designers managed to install such a powerful and high-quality armor on such a small tank. (However, it is clear how - due to the cramped fighting compartment).
In terms of security, "Valentine" was many times superior to all of its classmates - the Soviet BT-7, or the Czech Pz. Kpfw 38 (t) in service with the Wehrmacht, had only bulletproof armor. The meeting between Valentine and the more modern PzKpfw III did not bode well for the German crew either - the British tank had a good chance of destroying the troika, while remaining unharmed.
The direct analogue of the Valentine tank was most likely the Soviet light tank T-70, which surpassed the British in speed, but was inferior in security and did not have a standard radio station.
Soviet tank crews noted such a shortcoming of the Valentine as a disgusting view from the driver. On the T-34 on the march, the mechanic could open its hatch in the frontal armor plate and radically improve the visibility - on the Wallentine there was no such opportunity, had to be content with a narrow and inconvenient viewing slot. By the way, the Soviet tank crews never complained about the close fighting compartment of the British tank, tk. on the T-34 it was even tighter.
In November 1943, the 139th Tank Regiment of the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 5th Army carried out a successful operation to liberate the village of Devichye Pole. The regiment had 20 T-34 and 18 Valentine tanks. On November 20, 1943, in cooperation with the 56th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, and the infantry of the 110th Guards Rifle Division, the tanks of the 139th Tank Regiment went forward. The attack was carried out at high speeds (up to 25 km / h) with a landing of armored submachine gunners and anti-tank guns attached to tanks. In total, 30 Soviet combat vehicles were involved in the operation. The enemy did not expect such a swift and massive blow and was unable to provide effective resistance. After breaking through the first line of enemy defense, the infantry dismounted and, having detached the cannons, began to take up positions, preparing to repel a possible counterattack. During this time, our troops advanced 20 km into the depth of the German defense, losing one KB, one T-34 and two Valentines.
Land cruiser
British attempt to create a heavy tank similar to the KV. Alas, despite all the efforts of the designers, the masterpiece did not work out - "Churchill" was morally outdated even before its appearance. However, there were also positive aspects - for example, a powerful booking (later it was strengthened to 150 mm!). Outdated 40 mm guns were often replaced by 57 mm or even 76 mm howitzer-type guns.
Due to their small numbers, Churchillies did not gain much fame on the Soviet-German front. It is known that some of them fought on the Kursk Bulge, and the Churchillies from the 34th Separate Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment were the first to break into Orel.
W. Churchill himself joked best of all about this vehicle: "The tank bearing my name has more shortcomings than myself."
The universal carrier
The Universal Carrier has fought all over the world, from the Soviet-German front to the Sahara and the jungles of Indonesia. 2560 of these unprepossessing, but very useful machines got to the USSR. The "Universal" armored personnel carriers have found application mainly in reconnaissance battalions.
Facts and figures are taken from M. Baryatinsky's book "Lend-Lease Tanks in Battle" and D. Loza's memoirs "A Tank Driver in a Foreign Car"
