Which is heavier: a kilogram of cotton wool or a kilogram of lead?
This material is a logical continuation of the recent discussion about the mystical "disappearance" of load articles on modern ships -
Engineers of past generations managed in an incomprehensible way to "squeeze" into the hull of a cruiser with a displacement of ≈10 thousand tons a lot of large-caliber guns in massive rotating towers, place bulky engine rooms with steam turbine power plants, provide living quarters for 900 crew and at the same time cover all important compartments and mechanisms of the ship multi-centimeter steel armor!
The trouble is that modern shipbuilders hardly have enough of the same 10 thousand tons to build an armored "tin" with computers and light launchers for missiles. The mass and dimensions of modern weapons are not very similar to the performance characteristics of the main caliber turret of the cruiser M. Gorky "(project 26-bis, 1938) - 247 tons excluding ammunition, thick steel barbets and mechanization of artillery cellars.
Modern computers, antennas and radars look no less amusing against the background of the 110-meter armor belts of the old ship (the width of the steel plates is 3.4 meters; the thickness is 70 mm). The total mass of the armor of the cruiser "M. Gorky "- 1536 tons!
At the same time, the full displacement of "M. Gorky "was only 9700 tons. Like a modern cruiser or destroyer!
Project 26-bis cruiser
Armor, heavy weapons, engine rooms with fuel oil boilers, "extra" 360 tons of fuel … all this disappeared. The crew was cut three times. But why has the displacement of modern ships remained at the same level?
The paradox has a number of simple explanations:
1. Jokes with metacentric height and stability were not in vain. The antennas of modern radars are quite lightweight compared to the armor of war cruisers, but take a look at where the antenna devices are located - on the roofs of superstructures and the tops of the masts! The "lever rule" comes into play - in order to avoid capsizing and maintain the metacentric height within normal limits, hundreds of tons of ballast have to be added in the underwater part of the ship.
2. The electronics boxes are lightweight but require a lot of free space to fit. It is no longer possible to put Tomahawks here and pour tons of fuel. Internal compartments "swell" in size - the designers "squeeze" them into huge superstructures. Compared to their glorious predecessors, modern cruisers have a less dense layout, but larger dimensions - as a result, a similar amount of water splashes out from under their bottom ("If a body is thrown into water, it will not sink for a long time", - used to say the Greek Archimedes).
In addition, bulky superstructures have high windage, which also negatively affects stability - it is necessary to compensate for their influence with another portion of ballast (filled with lead and blocks of depleted uranium along the keel of the ship).
3. Recent trends in shipbuilding:
- elevators and belt conveyors along the entire hull of the ship;
- automated systems for localizing combat damage and conducting damage control (smoke and water sensors, automatic locking of hatches and doors, video cameras, signal processors, automatic fire extinguishing systems);
- sealing and anti-nuclear protection elements (overpressure is maintained inside the cruiser hull, preventing the flow of outside air outside the ventilation system filters);
- increased requirements for power supply, cooling systems and air conditioning in the compartment where the electronics are installed;
- comfortable living conditions on board - gyms, swimming pools, restaurant meals …
As a result, all these points and "gobbled up" the load reserve, freed up after the abandonment of large-caliber artillery and heavy armor.
However, there was no intrigue here from the very beginning. We compared ships from different countries and eras: despite some common displacement and size, the Orly Burke of the IIA series and the cruiser M. Gorky "- completely dissimilar ships, designed at different times by different schools of shipbuilding for different tasks. It is clear that the explanation for the mysterious "disappearance" of load items had to be sought in the differences between the level of technical development and ship design standards - now and 70 years ago.
But this is where the laws of the thriller come into play. It's not close to the happy end yet …
The tale of the crumbling Teremka
The paradox with the mysterious "disappearance" of articles of the load, in an even more severe form, is observed today. Moreover, unlike the previous, purely theoretical comparison, the current situation threatens to become a textbook example in shipbuilding.
The Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser and the Orly Burke-class destroyer URO.
One country. One flag. One time. One and the same tasks - escort and launching missile strikes of SLCM. The cruiser and the destroyer use similar types of weapons, the same means of detection and communication under the control of the Aegis BIUS. Identical electronics. Identical mechanisms. Identical power plant - four LM2500 gas turbines on each of the ships …
And yet they are different. So much so that the differences between "Tika" and "Burk" cause a considerable amount of controversy among fans of the naval theme.
A brief acquaintance with the paper description of the cruiser and the destroyer (the number and type of radars / fuel supply / number of UVP cells) can cause bewilderment among the layman: why did the Americans refuse to build such wonderful ships as Ticonderoga, and concentrated all their efforts on building " Berkov "?!
Even the most advanced of the Orly Burke's modifications looks like complete squalor against the background of a missile cruiser. Judge for yourself:
- The cruiser outperforms the destroyer by 25% in the number of missile launchers - 122 UVP cells against 90 … 96 cells on board the "Burk".
- The cruiser has a two-fold advantage in artillery - unlike the Ticonderoga, the Berk is deprived of the 127 mm stern gun;
- The cruiser has 18% more fuel. The cruising range of the Ticonderoga is 6,000 miles against the 4,890 miles of the Burke at an economic speed of 20 knots.
- The cruiser has a significant advantage in the field of detection and fire control systems: four AN / SPG-62 target illumination radars against three illumination radars on the Orly Burke.
In addition, the cruiser has a "bonus" in the form of an additional air surveillance radar AN / SPS-49. Why did the Aegis cruiser need the old two-coordinate radar? According to one version, the Yankees did not trust the newest AN / SPY-1 and decided to install a backup radar. In addition, the duplication of detection means increased the combat stability of the ship - in the event of a failure of the main radar, the proven SPS-49 came into operation.
According to the opposite version, the SPS-49 installation had a much deeper sacred meaning. The decimeter SPS-49 during its operation covers the frequency range 902-928 MHz. Radio waves at these frequencies are weakly reflected from the surface of the water, which is critical when detecting low-flying targets.
Be that as it may, AN / SPS-49 radar was installed on each of the Ticonderogs. A high-positioned antenna post weighing 17 tons moved the cruiser center of gravity upwards by 0, 152 m, which, of course, led to a decrease in its stability. To compensate for the negative effect, 70 tons of ballast were added.
Marvelous?
But the following fact will sound even more surprising - the displacement of "Ticonderoga" and "Orly Burke" are the same.
Or, to put it in exact numbers:
Ticonderoga - 9600 long tons (or 9750 metric)
Orly Burke Series IIA - 9515 Long Tons (or 9670 Metric)
But excuse me! - the surprised reader will exclaim, - We have removed a significant part of the weapons, dismantled several radars and reduced the fuel supply by 200 tons … how did the displacement remain at the same level ?!
Surely Ticonderoga has a terrible secret of its own. But where to look for the truth in this tangled case?
Let's take a quick visual inspection of the "crime scene".
Oh wow! (A startled exhalation.) One glance at the cruiser is enough to be horrified by its stability reserve - it's amazing how this awkward box hasn't overturned yet!
That there is one helipad "Ticonderogi" - located closer to the center of the hull (where there is less vibration amplitude during pitching), it is located two decks higherthan the Orly Burke's aft helipad! It is not hard to guess how this affects the stability of the cruiser … And what will be the result (one hundred tons of additional ballast).
Even with the naked eye it is noticeable what a huge "tower" of the superstructure "Ticonderoga" has. Moreover, there are as many as two superstructures - bow and stern. Structural mass + additional ballast = cumulative effect of displacement growth.
Compare the height of installation of anti-aircraft guns "Falanx" and fire control radars on the cruiser and destroyer.
Be sure to check out the 40-meter bulwark in the bow of the cruiser.
Such tricks are not in vain - compared to the Orly Burke, the cruiser must spend a significant part of its displacement on the dead weight of lead in the lower part of the hull. And besides, it carries a lot more weapons, fuel and electronic systems than the Orly Burke!
It is simply incredible how the cruiser's displacement remained on par with the simpler, lighter and weaker armed destroyer. Wonders?
Unlikely. Everything should have its own logical explanation.
Some mysterious element in the design of the Orly Burke "gobbled up" the entire allocated displacement reserve - after optimizing the appearance, removing thousands of tons of excess ballast, abandoning a number of weapons and systems?
What if a battalion of Abrams tanks is hiding inside the Berk's hull? No, what if it’s true?
Or, perhaps, the displacement reserve was spent on armor and increasing the level of protection of the destroyer?
Hell no! The real level of security of the Orly Burk was clearly demonstrated by the case of the blasting of the USS Cole (DDG-67) - Port of Aden, 2000. A close explosion, equivalent in power to 200 … 300 kg of TNT, completely disabled the destroyer. 17 dead. 39 wounded sailors.
The security of the Burk does not fundamentally differ from the security of the Ticonderoga - local armoring of important rooms using Kevlar and 25 mm aluminum-magnesium alloy plates.
One can begin to reason from the opposite - the load reserve for the installation of new systems and huge add-ons could not appear out of nowhere. The creators of "Ticonderoga" clearly saved on something. And they saved a lot. But on what?
The cruiser's gas turbine power plant is almost identical to the destroyer. Fuel supply? On the contrary, it has been increased. The last option remains - the building …
… During operation, over 3000 cracks were revealed in the superstructures of 27 cruisers
- www.navytimes.com, Ticonderoga Cracking Epidemic
In 1983, a supership, the missile cruiser USS Ticonderoga (CG-47), was equipped with the Aegis advanced combat information and control system. A huge banner fluttered in the wind at the stern of the cruiser: "Stand by admiral Gorshkov:" Aegis "- at sea!" (Beware, Admiral Gorshkov! Aegis at sea!).
If you look at the event without the stars and stripes pathos, it becomes obvious that the Yankees brought a rusty bucket that was not capable of fighting into the sea. The super-super cruiser bursts at the seams under its own weight and falls apart even without any fire from the enemy.
The Aegis system also turned out to be not so cool. The only trophy of the American sailors is the IranAir passenger Airbus, which was identified by Aegis radars as a "fighter". 290 passengers at once to the next world. To the commander of the cruiser "Vincennes" - thanks for his composure and fearlessness in a combat situation. And the characteristic statement of George W. Bush: "I will never apologize for America."
In an effort to "shove" as many weapons and radio electronics as possible into the modest hull inherited by the Ticonderogs from ships of the "Spruance" type, the Americans did not find anything better than to use an aluminum-magnesium alloy of the "5456" brand as a structural material for superstructures.
In principle, the solution is quite logical - despite its potential fire hazard, light AMG alloys were widely used on ships around the world. But the Yankees outdid everyone - the superstructures of the "Ticonderogo" were monstrously overloaded, their design was made to the limit of its strength. The result was not long in coming - the cruiser began to burst at the seams right in front of the astonished sailors.
Moreover, these are not some small microcracks visible only through a microscope. The cruiser is bursting quite seriously and for real.
In the superstructure of the cruiser "Port Royal", a new crack, 8 feet (2.4 meters) long, was discovered.
- communication for September 2009. It is noteworthy that Port Royal was damaged - the newest of the Ticonderogs, commissioned in 1994, and just returned from major repairs after landing on the reef in February 2009.
The cruiser was out of action for six months. Rebuilding the cracked deck, coupled with work to prevent similar scenarios in the future (ha ha), cost the Pentagon $ 14 million. The Yankees reinforce the structure as much as possible, use special welding methods (Ultrasonic Impact Treatment), and try to extend the life of their Ticonderogs until 2028. However, there are serious suspicions that the number of cruisers will begin to gradually decline in the coming years - the Crack Plague epidemic leaves sailors no other choice.
"Port Royal", firmly seated on a reef near the coast of about. Oahu
Already in the spring of 2013, it was planned to decommission four cruisers - USS Cowpens (CG-63), USS Anzio (CG-68), USS Vicksburg (CG 69) and USS Port Royal (CG-73), which have the greatest damage to superstructures. However, the fleet still defended its ships, "knocking out" the necessary funds for their next overhaul.
Returning to the main topic of this story - namely lightweight aluminum superstructures, made with a minimum margin of safety, provided the Ticonderogo with the necessary displacement reserve that was spent on the installation of additional weapons, radars and an increase in fuel reserves.
However, when the deck is cracking underfoot, and the "tower" of the superstructure all the time threatens to tumble to one side, drowning the entire command staff of the ship in the waves - such a situation hardly contributes to an increase in the morale among the crew of the superpuper cruiser.
The next time the Americans behaved more cautiously: when creating the Orly Burke-class destroyer, it was decided to sacrifice some of the weapons, radio electronics and cruising range - in favor of increasing the strength of the hull and increasing its stability margin. The "Burk", in contrast to the cruiser, has completely steel superstructures - it was they, coupled with a new, more "stocky" and stronger hull, as a result, "absorbed" the entire released load reserve.
Decommissioned Ticonderogs rusting off Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
