Adventure thriller about the Soviet Navy's campaign to the Falkland Islands, based on real events.
Fans of naval history can't wait to find out: was the Soviet sailors capable of an operation similar to the one that took place in the spring of 1982 in the vastness of the South Atlantic? In two months of hostilities, the British "sea wolves" took the Falklands by storm, returning the disputed territories to the control of the British Crown.
Was the Soviet Navy able to repeat something similar? A 30,000-mile hike for full autonomy, through the Roaring Forties and Furious Fifties? Would our fleet be able to conduct combat operations in conditions when the nearest logistics center is 6,000 kilometers from the theater of operations?
Ahead - roaring storms and Antarctic cold, daily air attacks and shooting until blue in the face … Time to prepare for the campaign - 10 days. Let's start!
Do not rush to place your bets, gentlemen - there is no intrigue here.
The results of the long-range campaign of the Soviet squadron are known in advance: the Russian Navy will grind the Argentine fleet into powder (and if necessary, the British one), and then, within a few days, capture the distant islands, with practically no losses on its part.
The epic with the "participation" of our sailors in the Falklands War is just a farce, the purpose of which is not so much an alternative history as proof of the possibility of conducting a database by the forces of the Soviet Navy at any distance from its shores.
This whole story is a good reason to talk about the special capabilities of the USSR Navy and experience a pleasant surprise at how much the Russian Navy was superior to any of the foreign fleets at that time. Even the once mighty Royal Navy of Great Britain, the third largest fleet of the Cold War, looked like a shameful bunch of junk against the backdrop of the Soviet fleet.
Hurray-patriot or realist?
Skeptical objections to the successful breakthrough of the USSR Navy to the Falklands are primarily based on a comparison of Soviet and British carrier-based aircraft.
The domestic VTOL Yak-38, unlike the British Sea Harrier, was not equipped with an airborne radar - the fighter capabilities of the Yak were limited to cutting circles around the top mast and shooting "by eye" short-range missiles at targets in the line of sight. There was no built-in cannon - a suspended cannon container could only be installed instead of a part of the bomb and missile armament …
Before continuing to criticize the Yak-38, I hasten to draw your attention to some of the features of the use of aviation in the Falklands:
In view of the almost complete absence of modern air defense systems * on the British ship, the task of air defense fell on the shoulders of the Sea Harrier fighters. Alas, as subsequent events showed, the Sea Harriers successfully failed their mission - a third of the squadron's ships suffered from enemy air attacks, six went to the bottom.
* Of the 25 surface warships of the "first line" (aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates), modern air defense systems "Sea Dart" were available only on seven ships. Most of the British frigates (9 out of 15) were armed with the Sea Cat air defense systems - subsonic (!) SAMs with an effective firing range of less than 6 km - it is not surprising that all 80 Sea Cat missiles were released into milk. As for self-defense in the near zone - the British "sea wolves" had nothing better than 114 mm "station wagons" with limited firing angles and Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns from the Second World War.
Unsurprisingly, the British squadron was brazenly shot from cannons and smeared with bombs from low level flight.
In the case of the Soviet Navy, everything will be completely different.
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers "Kiev" and "Minsk" with Yak-38 aircraft had no significance in terms of air defense.
Instead of them, the TARKR "Kirov", a 26,000-ton atomic monster with missile weapons, could go on a long campaign.
Unhappy Argentine footballers can relax and breathe calmly - Kirov will not use supersonic Granites with nuclear warheads. The P-700 missile is more expensive than any of the "pelvis" of the Argentine Navy.
The main value of "Kirov" is the presence of the multi-channel "Fort" air defense missile system - a "hot" version of the legendary S-300 system.
Twelve 8-round launchers. The maximum firing range is 75 km. Possibility of simultaneous guidance of up to 12 missiles at six air targets. The full ammunition load of the cruiser is 96 missiles - even taking into account the consumption of two missiles for each target, the Kirov cruiser, theoretically, could single-handedly destroy all combat aircraft of the Argentine Air Force.
In addition to the Fort air defense system, two short-range Osa-M air defense systems and four AK-630 batteries (eight six-barreled submachine guns with radar guidance) are installed on board the cruiser - try to attack the Kirov as the Argentine pilots did … even the bravest of the kamikaze will dare.
The only snag is that the S-300F Fort naval air defense system with the 5V55RM missile was officially adopted only in 1984 - despite the fact that the Kirov cruiser itself became part of the Northern Fleet in October 1980. The paradox can be easily explained: in the USSR Navy, a scenario was often practiced in which new weapons and systems reached a working state several years earlier than the official decree of the Council of Ministers on their adoption was signed (a lengthy bureaucratic procedure, comprehensive tests and always busy with the Commander-in-Chief).
One Soviet = three British
Whether or not the Kirov will be able to take part in the campaign (as of the spring of 1982) is not known for certain. In any case, the light on it did not converge like a wedge - a whole squadron of 100 warships and support ships is going on a long voyage - we will be guided by the British squadron as a reference.
The fighting core of the British consisted of eight URO destroyers (Type 42, Type 82 and a couple of outdated "County").
In the case of the USSR Navy, the functions of the British destroyers of the URO were performed by large anti-submarine ships (BOD) of projects 1134A and 1134B - by that time, the Soviet fleet had 17 ships of this type - quite enough to form an operational formation of 7-8 BODs.
Behind the sanctimonious terminology "Project 1134B large anti-submarine ship" ("Berkut-B") hides an 8500-ton missile cruiser with hypertrophied anti-submarine weapons. Soviet BODs were twice the size of the Sheffield destroyer (the one that burned out from an unexploded missile), while, unlike the British vessel, it had on board four air defense systems (versus one Sea Wolf on Sheffield), and also a rocket torpedo complex, a helicopter, mine and torpedo armament, RBU, universal 76 mm guns and a self-defense system of four AK-630 metal cutters, forming a continuous air defense contour of the ship.
Any Sheffield or County is just jelly against the backdrop of the Soviet Berkut. In terms of the capabilities of its air defense systems, one BOD 1134B was worth three British destroyers. A flurry of anti-aircraft fire.
Escort
Of the other warships, the British squadron had 15 rather primitive frigates (Type 21, Type 22, "Rothesay" and "Linder"), most of which were defenseless from air attacks.
It would not have been difficult for the Soviet Navy to repeat the record of Her Majesty's fleet. Our sailors at that time had: "singing frigates" (BOD project 61), patrol boats of the ocean zone of project 1135 (code "Burevesnik"), old but still strong destroyers of project 56 - more than 70 warships in total, each of which was in no way inferior to the British frigates.
Patrol ship - project 1135
To form a combat group of 15-20 patrol ships (BOD rank II, destroyers and frigates) from these means is a quite prosaic situation for the USSR Navy.
The most destructive ships
One of the most important components of the British expeditionary force were submarines - 5 nuclear and one multipurpose diesel-electric submarines were involved in the operation. Modest but tasteful.
What would the submarine component of a Soviet squadron look like?
Hmm … so what, but we have always had plenty of this good. For example, at that time there were 15 nuclear submarines in the Royal Navy of Great Britain; for comparison - there were more than two hundred of them in the USSR Navy!
To allocate a dozen nuclear-powered ships and several diesel-electric submarines for the operation is an obvious and necessary thing. Moreover, among the Soviet nuclear submarines, there were such samples as multipurpose boats pr. 671RT, 671RTM (K) or strike atomarines of project 670 "Skat" (carriers of supersonic missiles "Amethyst") - such animals could kill the Argentine fleet in a few hours.
Her Majesty's fleet is resting - the British at that time simply did not have anything like it.
Doubts about the possibility of Soviet submarines to reach the South Atlantic on their own are completely unfounded - back in 1966, the domestic K-116 and K-133, made a submerged transition from the North to the Pacific Fleet along the route Zapadnaya Litsa - Atlantic Ocean - Cape Horn - Pacific Ocean - Kamchatka.
It is noteworthy that for all 52 sailing days, the nuclear-powered ships have never risen to the surface. Right. Do they need it?
Impact capabilities
Now we will again turn to the topic of VTOL aircraft - while providing fire support to the advancing marines, the Sea Harrier planes dropped about 200 bombs on the enemy's head.
In the case of the Soviet Navy, the problem will receive a comprehensive solution - in addition to the possible participation in the operation of TAVKRs "Kiev" and "Minsk" (although is it worth taking such huge and voracious ships on a long voyage to drop a couple of hundred bombs?) fleet, there were specialized artillery ships suitable for fire support of the landing - a damn dozen cruisers of the 68-bis project. Most of them were over 30 years old, but the older artillery cruisers were still on the move and possessed a range of impressive skills unknown to modern battleships - guns and armor.
According to dry statistics, during the Falklands War, British ships fired more than 10 thousand 114 mm shells at Argentine positions on the islands - it's scary to imagine what the six-inch guns of Soviet cruisers would have done!
On each - 12 152 mm guns and 12 universal 100 mm guns - cannons hit in any weather, through night darkness, fog and snow blizzard - no Harriers and Yak-38 can compare in efficiency with a naval artillery gun.
Unlike most modern ships, the old 68-bis cruisers were wrapped in a reliable "skin" of 100 mm armor. The British destroyer Sheffield warmed up from an unexploded anti-ship missile - the Soviet cruiser simply did not feel the hit of the Argentine missile. The anti-ship missiles would burst on impact on the armor belt, like an empty nut, only peeling off the paint on board the cruiser.
Landing
Everything for them and for their sake!
By analogy with Britain, we will need to deliver about 10 thousand soldiers with heavy weapons, mobile air defense systems, MLRS, artillery and armored vehicles to the islands. It is not bad to deliver a couple of tank companies to the islands - rather modest T-55 or T-62.
And then - to supply the group for several weeks. Delivering provisions, tools, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, medicines … The task is not an easy one.
We will return to supplying the expeditionary forces a little later, but now we will try to determine - what forces did the USSR Navy have to deliver such a large group of forces across half the Earth?
At that time, the Navy included about 25 Large Landing Ships (BDK) of projects 1171 (code "Tapir"), 775 and 1174 (code "Rhino") - probably 10-15 of them could be involved in such an important operation.
What are these ships? For example, the BDK project 775 is a multi-deck flat-bottomed combat ship of the ocean zone, designed to transport a reinforced company of marines (225 paratroopers and 10 units of armored vehicles).
Ukrainian Navy ship "Kostyantin Olshansky" (U402) - ex. Soviet BDK-56
Larger ship - BDK pr. 1174 "Ivan Rogov" (at that time the only ship of its type in the USSR Navy) was designed to transport 500 paratroopers + up to 80 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. In addition, there are 4 helicopters on board the Rhino.
A notable feature of the Soviet large landing craft are the self-defense systems and the MLRS A-215 (the blighted "Grad") - this is once again to the issue of fire support for the landing. The second important difference is the ability to unload tanks ashore on their own through the bow gates and the retractable gangway.
Obviously, the capabilities of the BDK alone will not be enough. Part of the personnel will be able to be placed on board the hospital ships of the USSR Navy. The other part will be accommodated on large warships. And if there are not enough places?
In such cases, ships of the merchant fleet come to the rescue - ro-ro ships, container ships, floating bases. Cheap and cheerful.
In reality, those of the British who were lucky got to the war zone on the luxury liners Queen Elizabeth 2, Canberra and Uganda - the British command was not afraid to dispossess the Cunard Line.
Intelligence service
The USSR Navy also had something that the most daring "British scientists" could not even dream of - the Legend-M Marine Space Reconnaissance and Targeting System (MCRTs): an orbital constellation of passive radio reconnaissance satellites and incredible US-A spacecraft - low-orbit satellites with a nuclear reactor and side-looking radar.
In 1982, the fantastic system was already operational - it is known that during the Falklands War, the Soviet military closely followed events on the other side of the globe. Receiving data from the ICRC satellites, the Soviet Union saw the situation in the Falkland Islands at a glance, knew the balance of forces and the position of the ships of both opponents, had the ability to predict in advance the further actions of the British and Argentines.
In those years, no other state in the world had such a perfect intelligence system!
Paradoxically, the direct participants in those events were much worse informed: in order to get at least some idea of the situation in the theater of operations, Britain was forced to constantly keep naval reconnaissance "Nimrod" in the air and beg for intelligence from "Uncle Sam" (American space intelligence system NOSS, aka Wall Cloud). As for Argentos, these oddballs drove passenger Boeings and business jets in a circle over the ocean.
Logistics
An extremely important point in preparation for such a long and grandiose operation at a great distance from their native shores. It should be noted right away that all doubts about the incapacity of the USSR Navy (“will not work,” “not enough,” “will fall apart,” “accident rate, etc.), upon close examination, turn out to be a mirage - in 1985, in the vastness of the World Ocean, they were carried DAILY service of about 160 combat surface and submarine ships and support ships of the USSR Navy.
The rear base issue is much easier to solve.
The British squadron used the harbor and airfield on the island. Ascension (a tiny piece of land in the middle of the Atlantic, halfway to the Falklands). And what will the Soviet fleet do?
The answer is obvious, the Soviet Navy had a dense network of bases around the world; when conducting hostilities in the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean, Luanda (Angola) could act as a rear base.
As for the supply of dozens of ships on a long voyage, this is a painful question, but it can be solved. For these purposes, the USSR Navy had a whole armada of auxiliary vessels: scouts, advice notes, refueling tankers, integrated supply ships, refrigerators, weapons transports, floating workshops and floating bases - if necessary, the forces of the merchant fleet could be involved with their oil tankers, high-speed rokers and container ships. …
Have to handle it!
Some takeaways from this whole crazy story
We do not need other people's lands - we would have to master our possessions. The Falklands remain British. No matter! The main thing is that in those days our fleet had the potential to conduct a major naval operation in any corner of the planet.
Of course, such a quick collection and a long hike is a colossal stress. In normal times, they prepared in advance for the oceanic combat services - a sure sign of an imminent march was a course of vaccinations against southern fevers and diseases, prescribed without fail to all crew members. They certified maps, loaded supplies and food in the sweat of their brows, checked the electromechanical part of the ship, systems and weapons.
Could you get ready in at least two weeks? Could. Urgent order, the situation is urgent. In addition, at least half of the squadron was already in the ocean - it was only necessary to redirect the ships to a new square.
The hustle and bustle will have a detrimental effect on the preparation for the hike. It will not do without miscalculations, accidents and losses … however, any war in terms of organization is a fire in a brothel during a flood.
The main thing is that we had the second navy in the world, exceeding the size of the fleets of all other countries of the world combined (except for the American one). A fleet capable of laying siege to any enemy and fighting in any corner of the oceans.
Hero Gallery:
Gas turbine BOD project 61, so-called "singing frigate"
British destroyer York (Type 42 Batch III) is a modernized version of Sheffield. The consequences of the Falklands War are noticeable: the forecastle has been lengthened, the Falanx ZAK has been urgently added
Roller-gas turbine ship "Captain Smirnov" from the Odessa-Vietnam line. Dual-use vessel, max. speed - 25 knots!
BDK pr. 1174 "Ivan Rogov"
The cabin of the nuclear submarine pr. 670 "Skat"
Large sea tanker of the Navy, project 1559V. Displacement - 22450 tons. Carrying capacity: 8,250 ton fuel bunker, 2,050 tonnes of diesel fuel, 1,000 tonnes of aviation fuel, 250 tonnes of lubricating oil, 450 tonnes of feed water, 450 tonnes of drinking water, 220 tonnes of food
Arms transport "General Ryabikov"
TAVKR and complex supply ship "Berezina"
