Today, our country marks the jubilee date of the epic battle that changed the course of World War II - the 75th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Stalingrad. "Uranus" is the code name for the defensive (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and offensive (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) operations of the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts in the Great Patriotic War with the aim of encircling and defeating the German fascist group at Stalingrad.
Fuehrer's rage and a new offensive plan
After being defeated near Moscow, Hitler was furious. His illusions about the imminent and inevitable seizure of the Soviet capital were dispelled, his plans to seize the Caucasian oil turned out to be unfulfilled, and the order to cut off the flow of military supplies to Moscow along the Volga from the southern regions was unfulfilled. For the first time in the years of the war, German troops suffered a crushing defeat and for the first time were forced to retreat.
In the first quarter of 1942, the General Staff of the Red Army tried to determine where the German command could deliver the main blow. Opinions differed, but one thing prevailed: the main target of the German troops was still Moscow.
However, Hitler had more ambitious plans. His plan for a summer offensive on the Eastern Front was formalized in the form of a plan for a new campaign. On March 28, the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces arrived at Hitler's headquarters and reported to him a draft plan for a new operation, code-named "Blau". Hitler carefully studied it for several days, subjected the proposal of the General Staff of the Ground Forces to clarifications and adjustments. On April 5, the plan was finally approved as Directive 41.
Directive No. 41 ("Blau") contained the strategic plan of the German command for the conduct of the war on the Eastern Front in 1942 and determined the main directions of the main strike of the groupings of German troops. The goal of the 1942 summer offensive of the German forces on the Eastern Front was to "re-seize the initiative and impose their will on the enemy." The main attack was planned in the southern direction with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don River and subsequently seizing the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes across the Caucasian ridge.
In the course of operations in this strategic direction, it was planned to seize Stalingrad, which Hitler especially insisted on. To create the prerequisites for the successful implementation of the Blau plan, it was initially planned to capture Sevastopol, the Kerch Peninsula, cut off the protrusion of the Soviet front in the Barvenkovo area, and also conduct operations in some other sectors of the Eastern Front.
At the same time, considerable attention was paid to the Stalingrad direction. The directive says the following about this: "Try to reach Stalingrad, or at least subject it to the effects of heavy weapons, so that it will lose its importance as a center of the military industry and a communications center."
By giving such an order, Hitler hoped that by capturing the Caucasus, he would also be able to destroy the city that bore the name of Stalin. Many historians regard the order to destroy Stalingrad with the help of "heavy weapons" as a clear desire of Hitler to slap Stalin in the face and thereby exert a psychological influence on him. In fact, Hitler's plan was much more serious. After the capture of Stalingrad, Hitler planned to turn the main strike forces of the German troops to the north, cut off Moscow from the rear, and then carry out a general offensive against the Soviet capital from the east and west.
DEFENSE OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE
During the greatest battle of Stalingrad, all military and diplomatic missions abroad worked selflessly. What information was obtained in 1942 by military diplomats operating far from the Eastern Front?
As indicated above, Hitler approved Directive No. 41 on 5 April. However, thanks to the work of Soviet military diplomats, its main provisions became known in Moscow much earlier. This fact was noted by General of the Army Sergei Shtemenko as follows: “In the summer of 1942, the enemy's plan to seize the Caucasus … was revealed quite quickly. But this time, too, the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive actions to defeat the advancing enemy grouping in a short time."
It is difficult to say exactly when the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces began to develop the said directive, but the first report on Hitler's plans for a spring offensive on the Eastern Front came to Moscow from the military attaché (BAT) office at the USSR Embassy in London on March 3, 1942. It reported that Germany “plans to launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus in the spring of 1942. For these purposes, Berlin has reached an agreement to send 16 new Romanian, 12 Italian, 10 Bulgarian, 2 Slovak and several Hungarian divisions of full strength to the Eastern Front …"
Vladimir Lot in his work "The Secret Front of the General Staff" indicates that on the same day a new message arrived:
“The Bulgarian military attaché in Turkey reported the following from Ankara to Sofia:
a) Germany will launch its new offensive against the USSR between April 15 and May 1;
b) the offensive of the German troops will not have the character of a blitzkrieg. The Germans intend to act slowly but successfully …"
On March 15, one of the sources of the staff member of the Soviet military attaché in London, Captain I. M. Dolly Kozlova conveyed the content of the talks between the Japanese ambassador in Berlin and the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, which took place on 18, 22 and 23 February. In these conversations, Ribbentrop stated that the Eastern Front was stabilized. When asked by the Japanese ambassador when to expect a spring offensive on the Eastern Front, the German minister replied that “the plan for the summer campaign is being developed by the General Staff. So far, he cannot tell the exact date of the start of the offensive, but in general terms the plan is the same that Hitler told the Japanese ambassador about in a personal conversation. In Germany's operations against the USSR in 1942, the southern sector of the Eastern Front will be of paramount importance. It is there that the offensive will begin, and the battle will unfold to the north."
Further, the agent reported that, according to the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, the Germans plan to cut off the USSR from foreign aid, expand the offensive in the south, including the entire Donbass and the Caucasus. If it is not possible, as Ribbentrop said, to completely crush the Soviet regime, then after the summer offensive the USSR will lose all significance and strength.
By the way, since January 1942, this source has been transmitting to I. Kozlov copies of German radiograms deciphered by the British as a result of falling into their hands of the famous Enigma encryption machine. Dolly did not understand why Winston Churchill did not pass this information on to the Soviet leadership, which needed it to repel the onslaught of the German armies on the Eastern Front. During 1942, he transmitted 20 to 38 decrypted German, Japanese and Turkish radiograms every month. By that time, the British decryption service was able to split diplomatic and military codes not only in Germany, but also in Japan and Turkey.
Information from Dolly was received in such a quantity that they forced the Soviet military attaché in London to turn to the Center with the following unusual request: “Please evaluate Dolly's reports. Allow me to send them by regular mail so as not to overload the radio communication. These materials are not included in your information plans. Please give instructions on Dolly's tasks."
A day later, he received the following answer: “Dolly's data is very valuable. They must be sent in full. Let Dolly give more of this stuff. Strengthen security and conspiracy measures when holding meetings with Dolly.
Director"
Why did the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) treat Dolly's materials this way? Firstly, because this agent transmitted the content of all important negotiations conducted by Ribbentrop with the ambassadors of the Axis countries. Thus, the political plans of the German leadership became the property of Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov and were taken into account when carrying out foreign policy actions of the USSR. Secondly, Dolly passed on the content of many orders that the Hitlerite command sent to their generals operating near Stalingrad and in the Caucasus direction.
Here are some of the pieces of information that Dolly gave in November 1942.
November 16: "British intercepted messages from Berlin indicate that it is possible that Manstein's 11th Army will not be used in the central sector of the Eastern Front, where it is currently located, but in its southern sector."
November 18: "… the German Air Force is experiencing a significant shortage of fuel in units operating on the southern front from Stalingrad to the Caucasus."
November 19: “German artillery is short of high-explosive and shrapnel shells for 105mm field guns. This explains its weak intensity at Stalingrad."
November 22: "Goering ordered the 4th Air Fleet to pay special attention to the concentration of Russian tanks in the Beketovka area."
On November 22, "Dolly" transmitted a transcript of the radio intercepts of the 6th Army's orders of November 20. From these data it followed that the Germans intended "to stop the attacks on Stalingrad, the forces would be withdrawn from the city and used to strengthen the defense behind the western wing of the Paulus army."
November 30: "All the air forces available in the Stalingrad area will be thrown into the area of the Don River arc to bombard the concentration of Soviet troops near Pavlovsk, especially in the area where the Hungarian 8th and Italian 9th armies meet." The same report said that “Field Marshal Manstein took command of Army Group Don on November 27.
These and other similar reports "Dolly", revealing the position of the German troops surrounded at Stalingrad, were reported by I. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky.
A strictly limited circle of officials knew about the existence of this valuable source in Moscow. Even today, the real surname of this person remains unknown.
Other military diplomatic missions also worked actively in 1942. The information received from them allowed the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army to prepare a special message to the General Staff in March 1942:
“The preparations for the spring offensive are confirmed by the transfer of German troops and materials. During the period from January 1 to March 10, 1942, up to 35 divisions were deployed, and there is a continuous replenishment of the active army. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, there is an intensified delivery of military and transport vehicles … The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow.
For the spring offensive, Germany, together with the allies, will deploy 65 new divisions … The most probable date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942."
At the end of March, military diplomats continued to report: “The most probable direction of the main attack of the Germans on the Eastern Front will be the Rostov direction. The purpose of the military offensive is to seize the oil-bearing base of the USSR and subsequently strike at Stalingrad to reach the river. Volga.
At the end of March, in April and May, foreign attaches continued to receive clarifying information about the plans of the Germans. For example, on March 31, the source of the military attaché apparatus under the governments of Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in London, Gano, reported to Moscow:
“According to a credible source from Berlin, the German offensive plan on the Eastern Front foresees two directions:
1. Attack on Leningrad to reinforce Finland and break ties and supplies to the USSR through the White Sea.
2. An offensive in the Caucasus, where the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and a secondary one - on Rostov and, in addition, after the capture of Crimea - on Maikop. The main goal of the offensive is to capture the Volga along its entire length. On the west bank, the Germans intend to build strong fortifications.
There were disagreements about actions in the central sector of the front in the German headquarters. Some prefer to strike a frontal blow, others - to eliminate Moscow by bypassing."
At the end of the report, the agent named the approximate date for the start of the German offensive, which could unfold after April 15.
Having thus revealed the essence of the strategic plans of the German command for the first half of 1942, Soviet military diplomacy continued to obtain information about the further intentions and plans of the German command to conduct hostilities in the southern sector of the Eastern Front and to transfer the reserves of the German army to the area of the future Battle of Stalingrad.
DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE ALLIES
During the period of secret preparation of German troops for an offensive in the Caucasus, the military attaché at the USSR embassy in Great Britain, Major General Ivan Sklyarov, tried to start cooperation in the field of information exchange with the American military attaché in London. Sklyarov thought rationally - the allies should disinterestedly help each other in the fight against the common enemy. However, the very first experience of such cooperation with the Americans brought disappointment to Sklyarov.
On June 7, 1942, Sklyarov received information from the American military attaché about the deployment and grouping of units and formations of the German army and transferred them to the Center. He also sent information to Moscow about the grouping of German troops on the Eastern Front. However, after a while from Moscow came a far from flattering assessment of the transferred materials. The chief of military intelligence reported: “The quantity and quality of materials on the state and armament of the German army and the armies of the Axis countries, as well as the plans and intentions of the enemy command are still completely insufficient. Information on these issues is limited mainly to materials that you officially receive from the British and Americans. You do not get everything from them that they can give us."
What the representatives of the Allied intelligence services did not pass on to Sklyarov, the GRU received from other sources. Taking into account the just remarks of the chief of military intelligence and realizing that the General Staff constantly needs a large amount of various information about the enemy, Major General Sklyarov stepped up work with Agent Dolly.
Dolly's materials were often very important. The information transmitted by this source was taken into account when organizing the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The value of the information provided by Dolly to Captain I. M. Kozlov, can be judged from the report of Major General I. A. Sklyarov, prepared in 1942. So, on October 3, Sklyarov reported to the Center: “Dolly announced that at a regular meeting in the British military department, the chief of intelligence, Major General Davidson, made a report on the state of affairs on the Eastern Front. According to him, the Russians are winning the war for the British. The Russians are doing much better than we expected."
On the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, more precisely on November 5, 1942, Dolly handed over to the Soviet military diplomat a summary of the assessment of the USSR and the Red Army, prepared jointly by specialists from the General Staffs of Germany and Hungary:
“The Soviets cannot count on any effective assistance from the allies and have to rely only on their own resources.
The uncertainty of the situation in the Far East continues to worry Moscow, which fears Japan's entry into the war against the USSR.
The combat capability of the Red Army is generally lower due to the lack of aircraft, tanks, guns and the poor quality of training of the high military command.
The Red Army cannot be completely defeated in 1942, but it is not capable of any major offensive in winter and will not be a threat to the Axis countries in the future.
According to the estimates and forecasts of analysts of the German and Hungarian General Staffs, the goals of the USSR until the end of 1942 remained: "the defense of the Caucasus, the defense (liberation) of Stalingrad, the liberation of Leningrad." At the end of the summary, the conclusion was drawn: "The offensive of the Red Army on a large scale in 1942 is impossible."
Such an assessment of the situation at the front suited the General Staff of the Red Army most of all. The enemy was deeply mistaken. Other plans already existed at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK).
PREPARATION OF THE OFFENSIVE SURGERY
Thanks to the efforts of Soviet military diplomats, before the start of the offensive operation of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, practically the entire grouping of enemy forces of the first line was uncovered with an accuracy of a battalion, the forces and defense system of many enemy formations in front of the front of our troops. Accurate information was obtained about the deployment of the main shock units of the Hitlerite troops of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, about the tasks and strength of the 4th air fleet of the German Air Force.
Already in the course of the Battle of Stalingrad, the above-mentioned source of Gano continued to report important information. So, on October 6, he gave Alexander Sizov, the military attaché under the governments of Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in London, full information about the number and deployment of reserve units of the German army on the Eastern Front. The center asked to obtain information about the deployment of all Romanian units and their combat strength. Gano completed this and many other assignments of Soviet military intelligence.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military attaché Colonel Nikolai Nikitushev successfully worked in Sweden. He had several valuable sources of information that conveyed important information about Nazi Germany and its armed forces. So, in the period of preparation for the battle for Stalingrad, information came from him revealing the plans of the German command. On August 31, Nikitushev reported: “The Swedish General Staff believes that the main German offensive has begun in Ukraine. The plan of the Germans was to break through the Kursk-Kharkov line with the development of an offensive across the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then - the establishment of a barrier in the northeast and the continuation of the offensive with fresh forces to the south through Rostov to the Caucasus."
The following is the content of individual reports of Soviet military diplomats, which were used in the preparation of the offensive operation of the Battle of Stalingrad.
Report of BAT from London
March 29, 1942
Top secret
The Baron reported:
1. The situation on the Eastern Front by the German high command is generally assessed as satisfactory …
4. A well-informed source said: German aviation losses from the beginning of the war with us to March 1, 1942 were estimated at 8,500 aircraft, of which 30 percent were bombers. Average losses per month - 1,000 aircraft. In addition, they lost about the same number of aircraft on other fronts throughout the war."
Report of BAT from the USA
April 21, 1942
Top secret
… The main attack in the south is planned by the Germans at Stalingrad to secure the flanks, followed by an attack on Rostov.
New bombs and heavy shells of the Germans, when they burst, destroy all living things within a radius of 150-200 meters by the force of air pressure.
According to the French General Staff, the Germans lost 1 million killed, 1.5 million seriously wounded and 2.5 million lightly wounded.
Report of BAT from London
Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army
July 28, 1942
Radio lightning
Top secret
… The source conveyed information he personally received from the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm after his trip to Berlin to talk with Ambassador Oshima and the German General Staff.
1. Germany demands that Japan either attack the USSR or increase the threat of attack.
2. Germany declared to Japan that it is making every effort to achieve the following:
a) capture the Caucasus and reach the Persian Gulf;
b) capture Egypt and reach the Red Sea before autumn.
3. Oshima expects that if the Germans do one thing or the other, they will try to force Turkey to join the "axis".
4. Oshima said that until 06/07/42 Japan had not yet made a promise to fulfill the German demands and in general Japan found it difficult to fully engage in the Axis's operational plans …
5. From conversations with the German General Staff, the military attaché concluded that the Germans did not consider it possible to open a second front in 1942, so they considered it possible to transfer all troops from west to east, leaving 30 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland, and these divisions consist from units worn out on the Eastern Front, and from new formations of old people …
Brion.
At the turn of 1942-1943, the BAT devices obtained information about the enemy, mainly responding to numerous requests from the Center. Naturally, these assignments were developed at the General Staff, which was interested in obtaining accurate data on the rear defensive lines of the Germans southwest of Stalingrad, on the reserves of the German command, on the plans of the Germans in connection with the offensive of the Red Army, etc.
For example, here is the content of one of these reports.
Report of BAT from London
January 8, 1943
Top secret
1. The Germans are preparing a counteroffensive in the Don area. To this end, numerous reserves are being transferred from Kharkov to the Kamensk region. The grouping of troops is planned along the Donbass-Stalingrad railway. To ensure this counter-offensive, Millerovo will be held at all costs.
2. In Sevastopol, the Germans establish a large supply base for the armies of the Caucasus in case land communications and supply bases located west of the Don are cut off.
3. In the Romanian ports, the German military authorities have already begun to confiscate ships with a displacement of over 200 tons. Most of the supply vessels will be sent from Sevastopol to the Novorossiysk port.
4. In mid-December, the 75th and 299th Infantry Divisions, which were being transferred from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, were ordered to return to our front. (A well-informed source.) (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Op. 24183. D.3. L.105. The mailing list is indicated: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Antonov).
The long-awaited victory in World War II, which has no equal in world history, was forged by the efforts of millions of people of various professions from different countries. Among them, a place of honor belongs to Soviet military diplomats. Love for their homeland and unshakable faith in its future were the source of spiritual strength that allowed them to achieve a great victory, about which we knew very little for many years. Their enormous contribution to achieving victory in the Battle of Stalingrad is undeniable. Their feat for the sake of the happiness of people has been preserved in our hearts, and it must forever remain in the memory of our descendants.
