12 failures of Napoleon Bonaparte. At the very beginning of negotiations between Alexander I and Napoleon in Tilsit in June 1807, the Russian emperor turned to his French colleague with the words "Sovereign, I hate the British as much as you do!" "In that case," answered Napoleon, smiling, "everything will be settled, and the world will be consolidated."
Indeed, a peace treaty was signed, the two rival empires became allies, only Napoleon smiled in vain: much more than the British, the Russian tsar hated the French emperor himself. It was a truly all-consuming passion, which broke through only in communication with especially trusted persons.
So, to his sister, Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna (to whom, by the way, Bonaparte had wooed unsuccessfully), the sovereign brother confessed that there was room on earth for only one of them. However, the excellent actor Alexander skillfully concealed his feelings, and, using his natural charm, tried in every possible way to win over the French monarch.
And although Napoleon suspected acting in his opponent, it seems that he never solved the simple riddle of the Russian "Sphinx". To paraphrase a common quote, Bonaparte's relationship to Russia can be characterized as "only politics, nothing personal." Alexander proceeded from directly opposite motives: "no politics - only personal." The reasons for this attitude are a fascinating subject, but one that lies outside the scope of our topic and has already been analyzed in the Military Review.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 19th century, it was subjective factors that dominated relations between Russia and France. All attempts to overcome Russia are in some way unique, and in some ways similar. And in 1812, and in 1941, continental Europe considered the war with our country only as a stage (albeit the most important) in the defeat of England.
But if fascist Germany and the Soviet Union looked at each other as mortal enemies, fully aware that a military defeat would turn into a national catastrophe for the participants in the confrontation, then Napoleon's attack on Russia was clearly inadequately assessed in the official propaganda and public opinion of Russia of that era.
Napoleon did not plan any "invasion" of Russia. His military plans corresponded to political tasks - rather modest. First of all, the Corsican intended to tighten the continental blockade against England, create a buffer state on the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and conclude a military alliance with Russia for a joint campaign in India - this mega-project from the time of Paul I continued to occupy the imagination of Bonaparte.
The main meaning of the war on the part of the future adversary was "coercion into cooperation." Russia was required to strictly follow the previous allied obligations and take on new ones. Yes, it would be an unequal alliance, covering up vassal dependence, but still an alliance.
This approach was fully consistent with the views of the emperor, who was not prompted by numerous victories over Prussia and Austria to encroach on the state sovereignty and internal structure of these countries. Moreover, Napoleon did not hatch such radical plans in relation to Russia.
Unusual war
For the emperor of the French (as well as the soldiers and officers of the Grand Army), it was, let's say, an ordinary "Central European" war. The size of the army, exceeding half a million people, can be considered unusual. Bonaparte gathered under his banners almost the entire Old World, which had not only military, but no less political significance of demonstrating unity and power - before Alexander, England and the rest of the world.
The invasion of the "two languages" in Russia was perceived in a completely different way, which was greatly facilitated by official propaganda. After at the beginning of 1807 Russia opposed France as part of the so-called Fourth Coalition in order to incite hatred of the enemy in its subjects, the clergy after each Mass read to the parishioners the appeal of the Holy Synod, in which Napoleon was declared to be none other than … the Antichrist.
Note that in letters (for example, in a message dated March 31, 1808), Alexander called his French colleague "dear friend and brother." It is clear that the requirements of etiquette and political considerations prevail in diplomatic correspondence, but such an appeal by the Orthodox monarch to a person who was officially declared an enemy of the human race a year ago is at least amusing.
As historian S. M. Soloviev, "the war undertaken solely for the sake of saving the perishing Prussia was turned into a people's war directed against the persecutor of the Orthodox Church, who dreamed of proclaiming himself the Messiah." At the same time, a decree was issued on the collection of the people's militia. It is not surprising that five years later the war against Bonaparte, who invaded Russia, was declared Patriotic.
The very approach of the enemy to the heart of the country, unprecedented since the Time of Troubles, caused a shock in various strata of society. Moreover, after the rapid expansion of the country's borders to the west and south during the reign of Catherine, such a development of events seemed incredible. Add the natural rise of patriotism, hatred of the invaders, anxiety for the fate of the Fatherland, the pain of losses, the reaction to robberies and violence, and it becomes clear why the Patriotic War became such not in name, but in essence.
But, we repeat, for Napoleon, the Russian campaign differed only in the scale and theater of operations. The ruler of Europe had no idea about the pathological hatred of Alexander, which, with the outbreak of the war, entered into unison with the moods at the top and bottom of Russian society, and he hardly took such categories into account. In a letter from burnt-out Moscow, Napoleon will point out to Alexander that he "fought the war without bitterness." But these were, as they say, his problems - no one promised the aggressor to take into account his “good-naturedness”.
It is believed that Russia was pushed to confrontation by the humiliating Peace of Tilsit, which forced to curtail trade and grain exports to England, dealt a significant blow to the Russian economy. As for the "humiliation", then it is appropriate to talk about such, only if we take into account that the agreement was concluded with the "Antichrist" and under his dictation.
As for the economic problems allegedly caused by Russia's accession to the Continental Blockade, then, as Chancellor N. P. Rumyantsev, "the main reason for the financial crisis is not the break with Britain, but the incredible military spending."
In 1808, the losses of the treasury from the reduction in trade amounted to 3.6 million rubles, while military expenditures - 53 million rubles. In 1811, they more than doubled - to 113, 7 million rubles, which was one third of the entire state budget. Such large-scale preparations were clearly not undertaken for the sake of getting out of the Continental blockade, otherwise it would be akin to trying to nail a fly with a crystal vase.
On the whole, the development of any relations with England, the most consistent and ardent enemy of Russia, obviously contradicted national interests. Alexander had far more reason to befriend Napoleon against the British than the other way around.
It was this consideration that Bonaparte took into account. Moreover. The French emperor probably knew that Russian landowners who traded in grain, including many influential nobles of the capital, suffered from joining the Continental Blockade. In this case, the successful invasion of the Great Army into Russia could "help" the tsar to cope with the internal opposition and, without looking back at it, strictly follow the agreements in Tilsit.
But, as we know, Alexander (at least in this matter) was guided by completely different motives. He, perhaps, hated the English, but we should not forget that the conspiracy against Paul was inspired by London and there they knew very well the background of his son's accession to the throne. And in 1807, Russian troops fought with the "Antichrist" for Prussia with English money.
Scythian games
Napoleon intended to achieve his goals by winning a big border battle. However, the real scenario of the Russian campaign immediately and decisively diverged from these plans. Moreover, one gets the impression that this script was written in advance and written in St. Petersburg. This is fundamentally at odds with the prevailing view of the course of the 1812 campaign, in which the retreat of the Russian troops appears as a forced decision and almost impromptu, but the facts speak for themselves.
To begin with, this tactic was suggested by the entire experience of previous anti-French coalitions. As noted by S. M. Soloviev, all the best generals considered the best means of fighting Napoleon to avoid decisive battles, retreat, and drag the enemy deep into the territory.
Another thing is that in the cramped conditions of the European theater of operations, there was especially nowhere to retreat and "drag out", so Napoleon and his marshals resolutely suppressed such attempts - but the Russian expanses opened exciting prospects for such maneuvers. The scorched earth tactics also cannot be considered a domestic know-how - it was successfully applied in Portugal by the Duke of Wellington when retreating to the Torres-Vedras lines in 1810. And the Spanish guerillos demonstrated the effectiveness of the guerrilla war against the French quite clearly.
The strategy of the "Scythian war" is attributed to Barclay de Tolly. But the Russian military minister, in search of worthy examples, hardly needed to delve so far into the past. In 1707, on the eve of the invasion of Charles XII, Peter the Great formulated the following course of action for the Russian army: "Do not fight the enemy inside Poland, but wait for him at the borders of Russia", according to Peter's thought, Russian troops were supposed to intercept food, hinder crossings, "wear out" the enemy transitions and constant attacks.
With this strategy in mind, Alexander directly told Barclay: "Read and re-read the journal of Peter the Great." The minister, of course, read, read and made conclusions by his assistants, such as Ludwig von Wolzogen, the author of one of the plans for a "retreat" war against France.
Russia had no shortage of competent experts. The former Napoleonic Marshal, and at that time the Crown Prince of Sweden Bernadotte, in a letter to the Russian Tsar, gave extremely clear instructions:
“I ask the emperor not to give general battles, to maneuver, retreat, prolong the war - this is the best way of action against the French army. If he comes to the gates of Petersburg, I will consider him closer to death than if your troops were stationed on the banks of the Rhine. Especially use the Cossacks … let the Cossacks take everything from the French army: French soldiers fight well, but lose their spirit in hardships."
The emperor highly regarded the authority of Bernadotte, to the extent that he offered him to lead the Russian army after the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. Undoubtedly, the king listened to his advice and used it when making decisions.
