Open letter to D. A. Granin
Dear Daniil Alexandrovich!
I am a sincere and long-term admirer of your work. You command respect not only as the patriarch of Russian literature, but also as a front-line soldier who defended the independence of our country during the Great Patriotic War. Your word rightfully has a huge weight in any discussions on socially significant issues. It was this circumstance that prompted me to write this letter. As a researcher who has been studying the Soviet-Finnish relations of the 1930-1940s for fifteen years, I assure you that you were misled about the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army Carl Gustav Mannerheim during the blockade of Leningrad.
I quote your words:
“I understand those who oppose the memorial plaque of Mannerheim. Their reproaches are clear to me. Hitler's demand, Mannerheim forbade shelling Leningrad with guns, the writer explained his position.
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I hasten to assure you that science has no evidence for such a statement. Moscow researcher Oleg Kiselev made a detailed analysis of what the Finnish artillery had during the blockade of Leningrad and proved in detail that in 1941-1944 the field artillery of the Finnish army could not reach Leningrad. The same information can be found in the handbook on Finnish artillery published by the Artillery Museum of Finland (Tykistömuseon 78 tykkiä, Unto Partanen, ISBN 951-99934-4-4, 1988). None of the domestic or foreign scientists dispute this thesis. The only disputes about which there can be a dispute is about the Soviet railway transporters T-I-180 and T-III-12 captured by the Finns, which, at first glance, really blocked the entire city with fire.
Let's try to figure out what the Finnish railway artillerymen were doing in 1941-1944, whether they could reach Leningrad with their fire, and whether the Finnish Marshal sent them telegrams to the firing positions with requests to stop the shelling.
The 305 mm rail transporters were captured by the Finns on Hanko after the evacuation of the Soviet military base. Before evacuation, Soviet guns were disabled. Samuil Vladimirovich Tirkeltaub, a veteran of the Hanko defense, recalls:
… And with our guns - I know about my gun. The first thing that was done was to drain the alcohol from the shock absorbers. Alcohol, although technical, but at that time … There was actually no one to work further. Nevertheless, all guidance systems, all electrical circuits were broken. They put two half-charges into the barrel - they introduced it through the muzzle, covered it with sand, scattered and blew it up. As a result, the barrel was bent and torn. True, the Finns later restored these weapons. And then they were returned to us after the war. One of them stands in the Museum at the Varshavsky railway station, the second on Krasnaya Gorka in a badly ravaged state, and the third in Moscow on Poklonnaya Gora. So they do not work, but they have survived as museum exhibits.
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The Finns rebuilt these gigantic guns for two years, and by October 1942 they had brought them to their senses by making the first test shots. Firing practice and trips on giant transporters continued until September 1943. However, not a single Finnish document indicates that these guns were put into operation and entered service with the Finnish army. Thus, it can be argued that 305 mm transporters spent the entire war on Hanko, and after the armistice of 1944 they were returned to the Soviet side.
In view of the above, the possibility of shelling Leningrad with captured railway guns of 305 mm caliber disappears.
The Finns captured two TM-1-180 transporters on the Karelian Isthmus in an intact state. The 1st railway battery was formed from two transporters, which began its combat log on September 21, 1941. Thus, it is documented that two 180 mm transporters were adopted by the Finnish army in the fall of 1941 and entered the Primorskaya railway line. Fighting positions at the battery were in the area of Fort Ino, Seyvästö and in the area of Anttonala (now the village of Zelenaya Roscha).
According to the reference information, which the reader can easily find on the Internet, the firing range of these guns is up to 38 kilometers at an elevation angle of the barrel of 49 degrees. Let's take a closer look at the combat log of the 1st railway battery of the Finnish army.
In the Finnish National Archives, there are two battery combat logs. The second, from 1944, is a copy of the first, rewritten in a more legible handwriting. The first, most complete journal can be viewed at the link:
First of all, it was necessary to master these new tools for the Finns. Combat training went unhurriedly and boiled down to a constant change of firing positions, transfer of the gun from the marching position to the firing position and back to the marching position. Cleaning the gun barrels took a lot of time. The technique was new for the Finns, and its development was slow. The transfer of the gun from one position to another took from 30 to 40 minutes. This can be clearly seen in the combat log. The shooting positions also needed equipment. It was necessary to put in order and the loading mechanism, which was done by October 8.
By October 22, 1941, the battery was on alert.
On November 25, a combat alert was played on the battery:
In the south, there are two vehicles with the direction of movement to the east. Order: Puumala coastal battery opens fire, if Krasnaya Gorka answers, the 1st railway battery opens fire. There was no fire.
The battery opened fire with one gun for the first time on November 30, 1941, symbolically marking the second anniversary of the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war:
08.45. Combat alarm. Transport and small tug, bearing 2270, distance about 26 kilometers. Icebreaker Ermak and one destroyer in the direction of Kronstadt.
13.35. We started measuring the distance to Ermak.
13.59. The first shot bearing 2260, range 26300.
14.22. The last shoot. The supports did not stay on the ground, they began to bounce off after the third shot, and for this reason the shooting had to be interrupted after the 13th shot.
5th of December.
08.15. Combat alarm. The icebreaker Ermak and a large convoy appeared.
09.33. First shot. Nine shots were fired, after which the target disappeared in a blizzard.
09.36. The last shoot.
09.48-09.50. We fired four shells at Krasnaya Gorka, which responded with fire and fired five shells. The closest gap is 250 meters from us.
December 28, 1941.
12.30 order for a fire raid on Fort Rif.
12.45. First shot.
13.30. Last shot (8 rounds)
After that, a calm ensues in the operation of the battery. The winter was spent in repairs, studies and other worries. The guns refused to work in severe frosts.
Only in the early morning of May 1, 1942, the commander of the artillery of the Isthmus Army, after a stormy night of libations, orders to open fire on Kronstadt.
May 1, 1942
05.50 The order of the commander of artillery of the Isthmus Group was received - to prepare for firing, 30 fragmentation shells at Fort Rif.
07.15. First shot.
A total of 27 fragmentation shells were fired, of which 23 were in the forts area, 6 direct hits into the batteries. The first 2 projectiles - with a retarder, the last 6 - for a blow. Transporter # 86 fired 8 shells, Transporter # 102 - 19 shells.
08.17 - the last shot.
On June 15, 1942, General Walden arrived at the battery, who ordered to open fire on Soviet minesweepers and sea hunters in the Gulf of Finland. The battery fired 8 fragmentation rounds on a double charge. When loading the next projectile into transporter No. 102, a powder charge caught fire due to a technical malfunction, three gunners received light burns. By order of Walden, the shell was left in the barrel. They shot him only the next day.
After that, the battery was engaged in a constant change of positions, combat training, and only occasionally fired at Soviet ships in the bay. The firing range, as a rule, was 26 … 27 kilometers. The years 1942 and 1943 were spent in a routine change of positions, rare shooting, and combat training. There have been accidents, accidents and breakdowns. It is possible that the raid on the House of the Red Army in Kronstadt on April 30, 1944 was canceled precisely because of the collision of the railcar with the anti-aircraft gunner carriage:
11.55. The order of the IV Army Corps arrived through the regiment headquarters: This afternoon, at 18.00 - 19.00, move two guns to the firing position in Taikkina. Take with you the list of targets transmitted by the corps. Prepare firing with 25-30 semi-armor-piercing shells, the target is the House of the Red Army in Kronstadt. The start of the shelling is assigned by the corps.
12.45. The battery commander gives the order: “The battery is preparing for battle from the firing position at Ino, the combat mission is to shell the House of the Red Army in Kronstadt, and also to be ready for a possible battle against the enemy batteries if they open fire: Riff, Alexander Shants, Krasnoarmeisky, railway batteries of Kronstadt - from the firing position at Ino; against Krasnaya Gorka and the Gray Horse - from a firing position at Anttonal.
20.30: Accident at Taikkina: Lieutenant Berg crashed into a carriage of anti-aircraft gunners at full speed in a railcar, Lieutenant Berg was seriously injured, Junior Sergeant Yalmen and artilleryman Arminen received minor injuries. The car body is completely broken, the motor is slightly damaged.
Only on June 9, 1944, the entry of interest to us appears in the combat log:
June 9, 1944
19.30. The deputy regiment commander said that the battery must prepare for a possible anti-battery fight against targets on Kotlin Island. Since the range of fire from Anttonal was too long, he ordered two guns to be moved to the firing position at Ino.
This proves that the 1st railway battery fired at a MAXIMUM of 26-28 kilometers. If we assume that the Finns would have brought one gun to Kuokkala (Repino) and fired at Leningrad, then when shooting 28 kilometers from Kuokkala, the Finns could only reach the Park of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg and the Piterland water park. They then were out as a class. As well as the Primorsky district of the city of Leningrad - St. Petersburg. When firing at a maximum range of 37 kilometers, they could cover only the Petrograd side.
If we assume that the 1st railway battery decided to commit a beautiful suicide and arrived at the front line in Beloostrov, then the situation changes. Let us even assume that the entire track could withstand the weight of the installation of 150 tons (on June 11, 1944, due to the destruction of the railway track, the Finns almost lost one gun - transporter # 2 went off the rails).
The railway bridge across the Sestra River was blown up by Soviet units during the retreat in September 1941 and was not rebuilt by the Finns. Thus, the closest point to Leningrad from where the Finns could have fired a shot is north of the bridge over the Sestra in Beloostrov.
If they really did this: they arrived at the bridge, stood on an unequipped firing position in front of the Soviet fighters on the front line, would have placed a wagon with ammunition and a wagon with anti-aircraft machine guns nearby, would have had time to transfer the gun to a firing position in 30 minutes and make at least one shot at Leningrad, then we can say the following:
1) With a firing range of 26-28 kilometers, they could cover the Petrogradskaya side, the northern part of Vasilievsky Island and, possibly, would have reached the Peter and Paul Fortress. With the maximum firing range, they really would have blocked almost the entire city, reaching the House of Soviets on Moskovsky Prospekt.
2) From Beloostrov, they would not have left anywhere else. When the firing position was so close to the front line, they came under fire not only from the forts of the Kronstadt Fortress, but also from the field artillery of the 23rd Army defending the Karelian Isthmus. Using expensive, one-of-a-kind tools in this way is insane from all angles.
In connection with all of the above, it can be argued that the Finnish artillery in the period from 1941 to 1944 did not actually have the opportunity to fire at Leningrad. Even if we take into account the captured 180 mm railway transporters that operated on the Terijoki (Zelenogorsk) - Koivisto (Primorsk) railway.
We also note that before Kronstadt (now part of St. Petersburg), the Finnish artillerymen got it and absolutely did not hesitate to fire at it. The fact that the Finns did not open fire on the center of Kronstadt on April 30, 1944 is only a happy coincidence for the city residents and an unhappy coincidence for the Finns.
In connection with the above, it is absolutely impossible to explain the absence of shelling of Leningrad from the Finnish side by the goodwill of Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Similarly, historians do not know the documents in which Hitler would have demanded the shelling of Leningrad from the north near Mannerheim. It was not possible to find sources that the Nazi command demanded that the Finns place German guns on the Karelian Isthmus and shell Leningrad.
I ask you, dear Daniil Alexandrovich, to consider all the data given in my letter, documents and photographic documents that I attach to it. In my opinion, they prove that you were misled by an unscrupulous source.
Sincerely,
