Whether the Germans had the best self-propelled guns in the world or not is a moot point, but the fact that they managed to create one that left an indelible memory of all Soviet soldiers is for sure. We are talking about a heavy self-propelled gun "Ferdinand". It got to the point that, starting in the second half of 1943, in almost every combat report, Soviet troops destroyed at least one such self-propelled gun. If we sum up the losses of "Ferdinands" according to Soviet reports, then during the war several thousand of them were destroyed. The piquancy of the situation lies in the fact that the Germans produced only 90 of them during the entire war, and another 4 ARVs based on them. It is difficult to find a sample of armored vehicles from the Second World War, produced in such small quantities and at the same time so famous. All German self-propelled guns were recorded in "Ferdinands", but most often - "Marders" and "Stugs". Roughly the same situation was with the German "Tiger": it was often confused with the medium tank Pz-IV with a long cannon. But here there was at least a similarity of silhouettes, but what similarities between Ferdinand and, for example, StuG 40 is a big question.
So what was Ferdinand like and why is he so widely known since the Battle of Kursk? We will not go into technical details and design development issues, because this has already been written in dozens of other publications, but we will pay close attention to the battles on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, where these extremely powerful machines were massively used.
The conning tower of the ACS was assembled from sheets of forged cemented armor transferred from the stocks of the German Navy. The frontal armor of the cabin was 200 mm thick, the side and stern armor was 85 mm. The thickness of even the side armor made the self-propelled guns practically invulnerable to the fire of almost all Soviet artillery of the 1943 model of the year at a distance of over 400 m. barrel length 71 caliber, its muzzle energy one and a half times higher than that of the gun of the heavy tank "Tiger". The Ferdinand's cannon penetrated all Soviet tanks from all angles of attack at all ranges of actual fire. The only reason for non-penetration of armor on impact is ricochet. Any other hit caused the penetration of the armor, which in most cases meant the incapacitation of the Soviet tank and the partial or complete death of its crew. Such a serious weapon appeared in the hands of the Germans shortly before the start of Operation Citadel.
The formation of the units of the self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" began on April 1, 1943. In total, it was decided to form two heavy battalions (divisions).
The first of them, numbered 653 (Schwere PanzerJager Abteilung 653), was formed on the basis of the 197th StuG III assault gun division. According to the new state, the division was supposed to have 45 Ferdinand self-propelled guns. This unit was not chosen by chance: the personnel of the division had extensive combat experience and participated in the battles in the East from the summer of 1941 to January 1943. By May, the 653rd battalion was fully staffed according to the state. However, at the beginning of May 1943, the entire materiel was transferred to the staffing of the 654th battalion, which was being formed in France in the city of Rouen. By mid-May, the 653rd battalion was again staffed almost to the state and had 40 self-propelled guns in its composition, after passing the training course at the Neuseidel training ground, on June 9-12, 1943, the battalion departed in eleven echelons to the Eastern Front.
The 654th heavy tank destroyer battalion was formed on the basis of the 654th anti-tank battalion at the end of April 1943. The combat experience of his personnel, who had fought before with the PaK 35/36 anti-tank equipment, and then with the Marder II self-propelled guns, was much less than that of their colleagues from the 653rd battalion. Until April 28, the battalion was in Austria, from April 30 in Rouen. After the final exercises, in the period from 13 to 15 June, the battalion departed in fourteen echelons to the Eastern Front.
According to the wartime staff (K. St. N. No. 1148c from 03/31/43), a heavy battalion of tank destroyers included: battalion command, headquarters company (platoon: management, sapper, sanitary, anti-aircraft), three companies of "Ferdinands" (in each company 2 vehicles of the company headquarters, and three platoons of 4 vehicles; that is, 14 vehicles in the company), a repair and evacuation company, a motor transport company. In total: 45 self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", 1 sanitary armored personnel carrier Sd. Kfz.251 / 8, 6 anti-aircraft Sd. Kfz 7/1, 15 half-track tractors Sd. Kfz 9 (18 tons), trucks and cars.
The staffing structure of the battalions was slightly different. To begin with, the 653rd battalion included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies, the 654th - the 5th, 6th and 7th companies. The 4th company "fell out" somewhere. The numbering of vehicles in battalions corresponded to German standards: for example, both vehicles of the headquarters of the 5th company had numbers 501 and 502, numbers of vehicles of the 1st platoon were from 511 to 514 inclusive; 2nd platoon 521 - 524; 3rd 531 - 534 respectively. But if we carefully consider the combat composition of each battalion (division), we will see that in the "combat" number of units there are only 42 self-propelled guns. And the state is 45. Where have three more SPGs from each battalion gone? This is where the difference in the organization of improvised tank destroyer divisions comes into play: if in the 653rd battalion 3 vehicles were brought into the reserve group, then in the 654th battalion 3 "extra" vehicles were organized into a headquarters group that had non-standard tactical numbers: II -01, II-02, II-03.
Both battalions (divisions) became part of the 656th Tank Regiment, the headquarters of which the Germans formed on June 8, 1943. The unit turned out to be very powerful: in addition to 90 self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", it included the 216th assault tank battalion (Sturmpanzer Abteilung 216), and two companies of radio-controlled tankettes BIV "Bogvard" (313rd and 314th). The regiment was supposed to serve as a battering ram for the German offensive in the direction of Art. Ponyri - Maloarkhangelsk.
On June 25, the Ferdinands began to move towards the front line. By July 4, 1943, the 656th regiment was deployed as follows: to the west of the Oryol-Kursk railway, the 654th battalion (Arkhangelskoe district), to the east, the 653rd battalion (Glazunov district), followed by three companies 216th battalion (45 "Brummbars" in total). Each battalion of "Ferdinands" was assigned a company of radio-controlled tankettes B IV.
On July 5, the 656th Panzer Regiment went over to the offensive, supporting units of the 86th and 292nd German Infantry Divisions. However, the ramming strike did not work: the 653rd battalion on the very first day got bogged down in the hardest battles at the height of 257, 7, which the Germans called "Tank". Not only were the thirty-fours dug in at the height up to the tower, but the height was also covered with powerful minefields. On the very first day, 10 battalion self-propelled guns were blown up by mines. There were also heavy losses in personnel. Having blown up on an anti-personnel mine, the commander of the 1st company, Hauptmann Spielman, was seriously wounded. Having found out the direction of the strike, the Soviet artillery also opened a hurricane fire. As a result, by 17:00 on July 5, only 12 Ferdinands remained on the move! The rest received injuries of varying severity. The remnants of the battalion over the next two days continued to fight to capture Art. Diving.
The 654th Battalion's attack was even more disastrous. The 6th company of the battalion accidentally ran into its own minefield. Within just a few minutes, most of the "Ferdinands" were blown up by their own mines. Having discovered the monstrous German vehicles, barely creeping into our positions, the Soviet artillery opened concentrated fire on them. The result was that the German infantry, supporting the attack of the 6th company, suffered heavy losses and lay down, leaving the self-propelled guns without cover. Four "Ferdinands" from the 6th company were still able to reach the Soviet positions, and there, according to the memoirs of the German self-propelled gunners, they were "attacked by several brave Russian soldiers who remained in the trenches and armed with flamethrowers, and from the right flank, from the line of the railway they opened artillery fire, but seeing that it was ineffective, the Russian soldiers withdrew in an organized manner."
The 5th and 7th companies also reached the first line of trenches, losing about 30% of their vehicles on mines and coming under heavy shelling. At the same time, Major Noack, the commander of the 654th battalion, was mortally wounded by a shell fragment.
After occupying the first line of trenches, the remnants of the 654th battalion moved in the direction of Ponyri. At the same time, some of the machines were again blown up by mines, and Ferdinand No. 531 from the 5th company, being immobilized by flank fire of the Soviet artillery, was finished off and burned down. At dusk, the battalion reached the hills north of the Ponyri, where it stopped for the night and regrouped. There were 20 vehicles left in the battalion on the move.
On July 6, due to fuel problems, the 654th battalion launched the attack only at 14:00. However, due to the heavy fire of the Soviet artillery, the German infantry suffered serious losses, retreated and the attack was drowned. On this day, the 654th battalion reported "about a large number of Russian tanks arriving to strengthen the defense." According to the evening report, the self-propelled gun crews destroyed 15 Soviet T-34 tanks, and 8 of them were credited to the crew under the command of Hauptmann Luders, and 5 to Lieutenant Peters. There were 17 cars left on the move.
The next day, the remnants of the 653rd and 654th battalions were drawn to Buzuluk, where they made up a corps reserve. Two days were devoted to car repair. On July 8, several Ferdinands and Brummbars participated in the unsuccessful attack on the station. Diving.
At the same time (July 8), the headquarters of the Soviet Central Front received the first report from the chief of artillery of the 13th Army about the Ferdinand that was blown up by a mine. Two days later, a group of five officers of the GAU KA arrived from Moscow to the front headquarters specifically to study this sample. However, they were unlucky, by this moment the area where the damaged self-propelled guns stood was occupied by the Germans.
The main events developed on July 9-10, 1943. After many unsuccessful attacks on st. The diving Germans changed the direction of the strike. From the northeast, through the state farm "May 1", an impromptu battle group under the command of Major Kall struck. The composition of this group is impressive: the 505th battalion of heavy tanks (about 40 Tiger tanks), the 654th and part of the vehicles of the 653rd battalion (44 Ferdinands in total), the 216th assault tank battalion (38 Brummbar "), A division of assault guns (20 StuG 40 and StuH 42), 17 Pz. Kpfw III and Pz. Kpfw IV tanks. Immediately behind this armada, tanks of the 2nd TD and motorized infantry on an armored personnel carrier were supposed to move.
Thus, on a front of 3 km, the Germans concentrated about 150 combat vehicles, not counting the second echelon. More than half of the first-echelon vehicles are heavy. According to the reports of our artillerymen, the Germans here for the first time used a new attacking formation "in line" - with the "Ferdinands" that were in front. The vehicles of the 654th and 653rd battalions operated in two echelons. In the line of the first echelon, 30 vehicles were advancing, in the second echelon one more company (14 vehicles) moved with an interval of 120-150 m. The company commanders were in the general line on the command vehicles carrying a flag on the antenna.
On the very first day, this group easily managed to break through the state farm "May 1" to the village of Goreloe. Here our artillerymen made a truly brilliant move: seeing the invulnerability of the newest German armored monsters to artillery, they were allowed to enter a huge minefield filled with anti-tank mines and landmines from captured ammunition, and then opened hurricane fire on the medium-sized "retinue" following the Ferdinands. tanks and assault guns. As a result, the entire strike group suffered significant losses and was forced to withdraw.
The next day, July 10, Major Kall's group struck a new powerful blow and individual vehicles broke through to the outskirts of Art. Diving. The vehicles that broke through were the heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand".
According to the descriptions of our soldiers, the Ferdinands attacked, firing from a cannon from short stops from a distance of one to two and a half kilometers: a very long distance for armored vehicles of that time. Having been exposed to concentrated fire, or having found a mined area of the terrain, they retreated in reverse to some shelter, trying to always be facing the Soviet positions with thick frontal armor, absolutely invulnerable to our artillery.
On July 11, Major Kall's strike group was disbanded, the 505th heavy tank battalion and the tanks of the 2nd TD were transferred against our 70th army in the Kutyrka-Teploe region. In the area of art. Only the units of the 654th battalion and the 216th assault tank battalion remained, trying to evacuate the damaged materiel to the rear. But it was not possible to evacuate the 65-ton Ferdinands during July 12-13, and on July 14, Soviet troops launched a massive counteroffensive from the Ponyri station in the direction of the May 1 state farm. By midday the German troops were forced to withdraw. Our tankers supporting the infantry attack suffered heavy losses, mostly not from German fire, but because a company of T-34 and T-70 tanks jumped out onto the same powerful minefield where Ferdinands had blown up four days earlier. 654th battalion.
On July 15 (that is, the very next day), the German equipment knocked out and destroyed at the Ponyri station was inspected and studied by representatives of the GAU KA and the NIBT test site. In total, on the battlefield northeast of st. Ponyri (18 km2) left 21 self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", three assault tanks "Brummbar" (in Soviet documents - "Bear"), eight tanks Pz-III and Pz-IV, two command tanks, and several radio-controlled tankettes B IV "Bogvard ".
Most of the Ferdinands were found in a minefield near the village of Goreloy. More than half of the vehicles examined had damage to the chassis from the impact of anti-tank mines and land mines. 5 vehicles had damage to the chassis from shells of 76-mm and higher caliber. Two "Ferdinands" had bullet holes, one of them received as many as 8 hits in the gun barrel. One car was completely destroyed by an aerial bomb hit from a Soviet Pe-2 bomber, one was destroyed by a 203-mm projectile hitting the roof of the wheelhouse. And only one "Ferdinand" had a shell hole in the left side, made by a 76-mm armor-piercing projectile, 7 T-34 tanks and a ZIS-3 battery fired at it from all sides, from a distance of 200-400 m. And one more "Ferdinand", which had no external damage to the hull, was burned by our infantry with a bottle of KS. Several "Ferdinands", deprived of the ability to move under their own power, were destroyed by their crews.
The main part of the 653rd battalion operated in the defense zone of our 70th army. Irrecoverable losses during the battles from 5 to 15 July amounted to 8 vehicles. And one of our troops captured perfectly serviceable, and even together with the crew. It happened as follows: in the course of repelling one of the German attacks in the area of the village of Teploe on July 11-12, the advancing German troops underwent massive artillery shelling of a corps artillery battalion, batteries of the latest Soviet self-propelled guns SU-152 and two IPTAPs, after which the enemy left on the battlefield 4 "Ferdinand". Despite such a massive bombardment, not a single German self-propelled gun had armor penetration: two vehicles had shell damage to the chassis, one was badly destroyed by large-caliber artillery fire (possibly the SU-152) - its frontal plate was shifted from its place. And the fourth (no. 333), trying to get out of the shelling, moved in reverse and, having hit the sandy area, simply "sat down" on her belly. The crew tried to dig the car, but then attacking Soviet infantrymen of the 129th Infantry Division ran into them and the Germans preferred to surrender. Here ours faced the same problem that has long weighed down the minds of the command of the German 654th and 653rd battalions: how to get this colossus out of the battlefield? Pulling the "hippopotamus out of the swamp" dragged on until August 2,when, by the efforts of four tractors C-60 and C-65, Ferdinand was finally pulled out onto solid ground. But in the course of its further transportation to the railway station, one of the self-propelled guns' gasoline engines failed. The further fate of the car is unknown.
With the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, the Ferdinands fell into their element. So, on July 12-14, 24 self-propelled guns of the 653rd battalion supported units of the 53rd infantry division in the Berezovets area. At the same time, repulsing the attack of Soviet tanks near the village of Krasnaya Niva, the crew of only one "Ferdinand" Lieutenant Tiret reported on the destruction of 22 T-34 tanks.
On July 15, the 654th battalion repulsed the attack of our tanks from the direction of Maloarkhangelsk - Buzuluk, while the 6th company reported the destruction of 13 Soviet combat vehicles. Subsequently, the remnants of the battalions were drawn to Oryol. By July 30, all "Ferdinands" were withdrawn from the front, and by order of the headquarters of the 9th Army were sent to Karachev.
During Operation Citadel, the 656th Panzer Regiment daily reported on the presence of combat-ready Ferdinands by radio. According to these reports, on July 7, there were 37 Ferdinands in service, July 8 - 26, July 9 - 13, July 10 - 24, July 11 - 12, July 12 - 24, July 13 - 24, July 14 - 13 units. These data do not correlate well with the German data on the combat strength of the strike groups, which included the 653rd and 654th battalions. The Germans recognize 19 "Ferdinands" as irretrievably lost, in addition, another 4 cars were lost "due to a short circuit and the subsequent fire." Consequently, the 656th regiment lost 23 vehicles. In addition, there are inconsistencies with Soviet data, which documentary evidence of the destruction of 21 Ferdinand self-propelled guns.
Perhaps the Germans tried, as was often the case, to write off several vehicles as irrecoverable losses retroactively, because, according to their data, since the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive, 20 Ferdinands were irrecoverable (this apparently includes some of 4 cars burned down for technical reasons). Thus, according to German data, the total irrecoverable losses of the 656th regiment from July 5 to August 1, 1943 amounted to 39 Ferdinands. Be that as it may, this is generally confirmed by documents, and, in general, corresponds to Soviet data.
If the losses of the "Ferdinands" in both German and Soviet ones coincide (the difference is only in dates), then "unscientific fantasy" begins. The command of the 656th regiment declares that during the period from July 5 to July 15, 1943, the regiment disabled 502 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns, 20 anti-tank and about 100 other guns. Particularly distinguished in the field of the destruction of Soviet armored vehicles, the 653rd battalion, which recorded 320 Soviet tanks, as well as a large number of guns and vehicles, in the destroyed ones.
Let's try to deal with the losses of the Soviet artillery. During the period from 5 to 15 July 1943, the Central Front under the command of K. Rokossovsky lost 433 guns of all types. This is data for a whole front, which occupied a very long defense zone, so the data on 120 destroyed guns in one small "patch" seems clearly overestimated. In addition, it is very interesting to compare the declared number of destroyed Soviet armored vehicles with their real decline. So: by July 5, the tank units of the 13th Army numbered 215 tanks and 32 self-propelled guns, another 827 armored units were listed in the 2nd TA and the 19th TC, which was in the front reserve. Most of them were brought into battle precisely in the defense zone of the 13th Army, where the Germans inflicted their main blow. The losses of the 2nd TA for the period from 5 to 15 July amounted to 270 T-34 and T-70 tanks burned out and wrecked, the losses of the 19th TK - 115 vehicles, the 13th Army (including all replenishments) - 132 vehicles. Consequently, of the 1129 tanks and self-propelled guns used in the 13th Army's zone, the total losses amounted to 517 vehicles, and more than half of them were restored during the battles (irrecoverable losses amounted to 219 vehicles). If we take into account that the 13th Army's defensive zone on different days of the operation ranged from 80 to 160 km, and the Ferdinands operated on the front from 4 to 8 km, it becomes clear that so many Soviet armored vehicles could be “snapped” into such a narrow area. it was simply unrealistic. And if we also take into account the fact that several tank divisions operated against the Central Front, as well as the 505th Tigers heavy tank battalion, assault gun divisions, Marder and Hornisse self-propelled guns, as well as artillery, it is clear that the results 656th regiment shamelessly bloated. However, a similar picture is obtained when checking the effectiveness of the heavy tank battalions "Tigers" and "Royal Tigers", and indeed all German tank units. For the sake of fairness, it must be said that the combat reports of both Soviet, American and British troops sinned with such "truthfulness".
So what is the reason for such a famous "heavy assault gun", or, if you like, "heavy tank destroyer Ferdinand"?
Undoubtedly, the creation of Ferdinand Porsche was a kind of masterpiece of technical thought. In a huge ACS, many technical solutions were applied (a unique chassis, a combined power plant, the location of the BO, etc.) that had no analogues in tank building. At the same time, numerous technical "highlights" of the project were poorly adapted for military operation, and the phenomenal armor protection and powerful weapons were bought due to disgusting mobility, a short power reserve, the complexity of the machine in operation and the lack of a concept for using such technology. This is all true, but this was not the reason for such "fright" before the creation of Porsche, that the Soviet artillerymen and tankmen saw crowds of "Ferdinands" in almost every combat report, even after the Germans took all the surviving self-propelled guns from the eastern front to Italy and until the battles in Poland, they did not participate on the Eastern Front.
Despite all its imperfections and "childhood diseases", the self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" turned out to be a terrible enemy. Her armor did not penetrate. I just didn't get through. At all. Nothing. You can imagine what the Soviet tankmen and artillerymen felt and thought: you hit it, you fire shell after shell, and it looks like a spell, rushing and rushing at you.
Many modern researchers cite the lack of anti-personnel weapons of this ACS as the main reason for the unsuccessful debut of the Ferdinands. Say, the car did not have machine guns and the self-propelled guns were helpless against the Soviet infantry. But if we analyze the reasons for the losses of the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, it becomes clear that the role of the infantry in destroying the Ferdinands was simply insignificant, the vast majority of vehicles were blown up in minefields, and some more were destroyed by artillery.
Thus, contrary to popular belief that V. Model is to blame for the large losses at the Kursk Bulge of the Ferdinand ACS, who allegedly "did not know" how to apply them correctly, we can say that the main reasons for such high losses of these ACS were the tactically competent actions of the Soviet commanders, the fortitude and courage of our soldiers and officers, as well as a little military luck.
Another reader will object, why are we not talking about the battles in Galicia, where from April 1944 slightly modernized "Elephanta" participated (which differed from the previous "Ferdinands" by minor improvements, such as a course machine gun and a commander's cupola)? We answer: because their fate there was no better. Until July, they, brought together in the 653rd battalion, fought local battles. After the start of a major Soviet offensive, the battalion was sent to the aid of the German SS Hohenstaufen division, but ran into an ambush by Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery and 19 vehicles were immediately destroyed. The remnants of the battalion (12 vehicles) were consolidated into the 614th separate heavy company, which took the battles at Wünsdorf, Zossen and Berlin.
ACS number Nature of damage Cause of damage Note
731 Destroyed caterpillar Blown up by a mine SPG repaired and sent to Moscow for an exhibition of captured property
522 The caterpillar is destroyed, the road wheels are damaged Blown up by a land mine, the fuel is ignited The car burned
523 The track is destroyed, the road wheels are damaged Blown up by a land mine, set on fire by the crew The car burned down
734 The lower branch of the caterpillar is destroyed.
II-02 The right track is torn off, the road wheels are destroyed Blown up by a mine, set on fire by a bottle of KS The car burned out
I-02 Left caterpillar torn off, road roller destroyed Blown up by a mine and set on fire Machine burned down
514 The track is destroyed, the road roller is damaged Blown up by a mine, set on fire The car burned down
502 Torn off a sloth Blown up by a land mine The car was tested by shelling
501 The caterpillar was torn off The mine was blown up The machine was repaired and delivered to the NIBT landfill
712 Right drive wheel destroyed. Shell hit The crew left the car. The fire is extinguished
732 The third carriage is destroyed.
524 Caterpillar torn apart Blown up by a mine, set on fire Machine burned down
II-03 Caterpillar destroyed Shell hit, set fire to KS bottle Machine burned out
113 or 713 Both sloths destroyed. Projectile hits. Weapon set on fire Machine burned out
601 Right track destroyed Shell hit, gun set on fire from outside Machine burned out
701 The fighting compartment was destroyed. A 203 mm projectile hit the commander's hatch -
602 Hole in the port side of the gas tank 76-mm shell of a tank or divisional gun The vehicle burned out
II-01 The gun burned out Ignited with a bottle of KS The car burned out
150061 A sloth and a caterpillar destroyed, a gun barrel shot through Shell hits on the chassis and a cannon Crew captured
723 The caterpillar is destroyed, the gun is jammed. Projectile hits to the chassis and mask -
? Complete destruction Direct hit from the Petlyakov bomber
