The last year of the war was an agony for the Third Reich. Realizing the inevitability of defeat and punishment for the crimes committed, the Nazi elite tried with all their might to delay the defeat. For this, all means were good: they carried out a total mobilization, feverishly developed various models of "miracle weapons", the cities surrounded by Soviet troops were declared "fortresses". Breslau-Breslau, the capital of Silesia, also became such a citadel. The German garrison fought here for almost three months, from mid-February to May 6, 1945, and surrendered only after the news of the general surrender of the German armed forces.
Organization of the defense of Breslau
By February 15, 1945, Soviet troops blockaded the capital of Silesia, the city of Breslau. The city was defended by the corps group "Breslau" (about 50 thousand people, plus 30 thousand militias). The military commandant of the city was at first Major General Hans von Alphen, since March - General of the infantry Hermann Niehof. Political power in the fortified area was exercised by Gauleiter Karl Hanke, endowed with dictatorial powers. He shot and hanged everyone who wanted to leave the city without an order from the Fuehrer. So, on January 28, by order of the Gauleiter, the second burgomaster of Breslau Spielhaten was executed.
The garrison and the remaining residents of the city were convinced that their business was to withstand this strategic point until the Wehrmacht launched a counteroffensive and liberated them. There was hope that the forces of Army Group Center, located southwest of Breslau, would break through the encirclement. At first, the soldiers and townspeople believed in the emergence of a “miracle weapon that would save the Reich, and in the success of the offensive in Silesia and Pomerania. Rumors also spread about the imminent collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition, the conflict between the Western powers and the USSR. In addition, the front stabilized relatively close to the city and artillery cannonade was heard from there, which for a long time supported the hopes of the garrison for an early arrival of help.
Food in the city was sufficient for a long defense. The ammunition was worse. But they were delivered by "air bridge". The planes landed at the Gandau airfield. Also, during the siege, small units of paratroopers were airlifted into the city and the wounded were taken out. The Gandau airfield was under constant threat of capture. Hanke decided to build a new airfield in the city center along one of the main streets of the city - Kaiserstrasse. For this, it was necessary to remove all lighting masts, wires, cut down trees, uproot stumps and even demolish dozens of buildings for almost one and a half kilometers (to expand the strip). For clearing the territory of the "internal airfield" the forces of sappers were not enough, so they had to involve the civilian population.
Soviet intelligence believed that units of the 20th tank division, the 236th assault gun brigade, a combined tank company, artillery and anti-aircraft units, and 38 Volkssturm battalions were located in the city. In total, over 30 thousand people (including the militia), with 124 guns, 1645 machine guns, 2335 faust cartridges, 174 mortars and 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. The main forces of the German garrison were concentrated in the southern and western sectors. The southeastern, eastern and northern parts of the city were covered by natural barriers: the Veide River, the Oder River canals, the Ole River with wide floodplains. In the north, the area was swampy, which made it impossible to use heavy weapons.
The Nazis created a strong defense. Numerous stone buildings, gardens and parks made it possible to secretly place fire weapons and disguise them. The roads were blocked in advance with rubble of stones and logs, barricades and ditches, mined, as well as the approaches to them, were shot through. At the same time, in the city itself and in the suburbs there was a network of good roads, which allowed the Germans to quickly transfer their tanks, assault guns and artillery to a dangerous area. Armored vehicles were in the commandant's reserve and their small groups (1-2 tanks, 1-3 self-propelled guns) were used in active areas to support the infantry.
Storm
On February 18, 1945, the 6th combined-arms army of Gluzdovsky was transferred to the 349th guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (8 ISU-152). Each rifle regiment allocated an assault group (consolidated battalion) for combat operations in the city. Also for the assault, assault battalions of the 62nd separate engineer-sapper brigade were involved, whose fighters were trained for urban battles and the capture of long-term fortifications. The personnel of these units were armed with protective armor, ROKS flamethrowers (Klyuev-Sergeev knapsack flamethrower), portable rockets, trophy faust cartridges and explosives.
The combat operations of the assault groups took place from February 18 to May 1, 1945 (in anticipation of the complete surrender of the enemy, the troops blocking Breslau completed their attacking actions). Soviet troops mainly operated in the western and southern parts of the fortified area. The offensive was carried out unevenly: now activation, then a pause. During the pause, reconnaissance, regrouping and replenishment of forces, the supply of ammunition, and targeting of the new quarter were carried out.
The first assault (there were separate attacks earlier) began on the night of February 22, 1945 in the southern part of Breslau. After the artillery preparation, the batteries began to accompany the assault groups. The self-propelled guns moved behind the main forces of the assault groups at a distance of 100-150 meters along the streets from south to north. At the request of the infantry, they hit the enemy firing points. Self-propelled guns moved at some distance from each other, pressing against the walls of houses, supporting the neighbors with fire. From time to time, self-propelled guns fired harassing and targeted fire on the upper floors of houses to support the actions of infantry and sappers, who blazed a path through the rubble and barricades. Unfortunately, there were also mistakes, for example, two vehicles rushed ahead of the infantry and were knocked out by the fausters.
Soviet sappers actively used directional explosions, using water hatch covers as reflectors. Then, flamethrowers were sent to the holes in the barricades and walls of buildings. However, our troops met fierce resistance, and the Nazis repulsed the first assault aimed at the city center.
In early March, the 6th Army was reinforced by the 222nd separate tank regiment (5 T-34, 2 IS-2, 1 ISU-122 and 4 SU-122) and the 87th Guards heavy tank regiment (11 IS-2) … 349th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment was significantly strengthened (29 ISU-152). This strengthened the assault forces, fighting resumed with renewed vigor. As before, tanks and self-propelled guns moved behind the infantry, acting as mobile firing points. The line of the infantry, as a rule, was indicated by a green or white rocket, red - indicated the direction of fire. Tanks or self-propelled guns fired several shots and the arrows went on the attack under cover of smoke and dust, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's firing point was suppressed, or the Nazis hid under fire in shelters. The soldiers broke into the building, actively using grenades. Some buildings were destroyed by direct fire, brick fences and metal fences were destroyed by cannon fire. To avoid losses, the firing position of tanks and self-propelled guns was changed only after a complete cleanup of houses, floors, attics and basements. Sometimes heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were used as battering rams, making passages in fences and barricades.
In the best traditions of Russian ingenuity, tankers used river anchors to pull away rubble and barricades. A tank or self-propelled gun, under cover of fire from another vehicle, approached the blockage, the sappers hooked the anchor to logs, beams and other objects of the blockage, the armored vehicle backed up and pulled away the obstacle. It happened that a tank landing was used. One tank or self-propelled gun fired at the object, the other with a landing party on board at high speed jerked towards the building, stopping at a window or door. The landing force broke into the building and started close combat. The armored vehicle retreated to its original positions.
However, these forces were not enough to make a decisive turning point in the battle for Breslau. In March 1945, there was little success only in the center, where our assault groups managed to advance from Hindenburg Square in a northern direction by four blocks, in other areas only by 1 - 2 blocks. The battles were extremely stubborn. The Germans fought desperately and skillfully, defending every house, floor, basement or attic. They tried to use the 87th Guards Tank Heavy Regiment in the northern sector, but unsuccessfully. The sappers were unable to destroy all the blockages on the roads in time, and when heavy tanks moved off the roads, they got stuck in swampy terrain and became easy prey for the enemy. After this failure, no more active operations were carried out in the northern direction.
Easter battle
The assault on the city took on a positional character. Our troops recaptured the enemy house by house, block by block, and slowly "gnawed" deep into the city. But the German garrison also showed tenacity and ingenuity, fiercely fought back. The commander of the sapper battalion of the 609th division, Captain Rother recalled:
“The streets between the German and Russian positions were covered with debris, broken bricks and tiles. Therefore, we came up with the idea of placing mines disguised as debris. To do this, we covered the wooden hulls of antipersonnel mines with linseed oil, and then sprinkled them with red and yellowish-white brick dust, so that it was impossible to distinguish them from bricks. It was impossible to distinguish the mines prepared in this way from a distance of three meters from the brick. At night, they were installed using rods from windows, basement hatches and from balconies or from the ruins of houses, unnoticed by the enemy. So, a few days later, a barrage of 5,000 such antipersonnel mines disguised as bricks was set up in front of the front of the 609th engineer battalion."
In April 1945, the main fighting took place in the southern and western parts of Breslau. On April 1, on Easter Sunday, Soviet aviation and artillery delivered powerful blows to the city. The city blocks were on fire, buildings collapsed one after another. Under a veil of fire and smoke, Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns launched a new attack. The "Easter battle" began. Armored vehicles punched holes in the weakening enemy defenses, flamethrowers destroyed pillboxes and pillboxes, concentrated artillery fire from close range swept away all living things. The German defense was broken, our troops captured the main "artery" of the fortress - the Gandau airfield. Breslau was completely cut off from the Reich, since the "inner airfield" on the Kaiserstrasse was unsuitable for landing large planes that brought weapons and ammunition, and took away the wounded and sick. It became obvious that the fortress's position was hopeless. But the military-political command of the fortified city did not respond to calls for surrender.
In the following days, the battle continued. The main battles were fought in the western part of the fortified city, so all tank and self-propelled regiments were subordinated to the commander of the 74th rifle corps, Major General A. V. Vorozhischev. Armored vehicles supported the actions of the 112th, 135th, 181st, 294th, 309th and 359th rifle divisions. On April 3, the 6th Army was transferred to the 374th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. The self-propelled guns received the task, in cooperation with the 294th division, to reach the right bank of the Oder River. By April 15, despite strong enemy resistance, the task was partially completed. Since April 18, the self-propelled guns regiment performed the same task, but now it supported the offensive of the 112th division. In the battle on April 18, the 374th self-propelled guns regiment lost 13 ISU-152 out of 15. The Germans were able to disperse and destroy the landing (50 people), the rest of the assault detachment's infantry was cut off and the faustics burned the self-propelled guns. In the future, the self-propelled guns of the 374th regiment helped our attack aircraft to occupy several blocks.
On April 30, 1945, our troops stopped the offensive, awaiting the surrender of Germany. Breslau did not surrender, and after the surrender of Berlin on May 2, 1945, on May 4, the townspeople, through the priests, invited the commandant Niehof to lay down their arms in order to end the suffering of the people. The torture of the civilian population, the elderly, women and children became intolerable. The general did not answer. On May 5, Gauleiter Hanke announced through the city newspaper (its last issue) that surrender was prohibited on pain of death. Hanke himself escaped on the evening of May 5 by plane. After the flight of Hanke, General Nihof entered into negotiations with the army commander Gluzdovsky on the issue of the honorary surrender of the fortress. The Soviet side guaranteed life, food, safety of personal property and awards, return to their homeland after the end of the war; medical assistance to the wounded and sick; safety and normal living conditions for all civilians.
On May 6, 1945, Breslau capitulated. By the evening of the same day, all German troops were disarmed, our units occupied all quarters. On May 7, 1945, gratitude was announced to the troops that took Breslau, and a salute was given in Moscow with 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns.
The meaning of the "miracle of Breslau"
The defense of Breslau was used by the department of Goebbels, who compared this battle with the battle of Aachen during the wars with Napoleon. The Miracle of Breslau has become a symbol of national resilience. The German garrison fought for almost three months, until the end of the war held most of the city and surrendered only after the surrender of the entire Reich. Thus, the German military historian Kurt Tippelskirch noted that the defense of Breslau became "one of the most glorious pages in the history of the German people."
However, he also noticed that the defense of Breslau was of strategic importance only in the first phase of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, that is, in January and the first half of February 1945. At this time, the Breslau fortified area attracted part of the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which made it easier for the German command to create a new defense line from Lower Silesia to the Sudetenland. After February, the defense of the fortress no longer had military significance; several Soviet divisions besieging Breslau did not reduce the forces of the Red Army. That is, Breslau could surrender without prejudice to the Wehrmacht as early as late February - early March 1945. But the political significance of the defense of the fortress city (propaganda) had more weight than the military one.
Why the Red Army could not take Breslau by storm
The answer is simple. The front command almost immediately withdrew all forces from this sector, except for the rather weak 6th Combined Arms Army. As a result, the 6th Army led the siege only on its own (two rifle corps - 7 rifle divisions, 1 fortified area), without additional artillery and tanks. Her forces were too small for a full-fledged assault from several directions, which would definitely lead to the fall of the fortress. At the same time, the Soviet command initially underestimated the size of the enemy garrison. Its number at the beginning of the siege was estimated at only 18 thousand fighters (not counting the militia), but as the siege dragged out, the estimate of its number increased first to 30 thousand people, then to 45 thousand people. Thus, the number of troops of the 6th Army at first was less than the German garrison (in fact, the whole army), and there was not a sufficient number of guns and tanks.
The Soviet high command was busy with more ambitious tasks. Breslau no longer had military significance. The fortress was doomed and its fall was only inevitable. Therefore, no special efforts were made to capture Breslau.
Also among the objective reasons for the long-term defense of the city are the geographical features of the location of a large city. It was covered on both sides by natural barriers that interfered with the actions of mechanized units. In addition, the Soviet command did not want to incur heavy losses as the end of the war was approaching, there was no military need for a quick capture of Breslau. Moreover, since July 1, 1945, Silesia and Breslau (Wroclaw) were transferred to the new Polish state, friendly to the USSR. It was necessary, if possible, to preserve the city for the Poles.
