Agony of the Third Reich. 75 years ago, on February 10, 1945, the East Pomeranian strategic operation began. The Soviet armies of Rokossovsky and Zhukov defeated the German Army Group Vistula, liberated the ancient Slavic lands, took Danzig and occupied the Baltic coast. The threat of a German strike from Eastern Pomerania was eliminated, the Red Army began to regroup in the Berlin direction.
The threat from the north
The offensive of the Red Army, which began in January - early February 1945, led to the withdrawal of our troops to the Oder River, seizing bridgeheads on its western bank. At this line, from where it was already possible to go to Berlin, the Soviet troops stopped.
To continue the offensive in the Berlin direction, it was necessary to solve several important tasks. The 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Zhukov, which broke through the closest to Berlin, fought with part of its forces against the blocked enemy garrisons of Poznan, Kustrin, Schneidemühl and other strongholds of the Wehrmacht. At the beginning of February 1945, significant forces of the 1st BF had to turn to the northern flank, to the East Pomeranian direction. There the Wehrmacht concentrated large forces to strike the flank and rear of the Berlin group of the Red Army. The right flank of the 1st BF stretched for hundreds of kilometers, a huge and uncovered gap formed between the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and the Nazis could use this.
Until the very end of the war, the German army retained its high combat capability, delivered powerful blows and fiercely, skillfully fought. At the same time, the German command at the junction of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts was going to strike a strong blow in the northern direction from the Glogau-Guben line in Silesia. That is, the Germans planned on counterstrikes from the north and south to cut off the Soviet armies that had rushed forward in the Berlin direction, and to destroy them. Even a partial success of the operation led to a protraction of the war and deflected the threat of the storming of Berlin.
The German command tried to strengthen the position of the 9th Army under the command of T. Busse, which was defending in the Berlin direction. It was reinforced with reserves, reinforcements and officer schools. The Nazis were able to quickly strengthen the defenses on the Oder. On January 24, 1945, Army Group Vistula was formed to defend the Berlin direction under the command of SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler. It included the 2nd and 9th field armies. The 2nd German Army under the command of W. Weiss (from March 12 - von Sauken) was located in Eastern Pomerania, and acted against the right wing of the 1st BF and the left wing of the 2nd BF. By February 10, the 11th German Army (11th SS Panzer Army) was formed, operating west of the 2nd Army. Also in the Stettin area was the 3rd Panzer Army of E. Routh (since March - von Manteuffel), which could operate both in the Berlin and East Pomeranian directions.
German troops were highly mobile: Germany had an extensive network of railways and highways. Also, for the transfer of troops, sea communications and ports in the Baltic were used. A number of units were transferred from Courland to Eastern Pomerania to reinforce the Vistula Army Group. In addition, German aviation had a developed network of airfields near the front (Berlin concrete strips), which made it possible to concentrate forces and create a temporary advantage in the air. On some days, the Germans dominated the air.
The need to suspend the offensive on Berlin
At this time, when the Third Reich mobilized all forces and means for the defense of the capital region, the Soviet armies experienced objective difficulties in the main direction. The troops of the 1st BF and 1st UV suffered serious losses in previous battles. The number of rifle divisions by the beginning of February was reduced to 5, 5 thousand people. Equipment and tanks were knocked out. Due to the high rates of the Vistula-Oder operation, the rear fell behind, the supply of troops with ammunition, fuel and other means significantly deteriorated. The airfields near the Oder were damaged by rain (they were unpaved). I had to take urgent measures to strengthen the air defense.
As a result, the balance of forces in the Berlin direction, especially on the northern flank, temporarily changed in favor of the Wehrmacht. Under these conditions, it was impossible to storm Berlin. A poorly prepared assault on the German capital could lead to dire consequences: failure of the operation, huge losses, loss of time. And the political situation was difficult. The Nazis could open a front in the West and let the Anglo-American troops into Berlin.
Therefore, the supreme Soviet command decided from the beginning to remove the threat from the flanks of the Berlin group of the Red Army. For this purpose, offensive operations were carried out in Eastern Pomerania and Silesia, the destruction of the East Prussian grouping of the Wehrmacht was completed. At the same time, preparations were under way for an offensive on Berlin, a struggle for bridgeheads on the Oder.
Defeat of the East Pomeranian group
On February 10, 1945, the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Rokossovsky went on the offensive against the East Pomeranian group of the Wehrmacht. The armies of the 2nd BF were reoriented from the East Prussian direction to the East Pomeranian. But four armies of the front (50th, 3rd, 48th and 5th Guards Tank) were transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front. Those remaining in the 2nd BF were weakened by previous battles, and the 19th Army and 3rd Panzer Corps, transferred to Rokossovsky from the headquarters reserve, were still on the march. Therefore, the advance of our troops was slow. The wooded and swampy terrain contributed to the defending Nazis. By February 19, the Soviet armies pushed the enemy 15–40 km away and were forced to stop.
It became obvious that the forces of one 2nd BF could not defeat the enemy. The Soviet Headquarters decided to involve part of Zhukov's forces and the Baltic Fleet in the operation. Meanwhile, the Nazis tried to seize the initiative. On February 17, 1945, the Germans launched a strong counterattack from the Stargard area against the troops of the northern wing of the 1st BF. Our troops pushed 10 km away. A fierce battle broke out for the ancient Slavic lands. Zhukov's armies repulsed enemy attacks and on March 1 struck south-east of Stargard on Kohlberg. Even earlier, on February 24, the troops of Rokossovsky inflicted a strong blow on the Nazis from the Linde area to Köslin (Kozlin). The Soviet armies dissected the enemy grouping and on March 5 reached the Baltic coast in the area of Köslin, Kolberg and Treptow. Kohlberg was under siege. The German East Pomeranian group was cut into pieces. The 2nd German army was defeated and driven back to the northeastern part of the region. The 11th German army was defeated and fragmented, and rolled back to the Oder. The threat to the flank of the 1st BF was eliminated.
After reaching the Baltic, Rokossovsky's armies turned their front to the east in order to finish off the 2nd German army, which had lost ground contact with the rest of the German group, to clear the northeastern part of Pomerania from the Nazis, with the ancient Polish cities of Gdynia and Gdansk (Danzig). To quickly solve this problem, the 2nd BF was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank Army of Katukov from the 1st BF. The tank guards were supposed to go to Gdynia. Zhukov's troops advanced westward, reaching the lower part of the Oder (from the mouth to Tseden), in order to defeat the 11th German army and occupy the western part of Pomorie. After that, the right wing of the 1st BF again aimed at the Berlin direction. Tank formations were withdrawn to the rear to replenish and prepare for the decisive battle for Berlin.
The German command, despite the defeat and heavy losses, continued to offer strong resistance. The 2nd Army still had large forces (19 divisions, including 2 tank divisions), mobilized everyone they could, all the rear, special units and subunits, and the militia. Discipline in the troops was restored and maintained by the most brutal methods. The 11th Army was in the worst condition, defeated and fragmented. Therefore, in the west, the Nazis focused on the defense of individual settlements, which they turned into strong defense centers. The speed of the Soviet offensive did not allow the Germans to use units of the 3rd Panzer Army to strengthen the defense in Pomerania. Therefore, units of the 11th Army were withdrawn beyond the Oder in order to put in order, to organize a new line of defense. The main focus was on protecting the large industrial center of Stettin, so they decided to keep Altdamm.
On the morning of March 6, Rokossovsky's troops resumed their offensive. In the very first days, the Germans' defenses were hacked. On March 8, our troops took the large industrial center of Stolp - the second largest city in Pomerania after Stettin. Stolpmünde was also taken with a surprise attack. The Germans, hiding behind rear guards, and fighting back at intermediate lines (especially strong fortifications were on the right flank of the 2nd BF), withdrew troops to the strong positions of the Gdynia-Gdansk fortified region. As the Nazis retreated, their battle formations became denser and resistance increased significantly. The pace of movement of the Soviet troops decreased. On March 13, our troops reached the area of Gdynia and Gdansk, where the Nazis fiercely fought back until the end of March. On March 26, Soviet soldiers took Gdynia, on March 30 - Gdansk. After the elimination of the forces of the 2nd German Army, Rokossovsky's troops began regrouping from the Gdansk region to the lower course of the Oder in the direction of Stettin and Rostock.
Zhukov's troops finished off the encircled enemy group in the area south of Schiffelbein. It was not possible to completely destroy the semi-encircled grouping of the Nazis in the Treptow area. The Germans were able to escape to their own, although they suffered more losses. Also, it was not possible to immediately eliminate the enemy garrison of Kohlberg. Here the Poles, who had no experience in urban battles, were advancing. Only on March 18, Kohlberg was taken. Heavy fighting was going on in the Stettin direction. Here the Germans had a strong defense, which was reinforced by natural obstacles (water barriers), they fought desperately. Here Zhukov had to suspend the offensive, regroup the troops, and bring up additional artillery and aviation forces. In the course of a fierce battle, our troops broke the fierce resistance of the enemy and took Altdamm on March 20. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the right bank of the Oder. As a result, our troops completely cleared the western part of Eastern Pomerania from the enemy. The entire eastern bank of the Oder was in the hands of the Red Army. Zhukov's troops could now focus on preparing the Berlin operation.
Liberation of the ancient Slavic lands
This battle was of great historical and military-strategic importance. Russian troops liberated Slavic Pomorie, occupied at different times by the Germans. Russia gave these lands to Poland.
The troops of Rokossovsky and Zhukov defeated 21 enemy divisions and 8 brigades, eliminated the threat of a Wehrmacht strike from Eastern Pomerania on the flank and rear of the Red Army grouping aimed at Berlin. With the fall of Gdynia and Danzig, other ports in the Baltic, the Germans lost contact with the besieged Königsberg and the group in Courland. The Reich lost an important coastal region, shipyards, ports, industrial centers. The basing system of the Baltic Fleet was expanded. With the defeat of the East Pomeranian grouping, the Soviet army was able to concentrate on the Berlin operation.
More details about the liberation of Eastern Pomerania are described in articles on "VO": East Pomeranian operation; The offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front: the storming of Elbing and Graudenz. Defeat of the Schneidemühl grouping; Defeat of Army Group Vistula; The victorious end of the East Pomeranian operation. The storming of Gdynia, Danzig and Kohlberg.
