Winter War. Finland followed the principle formulated by the first Finnish President Svinhufvud: "Any enemy of Russia must always be Finland's friend." The Finnish ruling circles built their plans for the future with the expectation of profiting at the expense of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack by Japan or Germany.
Cold world
Soviet-Finnish wars 1918-1920 and 1921-1922 interesting in connection with the favorite topic of anti-Soviet people. Like, how could little Finland threaten the huge Soviet empire in 1939? However, a detailed study of the problem reveals that the Finnish threat was quite real.
First, aggressive nationalists came to power in Finland, who tried to use the temporary weakness of Russia in order to build "Greater Finland" at its expense. The first setbacks or small successes (the capture of Pechenga) did not cool their ardor. After an unsuccessful campaign in Karelia, the commander of the White Finnish volunteers Talvela said: “I am convinced that it is possible to free Karelia from russya (the contemptuous name of the Russians. - Author.) Only by taking it. New bloodshed will be required to liberate Karelia. But there is no need to try to do it with small forces anymore, we need a real army”. This is not just the opinion of one of the Finnish "field commanders", but of the Finnish military-political elite. That is, Helsinki did not abandon the course of creating a "Greater Finland" at the expense of the Russian lands. Continued political and military preparations for a war with Soviet Russia. If the ruling Finnish party claimed a part of Soviet territory that exceeded the size of Finland itself, then the appetites of the right-wing radicals were generally unlimited. So, in the charter of the youth organization "Sinemusta" it was noted that the border of Finland should pass along the Yenisei.
Secondly, do not confuse the mighty red empire of 1945-1953. with Soviet Russia of the 20s. It was a newly created state, which barely got out of a terrible civilizational, national catastrophe. The state is agrarian, with a weak industry, transport and armed forces. With a sick society, broken during the years of the Russian Troubles, in which the coals of a new civil and peasant war were smoldering. With a powerful "fifth column", which only temporarily hid and was ready to blow up and tear apart the country again. For the USSR of the 1920s, the threat was not even England or Japan (the great powers), but such local predators as Romania, Poland or Finland, who were not averse to participating in the division of the Russian bear skin again.
Therefore, Moscow during this period did not have any aggressive plans against Finland. This only liberals and Russophobes believe that Stalin (like the entire Soviet leadership) day and night only thought how to enslave Finland, like other neighboring countries and peoples. The anti-Sovietists have two "iron" arguments: 1) Stalin is a "ghoul"; 2) the communist ideology assumed the indispensable replacement of capitalism with socialism. However, none of the Soviet leadership in the 1930s argued that the Red Army was going to invade any state in order to overthrow the local government and establish Soviet power, socialism. On the contrary, it was said everywhere that the peoples themselves would make revolutions in their countries.
Considering the deplorable socio-economic and military state of Soviet Russia in the 1920s - early 1930s, and then the radical restructuring of the country and society (collectivization, industrialization, cultural, scientific and technological revolution, the construction of new armed forces, etc.), Moscow pursued a super-cautious policy before the start of World War II. Moreover, the Soviet government preferred to give in in conflict situations. There was not even any semblance of great-power politics. Moscow made concessions not only to Japan, but also to countries such as Finland and Norway when their fishermen violated our territorial waters and caught fish in them.
Third, Finland was dangerous as an ally of more powerful powers. Helsinki was not going to fight Russia alone. The Finnish leadership tried to use the favorable international environment to take part in the division of Russia, as it was during the Civil War and the intervention. Finland followed the principle formulated by the first Finnish President Svinhufvud: "Any enemy of Russia must always be Finland's friend." Therefore, the Finnish elite first fell under the Second Reich, even going to choose a German prince as a monarch. And after the fall of the German Empire, it quickly became a partner of the Entente.
The Finnish leadership was ready to enter into an alliance with anyone, if only against the Russians. In this respect, the Finnish nationalists were no different from the Polish, who collaborated with Hitler in the hope of a common march to the East. Both the Finns and the Poles reacted sharply negatively to the USSR's entry into the League of Nations, to the rapprochement of Moscow with Paris (the idea of European collective security). The Finns even struck up a relationship with Japan. In 1933, when Soviet-Japanese relations sharply deteriorated, Japanese officers began to come to Finland. They were trained in the Finnish army.
In Finnish society there was an active anti-Soviet propaganda, public opinion was for the "liberation" of Karelia from the "Russian occupation". Back in 1922, participants in a campaign in Soviet Karelia created the Karelian Academic Society. The goal of the society was to create a "Greater Finland" by capturing Russian territories. The Finnish press carried out systematic anti-Soviet propaganda. In no other European country has there been such open aggressive propaganda for the attack on the USSR and the seizure of Soviet territories.
The hostility of the Finnish elite towards Russia was obvious to everyone. Thus, the Polish envoy to Helsinki F. Harvat reported to Warsaw that Finland's policy is characterized by "aggressiveness against Russia … The question of joining Karelia to Finland dominates in Finland's position towards the USSR." Harvat even considered Finland "the most belligerent state in Europe."
Thus, both the Finnish and Polish ruling circles built their plans for the future with the expectation of profiting from the Soviet Union (and both countries paid for this in the future) in the event of an attack by Japan or intervention from the West. At first, the Finnish aggressors expected Russia to go to war with Poland again, then they began to connect hopes for an anti-Soviet war with Japan and Germany. But Helsinki's hopes for a war between Japan and the USSR, when it would be possible to "liberate" Karelia and Ingermanlandia (Izhora land) from the Russians, did not come true.
Finnish military threat
It is clear that the presence of such an aggressive state on the northwestern borders of the USSR was a constant headache for Moscow. Colonel F. Feymonville, the American military attaché in the Soviet Union, reported in September 1937 to Washington: "The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparation for repelling a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany, together with Finland in the West." That is, the West was well aware of the Finnish threat to Russia.
The hostile attitude towards the USSR was reinforced by deeds. On the Soviet-Finnish border, all kinds of provocations on the ground, in the air and at sea were commonplace. So, on October 7, 1937, on the Karelian Isthmus, in the area of border post No. 162, a Soviet border guard squad leader Spirin was mortally wounded by a shot from the Finnish side. Negotiations on the settlement of this incident were completed only in November 1937. At first, the Finnish authorities denied their guilt, but then admitted the murder and paid compensation to the family of the killed. Such incidents, shelling of Soviet border guards, citizens, territory, violation of the USSR border, etc. were commonplace on the border line with Finland.
Provocations were also arranged in the air. So, in a conversation held on June 7, 1937 with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland Kholsty, the plenipotentiary of the USSR in Finland E. Asmus complained about "repeated flights by Finnish aircraft to the Soviet border." On June 29, 1937, a Finnish plane violated the border in the Olonets area. On July 9, 1938, the Finnish plane violated the Soviet border in the area of the border pillar No. 699. Flying at an altitude of 1500 m, the plane deeper into the territory of the USSR by 45 km, flew about 85 km parallel to the border line along the Soviet territory, then in the area of the border pillar No. 728 returned to Finland.
Violations of the Soviet border were also noted at sea. In April 1936 the Soviet side informed the Finnish that from February to April 1936 our territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland were violated 9 times, 68 people were detained. Fishing by Finnish fishermen in the territorial waters of the USSR has reached a wide scale. The Finnish authorities, for their part, did not take any effective measures.
The problem of the Baltic Fleet and the defense of Leningrad
After the separation of the Baltic States and Finland, the red Baltic fleet was, in fact, blocked in Kronstadt. The Russians lost control over the Finnish skerries, for which they shed a lot of blood in the wars with Sweden.
With a friendly position, Helsinki could come to an agreement with Moscow in the 1930s. Provide the USSR with bases at the exit to the Gulf of Finland, in return for receiving territories in Karelia and economic benefits. At the same time, Finland's defenses would not be affected. On the other hand, the entrance to the bay for the fleets of other countries would be closed and the exit of the Baltic Fleet to the open sea would be guaranteed.
The Finnish leadership, on the contrary, did everything to worsen the military-strategic position of Russia and anger Moscow. In 1930, the Finns entered into a secret agreement with Estonia, according to which the navies of the two countries had to be ready at any time to block the Gulf of Finland. In addition, during the First World War, the Russians built several dozen coastal batteries with powerful artillery caliber from 152 to 305 mm on both shores of the Gulf of Finland. Most of these fortifications went to Estonians and Finns in good condition. So, 305 mm guns on the Finnish island of Makiloto had a firing range of 42 kilometers and reached the Estonian coast. And 305 mm guns on the Estonian island of Aegna were finished off to the Finnish coast. That is, the Finnish and Estonian batteries jointly blocked the Gulf of Finland.
Also, the two countries were preparing to block the Gulf of Finland with several rows of minefields. 7 submarines (5 Finnish and 2 Estonian) were to be on duty behind the minefields. The headquarters of Finland and Estonia have coordinated in detail all the details of the operation to close the gulf. Every summer since 1930, both fleets have conducted secret minefield exercises. Coastal batteries fired at targets in the center of the Gulf of Finland.
The position of "neutral" Sweden is also interesting. The Swedes in 1930 concluded a secret agreement with Estonia and Finland that in the event of a conflict with the USSR, Sweden would not formally declare war on the Russians. However, the de facto Swedes will help with ships, planes and ground forces disguised as volunteers.
Thus, the largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had only one base left - Kronstadt, whose harbors were visible through binoculars from the Finnish coast. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could hit not only long-range coastal guns, but also the corps artillery of the Finnish army. And Leningrad itself was under the threat of a blow from the Finnish army and its possible allies. Obviously, such a situation could not satisfy any great and naval power. And with the approach of a big war in Europe and the outbreak of World War II, such a situation became absolutely intolerable. There were no fools in the Soviet government, there were sober, reasonable people who cared about national security. The question had to be resolved.
It is also worth remembering that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, the West completely forgot about international law. In the world, only the right of force triumphed. Italy plundered in Africa and Europe, Germany in Europe, Japan in Asia. England already in September 1939 began preparations for the invasion of neutral Norway. England and the USA in 1939 - 1942 invaded without demand or permission in dozens of neutral countries and semi-independent possessions, including the French colonies.
Alliance with the Third Reich
Finnish-German ties were of particular concern to Moscow. Indeed, the threat was significant. Finland could become a strategic foothold for Germany for the war against the USSR from the northwest. A base for the fleet, including submarine, aviation and ground forces. From the territory of Finland, it was possible to threaten Murmansk and Leningrad, the second capital, the largest industrial and cultural center of the Union.
The Finns themselves did not forget to whom they owed their independence, and sought to renew fruitful ties with Germany. Relations were established even before the creation of the Third Reich. So, according to the Versailles agreement, Germany had no right to have a submarine fleet. But the Germans were not banned from building submarines for other countries. In 1930, the German-founded design bureau "Engineering Shipbuilding Office" (IVS, Netherlands. Ingenieuskaantor voor Scheepsbouw; formally a private company, in fact, the property of the German Navy) began developing a submarine project for friendly Finland. Built submarines (three ships) became part of the Finnish Navy. These submarines became the prototypes for the German series II small submarines. In March 1935, Germany terminated the Treaty of Versailles, and from 1935 to 1941 built 50 submarines of this type for its fleet.
In exchange for supplies of copper and nickel, Finland received from Germany 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, negotiated the supply of combat aircraft. Germany and Finland exchanged visits of high-ranking military officials and generals. In August 1937, the Finns hosted a German squadron of 11 German submarines. With the consent of the Finnish side, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center was created in the country in mid-1939. Its main goal was to conduct intelligence work against Russia, in particular, to collect information about the Baltic Fleet, the Leningrad Military District and the industry of Leningrad. The chief of the Abwehr (a body of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany) Admiral Canaris and his closest assistants since 1936 have repeatedly held meetings in the Third Reich and Finland with the leaders of Finnish intelligence Svenson and Melander. The Germans and Finns exchanged intelligence information about the USSR, developed joint plans.
Thus, Finland became a strategic foothold for the German Empire in the future war with the Soviet Union. It is clear that Moscow was striving at any cost to solve the problem of defending the northwestern borders of the country and Leningrad. Get the Baltic Fleet out of the Gulf of Finland.
