Troubles. 1919 year. Kolchak's army completed only the first stage of the planned operation. The Kolchakites defeated the 5th Red Army, the enemy offensive to Petropavlovsk and further Omsk was thwarted. However, the success of the Kolchakites was partial and the victory, in fact, was a Pyrrhic one. It cost such a sacrifice that the Reds would soon resume their victorious offensive in Siberia.
The first battle on Tobol
On August 20, 1919, the Red Army, breaking the resistance of the Kolchakites, crossed Tobol and developed an offensive to the east. After the crossing of Tobol, the 5th Infantry Division went into reserve to be sent to the southern fronts. Its place was filled with a stretch to the left by the regiments of the two remaining divisions (26th and 27th). This led to a weakening of the striking power of the 5th Army and created a favorable moment for the counterstrike of the White Army. At the same time, the 3rd Red Army, which also crossed the Tobol, marched on Ishim.
In the first days, the offensive of the Reds developed successfully, but after a week the enemy's resistance increased and the pace of the offensive began to fall. By the end of August, the troops of the 5th Army of Tukhachevsky in places advanced up to 180 km and were 70 km from the river. Ishim and Petropavlovsk. The weakness and decay of the White forces delayed the start of the planned counteroffensive. In addition, the mobilization of the Siberian Cossack Corps, which was to become the main striking force of the operation, was greatly delayed. Also, the Kolchak government called into the army of the Yenisei Cossacks and all Irkutsk Cossacks capable of carrying weapons.
In August-September, the white authorities took desperate measures to strengthen and replenish the army. As previously noted, the replenishments were very bad. The village refused to give soldiers, the peasants went into the forest and joined the Red partisans, and when the Reds approached, they joined the Red Army. Cossack regional atamans Semyonov and Kalmykov) did not want to obey Kolchak, especially losing the war. On August 9, an appeal was announced for the urban bourgeoisie and intelligentsia between the ages of 18 and 43; in early September, the mobilization of the rural bourgeoisie and intelligentsia was announced. However, Kolchak's supporters have long gone into the army as volunteers, and the rest of the "dictator" hated, supported the democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or were indifferent, did not want to fight, tried with all their might to "roll away" (said sick, hid, etc.).
They tried to revive the principle of volunteerism. They announced a lucrative contract: a period of 6 months, at the end of the contract, a cash bonus of 5 thousand rubles, summer and winter uniforms for ownership. But there were very few volunteers. Recorded were mostly idlers, unemployed, a dubious element who wanted to sit out on state rations for the winter (in the hope that there would be no hostilities in winter), and in the spring the contract would expire. They tried to create volunteer squads on a religious basis, like the squads of the "Holy Cross", "God-bearers" (from the Old Believers), and the "Green Crescent" (from the Muslims). But the effect was almost nil. The garrisons stationed along the Siberian Railway (mainly Czechs) were also not assembled. The Entente command refused to replace them with foreign contingents. An attempt to call up the Carpathian Rus (Rusyns) into the army failed. During the First World War, Carpathian prisoners of war were sent to Siberia, there were many of them in Omsk. Most were calm workers, they did not create problems for the authorities and local people, they worked in bakeries, in various black jobs. As part of Kolchak's army, there was already a Carpathian battalion, which showed itself well in battles. Having drawn attention to this, they decided to mobilize other Rusyns as well. The result was negative. They did not want to serve by force. Some fled, others, embittered by the violent mobilization through round-ups, openly said that at the first opportunity they would go over to the side of the Red Army and reckon with the offenders.
Thus, despite all the measures, appeals, prayers and round-ups, the mobilization went extremely badly. The Kolchakites were able to launch an offensive only on September 1, 1919, already near Petropavlovsk.
Kolchak's army counteroffensive
At the same time, the offensive of Kolchak's army began without the Siberian Cossacks. All the same thinned and weakened shelves. In the north, Pepeliaev's 1st Army advanced, on the southern flank, the Kappel corps and Molchanov's Izhevsk division were striking forces. As the last reserve, the personal convoy of the supreme ruler was sent to the front. Red intelligence captured the enemy's operational orders, but it was too late. The highly stretched 26th Infantry Division could not resist and began to roll back to Tobol
In the main direction, the Kolchakites were able to create an almost one and a half superiority in forces. White concentrated on the flanks of the 5th Army shock groups with the aim of striking the flank and rear to defeat the enemy. Particular attention was paid to the cavalry, which, by entering the rear of the red, was supposed to complete the defeat of the enemy. The main blow was struck on the southern flank of the 5th Army. The White command transferred two infantry divisions and a cavalry group of General Domozhirov (2 thousand sabers) up the Ishim River. Here the Siberian Cossack Corps was to be concentrated for a deep bypass of Soviet divisions and a raid on the rear of the enemy. On the northern flank of the 5th Army, the Ufa division and the combined Cossack division of General Mamaev were concentrated.
Thus, the Kolchak command counted on a surprise strike, the superiority of forces in the decisive direction, active actions of the cavalry (primarily the Cossacks), fatigue, isolation of the rear and the elongation of the Red Army regiments. So the army rear stretched for 700 km - from Ufa and Perm, divisional ones were located from the forward units at 300 - 400 km. This made it extremely difficult to supply the troops, especially in view of the destruction along the communication routes. The troops lacked uniforms (especially footwear) and ammunition. The worst position was in the spare shelves. The Soviet command was not up to par. The command of the Red Eastern Front has just changed - Frunze was replaced by Vladimir Olderogge. He was an experienced commander who had fought with the Japanese, and in the world war he headed a regiment, brigade and division. Olderogge voluntarily joined the Red Army, commanded in the western direction of the Novorzhevsk, then the Pskov and Lithuanian rifle divisions, fought with the Poles, White and Baltic nationalists. However, he had just assumed command, had not yet had time to understand the situation. The front command underestimated the enemy. Also overlooked the preparation of the enemy for a counteroffensive and the command of the 5th and 3rd red armies. The headquarters of the armies were up to 400 km from the forward forces and could not fully control the troops. Communication with the divisions was carried out via one telegraph wire from Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg. It happened that the army command did not know for several days what was happening in the divisions. It is clear that this all affected the situation at the front. The Red Army was still lucky that Kolchak's army had already lost its previous shock capabilities, otherwise the situation could become catastrophic.
The highly stretched 26th Infantry Division could not withstand the blow and began to roll back. The command of the 5th red army organized a counterattack with the forces of the 5th rifle division, which was again returned from the reserve to the front, and two brigades of the 35th division. The 26th division was supposed to hold the defense along the Peter and Paul tract, the 27th division shifted the main actions to its right flank and had to counterattack the enemy. That is, the forces of the 5th Army regrouped on the right flank, and a shock group was also formed from suitable reinforcements.
However, the implementation of such a regrouping required time and a certain freedom of action. The forces of the 5th Army were connected by battles with the advancing Kolchak men, the white cavalry tried to go to the rear. On September 5-6, the 26th division fought heavy battles, retreated, some of its units were surrounded and broke through in battle. The 27th division was also pushed back. On the evening of September 6, the concentration of the forces of the strike group was completed. The 26th and 27th divisions were tasked with supporting the attack of the strike group with offensive actions. On September 7, a counteroffensive by the strike group (5th division and part of the 35th) began. On September 7-8, the Reds pressed the enemy. But the units of the 26th and 27th divisions, which had already been defeated, were unable to support the actions of the strike group. The troops of the 26th division tried to put themselves in order, the 27th division was pushed back even further.
On September 9, the position of the strike group deteriorated significantly. With a two-week delay, the regiments of the Siberian Cossack Corps entered the battle. The Ivanov-Rinov corps, instead of the promised 20 thousand, numbered about 7, 5 thousand sabers, but, nevertheless, it was a fresh force at the front. Suddenly appearing on the flank, the Cossacks crushed the red cavalry brigade. The position of the Red strike group deteriorated sharply. White cavalry deeply swept the right flank of the Reds, cutting off and destroying individual regiments. By the evening of September 13, units of the strike group and the 26th division were retreating to Tobol.
It is worth noting the significantly increased combat capability and morale of the Soviet troops. They stubbornly resisted, used the peculiarities of the terrain to organize defense (lake defiles), did not succumb to panic as before, and even fought surrounded. This was also noted by the whites. On September 15, the commander-in-chief of the White Army, Dieterichs, noted that the enemy "stubbornly defends every inch of the land" and is very active. And the commander of the 3rd White Army, General Sakharov, later recalled: “Here were the best communist divisions, the 26th and 27th; … these eighteen Russian red regiments showed a lot of tension, courage and deeds in the September days of 1919."
Having thwarted the counterstrike of the 5th Army's right flank, the white command regrouped its forces and struck at the left flank of Tukhachevsky's army. The 27th division was also pushed westward. In the following days, the command of the 5th Army tried to return the initiative to their own hands, counterattacked with the help of new reinforcements (a brigade of the 21st Division, transferred from the sector of the 3rd Army). The battles went on with varying success, whites had already depleted their reserves. The Cossack corps was never able to fulfill its main task - a rapid breakthrough to Kurgan and access to the deep rear of the Red Eastern Front. In general, the 5th Army slowly yielded to the enemy and retreated to Tobol. October 1, 1919 Tukhachevsky withdrew his troops across the river. Tobol. The Reds took up defensive positions along the water line. The White troops were exhausted by the fighting, they had no reserves to continue the offensive, and there was a temporary lull.
Fights on the northern flank
On the northern flank, the White 1st Army did not make much progress. Until September 14, Mezheninov's 3rd Red Army continued the offensive with its center and left flank. Blucher's 51st division was advancing on Tobolsk. The Kolchakites stubbornly resisted. At this time, a caravan of ships from Arkhangelsk with weapons and supplies was to approach Tobolsk from the north along the Ob. However, in a stubborn battle, the White Guards were defeated, on September 4, the Reds occupied Tobolsk. At the same time, another part of the 51st division continued to move towards Ishim. However, as soon as the Kolchak offensive against the 5th Army began, the situation changed. The front command gave the order to create a shock group on the right flank of the 3rd Army to support Tukhachevsky's troops. Such a group was formed from the regiments of the 30th division, it shifted the offensive to the southeast and thereby supported the 5th army. The neighboring 29th division also changed its direction of movement from east to southeast. Part of the white forces was diverted to parry the blow of the 30th and 29th divisions. The Kolchakites stopped the Reds, but the position of the 5th Army was eased.
On September 9-13, the White 2nd and 1st Armies attacked the Red 3rd Army. The Red troops began to withdraw slowly. In the north, using the system of rivers in the Irtysh basin, the Kolchak flotilla was able to go behind enemy lines and disrupted communications between the regiments and brigades of the 51st Soviet division. At the same time, the white cavalry of the 2nd Army began to enter the flank and rear of the 51st division from the south. A difficult situation developed on the left flank of the Red 3rd Army. The Kolchakites, having gathered significant forces near Tobolsk, hoped to push back some of the Reds to the south and cut off part of the 51st Division, which was advancing on Ishim. The Whites believed that Blucher's troops would begin a retreat from Ishim to Tyumen by the shortest route, get bogged down in swamps, be surrounded and destroyed. However, the Red troops, which were covering the road from Tobolsk to Tyumen, put up desperate resistance and stopped the enemy's movement to the south. And Blucher's regiments began to withdraw from Ishim not to Tyumen, but to Tobolsk, which the enemy did not expect. Soon the Red Army went to Tobolsk and the battle began again. After a stubborn four-hour battle, the Blucherovites fought their way through, passed Tobolsk and themselves struck the rear of the White Guard troops, which were marching south along the river. The Reds took up again and made their way. The Kolchakites returned to Tobolsk on ships.
In the center, the Kolchakites tried to encircle the regiments of the 29th division, which operated in the Yalutorovsk-Ishim railroad strip. However, White's attempts were unsuccessful. Thus, the white did not manage to defeat the main forces of the 3rd red army. In early October, the 3rd Army retained its positions on the eastern bank of the Tobol and held these lines until a new offensive. The 2nd and 1st armies of the Whites could not achieve a decisive victory here either.
Pyrrhic victory of the Kolchakites
Thus, Kolchak's army completed only the first stage of the planned operation. The Kolchakites defeated the 5th Red Army, four Soviet divisions suffered heavy losses (about 15 thousand people, the total losses of the Red Army - about 20 thousand people). The offensive of the Red Army on Petropavlovsk and further Omsk was thwarted, the Reds retreated 150-200 km, having lost almost all the space they had conquered at the beginning of the battle. The Red troops were thrown back beyond Tobol, where the Whites began to restore their defensive positions. The Kolchakites also thwarted the dispatch of part of the forces of the Eastern Front of the Red Army to the South, against Denikin. They had to be returned to the Eastern Front.
However, the success of Kolchak's army was partial and the victory, in fact, was a Pyrrhic one. The White Guards reclaimed only space. The victory cost White such sacrifices that when the Reds recover, they will easily break into the White Guards' defenses. The 5th Red Army was defeated, but was not defeated, its combat effectiveness will be restored very quickly. The White 3rd Army, which delivered the main blow, suffered heavy losses - about 18 thousand people. Some divisions - Izhevsk, 4th Ufa, etc., lost up to half of their strength in two weeks of fighting. All the remnants of strength were absorbed by this "victory". The 2nd and 3rd white armies were unable to develop the offensive. Attempts by the White High Command to replenish losses and create reserves failed.
The Siberian corps launched the offensive with a serious delay, and could not break through to the enemy's rear. The Siberian Cossacks, after the defeat of the Red strike group, had to go to Kurgan, cut off the communications of the 5th Army. Despite the fact that the Cossack cavalry escaped into the operational space, the enemy's rear at that time were open, the corps did not fulfill its task. Ivanov-Rinov was afraid to get involved in a battle for a major railway junction, through which there was communication with the Urals and supply of the Reds. He preferred to take the cavalry aside, pursue broken parts, capture carts and other easy prey. The passion for looting once again let the Cossacks down. The corps commander received six orders from Dieterichs and Kolchak to immediately turn to Kurgan, but ignored them. As a result, the Siberian Cossacks did not live up to the hopes of the Kolchak command. Moreover, two regiments revolted. The corps had to be disbanded: one division was left at the front, two were taken out to the rear for restoring order and training. After the operation, Ivanov-Rinov was strongly criticized, accused of inaction and failure of the Tobolsk offensive, and was removed from command.
It is possible that the White War Minister Budberg was right, who argued that the bloodless White Guard units were not capable of a successful offensive and suggested that they limit themselves to creating a long-term defense on the Ishim and Tobol rivers. To delay the Reds until winter, buy time.
