Continuing to talk about the future of our fleet, from the very beginning it is worth noting the main point that surfaced: none of the high-ranking officials can say even approximately today what naval construction will look like.
And whether it will be at all.
Yes, you can wave mock-ups and models of ships as much as you like at show-offs such as "ARMY …" Models are good. But sometimes (and we always have) a lot of time passes from a plastic model to a ship in metal.
However, today it is simply impossible to determine where the main currents of the state armaments program are directed. Everything is hidden in such a fog that it is worth telling fortunes on the seaweed.
Fortune-telling, of course, is so, for the sake of a catchphrase. In fact, there are facts, and you can push off from them. The main thing is to do it calmly and without yelling.
The main conclusion that was made in one of the previous materials is simple. The Russian fleet in the next 10-12 years will greatly reduce the number of combat-ready surface ships in the sea and ocean zones.
There are even more arguments in favor than is required. The main one is that after the events of 2014, we lost, in fact, hands and places that could build large-tonnage ships and repair them.
Crimea is good, but Nikolaev is, if not all, then quite a lot. The break with Ukraine, political and economic, also destroyed (first of all) such a thing as shipbuilding cooperation. That is, Russia was left without Ukrainian marine diesel engines and hulls.
Actually, you can not continue further, because without a hull and an engine, there is no ship, as it were.
In fact, we have infinitely "shifted to the right" for the construction of frigates of projects 11356 and 22350 and problems with the repair of a number of Soviet-built ships. And if you can somehow get out with repairs at the expense of other shipyards (although it is still a pleasure to drive Moscow across half the world), then with marine diesel engines we have a complete nightmare.
There is a tendency (quite logical) to build what can be built. That is, the "mosquito" coastal fleet instead of the ocean.
Pretty logical. Let not 100% ourselves, but with the help of China, but we can build project 22160 corvettes and small missile ships of projects 21631 and 22800. While we can.
At the same time (and this pleases) the construction of ships of project 20380 continues, their more expensive and complex version - project 20385, as well as project 20386, enlarged in size and received a number of other major changes.
5 project 20380 corvettes and the same number under construction is not bad. Plus two ships of the project 20385. But if you look at the forecasts, the corvettes of the 2038x family by 2028 should be at least 18 units in the Russian Navy. That looks a little hacky, because the problem with the engines has not yet been resolved.
The same applies to the series of ships of the project 21160. The head ("Vasily Bykov") is being tested, 5 more in varying degrees of construction. And the series can be increased to 12 ships.
Following the corvettes are seemingly well-proven small missile ships of Project 31631 (Buyan). Criticism is, perhaps, rather low seaworthiness, but these RTOs are not for the Arctic and Pacific oceans. And for service in the Baltic, Caspian or Black Sea - quite.
And 6 more RTOs are under construction for 6 more. Plus, do not forget about "correcting mistakes", that is, "Karakurt", aka Project 22800. The project has greater seaworthiness in comparison with "Buyans", which is undoubtedly a plus in the situation …
In general, if we talk about ships with a displacement of up to 3,000 tons, then everything here looks more or less nothing. The only thing that causes confusion is still a large number of missile boats (project 1241), small missile ships (project 1234) and small anti-submarine ships (projects 1124 and 1331) of Soviet construction. In general, there are 62 units of these ships among this weight category, which is about 90% of the total number of small ships.
Whether our shipbuilding industry will be able to build corvettes, RTOs and other ships at such a pace as to compensate for the natural loss of ships due to obsolescence is the question.
But again, in the coastal zone, which can be controlled by the "mosquito" fleet, everything looks bearable.
But what cannot be said about the renewal of the grouping of surface ships of the distant sea and ocean zones, this cannot be said. The situation is critical in all classes of ships that could provide the performance of some tasks in the far ocean zone.
Missile cruisers. Here is a nuance. Very expensive but available. If you spend time, resources and money, the number of cruisers will increase to 5. This, as you already understood, is both project 1144 and 1164. But these are ships of the end of the last century, whatever one may say. Russia is not able to build something like that today.
Destroyers and BOD. Here, too, is mortal melancholy. Currently, the fleet has 10 ships in varying degrees of combat readiness. If you subject the anti-submarine ships of project 1155 to a major modernization (those that are still possible), then for some time you can prolong their existence. But in 10 years, according to forecasts, we will have no more than 3-4 ships of this class.
The program for the construction of new destroyers and frigates is constantly being adjusted and postponed (in terms of destroyers) and "freezes" (in terms of frigates).
To be honest with ourselves, the inability to build ships in the far sea zone in the proper quantity and quality automatically removes any tasks associated with this zone from the defense doctrine.
If the fleet is not able to carry out tasks far from its shores, then it is not worth even formulating these tasks. The coastal zone is our everything. In general, hello, Ukraine, though not in such a shameful way.
And do not discount this very natural decline of ships. I gave the number 5 in the calculations for cruisers, but you yourself understand that it is very conditional and optimistic.
"Admiral Lazarev" has been balancing on the brink of life and death since 1999, for almost 20 years. And how much money, resources and time will be needed to revive it, I don’t presume to say. Accordingly, in the pessim of cruisers we have 4. This is if they bring to mind "Nakhimov".
Meanwhile, one more nuance. A cruiser, destroyer, BOD, frigate, unlike a small missile ship or boat, takes a long time to build. And the ships we inherited from the USSR, I repeat, have by no means an infinite resource.
And, frankly, a small number of these ships that have survived to this day may not survive until the time when they are replaced by new destroyers, the construction of which is constantly being postponed.
It may even happen that by 2028, when the state armaments program ends, the number of DMZ ships may be reduced to 15-17 units. If we remember that our ships are actually divided between four fleets without the possibility of collecting in one strike fist, then we can forget about any possibility of the Navy to respond promptly to changes in the world situation in the form of the formation of combat-ready ship formations as to solve problems in remote areas. and to protect their own coast.
Of course not, if the Chinese fleet helps us …
But the overall situation is very sad. And there is only one way out of it: to sign one's own powerlessness and to bet not on what one would like to have (all these mock-model dreams in the furnace), but on what can actually be built.
That is, the coastal zone fleet of MRK, MRAK, corvettes and other little things, armed with cool babakhalk "Caliber" type and nuclear submarine cruisers for work in the far zone.
Not the most beautiful picture, but we really have what we have.
