The captured German reconnaissance aircraft FW-189, which fell into the hands of the specialists of the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force, after testing and careful study, left a positive impression. The reports wrote that the excellent visibility made it possible to quickly detect the enemy, and the high maneuverability ensured a successful reflection of attacks. At the same time, the stern firing point made it possible to fire at pursuing fighters without any problems. In case of danger, the "Rama" would spiral to low altitudes and hide from pursuit on low level flight. The Air Force Research Institute also developed specific methods of destroying the FW-189 - an attack from the front with a dive at an angle of 30-45 °, or from below at an angle of more than 45 °. It was necessary to enter the "frame" from the direction of the sun or clouds. In the event of shelling, the crew of the German aircraft was poorly protected - only the pilot's seat was equipped with an armored seat. Piloting the "frame" was very easy - Soviet testers noted this separately. The convenience of the location of the controls and the spaciousness in the cockpit were also noted. The machine could also perform the functions of a light bomber, capable of lifting 200 kg of bombs into the air. The FW-189 double-girder scheme turned out to be a successful idea, which proved to be excellent at the front, and in the Soviet Union it was decided to borrow it to create a similar machine.
During the war, the USSR Air Force did not have a specialized aircraft for close military reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment. This function was partially taken over by the Su-2 light bomber and the Il-2 attack aircraft. The first was removed from production in February 1942, and the Ilyushin vehicle became the main "eyes" of the gunners on the battlefield. In November 1943, under the influence of the successes of the German FW-189, the Sukhoi Design Bureau was tasked with creating a three-seater twin-engined reconnaissance aircraft with good maneuverability and strong armament. The aforementioned Air Force Research Institute was responsible for developing the requirements for the vehicle. In this story, the development of the scout did not even go beyond the outline design. It is still unclear why they decided not to develop the car, but in the end the Il-2 was forced to perform the function of an artillery spotter, which is unusual for it, until the end of the war. In the event of a shortage of attack aircraft, artillery was content with balloons.
Only in 1946, the idea of the Soviet "Rama" was remembered, and it was not the pilots who did it, but the artillerymen. More precisely, artillery marshal Nikolai Voronov, who wrote to Stalin about the urgent need to pay attention to short-range reconnaissance aircraft. The marshal in his address proposed to return to the idea of a two-boom aircraft, as well as to separately think over the concept of a spotter based on a helicopter. Voronov's idea was supported, and on July 10, 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree on the construction of such an aircraft.
Under the designation "RK"
The requirements for an army reconnaissance aircraft and part-time artillery spotter largely coincided with the characteristics of the FW-189, only they were "faster, higher, stronger." Especially "stronger" - four 20-mm cannons and the booking of the cockpit, as well as fuel tanks and engines made the aircraft a dangerous enemy. The airborne equipment was planned to include two AFA-33 cameras equipped with long-focus (500-750 mm) and short-focus (200 mm) lenses. In the Sukhoi Design Bureau, the design work on the project received the name "RK" (reconnaissance-spotter), and the intermediate result was supposed to be an aircraft ready for testing. The premiere date was set for September 15, 1947.
By March 47, the layout of the future Soviet "Rama" was ready, with the layout of which the representatives of the Air Force did not agree. Strictly speaking, the generals of military aviation from the very beginning were against the development of an analogue of the German FW-189 - Nikolai Voronov hardly pushed through the idea of developing a machine for the needs of artillery. After analyzing the preliminary layout, they came to the conclusion that the troops did not need the vehicle at all. First, they referred to the ready-made and proven Tu-8 bomber, which, however, was too large for such tasks (after all, the take-off weight was 11 tons versus 9.5 for the "RK"). They first proposed to lighten the Tupolev car by a couple of tons, and later they generally pointed to the Il-2KR and Il-10. According to the leadership of the Air Force, Ilyushin's aircraft are quite successfully coping with the tasks of adjusting artillery fire and army reconnaissance. True, a reconnaissance vehicle based on the Il-10 was never created. In general, if the will of the military pilots, "RK" would be sent to the archive for an indefinite period, or, at best, tortured with modifications, and then abandoned as morally obsolete. But there was a resolution of the Council of Ministers, and it had to be carried out. "RK" was named Su-12 and on August 26, 1947, ahead of schedule, the plane overcame gravity. The car was incomplete - there were no photographic equipment, weapons and radio stations. Unreliable motors ASh-82M with a capacity of 2100 hp. replaced with the proven, but less high-torque (1850 hp) ASh-82FN. I must say that, having risen into the sky 27 times by October 30, 1947, the Su-12 made a fairly good impression on the testers. They noted the ease of use, easy control, spacious cockpit and good aerobatic properties. True, with less powerful engines, the pilots did not manage to reach the planned maximum speed of 550 km / h. They managed to reach only 530 km / h at an altitude of 11,000 meters. But the problems with weapons were never solved - the cannon installations were not ready for state tests. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the summer of 1948, the Su-12 had flown 72 hours during 112 sorties during tests, confirming its suitability for military work for the second time.
OKB-43, responsible for the development of cannon installations for the Su-12, was simply ordered by another resolution of the Council of Ministers to complete work on the assignment by the beginning of 1949. Also, chief designer Pavel Sukhoi was told about the need to eliminate minor design flaws in the aircraft. In particular, they talked about the difficulties of landing the car on three wheels of the chassis. In the course of modifications, the car received elongated tail booms - this solved the problem of simultaneous contact of the runway with three points. Tests of the combat use of the Su-12 were carried out at the Gorokhovets artillery range and the Kalinin range. A crew of four (planned three) could determine the work of an artillery battery with a caliber of 120 mm from a height of 6000 meters, and from an altitude of 1500-3000 meters it was possible to adjust the fire of its own artillery. By July 1949, the vehicle was fully ready for mass production - the Air Force estimated the need for the Su-12 at 200-300, no more. By this time, the fleet of artillery spotters at the Il-2 base, most of which had gone through the war, had already been thoroughly dilapidated. But the Su-12 never became serial. Why?
First, there was nowhere to produce it - all aircraft factories were operating at full capacity, and many had not yet been fully restored. The relevant departments even considered the possibility of transferring the assembly of new items to friendly Czechoslovakia. Secondly, the Su-12 was a typical interdepartmental project - military aviation brushed it off, not wanting to deal with artillery problems. If the Air Force was really interested in such an aircraft, the spotter would no doubt go into series production. Thirdly, the Council of Ministers of the USSR in November 1947 closed the Sukhoi Design Bureau, distributing the design staff among the offices of Tupolev and Ilyushin. Again, nobody wanted to deal with the fate of someone else's car. And finally, fourthly, for the Main Artillery Directorate, an interesting project of a spotter helicopter was presented by the Bratukhin Design Bureau. He did not fit in many parameters, but shifted the focus of the department's attention to rotary-wing aircraft. As a result, in 1956, the Mi-1KR / TKR spotter helicopter was adopted instead of the Su-12. The traces of the only copy of the Su-12 were lost, and for history it remained only in photographs.
