1941. Concentration of separate armies at the southern state border

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1941. Concentration of separate armies at the southern state border
1941. Concentration of separate armies at the southern state border

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1941. Concentration of separate armies at the southern state border
1941. Concentration of separate armies at the southern state border

The following abbreviations are used in the article: A - army, ABTU - armored vehicle control (GABTU - Main ABTU), IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZhBD - combat log, CA - Red Army, cd - cavalry division, mk - mechanized corps, md - motorized division, RGK - reserve of the main command, RM - intelligence materials, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, sc (sd) - rifle corps (division), SD - fortified area, Theater - theater of military operations, td - a tank division.

The article uses the designation VO or fronts: ARVO - Arkhangelsk VO, FVF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Transbaikal VO, ZakVO - Transcaucasian VO, ZAPOVO - Western special VO, KOVO - Kiev special VO, MVO - Moscow VO, OdVO - Odessa VO, OrVO - Orlovsky VO, PrivO - Volga VO, SAVO - Central Asian VO, Siberian Military District - Siberian VO, SKVO - North Caucasian VO, UrVO - Ural VO, KhVO - Kharkiv VO.

In the previous part, the events related to the adoption on June 9 of the decision to change the route of the 16th A and 57th TD from the south to the west were considered. Further in the text, the author's assumptions will be accompanied by the sign "?", The word "probably" or similar words.

Prelude to the operation in Iran

Since 1940, England has been considered our adversary. In May-June 1941, the British tried to start unofficial negotiations with our government. There are suggestions that the Junkers, who arrived in Moscow on May 15, delivered a message from Hitler to Stalin, which could contain assurances not to attack the USSR and proposals for the Middle East. After that, the rate of delivery of German troops to the border decreased: from 1, 43 … 0, 95 divisions / day to 0, 3.

In May 1941, the RM arrived, in which it was noted:

- Intensive air operations of the German army and the war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline supplies. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs to speed up an offensive on Iraq to occupy oil sources;

- the forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East (up to 40 divisions) have been determined. Additionally, up to two parachute divisions can be used in Iraq;

- German troops (at least 3-4 divisions) are already officially going through Turkey to Iraq and Syria;

- the German side is preparing an illegal impact in the Caucasus and preparing airborne troops to prevent the destruction of oil industry installations;

- There are a large number of German agents on the territory of Iran, weapons are being imported, sabotage is being prepared at the oil fields in Baku. Pro-German sentiments in Iran are very strong in all strata of society.

It is believed that the free penetration of sabotage groups into Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea is possible. The country's leadership was obliged to respond to the growing threat on our southern borders. After the start of the transportation of troops to the southern theater of operations in Iran, it was decided to increase the presence of illegal agents in the adjacent territory and to start special measures. Probably the same was done at SAVO.


The operation itself to bring troops into Iranian territory was not an act of aggression. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, both sides assumed obligations that were required to be fulfilled. The Treaty spelled out the procedure after which it was possible to enter the USSR troops, which was later carried out (Operation "Consent").


The point of view of I. V. Stalin did not appear unexpectedly on July 2 or 3. It was a consequence of the RM received earlier, the refusal to conduct an operation in Iran and the reduction of the group of spacecraft forces in the southern theater of operations.

Destination: Transcaucasia

From 3.6.41, Army Commander Lukin begins work in the General Staff and learns about the place of concentration of the army and its tasks for the near future.


(?) 16th A is to be concentrated at the border on the territory of Azerbaijan. A significant part of the ZakVO troops are located at the border to contain Turkish or German troops. The 24th cd, 76th and 77th guards are deployed on the territory of the AzSSR. Before the start of the war, the SD and GDS of the district were kept in 6-thousand. state and it is not planned to call in the assigned personnel for their staffing, with the exception of the 47th state rifle division.


Everything connected with the development of an operation to bring troops into Iran in June 1941 is unknown to us. It can only be assumed that the tasks of the operation determined the forces, timing, routes of movement, etc. The depth of the operation depended on the grouping of troops that was allocated to the General Staff. When redeployed as part of the 16th A, there was only the 5th MK. Probably, the armies could give the 24th CD, the 76th and 77th Guards. The GDS could be used to cover the Iranian-Turkish border. The troops of the 16th A, supported from the SAVO, could reach a latitude that captures the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. In this case, the movement of enemy groups across the Caspian to carry out sabotage was excluded. Judging by the decision to supply the cities of Tabriz, Pahlavi, Rasht and others with grain, sugar, kerosene, manufactory and other goods, this option was the main one. It is possible that this was the first stage of the operation.

(?) If the 16th A had the 5th mk, parts of the ZakVO (28 mk and two cd) and with the support of a group from the SAVO, it was possible to carry out an operation to the Abadan field (to the coast of the Persian Gulf), on which there was Refinery. In this case, the ownership of the Anglo-Persian oil company was taken under control and the supply of oil products from this region could be controlled. It was important that the production of aviation gasoline in this region was carried out at only two plants - at one in Baku, and at the second at the Abadan field. Such an operation could have been planned only with the tacit consent of the British to prevent the oil industry from falling into the hands of the Germans or pro-German circles in Iran.

At the first stage of the operation, many mobile troops were required, and the rifle formations of the 32nd RC (46th and 152nd Rifle Divisions) were not particularly needed. The presence of these divisions was required later for the protection of objects, for carrying out garrison service, etc. At the time of the decision on the transfer of troops, both divisions were contained in peaceful states and the rise of the assigned personnel in the ZabVO was not planned. When the 152nd Rifle Division was dispatched, it had the minimum number among all the divisions of the internal military units, which were subsequently sent to the West, which once again testifies to the fact that initially the 152nd Rifle Division was not sent to the west. After changing the route of the 16th A, the concentration of the 46th rifle division became irrelevant and therefore, after the start of the war, it was first mobilized, and only then, from June 27, it began to go to the West. ZhDB 16th A:

“[By 14.7.41, 16th A] continued its concentration … The 16th A included … the 32nd RC, which consisted of… two divisions: the 152nd Rifle Division concentrated entirely on the states of peacetime … the 46th Rifle Division was not completely concentrated … Was this division also manned according to the states of the peace? time …"


The phrase about the peaceful state of the 46th Rifle Division is underlined in the magazine, a question mark is put. Captain I. F. Nomads, who left the ZabVO on June 3, did not know that the arriving 46th Rifle Division was a full-time division. The chief, checking the entry in the ZhBD, underlined the word "peaceful" and put a question mark, since he could have more accurate information.

(?) In May-June 1941, 3816 civilians were mobilized to be sent to Iran in the AzSSR: 82 party workers, 100 employees of Soviet organizations, 200 employees of security agencies, 400 militiamen, 70 prosecutors, 90 judges and 150 workers of printing houses, etc. etc. The heads of the subcommittees were appointed and to lead the commissions …

Transportation of troops of the 16th Army across the sea

In the memoirs of A. A. Lobachev, it was noted that all echelons of the army were sent in 7 days. In fact, until June 3, it was only possible to send the 17th TD and, possibly, part of the 109th MD. From June 4 to June 14, the 13th TD was dispatched. Echelons from the 109th MD also continued to leave. The 152nd SD was the last to go. The urgent dispatch of four divisions to the West within three weeks looks somehow incomprehensible. Perhaps that is why the period in the memoirs was changed to 7 days.

(?) The dispatch of army echelons was carried out so that the port of Krasnovodsk could cope with the transport of troops across the Caspian Sea. After the operation was canceled, the echelons went to the West along the same Central Asian route. there was no need to rush anywhere - after all, the start of the war was not expected … This is confirmed by the fact that the six rifle divisions of the Siberian Military District, for which the call-up of 36,000 men was planned, had not been transferred to the West before the war began.


At that time, three shipping companies of the People's Commissariat of the Navy were operating in the Caspian Sea: Caspflot (82 vessels with a total carrying capacity of 87 thousand tons), and Kaspanker (69 vessels with a total carrying capacity of 205 thousand tons, including 11 large-tonnage tankers with a carrying capacity 9600 tonnes each) and Reidtanker (122 vessels with a total carrying capacity of 240 thousand tonnes). In terms of cargo transportation, the Caspian sea fleet ranked first in the USSR and accounted for up to 1/3 of the cargo traffic. It is clear to everyone that people and cargo cannot be placed in tanks of tankers, but they were used to evacuate refugees and equipment of their decks during the war years. During the evacuation of refugees, up to 4500 people were transported on the deck of a large-tonnage tanker, and 2000 … 2500 people were transported on the decks of other tankers. When loaded with ballast tankers on the decks, it was possible to transport military equipment.

During the evacuation of equipment from the North Caucasus, the Baku port was able to reach the volume of cargo transportation up to 100 wagons per day. If these were two-axle 20-ton cars, then up to 2000 tons of goods were transported per day. At the indicated time, there were also four-axle 50-ton cars. In this case, the volume of transported goods was even greater. By the end of 1941, during the evacuation of the population, 10 … 12 thousand people a day were transported through the Baku port. The author estimated the mass of equipment, weapons, transport (without personnel and small arms) of the 17th TD, which amounted to about 11, 3 thousand tons. With a consecutive arrival at the port of the division's echelons, within 7 days, it was required to transport up to 1, 62 thousand tons and 1200 … 2000 people. Theoretically, the troops could be transported across the Caspian, but to the detriment of the economy …

Why didn't you send troops from the North Caucasus Military District?

The question was asked: "Why were the troops transported to Transcaucasia from Transbaikalia, and not sent from the North Caucasus Military District?" From the North Caucasian Military District, the SD could be used, but they were not required for the rapid advance of the troops.

The 26th MK began its formation in the North Caucasus Military District in March 1941. In the book M. Meltyukhova "Stalin's Lost Chance" provides data on the availability of armored vehicles in the districts. After the start of the transport of troops from the ZabVO on June 1, the North Caucasian Military District had: 2 tank BT-2, 84 - BT-5, 1 - two-turret T-26, 1 - T-26, 3 - flamethrower HT-26, 22 - T-38, 44 - T-37, 80 - T-27 and 47 armored vehicles. A total of 237 tanks, of which 87 were armed with a gun. Therefore, the corps was not sent to the ZakVO. The 5th MK was transported from the ZabVO, which had more than 1000 tanks (of which about 900 were equipped with a gun) and 213 armored vehicles.

In May, the 26th MK was part of the 19th A, but due to the small number of old tanks with a limited motor resource, it was not transferred to KOVO until June 27. In June, in the 19th A, the corps was replaced by the 23rd MK from the OrVO (413 tanks, of which about 186 were equipped with a gun). Before the start of the war, the 23rd MK was also not nominated in KOVO.

On the twentieth of May 1941, the future war with Germany was seen in a completely different form, the closer to its beginning. Commander of the 21st MK D. D. Lyalyushenko wrote:

About a month before the start of the war, while at the GABTU, I asked the chief: “When will the tanks arrive to us? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing …"

“Don't worry,” said Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your corps should be fully completed in 1942.

- And if there is a war?

- The spacecraft will have enough strength even without your corps.…

In mid-June, the use of mechanized corps of the 2nd stage in case of war is already being considered. But only being considered …

Destination: Central Asia

According to the official point of view, the 57th TD has been moving to the West since May. The forum assumed that according to the original plans of the 57th TD, it was necessary to perform other tasks than to participate in the battles near Smolensk. The author agrees with his point of view. An indirect confirmation of this is the following fact. The commander of the 29th MK (will soon be appointed or already appointed as the head of the ABTU Far Eastern Fleet), transferring V. A. Mishulin did not point out that the division was part of the 16th A. Until June 12, not a single document or memoir of the veterans of the 16th A states that the 57th division was part of their army. Only upon arrival at the General Staff late in the evening of 11 or the next day, the division commander could enter the 57th TD into Lukin's army.


After receiving a directive on the redeployment of troops from the ZabVO to the General Staff, only Army Commander Lukin was summoned. On June 3, the second head of the 16th A - PMC Lobachev was summoned to Moscow. Presumably on June 3, the commander of the 57th TD is summoned to the General Staff. More in the General Staff of the 16th A did not call not a single corps commander (out of two) and not a single division commander (out of five). This can only indicate that a separate division had a special mission to fulfill.

Looking at the map, Lukin saw that to the left of his army some other formations not designated by numbers should be deployed … During the lunch break, Lukin … saw … the commander of the Ural Military District, General Ershakov …

“Why play hide and seek,” said Ershakov. - You and I in the east were almost neighbors, apparently, and now we have to act in the neighborhood …

[M. F. Lukin] - And I look at the map and think, who is my left neighbor?.."

The left neighbor 16 A was supposed to be located on the other side of the Caspian Sea, in SAVO. Consequently, it was planned to transport troops from the Ural Military District (22nd A) to SAVO. It turns out that the two armies of the RGK from the end of May are not planned by the General Staff for use in the West! Somewhere after 10 … 12 the echelons of the 22nd Army could start moving along the Aktyubinsk - Arys railway line and further to the southern border. How many rifle divisions were planned to be transported from the Ural Military District, it is difficult to say. It can only be noted that there were no good tanks in the Ural Military District, except for a few dozen T-27 and T-37.

There were no good tanks in SAVO, in which the 27th MK (9th, 53rd TD, 221st MD) began to form in March 1941. Until June 1941, there were only one 9th TD in the corps. All tanks arrived after participating in the war in Finland, underwent major repairs and had a limited service life. In the spring of 1941, there were about 321 tanks in SAVO, incl. equipped with a cannon - 250. It should be noted that in the spring in the 27th MK were quite intensive three-month exercises with the active use of technology.

To carry out the operation in Iran (from the SAVO side), good tanks were needed. Probably, the 57th TD was to be used in the district for a special task. For example, connect with the mobile units of the 5th MK on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. To operate in other directions, SAVO also needed reliable tanks. At this time, 50 fairly modern BT-7M tanks suddenly appeared in the district, 9 of which had walkie-talkies. In the records of the Moscow Military District, these tanks were listed from 1940 to 1.4.41, and on June 1 they already appeared in the list of a secondary district. It is logical to assume that the decision to send them to the southern theater of operations was made simultaneously with the decision to transfer troops from the 16th A and 57th TD.

Pre-war exercises in ZakVO and SAVO

According to the plans, two different groups of General Staff officers of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff were supposed to conduct exercises in the districts. Exercises and trips with the participation of the General Staff were planned in the ZakVO from May 10 to 20, and in SAVO - from May 10 to 30. According to the memories CM. Shtemenko the main staff of the department left for the exercises in May:

Just before leaving, it turned out that neither the chief of the General Staff, nor his deputy could leave and the exercises would be led by the commanders of the troops: in the ZakVO - D. T. Kozlov, in SAVO - S. G. Trofimenko. However, the very next day after our arrival in Tbilisi, Lieutenant General Kozlov was urgently summoned to Moscow. It was felt that something unusual was happening in Moscow …

Major General M. N. Sharokhin … The front was commanded by Lieutenant General P. I. Batov … After the analysis of the exercises in the ZakVO, we went by steamer from Baku to Krasnovodsk …

If we assume that the chief of the General Staff and his deputy could not leave due to the preparation of the operation to bring troops into Iran, then the departure of the General Staff specialists from Moscow could have occurred on May 24-25. They arrived in Tbilisi on May 26-27. A day later, the commander of the ZakVO was urgently summoned to Moscow. On May 26, Army Commander Lukin was also urgently summoned to Moscow, who left on the 27th.

General Batov commanded the front, which could be deployed from the headquarters of the ZakVO. But the front at that time was at least two armies. If the front-line and one army headquarters in the district headquarters could still recruit commanders, then where to get the personnel for the second army headquarters? Perhaps the second army was the army being moved from Transbaikalia … 16th A was already on its way to the ZakVO, but they hardly knew about it during the exercises …

After the departure of the General Staff Commission to SAVO, the second exercise took place in the ZakVO. P. I. Batov:. General Batov and the chief of staff of the district F. I. Tolbukhin. Consequently, the commander of the ZakVO has not yet returned from Moscow. Due to the change in the route of 16th A, the plans for the General Staff in a part of the district had to be changed. This was what General D. T. Kozlov. CM. Shtemenko:

[In SAVO. - Approx. auth.] during the game, I managed, together with Sharokhin and the head of the operational department of the SAVO headquarters, Colonel Chernyshevich, to drive along the border from Serakhs to Ashgabat and further through Kizil-Atrek to Hasan-Kuli in order to study the theater …


M. I. Kazakov (chief of staff of SAVO):

In early June, we held a command post exercise. Responsible representatives of the General Staff took direct part in its leadership: Major General M. N. Sharokhin, who was then head of the Middle East theater department, and Colonel S. M. Shtemenko. The topic "Concentration of a separate army to the state border" was being worked out.

On June 11, a call came from Moscow. They summoned either the commander or me. S. G. Trofimenko wanted to personally conduct an analysis of the doctrine, but he did not feel well, and therefore it was decided that I would go on call …

During the exercises, a topic was worked out, which turns out to be close to the actual events, since the arrival of the 22nd A. It is possible that in the ZakVO the exercises were conducted on a similar topic … After the start of the war, the commander of the ZakVO put into effect a plan to cover the border with Iran and Turkey … In response to his actions, an encrypted message came from the chief of the General Staff: That's right, because after changing the route of the two armies' advance, the grouping of our troops in the southern theater of operations was significantly weakened …

Continued development of the operation


In the memoirs of M. I. Kazakov, let's pay attention to four main points. First. 8 days before the start of the war, the chief of staff of SAVO is working through some documents. The deputy chief of the General Staff Operations Department works with him. Less than two days before the start of the war, the documents are carefully studied by the chief of the General Staff. It turns out that these documents are not sent to the district: they are sealed and deposited, i.e. its sending by secret mail to the district is not provided. It is possible that General Kazakov took over from the commander of the 22nd A and was engaged in the district's plans with regard to Iran, i.e. the operation itself to prepare for the introduction of troops into Iran did not stop.

Second point. Around June 18, Kazakov asks Vasilevsky a question: Deputy Head of the Operations Directorate A. M. Vasilevsky, who is fully obliged to master the situation on the border and its understanding in the General Staff, answers: At this time, the General Staff is not sure exactly when the war will start, and in some books they write that from June 12, according to the directives of the General Staff, troops began to withdraw according to cover plans in anticipation of war on June 22. Even a certain directive of the General Staff of June 18 was invented … But it turns out that some of the events on the eve of the war are distorted. This can be seen from the example of the redeployment of the 16th A.

Third. In the third part, the answer of Mekhlis to the question of his deputy Kovalev about the purpose of transportation of the 16th A. I. V. was presented. Kovalev: the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented

Let's pay attention to the secrecy measures when working out the plans of the operation in the General Staff. The list of persons who were familiar with the operation plan was reduced to a minimum. Only Vasilevsky, Vatutin, Zhukov and Timoshenko worked with Lukin. To exclude acquaintance with the plans of unauthorized persons, the army commander was locked in the room. In the memoirs of M. I. Kazakov, the same persons are present: Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Zhukov. Since the operation was postponed in full, the developed documents were not reported to the People's Commissar of Defense, in contrast to the plans prepared by M. F. Lukin.

It turns out that the prepared documents in the General Staff should not have come to the district headquarters, which once again confirms the highest level of secrecy of the operation. Commander Lukin simply did not reach this step, since his participation in the operation was canceled. Mekhlis would not disclose top-secret information during its preparation: he could simply not know about it. If the question was asked after June 10, then disinformation was issued in response. Even in this case, it was not necessary to disclose information that could harm the party and the country in the future …

As an example of how the highest secrets were treated at that time, I will give a simple example. After leaving G. K. Zhukov, his adjutant suggested the cipher-clerk Khramtsovsky to seal a packet with sheets from a notebook for cipher telegrams. He agreed: [From the office. - Approx. auth.]

The Arys - Aktyubinsk railway was viewed from the passenger plane, and General Kazakov unambiguously identified the 16th A train of echelons as military traffic through his district. If enemy spies were at railway stations or near the road, they could even more easily reveal the fact of military transport to the West. There was no way to hide the fact that troops were being transported to the west. And why hide it? If even after June 10, army troops began to be transported not to the western special districts, but to the territory of the inner district - the OVO! What does the Germans care about transporting troops inside the country? It should be noted that the mythical note of the German Foreign Ministry has not yet been found and not a single employee of our Foreign Ministry has written about such a fact. We came across an example of misinformation to cover up an operation even after it was canceled …

And the fourth point. On June 13, Kazakov met Lukin at the General Staff, and on June 14-15, several more army commanders appeared there. Several are three or more people. Perhaps these were the commanders of the 20th, 21st and 22nd armies, who had arrived to familiarize themselves with the plans for the use of their troops.

After the outbreak of the war, SAVO somehow began to operate. The author does not support the version about the entry of troops of the 83rd Guards Division into Iran on June 22. There are too many inaccuracies in this version. Many missing servicemen (missing on western fronts, not Iran). It turned out that marching units formed from servicemen assembled from the district's formations were also sent to the front from the SAVO. But the author could not dispute three facts of the use of military personnel on the territory of Iran before the start of Operation "Consent". For example:


Information about belonging to a specific military unit of the Red Army soldier V. E. Bidenko (blessed memory!) Could not be found. It is possible that after the start of the war, the intelligence forces operating in Iran against German agents and sabotage groups were reinforced with volunteer detachments from the SAVO or ZakVO units …

Change in the grouping of troops in the southern theater of operations

After June 9, 16th A and 57th TD received a new route - to ARVO.

22nd A, after the directive of the General Staff of June 12, began redeployment to ZapOVO.

On June 10, a directive came from the General Staff to the Ural Military District on the introduction of symbols, probably for units to be redeployed to the West.


In the southern theater of operations, the threat continued to remain and was reflected in the Help (13.6.41) "On the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West." The figures below show the dependences of changes in the total number of troops of the ZakVO and SAVO, as well as the number of divisions that the General Staff planned to leave in these districts after the transfer of part of the troops to the army of the RGK.


After changing the transportation routes of the 22nd A and 57th TD, the number of divisions remaining on the territory of SAVO doubled.

After changing the route of 16th A, the number of troops remaining in the ZakVO increased by 50%. The certificate states the presence of 20 divisions in the ZakVO and SKVO, excluding another division (SKVO), involved in the protection of the Black Sea coast. From the fall of 1940 and until 13.6.41, according to the plans of the General Staff in the North Caucasus Military District, only one rifle division should remain to protect the coast. Thus, due to the threat in the Transcaucasus, five more divisions remained in the North Caucasus Military District, which were previously planned to be sent to the north. Thus, after the change in the routes for the movement of troops from Transbaikalia and from the Ural Military District, the number of troops to cover the southern borders (including divisions in the North Caucasus Military District) doubled.

In the last lines of the Help there is a phrase: but no one knew when the situation on the borders with Turkey and Iran would be favorable before the start of the war. After the start of the war and the defeat of a large number of our border troops from the North Caucasus Military District and the SAVO to the West, divisions will be transferred, but this will be connected to a greater extent with hopelessness, tk. The General Staff will have nothing more to do …

Troops of armies from the interior districts

And what happens with the armies that are formed or will be formed on the basis of internal districts?

16th A went to the Transcaucasia, June 9-11 - in the OVO. On June 12, the Directive on redeployment to the territory of the district was sent to KOVO from 15.6. 10.7 troops of the 16th A, consisting of: army directorates with service units, the 5th MK (13th and 17th TD, 109th MD), 57th TD and 32nd RC (46th and 152nd rifle division, 126th corps artillery regiment). 16th A is part of the military district and is subordinate in all respects to the Military Council of the district. By 14.7.41, the 46th rifle division and the 5th micron were not yet fully concentrated (up to 40% of the troops did not arrive from the corps).

18th A (HVO). According to the directive of 13.5.41, the 25th RC (three rifle divisions) was transferred to camps on the territory of KOVO and on May 29 was included in the 19th A. nd A was not formed.

19th A In accordance with the directive of May 13, at the end of May - beginning of June, KOVO sends four rifle divisions and one road police department from SKVO to the territory.


20th A after the start of the war, it will be formed on the basis of the Air Defense Forces and the troops of the Moscow Military District. The 61st and 69th sk, 7th mk entered the army. Before the start of the war, not a single corps was raised or moved anywhere.

21st A formed in June 1941 on the basis of PrivO. In May, the call-up for the training camp began. The servicemen were going to go to the maneuvers in KOVO: this is how the district commanders were oriented in May. In June, the transfer of the army to the Gomel region began. The last train departed on June 20.

22nd A (Ural Military District), according to a directive of May 13, on additional instructions, it was supposed to be transferred to the West as part of two rifle corps. From the end of May to June 9-10, it was preparing for a transfer to the southern direction. On June 12, she received a directive on redeployment to the territory of ZapOVO. The arrival of echelons of the 61st and 63rd SK (six RDs in total) was to take place from June 17 to July 2. On June 13, the loading of troops into echelons begins. By the beginning of the war, three rifle divisions arrived at ZapOVO.

28th A (ARVO). In accordance with the directive of June 19, a front-line administration should have been formed on the basis of the district, and on June 24, a new directive was received on the formation of an army command instead of a front-line one.

On 13.6.41, KOVO receives a directive to transfer closer to the state border to new camps on the 31st, 36th, 37th and 55th sk - by march; 49th sk - by rail and hike. A similar directive comes to the ZAPOVO on the withdrawal of deep divisions to the deployment sites of the second echelons of the covering armies.

This is natural, since troops from the internal districts began to arrive to play the role of military reserves. The problem is that the withdrawal of troops from the reserves of the districts is perceived by some writers as the beginning of the implementation of measures under the cover plans, which is not true. Why? Because all these formations, which are part of the rifle corps of the reserves of the districts, were to move west only after mobilization! They were supposed to accept the remaining enrolled personnel and, most importantly, automobile (including tractors) and animal-drawn vehicles. Since they were provided with transport by only 40-50%, the divisions advancing on a campaign had only wearable ammunition, carried a lot of training equipment and everything necessary for subsequent camp life. Most of the artillery, due to lack of transport, remained in the points of permanent deployment. Therefore, regarding the advancement of these formations, one can only speak of their movement closer to the second echelon of the covering armies. Movement is limited to combat-ready divisions. Enough time was required to increase their combat effectiveness. Here is a concrete example of such a nomination. Captain Comrade Malkov (commander of the 163rd ap, 64th rifle division, 44th sc):

21.6 the regiment was loaded into the echelon at station. Dorogobuzh, where the camp of the rifle corps was, for what purpose, was not known. 22.6 at 7 o'clock at the station. Smolevichi, by 17 o'clock drove up to Minsk, where they only learned about the beginning of hostilities.

The regiment was loaded into the echelon was understaffed, 50% of the materiel had no thrust. There were only 207 shells for the entire regiment. They took all the property with them, i.e. bedding, tents. In this form, they moved to the front.

This was the situation throughout the division. It had live ammunition, only a training supply … During the battle at the UR, the division received cartridges from the UR area, and I received a sufficient number of shells for the 76-mm cannon, there were no 122-mm shells …

The rifle division moved forward in echelons and was able to load even materiel that was not provided with transport. The division received cartridges and 76-mm shells from Ur's warehouses. It is difficult to say whether there were enough shells for the 45-mm anti-tank guns, which were not part of the 163rd artillery regiment. But Ur's warehouses do not have 122-mm shells. Also, they could not have mortar mines, since 122-mm guns and mortars are not in service with the UR … According to the norms, more than 40 thousand hand grenades are required for a rifle division. And were there such quantities in the UR warehouse?..

Why did they begin to transfer troops from the inner districts?


Pavel Anatolyevich indicates the reason for the concentration of spacecraft troops in the western special military units. I suggest checking this version. The author is not an expert in the redeployment of infantry troops to the west, and therefore he used data from the Internet. The figure below shows the change in the size of the German grouping near our border and the troops of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the covering armies of the western border districts. Since in May - June 1941, according to the documents of the General Staff, the 9th Army is part of the Southwestern Front, the data on the KOVO and ODVO are combined in the figure.


Until May 31, the grouping of German troops concentrated on the border (with the exception of the Poznan-Danzig-Thorn area) does not have an overwhelming superiority over the units of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the covering armies of the western borderlands.

In PribOVO, one rifle division, which is assigned to the reserves of the district, is actually located in the same areas as the troops of the 2nd echelon. On June 14, the redeployment of the 11th RD began, and the redeployment of the 16th RD was delayed due to the insufficient number of cars.

In the ZAPOVO, too, there is no overwhelming superiority of the German group over the troops of the district. In the second half of June, a covert transfer of troops to the area of deployment of two echelons began. But there can be no talk of any attack by the Soviet Union on Germany, since not entirely combat-ready divisions are being transferred. Most of them are being thrown on foot.

Against the troops of the KOVO and especially the ODVO, there is a significant advantage of the German grouping. Basically, this advantage was ensured by the disinformation of the German command. Taking into account the troops of Germany's allies, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy was even more ensured. And, of course, it was required to achieve at least some kind of parity with the German group. Especially after the receipt of the RM on possible provocations on the Romanian border by June 8.

On June 13, a decision was made to transfer five skirmishes and one more rifle division to the deployment areas of two echelons of the KOVO covering armies. There is no reason not to believe the version of P. A. Sudoplatova. All the troops that were to be redeployed arrived at their destination in late June or early July 1941. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft did not take into account the most important circumstance - Hitler's illness, on which arguments in the form of the parity of troops near the border and the presence of significant reserves of spacecraft did not work.

Only a manic idea possessed him …