Moscow campaign of Denikin's army

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Moscow campaign of Denikin's army
Moscow campaign of Denikin's army

Video: Moscow campaign of Denikin's army

Video: Moscow campaign of Denikin's army
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Troubles. 1919 year. 100 years ago, in May-July 1919, the Moscow campaign of Denikin's army began. By the beginning of June, the White Guards captured Donbass, on June 24 - they took Kharkov, on June 27 - Yekaterinoslav, on June 30 - Tsaritsyn. On July 3, 1919, Denikin signed a Moscow directive, in which he set the task of taking Moscow.

Moscow campaign of Denikin's army
Moscow campaign of Denikin's army

May battle on Manych and Sale

On May 17, 1919, the strategic offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia under the command of Denikin began with the aim of defeating the Southern Front of the Red Army under the command of Gittis. In mid-May 1919, the troops of the Red Southern Front (2nd Ukrainian Army, 13th, 8th, 9th and 10th armies) were attacking in the Donbass, on the Seversky Donets and Manych rivers. As a result, a fierce oncoming battle took place.

The Red Command delivered the main blow to Rostov-on-Don, in the direction of which two converging strikes were delivered. From the east, Yegorov's 10th Army was advancing, which stood on Manych and penetrated deeply, was 80 km from Rostov. The forces of the 8th, 13th and 2nd Ukrainian armies were advancing from the west. The Reds had a significant advantage in strength and resources. So, in the Luhansk direction, where the main blow was delivered, the Reds outnumbered the Whites by 6 times.

The battle began on the eastern sector of the Southern Front, on Manych. The main forces of Yegorov's 10th army crossed Manych, Budyonny's 4th cavalry division on the right flank captured the villages of Olginskaya and Grabievskaya. The red cavalry was preparing to break through to the rear of the enemy. However, at the same time, the white command prepared its counterstrike. The operation was personally supervised by Denikin. And the strike group was led by Wrangel. For flank attacks, the Kuban corps of Ulagai and Pokrovsky were concentrated. In the center of the Reds, the infantry of the corps of Kutepov met.

As a result, the main forces of Yegorov's army were connected by frontal battles with the white infantry, and on the flanks the Kuban cavalry made a roundabout maneuver. Division Budyonny was defeated in a fierce battle with the cavalry of Pokrovsky. However, the Budennovites were able to cover the retreat beyond Manych of the 37th and 39th Red Divisions. On the left flank of the 10th Army, the situation was even worse. Corps Ulagai in stubborn battles near Priyutny, Remontny and Grabievskaya defeated the Steppe Group of the 10th Army (32nd Infantry and 6th Cavalry Divisions). The Reds were cut off from the main forces and suffered heavy losses. Egorov threw the elite red cavalry under the command of Dumenko from the Grand Duke against Ulagai. On May 17, a counter battle took place near Grabbevskaya, after a fierce battle Ulagai defeated Dumenko's cavalry, which retreated to the west. After success on the flanks, Wrangel attacked in the center and defeated the Reds in a three-day battle near Grand Duke.

By May 20, Yegorov's heavily drained divisions were able to connect at Remontny. Gathering all the troops together, Egorov decided to give the white one more battle. The cavalry divisions (4th and 6th) were combined into the Cavalry Corps under the command of Dumenko (the nucleus of the future famous 1st Cavalry Army). On May 25, a new oncoming battle began on the Sal River. The battle was extremely stubborn and fierce. Suffice it to note that one day the best commanders were knocked out of the Reds - Yegorov himself, Dumenko, two division commanders were seriously wounded. As a result, the Red troops again suffered a heavy defeat and, pursued by Wrangel's army, began to roll back to Tsaritsyn. At this time, striking at the junction of the 9th Red Army, Mamontov's White Cossack cavalry broke through the front.

Thus, the 10th Army was defeated in the Manych battle and on the Sal River, suffered heavy losses and retreated towards Tsaritsyn. The Manych White Front was named the Caucasian Army under the command of Wrangel and launched an offensive against Tsaritsyn. The troops of the former Caucasian Volunteer Army were named the Volunteer Army. General May-Mayevsky was put at its head.

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White victory in Donbass

At the same time, the White Guards won a victory in the Donetsk direction. On May 17, 1919, the Reds, having concentrated the forces of three armies and reinforced by units from the Crimea, went on a general offensive. The Makhnovists achieved the greatest success, advancing on the southern, coastal sector of the front. They occupied Mariupol, Volnovakha, broke through far ahead to the Kuteinikovo station, north of Taganrog. The volunteer army of May-Mayevsky was inferior to the enemy in numbers, but this inequality was somewhat smoothed out by the fact that the most elite units of the White Guards fought here - the Markovites, Drozdovites, Kornilovites. Kutepov's army corps, reinforced by other units. The first and only detachment of British tanks in the White Army was attached to the corps. True, their significance should not be exaggerated. Tanks then had many restrictions, so they could only go on level ground and for a short distance. For their further use, special railway platforms and loading and unloading facilities were required. Therefore, in the Russian civil war, they were more a psychological weapon than a military one. Armored trains were much more reliable, efficient, faster and more maneuverable.

The Reds had complete superiority in forces and means, any attempt to conduct positional defense on a huge 400-kilometer front for the Whites was doomed to defeat. The only hope for success was a surprise attack. On May 19, 1919, Kutepov's corps struck at the junction of Makhno's troops and the 13th Red Army. The effect exceeded all expectations. The Reds were not ready for such a development of the situation and began to retreat. Taking advantage of the first success, the White Guards threw a tank detachment into the attack. Their appearance caused a great psychological effect, panic.

Later, in order to justify the defeat, the Makhnovists were accused of everything. Like, they betrayed, opened the front. Trotskyf accused Makhno of the collapse of the front. The Makhnovists blamed the Reds for everything, allegedly they opened the front so that the Denikinites would destroy the rebels. In fact, there was no betrayal. White's counter strike was unexpected for the Reds, who were confident in their superiority. In addition, the red command at this time was carrying out a regrouping of forces here, withdrawing units infected with anarchy to the rear, replacing them with others. And the Makhnovists had the greatest success here, taking the lead. This success was not yet consolidated and White was able to strike into the joint, under the base of the ledge. As a result, the new units of the Reds, among whom there were many non-fired recruits, mixed. The units that had been destroyed by the Makhnovshchina ran away. Stronger, more combat-ready units (2nd International Regiment, Voronezh and Jewish Communist Regiments, Special Cavalry Regiment, etc.) fell under a general wave of confusion and panic, and also mixed.

By May 23, 1919, a gap of 100 kilometers had formed. May-Mayevsky threw the 3rd Kuban Cavalry Corps Shkuro at him. The Makhnovists, who were threatened with encirclement, also fled. Their retreating units were met by Shkuro's cavalry and were defeated in three-day battles. The white cavalry rapidly developed an offensive in Tavria, moved to the Dnieper, cutting off the Crimean grouping of the Reds. Kutepov's corps, defeating the Reds near Grishino station, attacked the 13th Red Army from the flank. It was already a disaster. The Red Front was falling apart, Lugansk had to be abandoned. The 13th Army fled, the soldiers rallied and deserted in whole units. The White Guards reached Bakhmut, began to develop an offensive along the Seversky Donets, to Slavyansk, Izium and Kharkov.

Thus, Denikin's army launched a counteroffensive on the western flank, defeated the enemy within a few days, and again captured the Yuzovski and Mariupol area. White began to develop an offensive in the Kharkov direction. The Red Army suffered a heavy defeat, lost thousands of soldiers and a large number of weapons. The insurgent army of Makhno also suffered heavy losses, again entered into conflict with the Bolsheviks, but the Makhnovists remained enemies of the Whites.

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Strategic turning point in favor of the White Army

As a result, in May 1919, on the southern front from the Caspian to the Donets and from the Donets to the Azov and Black Seas, a strategic turning point occurred in favor of Denikin's army. Shock groups of the Reds on the flanks of the Southern Front suffered a heavy defeat and retreated. The White Guards launched a decisive offensive. White troops from the North Caucasus attacked Astrakhan, the Caucasian army - in the Tsaritsyn direction, the Don army - in the Voronezh, on the Povorino - Liski line, the Volunteer Army - in the Kharkov direction and to the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the 3rd Army Corps, attacking from the Ak-Monaysk positions, was supposed to free Crimea from the Reds.

The position of the Red armies of the Southern Front was complicated by the disintegration of troops in Little Russia, which in many ways were formed from Little Russian rebel detachments. The former rebels had low discipline, politically they often leaned towards the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Petliurists, anarchists, or were outright bandits. Their commanders - atamans and dad, were unreliable, accustomed to anarchy, unlimited personal power, "flexible" policy "- moved from camp to camp.

At the same time, the peasant war continued, a new stage began, associated with the tough food policy of the Bolsheviks - food dictatorship, food appropriation, food detachments. Throughout Little Russia, insurgent detachments led by atamans, who did not recognize any power, continued to walk. For example, in Tripoli until June 1919, the ataman Zeleny (Daniil Terpilo) ruled.

The rear of the Red Army was destabilized by a major uprising of the Don Cossacks - the Vesheno uprising and the revolt of Ataman Grigoriev in Little Russia. In May 1919, Novorossia was shocked by the uprising of the Grigorievites (How the uprising of the ataman Grigoriev began; Nikifor Grigoriev, "the chieftain of the rebel troops of the Kherson region, Zaporozhye and Tavria"; Odessa operation of the chieftain Grigoriev; The uprising in Little Russia. How the "blitzkriev" failed). At the first stage of the uprising, the Grigorievites captured Elisavetgrad, Krivoy Rog, Yekaterinoslav, Kremenchug, Cherkassy, Uman, Kherson and Nikolaev. The Grigorievites threatened Kiev. Local red garrisons went over to the side of the rebels en masse. The reserves of the Southern Front, reinforcements from the central part of Russia were thrown into the fight against the Grigorievites. The mutiny was quickly suppressed, which was due to the weakness of the rebel command and their low combat effectiveness. Grigoriev's bandit formations, spoiled by easy victories (including over the Entente troops in Odessa) and permissiveness, degenerated into hordes of robbers and murderers who massacred Jews and "strangers from the North" by the thousands. Therefore, Voroshilov, who led the Kharkov district, and launched an offensive from Kiev, Poltava and Odessa, easily dispersed the gangs of Grigoriev. The Grigorievites, who were accustomed to being afraid of them and running in front of them, could not withstand the correct battle with motivated, staunch Soviet units. The Grigorievschina was finished in two weeks.

Large bandit formations split into small detachments and groups and predated even before July 1919. Thus, the Grigoriev uprising was quickly suppressed, but it diverted large forces of the Red Army at the time of the decisive battle on the Southern Front, which contributed to the victory of the White Army in the South of Russia.

The conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Makhnovists also contributed to the failure of the Red Army on the western flank of the Southern Front. Makhno and his commanders controlled a huge area (72 volosts of the Yekaterinoslav and Tavricheskaya provinces) with a population of 2 million, not allowing the Bolsheviks there. Makhno's "capital" was in Gulyai-Pole. Makhno's "brigade" was the size of an entire army. In words, Makhno obeyed the red command, in fact, he retained independence and independence. In fact, Makhno created the nucleus of an anarchist "state within a state." In April, the local 3rd Congress proclaimed an anarchist platform, refused to recognize the dictatorship of one Bolshevik party, and opposed the policy of War Communism.

For some time, the conflict was restrained by the presence of a common enemy - whites. Therefore, the first attempts of the Red Command to restore order among the Makhnovists, to disband part of the detachments, did not lead to success. Commander of the Ukrainian Front Antonov-Ovseenko at the end of April met with Makhno in Gulyai-Pole. The most pressing issues were resolved. However, the Makhnovist freemen was a strong corrupting factor with which the red military-political leadership could not reconcile. Discipline in the units adjacent to the Makhnovists was falling, the Red Army soldiers en masse deserted to Makhno. In response, the Red Command cut off the supply of weapons and ammunition to the Makhnovists. The most reliable communist, internationalist troops and Cheka detachments began to be transferred to the junction of the 13th Red Army with the 2nd Ukrainian Army, which included Makhno's detachments. There were clashes between them and the Makhnovists.

Makhno did not support the uprising of Grigoriev, his commanders were dissatisfied with the actions of the Grigorievites (pogroms, massacres of Jews). However, Makhno blamed for the uprising not only on Grigoriev, but also on the Soviet regime. As a result, on May 25, the Ukrainian Defense Council, at the direction of Lenin and Trotsky, decided to "liquidate the Makhnovshchina in a short time." After the uprising of Grigoriev in Little Russia, they stopped relying on the "Ukrainization" of the army. The purge of the military command was carried out. By order of June 4, 1919, the Ukrainian Front and the Ukrainian Soviet armies were disbanded. So, the 2nd Ukrainian Army was transformed into the 14th Army of the Red Army and left as part of the Southern Front. Voroshilov led the 14th Army. On June 6, the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Trotsky, issued an order in which he declared the head of the 7th Ukrainian Soviet Division Makhno outlawed "for the collapse of the front and insubordination to the command." Several commanders of the Makhnovist detachments were shot. Part of the Makhnovists continued to fight as part of the Red Army.

Makhno, with another part of the troops, broke off relations with the Bolsheviks, retreated to the Kherson province, entered into a temporary alliance with Grigoriev (as a result, he was shot for wanting to go over to the side of the Whites), and continued the war with the Whites. Makhno headed the Revolutionary Military Council of the United Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (RPAU), and when Denikin's army launched an offensive on Moscow, he again entered into an alliance with the Reds, and began a large-scale guerrilla war in the rear of Denikin's army.

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