Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 190 years ago, in July 1829, the Trans-Balkan campaign of the Russian army under the command of General Diebitsch began. Russian troops unexpectedly overcame the Balkans for the enemy.
The Russian army defeated the Turks in the battles at Aidos and Slivno. On August 8, Diebitsch's troops captured Adrianople. The advance of Russian units to the approaches to Constantinople demoralized the Ottoman military-political leadership. Turkey asked for peace.
Diebitsch's unexpected maneuver
The defeat of the Turkish army under the command of the vizier Reshid Pasha in the Battle of Kulevchin (Battle of Kulevchin. How Dibich paved the way for the Russian army through the Balkans) radically changed the situation in the Danube theater in favor of the Russian army. Part of the Ottoman army fled through the Balkans, the other - home. The vizier himself was able to withdraw some of the troops to Shumla. The defeat of the popular in Turkey commander Reshid Pasha demoralized the Turkish garrisons in the Balkans. The powerful Turkish fortress on the Danube - Silistria, which was besieged by Russian troops from the beginning of May 1829, and was badly damaged by the action of artillery, without receiving help from the vizier, surrendered. The Turks lost about 15 thousand people - half were killed and wounded, the rest surrendered.
After the victory at Kulevi, the main forces of the Russian army moved to Shumla, the main Turkish fortress base. The Russian commander Ivan Ivanovich Dibich showed the enemy that he would besiege Shumla. This was the expected move. The grand vizier immediately reinforced the garrison of the fortress with fresh troops, withdrew troops from other sectors. This led to the fact that the defense of the Black Sea coast and mountain passages through the Balkans was significantly weakened. Russian intelligence quickly discovered this. In addition, Diebitsch knew that the Ottoman command believed that a breakthrough of a small Russian army through the rugged Balkan Mountains was impossible. To organize such a campaign, the Russians need to take Shumla and concentrate a large army.
Then Diebitsch made his famous maneuver, took a risk. The Trans-Balkan campaign could put a victory point in the war. The 6th, 7th and 2nd corps were sent to participate in the campaign, a total of 37 thousand people (30 thousand infantry and 7 thousand cavalry) with 147 guns. For such a strategic operation, this was not enough. In addition, the Turkish army remained in Shumla, which could attack the Russian rear. Continuing to mislead the enemy, Diebitsch ordered General Krasovsky with the 3rd corps, which was freed after the capture of Silistria, to go to Shumla.
The beginning of the Trans-Balkan campaign. The defeat of the Ottomans on the Kamchik River
The trek began in early July 1829. Diebitsch divided the troops into three columns: right, left and reserve (she followed the left), which followed two roads. In the right column (7th Corps) under the command of Ridiger there were 14 infantry battalions, 3 Cossack regiments, 3 companies of pioneers (sappers) with 14 pontoons and 44 guns. The left column (6th Corps), approximately equal in strength to the right, was commanded by General Roth. The reserve column (2nd corps) was commanded by Count Palen. It consisted of 19 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry squadrons, 2 Cossack regiments and 60 guns. Palen's troops could both strengthen the troops in front, and become a barrier if the Turks attacked from the rear, from the direction of Shumla.
Thus, Diebitsch was able to outwit the enemy. While Krasovsky was advancing towards Shumla, the detachments of Ridiger, Rota and Palen went to the Kamchik River (Kamchia) along the previously outlined routes. All movements of the Russian troops were carried out at night, and the Turks in Shumla did not immediately notice the changes in the Russian camp. Leaving parts were immediately replaced with new ones. This made it possible to win several transitions, while the Turkish commander-in-chief guessed the true plans of the enemy. Turkish intelligence was unable to reveal the essence of Russian movements in time.
From the Turkish army, Dibich covered himself with Krasovsky's corps. He was ordered not to leave the fortress further than Yanibazar. Krasovsky left Shumla on July 5 and stayed at Devno. Krasovsky took a comfortable position at Yanibazar. In Shumla, they found incomprehensible Russian maneuvers and were alarmed, because they were waiting for a siege there. The Grand Vizier sent a strong cavalry detachment from the fortress for reconnaissance. However, the Ottomans were stopped by the Russian cavalry under the command of Prince Madatov. The Turks mistook Krasovsky's forces for the vanguard of the Russian army and retreated. Reshid Pasha calmed down for a while, believing that the Russians had retreated from Shumla, since they were not ready to storm such a strong fortress.
Meanwhile, the columns of Ridiger and Roth, somewhat delayed by heavy rains that washed away the roads, reached the Kamchik River on 6 July. This river covered the approaches to the Balkan Mountains. The Turkish garrisons, which occupied the field fortifications at the crossings, were taken by surprise. The Ottomans believed that the Russians were busy laying siege to Shumla. Ridiger's troops immediately set up a pontoon crossing at Keprikoy and crossed the river. The Russian companies with a quick attack took the enemy field fortifications. The Turks, demoralized by the unexpected appearance of the Russians, almost did not resist and fled to Keprikoy, abandoning the banner and 4 guns.
Roth's column faced great difficulties. She went to the river near the village of Dervish-Dzhevan. Here the Turks had a strong fortification of a garrison of many thousands and 18 guns. The right bank, where the Ottomans settled, was high, which gave the Turks an advantage. To avoid unnecessary losses and loss of time, the Russian general decided to bypass the enemy. For a firefight with the Turks, a battery of 16 guns was left (due to the complexity of the terrain, 11 guns were installed), which was covered by the huntsmen. Having installed the guns, the Russian artillerymen opened fire. The artillery duel lasted all day. While the firefight was going on, Major General Velyaminov with the 16th Infantry Division and part of the 7th Infantry Division made a roundabout movement to the right towards the village of Dulgard. The pontoons were brought here over difficult terrain with great difficulty. Under fire from the enemy, who had settled down in the trenches on the other bank, Russian sappers erected crossings at night. On July 7, under the cover of a 12-gun artillery battery, Russian troops crossed the river. General Velyaminov personally led the Murom and Yakutsk infantry and 32nd Jaeger regiments. The Turks did not accept the battle and fled. Then Russian troops moved to Dervish-Dzhevan. There was no road, so we had to work our way through the forest.
The Turkish fugitives warned the garrison in Dervish-Jevan and the Ottomans lined up for battle. Russian troops came out of the forest in assault columns and launched a bayonet attack. The Turks could not stand it and fled to their fortified camp. At this time, Russian huntsmen and Cossacks ford crossed the river and rushed at the Turks in the camp. A bloody hand-to-hand fight ensued. Finding themselves under a double blow, the Turks were completely demoralized and fled. In doing so, they managed to save some of the guns. Thus, Russian troops defeated the troops of two Turkish generals Ali Pasha and Yusuf Pasha. Russian trophies were 6 banners, 6 guns, all camp supplies. Turkish losses amounted to about 1,000 people killed and 300 prisoners. Russian losses - 300 people.
Overcoming the Balkan Mountains
Having completed the successful crossing of the Kamchik River, the Russian troops continued their rapid movement. Soon they entered the Balkan Mountains, which were considered insurmountable by the troops. The ascent to the mountain passes was very difficult. In a 6-hour crossing, we covered only 10 versts. Russian soldiers, in fact, had to build a mountain road themselves: chop down interfering trees, drag their side, break stumps with pickaxes, knock down, remove or destroy stones, rip or fill in the ground. Only after that it was possible to transport guns, ammunition boxes, light carts. Already at the very beginning of the journey, we had to abandon the heavy carts. The soldiers now had to carry on themselves ammunition, food, various military equipment. And all this in hot weather. Not surprisingly, many threw crackers, fell from fatigue and caught up with their own at night. The scorching heat and the lack of good water caused a high incidence. The composition of our army was decreasing every day.
Russian troops crossed three parallel ridges of the Small Balkans in 5 days. The Turks did not expect this, so they could not offer worthy resistance. During the offensive, our troops captured 3 thousand prisoners and 50 guns. On July 12, the Russians captured the seaside city of Burgas. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet were already stationed in the Burgas Bay. This route was not chosen by chance. Diebitsch used the fact that the Russian fleet dominated the sea. The Turks had a weak fleet and did not dare to fight for sea routes. As a result, the Russian army had a seaside fortress in the rear of Varna and could count on the support of the fleet. Diebitsch was provided with supplies by sea. In addition, the Russians landed troops in February and captured Sizipol (a port south of Burgas), which became a supply base for Russian troops in Bulgaria.
Thus, the Russian army covered about 150 km in 11 days, overcoming difficult, unfamiliar mountains. The thrust of the Russians for the Balkans caught the Ottoman command by surprise. The Turks lost two of the most important frontiers on the way to the inner regions of the Ottoman Empire - the Danube and the Balkans. The main hostilities from the northeastern borders of the empire were moved beyond the Balkans. Earlier in Constantinople they felt calm behind the mighty shield of the Balkan Mountains. The unexpected appearance of the Russians had a strong psychological impact on the Turks. Further hostilities also developed rapidly and unfavorably for the Port. Without a fight, the fortresses of Messemvria and Achiolo surrendered to the corps of General Roth.
Further offensive of the Russian army. The defeat of the Turkish army at Aydos
The Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, pulling up troops from Ruschuk, sent two corps behind Dibich along different roads: 15 thousand. Khalil Pasha's detachment to Sliven and 12 thousand Ibrahim Pasha's detachment to Aydos (Aytos). Krasovsky, did not pay due attention to the control of the terrain south and south-west of Shumla, and could not interfere with the movement of enemy troops. The Turkish command hoped to strengthen the local garrisons and stop the march of the Russian army to Adrianople. Thus, Diebitsch was able to defeat the enemy troops in parts.
On July 13, 1829, a battle took place at Aidos, which was attacked by Ridiger's corps. The Russian general knew from defectors and prisoners that the enemy detachment had superiority in strength. However, he decided to attack until the garrison of Aidos received new reinforcements from Shumla. Hundreds of Cossacks, who followed in the vanguard of Ridiger's column, on the outskirts of the city were attacked by the numerous Turkish cavalry of Ibrahim Pasha. The Cossacks, not accepting the battle, retreated, luring the enemy to their four mounted guns. The Turkish cavalry, carried away by the pursuit, came under grape-shot fire from the Don gun crews. The Turks mixed up and tried to retreat. At this time, they were attacked by the 2nd brigade of the 4th Uhlan division, which was following the Don Cossacks. The Uhlans were followed by the rebuilt Cossack hundreds.
The Ottomans suffered heavy losses and rolled back under the protection of their artillery. Ibrahim Pasha restored order in his troops and several more times threw his cavalry into the attack, trying to use numerical superiority and crush the Russian cavalry before our infantry and main artillery approached. However, the Turks were unable to overturn and destroy our forward forces. When the main forces of Ridiger approached Aidos, the situation radically changed in our favor. The Russian artillery immediately turned around and opened fire. The terrain was convenient - a valley and a road leading to the city. The Turkish cavalry could not stand it and fled for the positions of their infantry, which was entrenched in the heights of the city. But here, too, the Turks were covered with artillery fire. Meanwhile, Russian troops began to outflank the enemy. Turkish troops fled through the city. The Russians, on the shoulders of the enemy, broke into Aidos and occupied the city. There was no battle. The Turks fled. The victory was complete. Turkish troops lost up to 1 thousand people only killed, more than 200 people were taken prisoner. 4 banners and 4 cannons became Russian trophies.
Moving further, the Russian commander-in-chief actively used light cavalry - hussars, lancers and Cossacks. Russian cavalry units appeared in the most unexpected places, instilling fear and panic on the enemy. Local Bulgarian guides rendered great help in this matter. So, a Cossack detachment under the command of Major General Zhirov, with a bold raid without a fight, captured the city of Karnabat, which was on the route of Diebitsch's army.
On July 18, the advance detachment of Major General Sheremetev (the 2nd brigade of the 4th Ulan division, one hundred Cossacks and 4 mounted guns) collided with the Khalil Pasha corps near the city of Yambol. A counter battle ensued. First, the Turks came under grape-shot fire, then they were attacked by the Russian cavalry. As a result, the troops of Khalil Pasha retreated, abandoning their marching camp. The Turks fled to the city of Yambol, but fled when the Russians approached. On July 21, the Russian vanguard occupied Yambol. Here valuable trophies were captured - food supplies for the Ottoman army. They were used to supply Diebitsch's army.
In the rear of the Russian army, the grand vizier Reshid Pasha once again decided on a sortie and left Shumla in large forces. However, the Turkish army was already demoralized by previous failures, so the numerical superiority of the vizier's forces over Krasovsky's corps did not help. In a short skirmish, the Russians defeated the enemy and pushed him to the mountains between the Matcha fortifications and Truli. Part of the Ottoman army fled back to Shumla. Thousands of Turks fled through the forests and mountains, deserted.
