“Have mercy, Alexander Sergeevich. Our tsarist rule: do not do business, do not run away from business”.
Pushkin A. S. Imaginary conversation with Alexander I
“The revolution is on the threshold of Russia, but I swear it will not penetrate it,” said Nicholas I after accession to the throne and defeat of the Decembrist uprising. He is not the first monarch in Russia who fought a "revolution", but the most iconic one.
The natural development of Russia within the framework of the feudal formation collided with external causes that brought new serious challenges. In such a difficult situation, a crisis of the feudal-serf system began in Russia, the management system ceased to correspond to external and internal challenges.
As we wrote in the article “Russia. Objective reasons for lagging behind”, the country embarked on the path of historical development, when feudalism was already forming in Western Europe, on territories with ancient Roman infrastructure, roads and laws.
She began her historical path in much more difficult climatic and geographical conditions, having a constant destabilizing factor in the form of a threat from the Great Steppe.
For these reasons, Russia lagged behind neighboring European countries, which posed a military threat to the country.
In such conditions, the first modernization of the country was carried out, which, in addition to military power, also provided the development of the country's productive forces, its economy and the development of new lands important for the country, both in distant America and in Novorossia (Manstein Kh-G.) …
Without the modernization of Peter the Great, such a Russia would not have even dreamed of. Against this background, an attempt in near-historical circles, using, among other things, scientific works (P. N. Milyukov), to refute these obvious conclusions, supported even by foreign scientific literature, is surprising.
Irrationality and inconsistency in Peter's actions, controversial reforms and the growth of new social ulcers, riots and hunger, partial counter-reforms after the death of the shipbuilder tsar do not cancel the achievements of Peter the Great's modernization (S. A. Nefedov).
Critics do not take into account the consequences of its absence (modernization) in an aggressive external environment, which the brilliant Russian tsar certainly felt and understood, if you like, “irrationally”.
The acceleration, which N. Ya. Eidelman wrote about, caused by the modernization of Peter, weakened by the beginning of the 19th century, while the Great Bourgeois Revolution in France and the Industrial Revolution in England, which created an industrial society based on machine production, took place.
Social revolutions in European countries have significantly accelerated the industrial revolution, ensuring the transition to an industrial society in countries of potential competitors of Russia, while in Russia:
“… during the first thirty years of the 19th century. the distribution of machinery was sporadic, unstable and could not shake small production and large manufactory. Only from the mid-30s. the simultaneous and continuous introduction of machines began to be observed in various branches of industry, in some - faster, in others - slower and less efficient."
(Druzhinin N. M.)
And just in this period, when the question of new modernization arose, the need for social changes and the introduction of new technologies was ignored.
It is possible to compare Peter I and his descendant Nicholas I only in one thing: both had Menshikov, one talented "nestling" of a turbulent era, the other, a courtier evading business, who did not hide his ignorance.
Both tsars were extremely active, as contemporaries noted, but one spent his reign time on modernizing Russia, and the other wasted it on bureaucratic mirages and battles with windmills.
For both kings, the "regularity" of the army, for Peter also the fleet, was the most important component and model for civil administration, the only difference was that for the beginning of the eighteenth century. it was a revolutionary method of management, but for the first half of the nineteenth century it was an anachronism. The father-commander of Emperor Nicholas, Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich wrote:
“Regularity in the army is necessary, but we can say about it what they say about others who break their foreheads, praying to God … It is good only in moderation, and the degree of this measure is knowledge of war [emphasis - VE], otherwise acrobatism comes out of regularity."
If we compare the situation after the completed and failed military modernization, then in the first case, victory after victory, and in the second - defeats and losses, which ended in the defeat of Russia in the First World War.
Revolution is on the doorstep …
First half of the 19th century - this is the time of the rise of national consciousness among many European peoples. These trends reached Russia as well, having received a formulation in a triune formula: autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality.
Everything would be fine, but on Russian soil, the problem was that the country was not just socially divided. The main class, which paid taxes and taxes in blood, was in a slavery state (how many shades of slavery are not the subject of this article) and could not in any way personify nationality in the full sense of the word. As Prince Drutskoy-Sokolinsky wrote about serfdom in a note addressed to the emperor: about slavery in Russia they invented "European twists … due to envy of the power and prosperity of Russia."
It was some kind of a mockery of common sense and humanism: to talk about nationality and define the overwhelming majority of the country's peasant population (private and state peasants) as "property".
Another Swiss teacher of Nicholas I's elder brother, Laharpe, wrote:
"Without liberation, Russia may be exposed to such a risk as under Stenka Razin and Pugachev, and I think about this unreasonable reluctance of the (Russian) nobility, which does not want to understand that it lives on the edge of a volcano … and cannot help but feel the liveliest uneasiness."
Which, however, was not a revelation. Nicholas I, who was attentive to the history of Pugachev, considered it useful to publish Pushkin's History, personally reviewed by him, in order to "scare" the presumptuous nobles.
The crisis of the feudal system on the eve of the fall of serfdom was precisely caused by the increasing non-economic exploitation of the peasants by the nobles.
The need for bread as an export raw material required an increase in production volumes, which under conditions of serfdom led exclusively to an increase in pressure on the farmer, as V. O. Klyuchevsky wrote about:
“… in the 19th century. the landlords are strenuously transferring the peasants from quitrent to corvee; corvee gave the landowner a wider income in general in comparison with the quitrent; the landowners tried to take from serf labor everything that could be taken from it. This significantly worsened the position of the serfs in the last decade before the liberation."
The most important sign of the crisis was the complete inability of the nobles to manage their "private property": sell the fatherland - send money to Paris!
The reform of 1861 was made easier for the state by the fact that a huge number of estates were "returned" to the state through pledges and even re-pledges.
Retreat
In St. Petersburg, opposite the Mariinsky Palace, there is a magnificent monument to the emperor - a masterpiece by O. Montferrand and sculptor P. Klodt. It depicts moments from the life of the king. In one bas-relief, Nikolai Pavlovich alone calms the crowd on Sennaya Square during a cholera riot. Yes, personally a brave, born orator, personal censor and admirer of Pushkin, like all tsars, a caring family man, a humorist and a good singer, a ruler, thanks to whom we have just such a city of St. Petersburg that we admire - many masterpieces were built under him. This is on the one hand.
On the other hand, Nicholas is an emperor with an education and outlook at the level of junior officers, completely unprepared for the role that he was forced to play. The enemy of education, even in the military field, and the author of the biting aphorism: "I do not need clever people, but loyal subjects." How not to recall here Peter, who insisted: I am learning and I demand teachers for myself.
Of course, Nicholas was not prepared for the throne, they were trained to be corporal, at best, to the commander of the guards corps, the refusal of the throne of the discredited Constantine played a bad joke with Russia, putting forward instead of the organizer, "outside observer", and not a participant in the process, the ruler, who was waiting all the time, not acting (which is worth his work on the "abolition" of serfdom).
Here lies the key difference between the organizer and creator Peter the Great, who knew and understood what was needed, as it should, who himself knew and determined what was needed for modernization, and the autocrat, who was not at all interested in progress, who received information through verbose reports, endless work of commissions, considering innovation is like a bored tourist, even in the beloved military realm.
V. O. Klyuchevsky wrote:
“Alexander I treated Russia as a cowardly and cunning diplomat alien to her. Nicholas I - as also a stranger and also frightened, but a more resolute detective from fright”.
Control
After the action or, rather, inaction of Alexander I, his brother, by chance, got a country that was shaken from the point of view of government. The social crisis after the victory in the war with Napoleon was gaining momentum, and something had to be done.
Nicholas, who came to the throne during the crisis, of course, was aware of the problem. But the threat of re-election by means of the bayonets of the nobility stopped him, even when there was no such threat at all: wasn’t that “chosen” his brother by killing his father? How else to view the uprising on the Senate Square on December 14, 1825?
That is why all eight committees on the "peasant question" (emancipation of the peasants) were secret. From whom were they hiding, from the peasants? From the nobles.
The tsar instructed A. D. Borovkov to compile a "Collection of Testimonies" of the Decembrists concerning the shortcomings of state administration, with the aim of correcting them.
And in such conditions, the tsar, thinking about transferring the peasants to temporarily obligated, gradually abandoned this idea, and perhaps, simply tired of the ineffective work of organizing internal life, switched to an effective and, as it seemed, brilliant, foreign policy. The "era of reforms", which someone dreamed at the beginning of the reign, in connection, probably, with the creation of the III branch (political police), quickly disappeared into oblivion. And Nikolai's reforms were absolutely formal.
The noble dictatorship, in the broadest sense of the word, was unable to effectively develop the country, but tenaciously kept the management of the country and the economy in its hands, and Nicholas I, who was not ready as a person for the mission of developing the country in new historical conditions, spent all his energy and enormous efforts to strengthen the outdated "feudal" system, its conservation during this period.
This happened in the context of the industrial revolution, when external threats to the country's development required a completely different approach.
For example, a more progressive management system, excluding the Table of Ranks, was rejected due to the possibility of further bourgeoisization of officials. Was not adopted "Law on the state", allowing trade not only merchants, but all classes.
The tsar chose the path of strengthening the state apparatus of suppression. He was the first to build, as it was recently customary to say, a "vertical" of officials, which in fact did not work at all.
For example, as in the case of the reform and the creation of the 1st department, which was headed by Taneev, and A. A. Kovankov was appointed director of the department, a man who was
"… limited, poorly enlightened and never served anywhere, and Taneyev, in addition to all the same qualities, is also an extremely ill-intentioned, affectionate and absurd pedant who will press and press wherever possible …"
(M. A. Korf.)
The tsar had to put up with the arbitrariness of the local nobility, who violated the "correct laws" everywhere and en masse, as was the case with the Inventory Reform of 1848, which was supposed to limit the arbitrariness of the landowners in relation to their serfs.
The entire structure of the provincial administration, forever imprinted by N. V. Gogol and M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin, can be characterized (with the exception of a few governors) as an absolutely unsystematic machine, which is often the personal fiefdom of tyrant governors (such as V. Ya. Rupert, D. G. Bibikov, I. Pestel, G. M. Bartolomei). A structure that was formally harmonious, but in fact it was a system that consisted of governors who either did not work at all, or stayed on their estates. People are often incompetent, manipulating statistics so as not to offend the emperor with the "truth". It is worth adding here the general embezzlement and bribery. At the same time, the odious governors were not only not punished, but received new seats.
The leaders of ministries and departments were also selected to match the system, many exclusively for drill or, as in the case of P. A. Kleinmichel, a manager who spent inadequate financial and human resources where they could not have been spent to achieve dubious goals, while simultaneously being a embezzler. And this is in a country that has never suffered from excesses.
Few really sensible leaders within the established framework of the system of inadequate waste of people's resources, senseless formalism, general theft, and in the last years of the emperor's life and endless servility, could not do anything.
It is worth adding to the assessment of the country's governing system that under Nicholas, it turned into a personal feeding trough for the police, officials of all levels, who arranged their affairs and engaged in the civil service insofar as.
Embezzlement and bribery permeated the entire state system, the words of the Decembrist A. A. Bestuzhev, addressed to Nicholas I, who came to the throne, fully characterize the period of his reign:
"Whoever could rob, who did not dare, stole."
Researcher P. A. Zayonchkovsky wrote:
“It should be noted that over 50 years - from 1796 to 1847 - the number of officials increased 4 times, and over 60 years - from 1796 to 1857 - almost 6 times. It is important to note that the population has approximately doubled over this period. So, in 1796 in the Russian Empire there were 36 million people, in 1851 - 69 million. Thus, the state apparatus in the first half of the XIX century. grew about 3 times faster than the population."
Of course, the complication of processes in society requires an increase in control and management of them, but with the available information about the extremely low efficiency of this control machine, the expediency of increasing it remains questionable.
In conditions of unwillingness or inability to solve the key issue of Russian life, or, more precisely, to solve this issue without prejudice to the nobles, it was decided to expand control over the population through police and administrative measures. Postponing the decision until later, simultaneously increasing the pressure on external forces that are “destructive” from the point of view of the emperor and driving a number of other problems inside, without solving them (as in the case of the “suitcase without a handle” - Poland, or the Caucasian war).
Foreign policy
Of course, not all actions in the past can be viewed through the prism of modern knowledge, therefore, it seems incorrect to accuse the enemies of Russia of helping the enemies of Russia, but the salvation of hostile states, based on idealistic ideas, and not real politics, created problems for the country.
In 1833, when the power in Istanbul because of the uprising of the governor of Egypt, Muhammad-Ali, hung in the balance and the "eastern question" could be resolved in favor of Russia, the tsar provided military assistance to the Port by signing the Unkar-Iskelesi treaty with it.
During the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-1849. Russia supported the Vienna monarchy. And, as Nikolai self-critically told the Adjutant General Count Rzhevussky:
“I'll tell you that the most stupid Polish king was Jan Sobieski, because he freed Vienna from the Turks. And the most stupid of the Russian sovereigns, added His Majesty, “I am, because I helped the Austrians to suppress the Hungarian revolt.”
And brilliant Russian diplomats, at the same time experienced courtiers, taking into account the "opinion" of the tsar that England and France of Napoleon I's nephew were irreconcilable enemies, made reports to him in the same spirit, thereby hiding the real facts of the formation of an alliance of these two countries against Russia.
As E. V. wrote Tarle:
“Nikolai was even more ignorant in everything that concerned the Western European states, their structure, their political life. His ignorance has harmed him many times."
Army
The emperor devoted all his time to the burning state affairs of changing the uniforms of the guards and ordinary regiments: epaulettes and ribbons, buttons and mentics were changed. For the sake of justice, let's say that the tsar, together with the adjutant general artist L. I. Keelem invented the world famous helmet with a pointed top - the “pickelhaube”, the style of which was “kidnapped” by the Germans.
Nikolai's reluctance to really understand management issues, to see the problem as a whole, and not its segments, conservatism and the complete absence of real experience in management in the war (not Nikolai's fault, who was not allowed on foreign campaigns) - all this was reflected in the tsar's favorite brainchild - the army.
Or rather, not armies, but "playing with soldiers", as D. A. Milyutin.
Personnel policy and unwritten rules of servility, an atmosphere of flattery forced even very good Russian commanders to keep silent about problems, not to bring them to the emperor, as in the case of Paskevich's campaigns in Hungary or during the introduction of troops into the Danube principalities in 1853.
In the "Historical Review of the Military Land Administration from 1825 to 1850", created in the Ministry of War, it was reported that over 25 years in the army, 1,062,839 "lower ranks" died of diseases. During the same time, according to the report, in the wars (the Russian-Iranian war of 1826-1828, the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the Caucasian wars, the suppression of the uprising in Poland in 1831, the campaign in Hungary in 1849).) killed 30 233 people. In 1826, there were 729 655 "lower ranks" in the army, 874 752 recruits were recruited from 1826 to 1850. A total of 2,604,407 soldiers served during this period.
Moreover, the old methods of management in the army, the concentration of attention, again and again, as in civilian management, on the form and form, and not on the content: on the appearance of soldiers, on parades and drills, on drill techniques, all this in conditions an increase in the rate of fire of weapons had an extremely negative effect on the results in a new war.
Outdated tactics ensured victory over Polish and Hungarian irregulars, over Turks, Persians and highlanders, but in a clash with the French and British, they could not do anything, despite the frequent fatal tactical mistakes of the allies in the Crimea.
Here is what the outstanding military reformer D. A. Milyutin:
“In most of the state measures taken during the reign of Emperor Nicholas, the police point of view prevailed, that is, concern for the maintenance of order and discipline. From this stemmed both the suppression of the individual and the extreme restraint of freedom in all manifestations of life, in science, art, speech, and the press. Even in the military business, which the emperor was engaged in with such passionate enthusiasm, the same concern for order and discipline prevailed, they were not chasing after the essential improvement of the army, not for adapting it to a military purpose, but for only external harmony, for a brilliant view at parades. meticulous observance of countless petty formalities that blunt the human mind and kill the true military spirit."
Sevastopol, subjected to terrible artillery fire, was not completely blocked and had full communication with the headquarters in Simferopol. And the sluggish attempts to unblock it from the outside were soon completely abandoned.
The tragedy was that even taking into account several theaters of operations, the Russian army could not oppose anything serious to the expeditionary corps of the European allies, who had full initiative!
The story of L. N. Tolstoy's "After the Ball" vividly illustrates the formula about "autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality." No wonder Nikolai received the nickname Palkin:
German bullets
Turkish bullets, French bullets
Russian sticks!
Industrial revolution on the doorstep
The same situation was observed in general in the management of the country.
P. A. Valuev wrote:
“… Shine from above, rot from below; there is no room for truth in the creations of our official verbiage."
The bureaucracy, formalism, as they said then, formularism, disregard for the common man reaches its limit during this period: paraphrasing VG Belinsky, the entire humanistic tradition of Great Russian literature emerged from Gogol's "Overcoat" - the greatcoat of the times of Nicholas I.
The system of management of society itself did not give a chance for the development of the country, it hindered its productive forces under the conditions of the industrial revolution in a neighboring, unfriendly civilization.
It is to the reign of Nicholas, and not to some deep-seated historical "birth trauma", that we owe the entire situation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the "rapid" development of Russia always ended in military defeat: "Saddle the horses of the Lord," the emperor exclaimed, addressing to the officers at the ball - there is a revolution in Paris."
How not to recall the letter of the Decembrist A. A. Bestuzhev, written to the new emperor in 1825:
“The dismissal of distillation and the improvement of the roads between poor and grain-rich places by state funds, the encouragement of agriculture and, in general, the protection of industry would have led to the satisfaction of the peasants. The provision and permanence of rights would attract many productive foreigners to Russia. Factories would multiply with the increasing demand for artificial works, and competition would encourage their improvement, which rises on a par with the well-being of the people, for the needs for the goods of the satisfaction of life and luxury are incessant. The capital, stagnant in England, assured of an undoubted profit, for many years to come, would have poured into Russia, for in this new reworked world they could be more profitably used than in the East Indies or America. Elimination or at least limitation of the prohibitive system and the arrangement of communication routes not where it is easier (as it was before), but where it is necessary, as well as the establishment of a state merchant fleet, so as not to pay expensive freight to foreigners for their products and to turn the transit trade in Russian hands, would allow trade to bloom, this, so to speak, the muscle of state power."
It so happened that it was during the reign of Nicholas I that became the period when the path of development of Russia could be changed, the industrial revolution was on the threshold of the country, but it was not allowed into Russia!
Modernization could seriously contribute to changes in the country's development, removed many crises and numerous casualties that occurred precisely because it was not carried out on time, during a period of relative peace and external security for Russia
Remember: "The revolution is on Russia's doorstep, but I swear it will not penetrate it."
