The creation of the S-75 anti-aircraft guided missile system began on the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2838/1201 of November 20, 1953 "On the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft guided missile system to combat enemy aircraft." During this period, the Soviet Union was already testing the S-25 guided stationary anti-aircraft missile system, designed for air defense (air defense) of large administrative and industrial centers of the country. However, given the high cost of such stationary systems, it was not possible to provide reliable anti-aircraft cover for all important objects on the territory of the country, as well as areas of concentration of troops. The Soviet military leadership saw a way out in the creation of a mobile anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), albeit inferior in its capabilities to a stationary system, but allowing in a short time to regroup and concentrate air defense forces and means in threatened directions.
The new complex was intended to intercept tactical and strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying at subsonic or moderate supersonic speeds at medium and high altitudes.
The missile, with a radio command guidance system, designated B-750 (product 1D), was created on the basis of a normal aerodynamic design. It had two stages - a starting one with a solid fuel engine and a sustainer one with a liquid one, which ensured a high initial speed from an inclined start.
Rocket scheme 1D: 1. Transmitting antenna RV; 2. Radio fuse (RV); 3. Warhead; 4. Receiving antenna RV; 5. Oxidizer tank; 6. Fuel tank; 7. Air bottle; 8. Block of an autopilot; 9. Radio control unit; 10. Ampoule battery; 11. Current converter; 12. Steering drive; 13. Tank "I"; 14. Main engine; 15. Transitional compartment; 16. Starting engine.
Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1382/638 of December 11, 1957. The first version of the SA-75 "Dvina" air defense system, operating in the 10-cm range, was put into service. Simultaneously with the organization of the serial production of the SA-75, the KB-1 design team continued to work on the creation of a complex operating in the 6 cm range. In May 1957, a prototype S-75 operating in the 6 cm range was sent to the Kapustin Yar test site for testing. In the new complex, the option of placing the elements of the SNR in three cabins, located in two-axle car trailers, was implemented, in contrast to the SA-75, where the equipment was located in five KUNGs of ZIS-151 or ZIL-157 vehicles.
In the late 50s, the complex began to enter the troops. At that time, cases of violation of Soviet borders by US and NATO aircraft were massive. Even "neutral" Swedes did not hesitate to fly into Soviet airspace in the Kola Peninsula region.
But oddly enough, the first case of successful combat use occurred outside the USSR.
In the 50s, reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and Kuomintang Taiwan flew over the territory of the PRC with impunity for a long time.
At the personal request of Mao Zedong, two sets of SA-75M "Dvina" air defense systems were handed over to the Chinese and training of calculations was organized.
On October 7, 1959, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft of the Taiwanese Air Force was shot down by the C-75 complex near Beijing, at an altitude of 20,600 m, the pilot of the aircraft was killed. The tape recording of the pilot's negotiations with Taiwan was cut off in mid-sentence and, judging by it, he did not see any danger.
It was the first aircraft in the world to be destroyed by a missile defense system. The aircraft was of American production - RB-57D, a twin-engine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, which is a copy of the reconnaissance version of the British Canberra.
To hide the presence in China of the latest, at that time, anti-aircraft missile technology, the Chinese and Soviet leaders agreed not to give an open message about the downed plane in the press. However, when Taiwanese media reported that the RB-57D had crashed, crashed and sank in the East China Sea during a training flight, Xinhua reported in response: “BEIJING, October 9. October 7 in the first half one day a Chiang Kai-shek reconnaissance aircraft of American production, with provocative purposes, entered the airspace over the regions of North China and was shot down by the air force of the People's Liberation Army of China. How and with what weapon - for reasons of secrecy - not a word.
Subsequently, several more aircraft were shot down over the PRC, including 3 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2 Lockheed. Several pilots were captured. Only after this did reconnaissance flights over the territory of mainland China cease.
At that time, the Americans from the territory of Western Europe were carrying out a massive launch of reconnaissance high-altitude balloons. These were very difficult targets for the Soviet air defense. When trying to shoot them down, as a result of the collision, several Soviet fighters were killed.
New air defense systems began to be used to combat them, although of course the cost of the rocket was many times higher than the cost of the reconnaissance probe.
On November 16, 1959, the first case was recorded, near Stalingrad, the S-75 air defense system was destroyed by an American reconnaissance balloon flying at an altitude of 28,000 m.
Since the summer of 1956, Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft began flying over the USSR on a regular basis. They have repeatedly flown with impunity over large administrative and industrial centers, spaceports and rocket ranges.
Flying at an altitude of over 20 km, the U-2 was invulnerable to Soviet air defense fighters.
This situation made our leadership very nervous. To all Soviet diplomatic notes, the Americans declared their innocence.
Finally, on May 1, 1960 over Sverdlovsk, an anti-aircraft missile was shot down by the previously unattainable American high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2, the pilot Gary Powers was captured.
The destruction of the high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, considered invulnerable, was a real shock for the Americans. After that, there were no more reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR.
At that time, there was still no experience in firing at real enemy aircraft, so the cloud of U-2 wreckage falling to the ground was initially taken by the missilemen for passive interference supplied by the aircraft, and the knocked-out U-2 was re-fired with a salvo of three missiles. However, there was nothing wrong with that. More sadly, the fact that the intruder was destroyed for almost half an hour was never recorded, and at that time there were several Soviet planes in the air, trying in vain to intercept the intruder. As a result, half an hour after the defeat of the U-2 due to confusion at the level of the local command, a pair of MiG-19s was fired upon by another three-missile salvo, which had been raised to intercept the intruder almost an hour before. One of the pilots, Ayvazyan, promptly dived under the lower border of the affected area, and the other pilot, Safronov, died along with the plane.
Nevertheless, despite this tragic episode, the anti-aircraft missile forces for the first time confirmed their high efficiency. The victory of the missilemen looked especially impressive against the background of repeated unsuccessful attempts by fighter aircraft to intercept the U-2.
Another politically significant use of the SA-75 was the destruction of U-2 over Cuba on October 27, 1962. In this case, pilot Rudolph Anderson died, and this "first blood" added fuel to the fire of the "Cuban missile crisis". At that time on the "island of freedom" were two Soviet divisions with anti-aircraft missile systems, which were armed with a total of 144 launchers and twice as many missiles. However, in all these cases, as in the use of anti-aircraft missiles at U-2 over China in 1962, low-speed and non-maneuverable aircraft were fired upon, although flying at very high altitudes. In general, the conditions for combat firing differed little from the range, and therefore the ability of the SA-75 to hit tactical aircraft was rated by the Americans as low.
A completely different situation developed in Vietnam during the hostilities in 1965-1973. After the first "rehearsal" that took place during the "Tonkin Crisis" in August 1964, the United States from the beginning of 1965 began systematic bombing of the DRV (North Vietnam). Soon the DRV was visited by a Soviet delegation headed by A. N. Kosygin. The visit resulted in the start of large-scale deliveries of weapons to the DRV, including the SA-75 air defense system. By the summer of 1965, two SA-75 anti-aircraft missile regiments, manned by Soviet military specialists, were deployed in Vietnam. The Americans, who had recorded the preparation of positions for new weapons as early as April 5, 1965, rightly assumed the presence of "Russians" on them and, fearing international complications, did not bomb them. They did not show heightened concern even after July 23, 1965, an RB-66C electronic reconnaissance aircraft recorded the first activation of the CHR-75 missile guidance station.
The situation changed radically the very next day, when, on July 24, three missiles fired by a Soviet crew under the command of Major F. Ilinykh fired at a group of four F-4Cs flying at an altitude of about 7 km. One of the missiles hit the Phantom, which was piloted by Captains R. Fobair and R. Keirn, and fragments of two other missiles damaged three other Phantoms. The pilots of the downed Phantom ejected and were captured, from which only R. Keirn was released on February 12, 1973, the fate of the co-pilot remained unknown.
So, it is extremely bad for the Americans, the events unfolded the first time after the start of the use of the air defense system. And this despite the fact that the Americans began to prepare for a meeting with Soviet anti-aircraft missiles immediately after the destruction of Powers' plane. In 1964, in the California desert, they conducted a special exercise "Dessert Strike", during which they evaluated the capabilities of aviation in the area of operation of air defense missile systems. And immediately after receiving information about the first downed Phantom missiles, the Hopkins Institute was involved in the study of possible anti-air defense systems.
Following the first recommendations received on countering air defense systems, the Americans significantly increased their reconnaissance activities, assessing in detail the capabilities of each detected air defense system, taking into account the surrounding terrain and, using non-projectile areas at the joints and at low altitudes, plotted their flight routes. According to the testimony of Soviet specialists, the quality of reconnaissance was very high, and it was carried out with such thoroughness that any movement of missilemen in the shortest possible time became known to the Americans.
Other recommendations for countering air defense missile systems were reduced to the implementation of tactical and technical techniques - the implementation of an approach to bombing targets at low altitude, maneuvering in the area of the air defense missile system, setting up radio interference cover from EB-66 aircraft. The main option for avoiding missiles during 1965-1966. became an intense reversal. A few seconds before the arrival of the rocket, the pilot put the plane into a dive under the rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With a successful execution of this maneuver, the limited speed of the missile guidance and control system did not allow compensating for the newly arisen miss, and it flew by. In case of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the missile warhead, as a rule, hit the cockpit.
During the first month of the SA-75's combat use, according to Soviet estimates, 14 American aircraft were shot down, while only 18 missiles were used up. In turn, according to American data, only three aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles during the same period - in addition to the previously mentioned F-4C (Soviet specialists counted the destruction of three Phantoms in that battle at once) on the night of August 11, one A- 4E (according to Soviet data - four at once) and on August 24 another F-4B. Such a mismatch in losses and victories, however, characteristic of any war, over the next seven and a half years of hostilities became an indispensable companion of the confrontation between Vietnam's air defense and American aviation.
Having suffered the first tangible losses, in February 1966, the Americans were forced to practically end the air war over North Vietnam for two months, using this break to equip aircraft with electronic warfare equipment and master new tactics. At the same time, unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily the BQM-34, equipped with electronic reconnaissance equipment, were used to collect the necessary information. The greatest success at that time, according to American data, was with the Ryan 147E “Firebee” drone, which on February 13, 1966 was unsuccessfully fired upon by rockets. As a result, information was recorded on the operation of missile guidance systems, remote detonation of the warhead and the characteristics of the missile warhead.
In March 1966, the first Shrike missiles appeared on American aircraft, designed to attack air defense systems radars, and in the summer, Vietnam received specialized EF-105F "Wild Weasel" aircraft (later designated F-105G).
According to American data, only about 200 vehicles were lost from the SAM fire. One of the pilots shot down by an anti-aircraft missile was future presidential candidate John McCain, which apparently made an indelible impression on him, only this can explain his pathological hatred of the Russians.
It can be assumed that, in addition to the in principle possible deliberate misinformation, the reason for the Americans' underreporting of the data on losses from the air defense missile systems may be their lack of objective data on the specific reasons for the death of their aircraft - the pilot could not always inform the command that he was fired upon by the air defense missile system. On the other hand, the history of all wars testifies to the inevitable and often unintentional overestimation of the number of their victories by the combatants. Yes, and a comparison of the reports of the missilemen, who judged the effectiveness of the firing by the marks on the screens, with the more primitive method of accounting for the downed American aircraft by the Vietnamese by the serial numbers on the wreckage, in a number of cases indicated an overestimation of the number of aircraft destroyed by missiles by 3 times.
The average missile consumption per shot down aircraft accounted for 2-3 missiles at the initial stage of use and 7-10 missiles at the time of the end of hostilities. This is due to the development of countermeasures by the enemy and the use of Shrike anti-radar missiles. In addition, it should be remembered that Dvina fought in extremely difficult conditions. It was not supported by air defense systems of other classes, the air defense missile systems fought in combat conditions with the enemy constantly adapting to the changing situation, free to change the tactics of the raid. There was no continuous anti-aircraft missile fire zone in Vietnam at that time. The Americans were very flexible in responding to the use of new weapons, organizing countermeasures in the form of introducing effective jamming stations, changing tactics and organizing "retaliation strikes."
The Americans entered the new stage of the air war with updated materiel and acted in accordance with carefully thought out tactics. The flights, as a rule, were carried out outside the zones of destruction of the air defense missile system, outlined on the basis of the exact determination of the closing angles, which are very significant in the mountainous terrain of Vietnam. Almost all American planes were equipped with warning equipment for the irradiation of missile guidance stations of the S-75 complexes, according to information from which the pilots practiced anti-missile maneuvers.
Most of the aircraft were also equipped with active jamming stations for self-cover, passive jamming means. Group cover was carried out by EV-66A active jammers from a distance of 60 to 120 km. As a result, on the screens, flare from passive interference was constantly observed - from a narrow strip to a bright uniform glow of the entire screen. With the use of powerful active self-cover interference, fighter-bombers were practically unable to shoot down. Theoretically, in this case, it was necessary to take the direction finding of the active interference and direct the rocket using the "three-point" method, but practically it was not possible to determine the center of the interference due to the powerful illumination of the screen.
The work of the air defense missile system became even more complicated with the beginning of the use of the Shrike anti-radar missiles. F-4E "Wild Weasel" aircraft, saturated with radio reconnaissance and radio countermeasures, were used as their carriers.
The Shrike missile itself in the vast majority of cases was not observed on the SNR screens due to its small effective scattering surface. Its launch was recorded by changing the shape of the mark from the carrier to the indicator "5 km". As a rule, in this calculation of the air defense system, it was necessary to reset the target, turn the antenna, after which the power was switched to the equivalent. With a favorable temporal situation, these operations could be carried out not immediately at the launch of the Shrike missile, but after the destruction of the aircraft being fired upon by the air defense missile system.
In addition to electronic warfare measures, the Americans also widely used fire resistance. The positions of the air defense missile system were subjected to 685 air strikes. Slightly less than half of them were produced by Shrike rockets, the rest by bombs. In 1966, 61 missiles were damaged by shrapnel, in 1967 - 90 missiles, of which no more than half were recovered. In total, during the war years, the air defense systems were disabled 241 times. On average, each division was incapacitated approximately once a year. The positions were changed on average 10-12 times a year, and during the period of the most intense hostilities - after 2-4 days. As a result of the actions of American aviation, out of 95 anti-aircraft missile systems supplied by the Soviet Union by 1973, 39 combat air defense systems and four in training centers remained in service.
In the face of confrontation with American aviation, the air defense missile systems used new tactics. The practice of "ambushes" and "nomadic" divisions was organized. In order to increase maneuverability and mobility, the number of technical equipment was reduced to one guidance station SNR-75 and 1-2 launchers. The divisions hid in the jungle without turning on the technical means, waiting for the moment to make an effective launch. Regardless of the results of the shooting, an emergency relocation of the complex was organized within 30-40 minutes. The method of "false" launch was practiced, with the inclusion of the SNR-75 guidance channel without launching missiles. That often forced American aircraft to get rid of the combat load in order to perform an anti-missile maneuver, exposing themselves to anti-aircraft artillery fire. The "false launch" brought the greatest benefit at the moment of the direct attack of the object - the pilots immediately became not up to the ground problem.
A number of other tactical innovations were also implemented in Vietnam. Since November 1967, the method of target tracking without CHP radiation began to be used - according to the mark from the active self-cover interference. In the future, the calculations of the air defense missile system switched to using for visual tracking of the target specially installed on the "P" cabins and coupled with the control units of the field commander's periscopes.
Despite the fact that, even according to Soviet experts, the air defense system shot down less than a third of the destroyed American aircraft, the most important result of their use was the need for a radical change in the tactics of aviation combat operations, its forced transition to flights at low altitudes, where it suffered heavy losses from fire artillery,small arms and low-altitude fighter attacks, as a result of which the effectiveness of the use of aviation was significantly reduced.
Created to combat low-maneuverable bombers and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the complex proved to be quite effective against tactical aircraft. This was facilitated by the continuous improvement of the complex and the emergence of new longer-range and high-speed missiles to it.
In addition to Vietnam, air defense systems of the C-75 type were also massively used in conflicts in the Middle East. The first experience of using them in the "Six Day War" can hardly be attributed to successful ones. According to Western data, the Egyptians, with 18 complexes, were able to launch only 22 missiles, shooting down two Mirage-IIICJ fighters.
According to Soviet data, the Egyptians had 25 S-75 divisions, and the number of aircraft shot down by missiles was 9. However, the most unpleasant event of that war was the capture by the Israelis on the Sinai Peninsula of some S-75 components, including missiles.
More successfully anti-aircraft missiles were used in the so-called "war of attrition". On July 20, 1969, the Egyptians shot down an Israeli Piper Cub and before the start of the 1973 war brought the number of S-75 victories to 10. One of them was highly rated by the Egyptians when the S-75 on September 17, 1971 "took off" at a distance of 30 km radio reconnaissance aircraft S-97.
Judging by foreign data, during the "October War" of 1973, another 14 Israeli aircraft were shot down by the Egyptians and Syrians using the S-75 air defense system.
Satellite image of Google Earth: positions of the Egyptian air defense system S-75
Israeli pilots had a low opinion of the combat capabilities of the S-75. But the use of this air defense system forced to abandon flights at altitude and switch to low-altitude flights. This made it difficult to carry out the combat mission and led to large losses from low-altitude air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery. In addition, combat aircraft were forced to carry containers with jamming stations, which reduced the combat load and reduced flight data.
To be fair, it is worth noting that the use of the S-75 in Vietnam was more successful. According to the recollections of our specialists, both the general low motivation of the Arabs to fight, sloppiness, stereotyped actions and outright betrayal, as well as more difficult conditions of hostilities, affected. In the desert, it was many times more difficult to mask positions. When the missiles were launched, the complex gave itself out as a cloud of dust visible from afar.
In addition to the most large-scale wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, complexes of the C-75 type were used in many other conflicts, starting with the Indo-Pakistani clash in 1965, when the Indian An-12 became their first victim in the Third World, mistakenly accepted for the Pakistani S-130.
The S-75 air defense system was used by the opposing sides in 1979 during the Vietnam-Chinese conflict, the Chinese counterparts of the seventy-five - HQ-2, two Vietnamese MiG-21s were shot down.
The complex was used extensively during the Iran-Iraq war. Both sides used it to cover cities, troop concentration areas and oil production sites. Iran used Chinese HQ-2 air defense systems.
Satellite image of Google Efrth: Iranian SAM HQ-2
In the 80s, the Syrians once again used it against Israeli air raids.
Libyan missiles of the S-75 complexes were launched at American aircraft while repelling air strikes during Operation Eldorado Canyon in April 1986.
Of the most recent examples of the use of complexes of the C-75 type, foreign sources indicate the destruction of the Russian Su-27 over Georgia during the Abkhaz conflict on March 19, 1993.
During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was armed with 38 S-75 air defense missile systems. During the hostilities, they shot down and damaged several aircraft of the coalition forces, including the AC-130 gunship. However, later on, most of the Iraqi S-75 air defense systems were suppressed or destroyed.
During the 2003 US invasion. the complexes were not used for their intended purpose. At the same time, several missile launches were recorded, the Iraqis tried to use them to fire at ground targets.
During the West's aggression against Libya, not a single C-75 launch was recorded.
Satellite image of Google Efrth: Libyan C-75 air defense system destroyed in an air strike
All Libyan complexes were destroyed as a result of airstrikes, shelling from the ground or captured by "rebels".
In our country, the S-75 was withdrawn from service in the early 90s, but continues to be in service in the PRC and a number of other countries.
