This article began as a continuation of the story about the armored cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud. But in the course of working with materials about how the last days of the Russian squadrons passed before the Battle of Tsushima, the author first drew attention to some absurdities in the usual interpretation of the detection of our ships on the night of May 14, 1905, when the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru ", Finding the burning lights of the hospital ship" Eagle ", went to them and" literally buried himself in the very center of the squadron. " Therefore, the material offered to your attention is entirely devoted to this episode.
How it all began
So, the Russian squadron was approaching the Tsushima Strait. But on May 12 at 09.00 in the morning, she split: 6 transports left for Shanghai, and the auxiliary cruisers Rion, Dnepr, Kuban and Terek left to carry out a special mission, which consisted of cruising off the Japanese coast and in the Yellow Sea. Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not believe that these weak forces would somehow be able to divert the main forces of H. Togo to themselves, but he already found benefit in the fact that their raiding could force the Japanese to send several armored cruisers to intercept, and thus weaken patrols in the area where they would be break through the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.
Russian ships moved in a compact marching formation.
It was assumed that in the event of the appearance of the enemy, the reconnaissance detachment would retreat to the cruisers in order to protect the transports, the right column, increasing its speed and then turning, “all of a sudden” would bypass and go to the head of the left column, and the Pearl and Emerald with destroyers take place on the opposite side of the enemy. In the event of the appearance of commercial steamers, these cruisers had to, without additional orders, "drive" them off the course of the squadron. But there were no "contacts", except that Japanese radio messages were received on the ships of the squadron. It was clear that the Japanese warships were not too far away, but Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not order to suppress their negotiations - the very fact of such an attempt, even if it was successful, would have warned the Japanese in advance about the approach of Russian forces.
On the night before the battle, that is, from May 13 to May 14, the squadron moved with the lights extinguished, the light signaling between the ships was not carried out either - the words of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatova "Frequent signaling by Stepanov's system often transformed the squadron into some kind of solemn cortege of brightly illuminated ships …" obviously belonged to an earlier time. Other officers of the squadron do not mention any "illumination", or directly write about the extinguished lights. However, the hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" went with a full set of side lights, including gaffer ones, which, in the end, became the reason for the discovery of the Russian squadron.
It is very difficult to understand the reasons for this decision, but we will try. As you know, on May 13, the Russian squadron remained undetected, in the sense that there was not a single Japanese combat or auxiliary ship that would have come out to our ships in line of sight. At the same time, the negotiations recorded by our ships became even more numerous and detailed: it was possible to make out the words: "Ten lights … Like big stars", etc. At about 13:00 on May 13, the Prince Suvorov sent signals to the other ships of the squadron: "The enemy is signaling by telegraph without wires." "Enemy scouts see our smoke, telegraph a lot among themselves." “Repeated mine attacks should be expected tonight” (probably, “repeated” meant multiple ones). Later, after 16.40, by order of Z. P. Rozhestvensky received more signals: "Prepare for battle." "From the telegraph signs I see that seven enemy ships are talking next to us."
Did Z. P. Rozhestvensky that the Russian squadron has already been opened by the Japanese, or did he just want to shake up the commanders a little before the night in which Japanese mine attacks could really be expected? Most likely, it is still the second, since in his testimony to the commission of inquiry, Zinovy Petrovich indicated that the report on the Japanese negotiations “did not completely convince me that the squadron was opened the previous night. I, and at the present time, cannot say in the affirmative when, exactly, the enemy scouts discovered us. Thus, on the night before the battle, the Russian commander did not know for sure whether his squadron had been found, but, of course, he admitted such a possibility.
In this situation, a compact marching formation without lights and without a vanguard pushed forward, in the best way corresponded to the desire of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky to evade detection and attacks of the enemy. But such a plan, most likely, made sense only if the entire squadron respected the blackout, but this was not.
Some publications expressed the opinion that Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not consider it possible for himself to force the hospital ships to extinguish the lights, but this is not true. The fact is that during the squadron's march to Tsushima, he several times ordered them to go without lights, and his order was carried out unquestioningly. As for the night from 13 to 14 May, the hospital ships directly carried out the order of Z. P. Rozhestvensky, given to them two days ago. The flag signal, which was received on the hospital ship "Orel" on May 11 at 15.20, read: "" Orel "and" Kostroma "to go to the rear guard of the squadron for the night and turn on the lights" (entry in the logbook of "Eagle").
What kind of fires were carrying "Eagle" and "Kostroma"?
As a matter of fact, the situation was complicated by another "innovation" of the Russian commander. As you know, a hospital ship is considered a non-combatant and, according to international law of those years, the use of military force is prohibited against it. In order to avoid tragic misunderstandings, hospital ships had a lot of differences from ships and vessels for other purposes. Their hulls were painted white, with a red or green stripe on the side, in addition, they carried the Red Cross flag and had some other differences.
But all this was clearly visible in daylight, and at night the hospital ships carried the usual set of lights, the same as any other ship. Accordingly, in the dark, such a vessel was relatively easy to confuse with a transport or an auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, in August 1904, the chief doctor of the hospital ship "Eagle" Ya. Ya. Multanovsky suggested installing additional, gaffer signal lights: white-red-white on the mainmast.
This proposal was supported by the Ministry of the Navy, and hospital ships were equipped with such lights. The Japanese were notified through diplomatic channels, but they responded very evasively: "Wearing special lights at night on hospital ships is not enough to give ships with such lights the rights and benefits in the form of many inconveniences that may arise from this." As a result, the Russian leadership came to the conclusion that the Japanese were against installing additional lights on hospital ships, and wanted to dismantle them. But then Z. P. intervened. Rozhdestvensky. He quite logically stated that international law does not limit the number of lights that a hospital ship can carry, and if so, then there is no need to consult with the Japanese. Zinovy Petrovich proposed to keep the lights, to notify the Japanese about it - from the fact that hospital ships will receive an additional distinction, it will not be worse, and the Japanese have no right to protest, since international laws do not prohibit this.
All this was correct, but thanks to these measures, Russian hospital ships received a clear difference from all other ships and vessels in the world. It was impossible to confuse them at night with any commercial steamer. Any observer who discovered the white-red-white gaff lights now knew exactly what he saw in front of him a Russian hospital ship, and no other. Accordingly, Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, having ordered his hospital ships to light all the lights, not only "lit" the latter, but, one might say, made every effort to ensure that the Japanese accurately identified them, without confusing "Kostroma" and "Eagle", say, with some anything by commercial vehicles.
But why, then, was it necessary to light the lights?
Of course, all of the above sounds extremely absurd. However, the entire history of the transition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron testifies that the Russian commander was not inclined to absurd decisions. He could be wrong about something, but his orders were always based on a foundation, and were logical.
Let's first ask ourselves a question - why do Z. P. Rozhestvensky took hospital ships with him to the breakthrough and into battle? On the voyage, they, of course, were useful to him, serving as such floating hospitals with a large squadron, which was especially valuable in conditions when anchorage in ports was impossible for Russian ships. But Vladivostok was not so far away, and there were doctors there, so why Z. P. Rozhestvensky was not supposed to send the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" together with other transports to Shanghai? Or, if we assume that the medical facilities in Vladivostok were not sufficient to support the actions of the Russian squadron, then it would be possible to send the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" by another route, for example, around Japan. Their status would have allowed them to reach Vladivostok much more reliably than they could have done as part of a squadron, because in the heat of battle they could have mistakenly opened fire on them.
It is impossible to give an exact answer to this question, but, most likely, this was the case. As you know, the chances of the Russian squadron to pass to Vladivostok without a general battle with the Japanese fleet were minimal, if not illusory. In the testimony of the Commission of Inquiry, he pointed out: “I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korea Strait or near the concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that a general battle would take place in the afternoon. " It is absolutely known that in order to win a battle, Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not expect, but did not expect a complete defeat: "… I could not admit the thought of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships." In other words, the Russian commander expected a battle and serious losses, damage to warships, but a large number of wounded always accompany this. At the same time, the medical assistance that the medical services of the warships could provide them was obviously insufficient. Of course, the ship's doctors were highly qualified specialists, but they were banally small in the state. In addition, various combat injuries can greatly interfere with the work of doctors: here there are fires in the area of the "hospital", interruptions in clean or hot water, de-energization of compartments, etc. including, finally, the death of the ship.
In general, it can be assumed that the presence of hospital ships, even with certain difficulties in transferring the wounded to them after the battle, could save many lives. Or, at least, Z. P. could think so. Rozhdestvensky. For many dear readers, with the light hand of A. S. Novikov-Priboy and V. P. Kostenko, accustomed to perceiving the commander of the Russian squadron as a tyrant and satrap, despising and completely unconcerned about his subordinates, this point of view may turn out to be too unusual. But you need to understand that this image of the vice admiral was very convenient for explaining the defeat in the battle of Tsushima and perfectly suited as an allegory for the "rotten tsarist regime." It is this Z. P. Rozhdestvensky was in demand - cruel, cowardly and narrow-minded, so the Soviet readers got it. Although the real Zinovy Petrovich, of course, was very different from his caricature and popular prints in the same Tsushima by A. S. Novikov-Priboya.
But maybe the vice admiral could have some other motives for leading the hospital ships with him? The author pondered a lot on this topic, but did not find anything worthy of attention. Perhaps dear readers will be able to offer some versions?
When asked whether Z. P. Rozhestvensky, to separate the hospital ships from the squadron in order to meet with them later, on the way to Vladivostok, should be answered in the negative. No one could know how the battle would have gone, where and at what time the squadron would have ended up after the breakthrough, which means that it was almost impossible to appoint a rendezvous point.
So, we come to the conclusion that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, there were reasonable grounds for leading hospital ships with the squadron. In fact, of course, it was a wrong decision, because the squadron was devastated, and the "Kostroma" and "Oryol" did not help the Russian ships, but were intercepted and detained by the Japanese. But this is known today, but then, before the battle, it was not obvious. Yet Z. P. Rozhestvensky assumed that the squadron, although suffering defeat, would pass to Vladivostok.
But now the decision has been made - but what would be the best way to do it? It was possible to put hospital ships along with transports under the protection of warships and order them to extinguish all the lights. But this created increased risks for them, because if the Japanese still found the squadron and attacked it, the "Kostroma" and "Eagle" could have suffered. So, Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to carry absolutely all the lights, but … at the same time he separated them from the squadron.
The fact is that, there is reason to believe that, contrary to popular belief, "Oryol" and "Kostroma" should not have followed directly behind the ships of the squadron, but were ordered to be at a considerable distance from it. So, the commander of the battleship "Sisoy the Great" M. V. Ozerov in his report pointed out: "At night the squadron walked with colored lights reduced to the extreme, by the power of light, not opening the top-end ships at all, and only hospital ships, which had lagged 40-50 cabins at night, carried all the lights set for sailing." … The captain of the 2nd rank Vl. Semenov: "Our squadron was opened for the first time only at 4:30 am on May 14, when in thinning fog the Shinano-Maru stumbled upon our hospital ships, which followed 5 miles behind the squadron, and opened the squadron along them." Moreover, Vl. Semenov asserted that "Orel" and "Kostroma" received direct orders from Z. P. Rozhestvensky to go 6 miles behind the squadron at night, although the author of this article did not find documentary evidence of the existence of such an order.
Suppose that "Orel" and "Kostroma" were not in a squadron formation, but 4-6 miles behind the squadron. What does this mean? Of course, the burning lights made a ship or vessel more noticeable at night, but they certainly did not turn it into an Alexandria lighthouse. Unfortunately, the official Japanese historiography does not contain information from what distance Shinano-Maru discovered the hospital ship Eagle, but V. V. Tsybulko in "Unread Pages of Tsushima" claims that from a distance of 3 miles, that is, just over 5, 5 km. At the same time, according to Japanese reports, the visibility was such that an unlit ship could be seen from about 1.5 km - it was from this distance that Shinano-Maru discovered the warships of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.
And from this follows a very simple conclusion: a Japanese patrol ship or ship could, of course, detect the main forces of the Russian squadron, or hospital ships - but not both at the same time. Let's put ourselves in the place of the Russian commander and consider what this could give him.
Suppose that on the afternoon of May 13, the Japanese nevertheless found a Russian squadron - this probability should be taken into account, due to the noticeably increased radio traffic of the Japanese, and Z. P. Rozhestvensky admitted this. Then the Japanese could and even had to send their destroyer detachments into the attack at nightfall. Their attacks would have exhausted the Russian crews before the start of the battle, and with luck, they would have been able to torpedo one or more warships, thereby weakening the strength of the Russian squadron.
But if the Japanese destroyers had discovered the main forces of the Russians, then the hospital ships going in the distance would not have had the slightest relation to this, since their lights would not have been visible from such a distance. In this case, the battle with destroyers, of course, would have taken place, but the "Orel" and "Kostroma" were not exposed to any danger. And if the Japanese destroyers, on the contrary, found hospital ships, then next to them there were no warships that they could attack. The Japanese probably would have realized that the Russian squadron was somewhere nearby, but in any case they would have spent some time "explaining" the hospital ships, they would have to figure out who is in front of them, it is likely that they would try to follow them, and all this would take away precious time from them. And the additional gaff lights contributed to the correct identification of the "Eagle" and "Kostroma", reducing the likelihood that they would be confused, for example, with auxiliary Russian cruisers and attacked.
Now let's consider another option - the Japanese did not see the Russians on May 13. In this case, again, their patrol ship or vessel would have stumbled upon the main Russian forces, the hospital ships had nothing to do with this. Well, if hospital ships were discovered, well, the Japanese would have to puzzle over where, in fact, the main forces of the Russians are.
The presence of two lonely illuminated "Christmas trees" looks like some kind of military trick, like a desire to tell the commander of the United Fleet that the Russian squadron is nearby, but is it really nearby? There is no doubt that if the Japanese sentinel found the "Eagle" or "Kostroma", he would spend some time tracking them, perhaps - he tried to detain them for inspection, but to find the main forces 5-6 miles ahead, he, in theory, he could not. Accordingly, in the event that hospital ships were discovered, H. Togo was not yet supposed to withdraw the main forces to the sea, fearing some kind of trick: he should have sent additional cruisers to the area to clarify the situation. But it would have been already in the morning or in the morning, and they would still need time to establish contact - and the fact that the battle will take place on the afternoon of May 14, Z. P. Rozhdestvensky was completely convinced.
Thus, it turns out that the separation of the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" from the squadron on the night of July 13-14 looks like the best solution in case the Japanese attempt to mine attacks. But if the Japanese had not yet seen the Russian squadron, then the discovery of the hospital ships could be the reason that the main forces of the Russian squadron would be discovered several hours earlier. On the one hand, it might seem that the later the Japanese would notice the Russians on May 14, the better it would be for Z. P. Rozhestvensky, so less time would be left for a general battle. But … was the win in a few hours so significant? Indeed, from the point of view of the Russian commander, the Japanese could calmly give battle not on May 14, but on May 15, if, for example, they had discovered the Russians on the 14th late in the evening.
It is known that Z. P. Rozhestvensky believed that a general battle was inevitable, and based on its results, he hoped to break through, losing some ships. Apparently (although the vice admiral did not speak about it directly), he still hoped to inflict such damage on the Japanese that would not allow them to resume fighting the next day. In this case, a few additional hours, in general, did not solve anything. Moreover, oddly enough, there is no firm belief that the postponement of the battle from May 14 to May 15 would be in the interests of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. On the night of May 13-14, he had an excellent chance of avoiding destroyer attacks, if any were undertaken, but on the afternoon of May 14, his squadron should have been noticed with the highest degree of probability. And if this happened in the evening, when the main forces did not have time to fight, H. Togo would certainly have sent a mass of his destroyers on the night of May 14-15. In this case, the Russians could have suffered significant losses even before the start of the battle of the main forces, so that the Russian squadron entered the general battle weakened.
Thus, given the knowledge and data that Zinovy Petrovich had at the time of the decision, from his point of view, this step could look quite logical and reasonable.
“Well, okay,” the dear reader will say: “The author has described the commander’s reasons well, but why didn’t it all work?”.
What happened after all?
Let's first look at how the Japanese officialdom describes the opening of the Russian squadron. For the convenience of the reader, Russian time will be indicated everywhere, which in the Korea Strait was 20 minutes behind the Japanese time.
So, on the night of May 14, at 02.25 am on the Japanese auxiliary cruiser "Shinano-Maru" they noticed the lights of a steamer heading to the east, and this steamer was also from the "Shinano-Maru" in the east. In fact, the Russian squadron "slipped" past this auxiliary cruiser, as it was sailing to the northeast, and if the vessel that was seen did not carry lights, it would never have been noticed on the Shinano-Maru.
Captain 2nd-rank Narikawa, commander of the Shinano Maru, of course wanted to find out who he had found. But it was not so easy to understand this, because the unknown ship was on the background of the month, and it was difficult to observe it. Therefore, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser set off in pursuit.
According to Japanese historiography, "Shinano-Maru" was only able to traverse the unknown vessel at 4.10, that is, only 1 hour and 45 minutes after its discovery. It looks strange, because on the night of May 14, the Russian squadron was sailing at 8 knots, and the Japanese auxiliary cruiser was a newly built (1900) commercial vessel with a maximum speed of 15.4 knots.
If we assume that V. V. Tsibulko is right that the Shinano-Maru detected the Russian ship at about 3 miles, that it should have been bypassed in an arc and approached, maintaining a distance of more than 1.5 km, and that the Japanese cruiser, most likely, did not give full speed, but walked where - at 12 knots, it should have taken him a little less time anyway. However, is it possible that Narikawa was just being careful?
Approaching at 04.10 to the Russian ship on the left, "Shinano-Maru" identified it as a three-masted and two-pipe vessel, similar to the auxiliary cruiser "Dnepr". The Japanese approached a little closer, but did not see the installed guns, and therefore correctly assumed that they saw a hospital ship in front of them. At the same time, the Russians, according to the Japanese, noticed the Shinano-Maru and began to signal something with an electric flashlight, however, Narikawa was not sure of this. From this it could follow that the hospital ship had confused the Shinano-Maru with another Russian ship, from which, in turn, it followed that they, these ships, were somewhere nearby. The commander of the Japanese auxiliary cruiser ordered to carefully examine the horizon, and at 04.25: "ahead of me on the bow and from the left side at a distance of no more than 1,500 m. I saw several dozen ships and then a few more smoke." Then "Shinano-Maru" turned away, and it is not even clear in which direction: unfortunately, the official Japanese history does not contain information that would allow any accurate determination of the further maneuvering of this ship. But what is known for sure is that the Shinano-Maru, in spite of its maneuvers, continued to observe the Russian ships, but at 05.00 lost sight of the squadron and was able to restore contact only 45 minutes later, at 05.45.
And what about the Russians? Most likely, on the "Eagle" "Shinano-Maru" all this time remained unnoticed.
Hospital ship "Eagle"
It is believed that a Japanese auxiliary cruiser was discovered on board the Eagle at about 5 am, but the author of this article has serious doubts about this. The fact is that midshipman Shcherbachev 4th, who was on the Orel, reported that from the hospital ship they saw a Japanese steamer on the right, at a distance of 40 cables, despite the fact that it was moving towards a rendezvous. But if "Shinano-Maru" was at 04.25 to the left of the "Eagle", and not less than 7-10 cables, then it is extremely doubtful that he could be four miles from him to the right after half an hour.
Moreover. If we assume that the Shinano-Maru approached the Eagle from the left, then where was the Kostroma at that time? According to the report of its commander:
“At 20 minutes past five in the morning, from the ship, 4 enemy cruisers, which were on the Zuid course, were 10 cables behind the stern. He waited a few minutes and, as soon as they disappeared into the darkness, raised the signal of what they had seen; and, making sure that they did not see the signal, overtook the cruiser Ural, walking in front of me, and by waving the flag transmitted this information, which was transmitted by the Ural further."
What conclusions can be drawn from this extremely scattered information?
Suppose the commander of the Shinano-Maru was not mistaken about anything. But then it turns out that by the time his auxiliary cruiser reached the Eagle's traverse, the main forces of the Russian squadron were not further than a mile from both the hospital ship and the Shinano-Maru. And this suggests that at night our hospital ships, or at least one of them (it is still possible that in fact Narikawa found not "Eagle", but "Kostroma") violated the order of Z. P. Rozhestvensky and came close to the squadron. In this case, the blame for the discovery of the Russian squadron lies with the commander (commanders?) Of the hospital ships, who violated the order they received.
Option two - both "Kostroma" and "Eagle" honestly followed the instructions given to them and followed 5-6 miles aft of the Russian squadron. In this case, it turns out that Narikawa made a mistake when he went to the traverse of the "Eagle": he thought that he was seeing the Russian squadron, which he could not see physically. The only ship that he could observe while near the Eagle was the hospital ship Kostroma! And then, alas, the tragedy of mistakes began. On the "Kostroma", "seeing" as many as 4 Japanese cruisers and losing sight of them, for some reason rushed to catch up with the squadron. To be honest, what comes to mind most of all is that the Kostroma were simply frightened and fled under the protection of warships. And "Shinano-Maru", believing that it was following the Russian squadron, was actually watching the "Kostroma", which, in the end, brought it to the main forces of Z. P. Rozhestvensky … Although the Japanese auxiliary cruiser lost sight of the Kostroma at about 05.00, but knowing the course she was heading, and which coincided with the course of the main forces of Z. P. Rozhestvensky, later managed to catch up with them. Then the real time of detection of the Russian squadron - 05.45, and this happened due to the illiterate actions of the commander of "Kostroma".
As for the assessment of the actions of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, it turns out like this. His decision to take the hospital ships with him, although it was erroneous, but at that time looked logical and, most likely, was dictated by concern for the health of the squadron's personnel. The risks of premature detection of the main forces of the squadron, as well as the danger of being subjected to a mine attack, were minimized by ordering the hospital ships to stay behind the squadron. However, the commander's plans were disrupted by the wrong actions of the commanders of the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" or only one "Kostroma".
And in any case, we can only state that the circumstances of the discovery of the Russian squadron on the night of May 13-14 and to this day remain unclear and require additional research.
