The Great Victory Day gave us not only a festive mood, but also good news for everyone who is interested in the current state of the fleet. We are talking about a TASS report, according to which the existing plans for the rearmament of the Navy envisage the construction of 12 frigates of the 22350M project, that is, the "improved Gorshkov".
Perhaps one of the preliminary "sketches" of the frigate of project 22350M
The specifics, alas, are not as much as we would like, but nevertheless it is said that:
1. The technical design for the new ship will be developed by the end of 2019.
2. The construction of the lead frigate will be completed in 2027.
3. The construction of the next 11 serial ships will be completed later, already within the framework of the next state armaments program.
4. And, finally, "the cherry on the cake" - the ship's displacement will be 7,000 tons, the armament will be increased to 48 Onyx / Caliber / Zircon missiles, and the anti-aircraft missile ammunition will be up to 100 SAM systems of the Polyment-Redoubt complex ".
As you can see, we are not spoiled with information: but still, what has been said inspires cautious optimism.
Construction prospects
They, oddly enough, are quite transparent and understandable. Until now, the snow-white frigate of our shipbuilding programs was smashed to smithereens, colliding with three rocks, whose name is:
1. Insufficient funding from the state budget;
2. Failure of the domestic industry to produce the required type of ship (equipment) on time;
3. Inability to calculate the cost of the finished product.
I foresee dissatisfied remarks from individual readers: they say, since the beginning of the 2010s, the country's armed forces have been financed much better than before, what kind of shortage of money can we talk about? But the fact is that, as you know, the military shipbuilding program for 2011-2020. We failed miserably: there were many reasons for this, but one of them was the curtailment of funding for state purchases of weapons in relation to the planned figures.
As you know, it was planned to allocate $ 20 trillion for GPV 2011-2020. rub. However, it was planned to allocate these funds incrementally. So, according to the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the planned figures for procurement and R&D expenditures in 2011-2015. should have amounted to a little more than 5, 5 trillion. rub. Accordingly, the rest is almost $ 14.5 trillion. rub. it was supposed to be spent in the period 2016-2020. It is difficult to say what the government was counting on when it pledged an almost threefold increase in costs for the "second five-year plan" of the GPV, and where it was going to find such funds, but our next financial crisis led to the fact that it became clear to everyone - not that to triple, but keeping military spending at the current level will be quite problematic. Thus, even if there had not been a break with German suppliers of diesel engines, with Ukraine, and our enterprises would have issued weapons and units that work like a Swiss chronometer just in time - the shipbuilding program according to GPV 2011-2020. still could not be performed.
So, the new GPV 2018-2027. much less ambitious than the previous one. Although for its financing it will be necessary to find about 19 trillion. rubles, but these are not at all the same pre-crisis rubles. Inflation between January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2018 amounted to 63.51%, that is, the new GPV can be (very conditionally, of course) estimated at 11.6 trillion. those rubles in which the GPV 2011-2020 was estimated.
On the one hand, of course, such a reduction in planned defense funds is very upsetting. But in any barrel of ointment you can find a spoonful of honey: most likely, the new GPV is much more realistic than the previous one, and the allocation of funds in the indicated amounts is still within our budget. This means that the chances that the purchase of military equipment and R&D will not be disrupted due to lack of funding is much greater than in previous years. The new state program, of course, is more modest than the previous one, but at the same time it is much more realistic. And if so, then the plans for the design and construction of frigates of the project 22350M laid down in it are much more realistic than the plans for the construction of their "younger brothers" 22350 in the GPV 2011-2020.
The second is about the inability of our shipbuilding industry to build anything on time. Unfortunately, this is the real scourge of a modern and efficient market economy. We train our management abroad, we implement 3D-modeling, corporate information systems of the ERP-standard, capable of automatically “decomposing” the procedure for creating a finished product down to specific instructions to an ordinary manager for procurement and issuing shift-daily assignments to a separate foreman in the shop. We build lean manufacturing technologies, develop the latest quality control systems, staff motivation … But with all this, alas, we are losing the ability to design and mass-produce complex engineering objects, such as, for example, a warship. We are losing the skills we had in the “antediluvian” USSR.
If we look at the rate of construction of the American nuclear submarine Los Angeles, laid down in the 80s, we will see that the average construction period for one submarine was 43 months. The Soviet analogue of Los Angeles, the Schuka-B multipurpose nuclear submarines, laid down in the 80s, took an average of 35 months to build, despite the fact that a number of ships of this type were being completed already in the wild 90s. e ". Today, 5 serial corvettes that have entered service, not counting the head "Guarding", we have been building on average for 100 months. each.
Corvette project 20380 "Loud"
For comparison: the Americans mastered their monstrous hundred-thousand-ton "Gerald R. Ford" in a little less than 91 months.
All warships under construction in the Russian Federation can be safely divided into 2 parts. The first of them is the ships that are being built at enterprises that have not been engaged in the serial construction of the latter for a long time, and here, in terms of time, everything is very bad. Others, these are those who, in the sad 90s and early 2000s, nevertheless built abroad - they still managed to largely preserve what they once owned. If the Yantar shipyard built the Project 11356 TFR for the Indian Navy, then it coped with the creation of frigates for the Russian Navy, in general, not bad - except, of course, the blockage with engines, which arose for reasons beyond the control of the shipyard. And "Admiralty Shipyards", which built "Varshavyanka" first for China, then - for Vietnam, Algeria and India, were able to deliver six diesel-electric submarines of project 636.3 for the Black Sea Fleet in more or less acceptable terms.
In this matter, experience means a lot, but no less important is the elaboration of counterparty supplies. Take the lead frigate of project 22350 "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov". We managed to build it for almost 12, 5 years, but is it really the fault of Severnaya Verf, where it was created? After all, there were many problems - both with the engines and with the 130-mm artillery mount A-192M, and even about the sad story (albeit with a happy ending) “Polyment-Redut” is known today even by people very far from the navy. And one can only guess how many problems during the construction of this ship went unnoticed by the media and the general public. But for diesel-electric submarines 636.3 and frigates of the "admiral's" series, there were almost no such problems, because their range of weapons and equipment was at the time of their construction fully worked out by production.
So, from this point of view, the prospects for the program for the construction of frigates of project 22350M also look quite rosy. At present, Severnaya Verf is building 6 frigates of Project 22350, and, obviously, their serial construction will be well worked out on this. At the same time, 22350M are, in fact, enlarged 22350s with increased ammunition, which gives us reason to hope for a relatively fast pace of construction of new frigates.
And finally, the third is the difficulty in determining the price of the finished product. Naturally, the cost of construction was greatly influenced by compliance with the contractual deadlines for the delivery of the ship to the fleet - "long-term construction", naturally, is more expensive. But here, as we said above, the frigates 22350M are doing pretty well. The second reason was that, as a rule, the ships were equipped with samples of weapons and equipment that had not yet been worked out in mass production, or even not yet created at all, which in fact cost much more than planned prices. But even here the project 22350M is in complete order, since the main types of weapons and equipment have already gone into mass production for frigates of project 22350.
In view of the foregoing, the chances of the execution of the program for the construction of a dozen frigates 22350M are much greater than that of the previous programs of "frigatization" or "corvetization" of our Navy.
Armament
Of course, information about an increase in the ship's main armament, that is, the installation of additional cells of the ZS-14 UKSK universal launcher, due to which the ammunition load of cruise and anti-ship missiles will increase from 16 to 48 units, will delight anyone. Both specialists and amateurs to measure the combat capability of a ship by the number of "Caliber" missiles installed on it.
But here's the thing - it is quite possible, and very likely, that in the relatively near future, the UKSK, designed today for missiles of the Caliber / Onyx / Zircon families, will also be able to use heavy anti-aircraft missiles.
On the Almaz-Antey website, in the Information for the Media section, there is a small note dated February 11, 2019, entitled “What the newest shipborne air defense system Polyment-Redut is capable of”. It says that at present the air defense system has only short and medium-range missiles capable of hitting air targets at a distance of up to 150 km. But at the same time, it is also argued that in the coming years this complex should be armed with an ultra-long-range missile defense system with a range of up to 400 km, which is now being created "on the basis of 40N6 ammunition for the S-400 and S-500 ground systems."
As I read this news, the author had great doubts about the reliability of this information. The fact is that 40N6 is the latest development, which is simply unrealistic to miniaturize without losing combat qualities. At the same time, of course, 40N6 is much larger than the range of missiles used by the Redut air defense missile system. The largest medium-range missile has a length of 5.6 m and a diameter of 240 mm with a mass of about 600 kg. How to cram 40N6 into a cell for such a missile - ammunition 8, 7 m long, 575 mm in diameter and weighing about 1,900 kg (according to other sources - 2, 5 tons)? Does the "Redut" air defense missile system launcher have such a size margin?
However, the answer was contained in the same note, which literally says the following:
"For firing anti-aircraft missiles, Polyment-Redut uses launchers (PU) of the universal ship complex 3S14 (UKSK), which in the Russian fleet are equipped with ships carrying Kalibr cruise missiles and Onyx anti-ship missiles."
Apparently, we are talking about a new, ultra-long-range missile defense system. The fact is that, firstly, to date, the Redut air defense system uses its own launcher, which has nothing to do with the UKSK. And secondly, according to some data (possibly - unreliable), the modern UKSK is incapable of using modern anti-aircraft missiles, because such a requirement has never been set before the designers. That is, today the UKSK cannot use anti-aircraft missiles, and perhaps the "40N6-based ammunition" is being adapted to the UKSK?
Again, I must say that the reliability of all of the above information can be questioned by the fact that the article quoted by the author is in the section "Information for the media" and the subsection "Publications in the media" - this is not a direct interview with an official of "Almaz-Antey" (although the words about the creation of a 400-km missile for "Polyment-Reduta" belonged to the commander-in-chief of the Navy). But you still need to understand that such publications usually appear according to the data provided in the media by the developer or manufacturer himself, and it is absolutely impossible to imagine that Almaz-Antey would publish data on its official website that it does not agree with.
Therefore, the author of this article is confident that in the foreseeable future the ships of our Navy will be able to use heavy ultra-long-range missiles from the ZS-14 UKSK cells, which are still capable of using only cruise and anti-ship missiles, as well as PLUR. And, if so, what benefit can the new frigates of Project 22350M derive from this?
Let's take a look at the possible 22350M ammunition compared to its predecessor. Suppose we are preparing a ship for a campaign and battle against the enemy fleet. In this case, a ship of the "Gorshkov" type will be able to take on board a maximum of 16 anti-ship missiles, and its air defense can be organized by placing, for example, 24 medium-range missiles in 24 cells of the Redut air defense system and in the remaining 8 cells (there are 32 of them) - another 32 short-range missiles 9M100, which, due to their small dimensions, can be installed four in one cell.
At the same time, the "Gorshkov" completely lacks air defense in the far zone, and practically no anti-submarine weapons, because the "Packet-NK" on it is still primarily not an anti-submarine, but an anti-torpedo system.
But on the new frigate 22350M can be placed 8 PLUR family "Caliber" - missile torpedoes capable of hitting enemy submarines at a distance of 40-50 kilometers. And yet - 16 long-range missiles, capable of, if not disrupting, then extremely complicating the "correct" airstrike carried out by several groups of aircraft, because the ship gets a sufficiently "long arm" to "drop from the skies" the "brain" of the air strike group - AWACS aircraft. And yet - absolutely the same number of medium and short-range missiles as on the Gorshkov. And yet - not 16, but 24 anti-ship missiles, and this is already serious. Because in this case, the striking power of the ship does not increase by 1.5 times, as it might seem from a simple ratio of the number of missiles, but much higher.
There is such a concept - "saturation of the ship's air defense / order", which means this. A modern ship has various active and passive air defense systems, including air defense systems, rapid-fire artillery, electronic warfare stations, traps, etc. They are capable of intercepting a number of anti-ship missiles that attack a ship, or an order in which this ship enters. It is clear that here a lot depends on all sorts of accidents, but nevertheless, for each ship or their group, you can withdraw a certain amount of anti-ship missiles, more than which they cannot reject and destroy even in the most favorable conditions for themselves. This number of missiles will be considered sufficient to saturate the air defense of the ship / formation.
So, if, for example, 12 Caliber anti-ship missiles are needed to saturate the air defense of a certain ship group, this means that a Gorshkov-class ship, having used up all the ammunition of 16 missiles, will achieve 4 anti-ship missiles hits on enemy ships. But the Project 22350M frigate attacking under the same conditions with 24 anti-ship missiles on board will achieve not 4, but 12 hits: of its 24 anti-ship missiles, 12 will go to saturate the air defense, and the remaining 12 will hit targets. In our example, we see that an increase in ammunition by only 1.5 times is capable of providing three times more effect under certain conditions!
Of course, the author of this article is not aware of the performance characteristics of the Zircon anti-ship missile, but he has great doubts that even a full-blooded US AUG will be able to survive the salvo of 48 hypersonic missiles fired by the Project 22350M frigate from the tracking position during combat service. This does not make, of course, one of our ships equal to the AUG in its capabilities, but in fact the frigate of project 22350M will pose a greater danger for the AUG of the 2030 model than the Soviet missile cruiser Atlant presented for the AUG of the 1980 model. And we have such frigates it is supposed to build 12 units.
At the same time, Project 22350M frigates should be no less versatile than the American destroyers Arleigh Burke. Unfortunately, it is unclear what displacement the sources had in mind, calling the figure 7 thousand tons - standard or full? In fact, both options are possible, but even if the indicated figure is still the standard displacement (which is somewhat doubtful - it turns out that the frigates of the project 22350 have "grown fat" by almost 60%), then even then it will be about one level with the "Arleigh Burks" of the II-A series, which has a standard displacement of 7,061 tons. At the same time, the ships have a comparable ammunition load.
American destroyers from their "birth" to the present day have 96 cells in the Mk.41 universal launchers. Our Project 22350M frigate will have launchers for 48 "heavy" and 32 "light" missiles, that is, a total of 80 cells. And this is in the event that the expansion of the UKSK to 48 missiles will be the only innovation of the project. However, if we assume that the standard displacement of our frigate will increase from 4,400 to 7,000 tons, it should still be assumed that the number of Reduta air defense missile systems will be increased by 8 or 16 launchers. In this case, the total ammunition load will be equal to the "Arleigh Burke". If 7,000 tons is still the full displacement of the new ship, and the number of cells for the Polyment-Redut missile defense system will not be increased, then the Project 22350M frigate, of course, will be slightly inferior in ammunition to the Arlie Burke, but at the same time it will itself will be much smaller in size - it is unlikely in this case that the ship's standard displacement will exceed 6,000 tons.
Unfortunately, the lack of understanding of the size of the ship does not allow us to imagine possible changes in the composition of the rest of the weapons. The artillery mount of the "main caliber" will probably remain the same single-gun 130-mm A-192M. Other artillery with the same high probability will be represented by the ZAK "Broadsword", in which at the design stage they "laid down" joint work with the "Polyment-Redut", although if the standard displacement of the ship reaches 7,000 tons, the number of installations may be increased. Obviously, no one will put 533-mm torpedo tubes on the frigate, and the "Packet-NK" will just as clearly remain.
As for the radar, GAK and other equipment of the new frigate, here, most likely, it will receive exactly the same thing as the frigates of Project 22350 had. It is possible, of course, that there will be upgrades, and that, for example, the same "Polyment" will be able to accompany and simultaneously attack more targets than before. But let's hope that everything will be limited to modernization: the most disgusting thing that can happen to frigates of Project 22350M is "getting stuck" on the slipway or in the completion of construction in anticipation of some "unparalleled in the world" hydroacoustic complex or something else …
Of course, new developments are necessary and important, the armed forces in general and the navy in particular should receive all the best. But let's still put new equipment on ships when it, this equipment, is ready, and while it is not yet there, we will not wait for the weather by the sea, but confine ourselves to older ones, providing for the possibility of replacement in the future, say, during a major overhaul.
In general, the following can be said about the armament - the frigate 22350M will have 80-96 rocket weapon cells, a 130-mm artillery system, 2 ZAK or more and 324-mm torpedoes, as well as one or two helicopters. That is, in terms of the composition of weapons, it will be extremely similar to the American destroyers, which gives us reason to call the Project 22350M frigate "the Russian Arleigh Burke".
Mysterious chassis
But the power plant of the promising frigate 22350M, today, is still a mystery. The fact is that the ships of the "Gorshkov" type, as such, had two diesel-gas turbine units М55Р. Each of them was equipped with a 10D49 diesel engine with a power of 5,200 hp. and a gas turbine engine M90FR with a capacity of 27,500 hp.
Two such units are enough to inform "Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov" the economic speed of 14 knots, and the maximum speed of 29 knots. But the installation of the same units on the 22350M project is not the best solution. Let's start with the fact that even if 7,000 tons represent exactly the full displacement of the new frigate, then in this case its speed may decrease to about 13.2 knots. economic and 27, 4 knots. full speed, and it is unlikely that this will be considered sufficient for a ship in a distant sea zone. However, it may turn out to be slightly higher than the indicated figures, if the length / width ratio of frigate 22350M will significantly exceed that of ships of the "Gorshkov" type. But in general, I would like to note that 14 knots for the economic move is very little, the same "Arlie Burke" has a similar indicator of 18 knots. And since until now the main means of projection of force for us remains the escort of the ship groups of a potential enemy, lagging in this parameter is extremely undesirable for us.
In addition, the diesel-gas turbine unit is bad for us because it contains domestic diesels, which, to put it mildly, do not differ in quality. What are the ways out of this situation?
We have mastered the independent production of M90FR gas-tube engines with great difficulty, and getting involved in the adventure of creating and mass production of a new engine for us looks like excessive waste, not to mention the fact that possible delays in its creation and development will simply paralyze the program of building the latest frigates. There are only 2 options left - either to use not two, but three M55R units on the new ships, or to modernize this unit, turning it into a gas-gas unit. That is, keeping the M90FR engine as the main engine, and using the newly created gas turbine engine, of greater power than today's 10D49 diesel engine, as an economic engine. However, these are only guesses, and what will actually happen - the future will show.
Current state of affairs
In the meantime, the process of creating frigate 22350M can be described as follows: "everything is going according to plan." As you know, the contract for the preliminary design of the new ship was signed with the Northern PKB on December 28, 2018. And on March 17, 2019, TASS was "authorized to declare" that the preliminary design of the frigate 22350M was completed, and the PKB began to develop working design documentation. We can only wish them every success in this, which we take this opportunity to do!
