The night before the battle passed relatively calmly, at least for the Russian ships - they were prepared for battle and to repel a mine attack, the crews slept at the guns, without undressing, which made it possible to almost immediately open fire on order. But in general, the teams were quite rested: why did nothing happen, although the position of the Japanese for a surprise attack was much more advantageous?
As we know, during January 26, Sotokichi Uriu carried out a landing operation, which was actually carried out on the night of the 27th, and he could (and should) have destroyed the Koreets and Varyag if the Russian stationers met him outside neutral waters. But he did not have the right to destroy Russian ships in a neutral roadstead, here he could enter into battle with them only on one condition - if the "Varyag" or "Koreets" opened fire first.
However, the situation changed on the evening of January 26, 1904, when at 20.30 S. Uriu received the order No. 275 we quoted earlier: in accordance with this document, he was allowed to ignore the neutrality of Korea at sea. Thus, Sotokichi Uriu received the right to start hostilities directly on the Chemulpo raid, but nevertheless decided not to use it on the night of January 27 - he was embarrassed that foreign hospitals were too close and could be damaged. At the same time, possessing an absolute superiority in forces, the Japanese Rear Admiral could afford to be slow - however, not excessive, since the option for the approach of Russian reinforcements from Port Arthur could not be completely discounted.
S. Uriu attached great importance to the fact that everyone (both V. F. Rudnev and the commanders of foreign stationary units) received a notice of the beginning of hostilities in advance. The letter he sent to V. F. Rudnev, was quoted in various sources more than once, but alas, it is not always correct, so we will give his text in full:
"The ship of His Imperial Majesty" Naniwa ", Raid Chemulpo, February 8, 1904
Sir, Since the government of Japan and the government of Russia are currently at war, I respectfully ask you to leave the port of Chemulpo with the forces under your command until 12:00 am on February 9, 1904. Otherwise, I will have to fight against you in the port.
I have the honor to be your humble servant, S. Uriu (signed)
Rear admiral, squadron commander of the Japanese Imperial Navy.
The senior officer of the Russian fleet is in place."
Let's remind that February 8 and 9, 1904 correspond to January 26 and 27 of the same year according to the old style.
S. Uriu made efforts to ensure that V. F. Rudnev received this message early in the morning, no later than 07.00 on January 27 (although he did not succeed in this). In addition, he prepared letters to the commanders of foreign stationaries: we will not give the full text of this letter, but we note that in it the Japanese rear admiral notified the commanders of the upcoming attack and invited them to leave the port in which the battle would be fought. It is interesting that in a letter to V. F. Rudnev S. Uriu suggested that he leave the port before 12.00, while he told the commanders of foreign stationaries that he would not attack Russian ships earlier than 16.00.
At 05.30 am on January 27, S. Uriu sent a destroyer with an order to the commander of the "Chiyoda" to meet with all the commanders of foreign ships, and to hand them the aforementioned letters, in addition, the latter had to clarify with Commodore Bailey whether V. F. Rudnev "call to battle" from the Japanese admiral. The essence of the request was as follows: "Find out from the commander of the Talbot if he knows whether the commander of the Russian ship received a notification and, if there are doubts that it was delivered, ask him to be kind in delivering it on board the Russian ship." …
From 06.40 to 08.00 a steam boat from Chiyoda carried S. Uriu's notice to foreign stations, and as soon as it was received, the commanders of the French and Italian cruisers immediately went to Talbot. A short meeting took place, as a result of which the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, captain of the 2nd rank Sene, went to the Varyag: from him at 0800 Vsevolod Fedorovich learned about the Japanese notification to the stationers. At 08.30 V. F. Rudnev invited G. P. Belyaev and informed him about the beginning of the war and new circumstances, while he himself went to the Talbot. And it was only there, on board the British ship, that the Varyag commander at 09.30 finally received the ultimatum of S. Uriu, which we quoted above.
In fact, further events before the battle were extremely predictable, and we will not dwell on them excessively: as has been said many times before, the neutrality of Korea for foreign commanders did not cost anything, in Chemulpo they defended only the interests of their own powers. And these interests, of course, did not include the aggravation of relations with Japan, therefore it is not surprising that the commanders of the British, French, Italian and American ships decided to leave the raid if the Varyag did not go out to battle before the date indicated in the notification.
The meeting of the commanders was recorded in minutes (recall that the American commander was not present at it, he made his decision to leave the raid alone upon receipt of S. Uriu's notification), and in this protocol, under item 2, it is written:
“In case the Russian warships do not leave the raid, we decided to leave our anchorage before 4 pm and anchor further north, since in the current position our ships can be damaged if the Japanese squadron attacks Russian ships, regardless of our protest . However, in the very text of the protest, signed by the commanders of foreign stationaries, nothing was said about the decision to leave the battlefield. However, all this did not matter at all, since along with the protest to Rear Admiral S. Uriu, the protocol of the meeting of the commanders was also sent, so the Japanese Rear Admiral knew all the same about their decision to leave the raid. And if it were otherwise, the Anglo-French-Italian protest did not cease to be a mere formality: S. Uriu had ample opportunity to detect the departure of Talbot, Elba, Pascal and Vicksburg.
There is a lot of talk about the fact that the commander of the American gunboat did not sign this protest, in fact, he generally refused to participate in the meeting of commanders of the stationary (according to other sources, no one invited him to this meeting). But in fairness, it should be noted that the commanders signed their protest after V. F. Rudnev announced that he would attempt a breakthrough. Thus, this protest was completely formal, in fact it was a reminder to S. Uriu that his actions should not damage the property of England, France and Italy. And the fact that the commander of "Vicksburg" W. Marshall did not participate in all this, hardly did any damage to the honor of the American flag.
On the advice of the commanders of the inpatients V. F. Rudnev announced that he would not remain in the roadstead and would go to a breakthrough, but asked foreign stationaries to accompany him until he left neutral waters. Why was this done? We will not describe in detail the sailing directions of the water area, where the battle between the Varyag and Koreyets took place with the Japanese squadron, but only recall that from the Chemulpo raid to Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) led the fairway, which in the narrowest places had a width of up to a kilometer, or even slightly more. It was not too difficult to navigate this fairway in peacetime, but it would be difficult to maneuver at high speed on it (as shown by the Tsubame accident), and the Russian ships, which found themselves under the concentrated fire of the Japanese squadron, in general, would have nothing to oppose the enemy. The situation would have improved somewhat if the "Varyag" and "Koreyets" had managed to get closer to the island - behind it began a fairly wide stretch, on which S. Uriu's squadron was located in the battle on January 27. But at the same time, the territorial waters of Korea ended about three miles from about. Phalmido (and the islet itself was about 6 miles from the Chemulpo raid). In general, there were some chances that if the stationers had escorted the Varyag and the Koreyets to the border of territorial waters, the Japanese would not have fired as soon as the Russian ships crossed it and opened fire, only when the cruiser and gunboat the boat would have ended up in the reach, that is, where they could still maneuver. Not that V. F. Rudnev had some chances, but … it was still better than nothing. Of course, the commanders of the stationary units refused him this request, and it would be strange to expect otherwise from them.
The decisions of the council of commanders of inpatients shocked V. F. Rudnev. According to eyewitnesses, he "walking down the ladder of the English ship, said in a heartbreaking voice:" They drove us into a trap and doomed to death! " they interpret the mood of Russian sailors quite freely. Reading Japanese memoirs, we are surprised to find that on January 26, the "Korean" returned to Chemulpo, because "he collided with desperate brave men" - meaning the actions of the destroyers, whose valiant crews allegedly so "embarrassed" the Russians that they fled from them. Although, in fact, the Japanese attacked the gunboat when she was already turning back, and it is obvious that it was not the actions of the 9th destroyer detachment that prompted her to do this. And even if this were not so, it turns out that the Japanese sailors stopped the "Korean" by the strength of their unyielding spirit, and not at all by the fact that this spirit was reinforced by a squadron of six cruisers and four destroyers, showing aggressive intentions and immeasurably superior to the Russian ship in firepower …
Nevertheless, there is no smoke without fire, most likely, the Russian commander really did not expect such a decision: this tells us a lot about how V. F. Rudnev. In order to understand this, it is necessary to make very great efforts to abandon the afterthought: we know that Chemulpo's neutrality was ignored, and we understand why this happened. Therefore, it is strange for us: why could V. F. Rudnev? But imagine a similar situation somewhere in Manila - after the Tsushima battle, armored cruisers Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug come there, and suddenly, out of nowhere, a Japanese squadron, whose commander threatens to enter the harbor and will drown everyone, and the Americans wash their hands … It is not surprising that the Russian commanders would be shocked by such a turn of events, and to you, dear reader, such an idea would seem fantastic. So, apparently, Vsevolod Fedorovich was unshakably convinced that despite the violation of the neutrality of Korea (landing), the neutrality of the Chemulpo raid would be strictly observed (as, for example, the neutrality of the Philippines, where the Russian cruisers left after the Battle of Tsushima), and when it turned out otherwise, it was a big blow for him. V. F. Rudnev, it seems, until the very end believed that the Russian ships would remain safe while they were in the Chemulpo raid, and, proposing to the Russian envoy in Korea Pavlov to take the ships away, he probably did not fear that the Varyag and the Koreets would destroyed, but the fact that the Japanese are blocking them in the port. But the ultimatum of S. Uriu and the council of commanders of the stationers dispelled this illusion, so that V. F. Rudnev was faced with the need to lead his small detachment into battle against the many times superior enemy in the coming hours.
Vsevolod Fedorovich had to make a choice where to fight - to try to make an attempt to break through, or to stay on the Chemulpo raid, wait for the arrival of the Japanese ships and fight there. As we know, V. F. Rudnev chose the first, and today many lovers of the history of the navies accuse him of this, believing that, fighting in the roadstead, the Russian ship would have a better chance of harming the enemy. The logic in this case is simple: if the Varyag remains in the roadstead, then the roles change - now the Japanese will have to “crawl” along the narrow fairway, and they are unlikely to be able to enter into battle more than two cruisers at the same time. A Russian cruiser could fight with them for a while, and then, when the Japanese are close enough, rush forward, and either converge with the leading Japanese ships for a "pistol" (torpedo) shot, or even ram one of them. In any case, the battle would have turned out to be much more fierce, and the Varyag, having died in the fairway, would have made it difficult for ships to move along it.
All of the above looks very, very reasonable, but only on one condition - that the ships of Sotokichi Uriu will make an attempt to "break into" the raid in the daytime. At the same time, we know for certain that the Japanese rear admiral did not intend to do anything of the kind. The fact is that in the morning, at about 09.00, on January 27, all Japanese ships received order No. 30 signed by S. Uriu on combat plans for the current day: including the actions of the forces subordinate to him, in cases where the Varyag "And" Korean "will remain in the roadstead, and foreign stationers will be in their places, or the latter will leave, leaving the Russian ships alone.
We will not cite this order in full, because it is large enough and also includes those actions that have already been performed at the indicated time. Those who wish to familiarize themselves with this text in full, we will send to Polutov's wonderful monograph "Landing operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Incheon" on page 220, and here we will cite only the seventh section of this order:
“If the Russian ships do not leave the anchorage by 13.00 on February 9, the following action plan is accepted for execution:
All ships take up positions next to the flagship. The flagship is located on the N from the Sobol Islands.
a) if the ships of the neutral powers remain at the anchorage, then a torpedo attack is carried out in the evening:
b) if only Russian ships and a small number of foreign ships and vessels are at the anchorage, then an artillery attack is carried out by the forces of the entire detachment.
The attack on point "a" on the evening of February 9 is assigned to the 9th destroyer detachment. The squad leader must pay special attention to not inflicting damage on foreign ships and vessels.
The 2nd tactical group, together with the 14th destroyer detachment, occupies a position within sight of the Chemulpo anchorage, the 1st tactical group occupies a position in the rear of the 2nd tactical group.
In the event of an attack on point "b," the 2nd tactical group approaches the anchorage and takes up a position at a distance of up to 4 thousand meters from the enemy, the 1st tactical group takes a position in the rear of the 2nd tactical group. Each destroyer detachment keeps close to its tactical group and, having improved the favorable moment, attacks the enemy."
Recall that according to order No. 28 dated February 8 (January 26) 1904, the 1st tactical group included "Naniwa", "Takachiho", "Chiyoda" and the 9th destroyer detachment, and the 2nd tactical group - respectively, "Asama", "Akashi" and "Niitaka" with the 14th detachment of destroyers.
What would happen if the Russian ships remained in the roadstead? It is very simple - according to point "c" the Japanese ships would have entered the fairway leading to the roadstead in Chemulpo, and … would have stopped 4 kilometers (21, 5 cables) from the Varyag. From this distance, the Asama gunners, being protected by very decent armor, by the way, impenetrable neither for the 152-mm guns of the Varyag, nor for the 203-mm guns of the Koreyets, would simply shoot the Russian armored cruiser as in an exercise. It was hardly possible to count on the fact that the "Varyag" or "Koreets" in such conditions would be able to get close to the "Asama" at the range of a torpedo shot, but even if the Russian ships made such an attempt, they would have to enter the fairway, where there were Japanese ships - and when they would have come close enough (which is extremely doubtful, since they would have been shot earlier), "Varyag" and "Koreets" attacked the destroyers, and everything would be over.
But S. Uriu could change his mind and carry out the attack according to plan "a". Then, with the onset of dusk, the destroyers of the 4th detachment would enter the raid, and the 2nd tactical group would move behind them. In this case, the "Varyag" simply would have nowhere to go: let's once again look at the layout of the ships on the night of January 26-27 and pay attention to its scale.
We see that the Chemulpo raid itself is very small - in fact, it is about a water area about a mile wide, and two miles long. It is possible to go further north, but this would mean that the Varyag is hiding “under the skirt” of foreign stationers, such an action would be completely unacceptable from any position. It is impossible to confuse the "Varyag" with any stationary, because the Russian cruiser was the only ship that had four pipes, so its meeting with the destroyers is inevitable - there is nowhere to hide in the roadstead. And how energetically maneuver in such a small area is simply unrealistic. In other words, all hope is for guns, but by opening fire, the Varyag finally unmasks itself, becoming an easy prey both for destroyers and for the gunners of the cruisers of the 1st tactical group, who were assigned to follow the destroyers "holding the anchorage in line of sight". It was possible, of course, to try to simply anchor and put in anti-torpedo nets, but the problem is that such an action would make the ship motionless, and still does not guarantee complete protection from torpedoes. And you can shoot a stationary ship even in the evening twilight, even after waiting for dawn.
Thus, we see that the tactics that the Japanese were going to adhere to did not leave the "Varyag" and "Koreets" a single chance if the ships remained in the Chemulpo raid. As for V. F. Rudnev, his report gives a short and clear explanation of his reasons:
“The decision to go for a breakthrough and accept a battle outside the raid was more convenient on the following grounds:
1. Narrow roadstead did not give an opportunity to maneuver;
2. Fulfilling the admiral's demand, there was little hope that the Japanese would release from the skerries and fight at sea; the latter was preferable, since in the skerries one has to follow certain courses and, therefore, one cannot use all means of defense and attack;
3. Destruction of a cruiser in the raid, without an attempt to break through and accept a battle, absolutely could not take place; assuming the possible death of the cruiser one way or another, of course, it was necessary to inflict the greatest possible harm on the enemy, not sparing his life."
In other words, we see that V. F. Rudnev believed that in the cramped conditions of the raid, without being able to maneuver, he would become an easy prey for Japanese ships. Having examined the tactics that Sotokichi Uriu was going to adhere to, we understand that Vsevolod Fedorovich had every reason for such an opinion. At the same time, all the alternatives to raid combat offered "on the Internet" are based on the fact that the Japanese squadron will break through to the raid at all costs under the fire of the Varyag and Koreyets. That this was absolutely not necessary to do, and that it was enough just to shoot the Russian stationaries, walking at a low speed (or even stopping) in the fairway, while being able to fend off any oncoming dash of Russian ships with destroyers, respected fans of naval history, obviously, did not enter into their heads came. But Sotokichi Uriu knew this very well, and therefore we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Remaining in the roadstead, "Varyag" and "Koreets" did not receive any advantages at all, but at the same time the Russian stationaries risked senseless death if the Japanese carried out a successful attack with destroyers on the night of January 27-28. The question of how high the probability of a Varyag and Koreyets being blown up by mines in a night attack is beyond the scope of this series of articles, but it is assumed to be extremely high. The reasons that prompted the author to consider it as such will be presented by him in a separate, off-cycle article devoted to the night attacks of Japanese destroyers;
2. If the Japanese undertook a daytime artillery "assault", the "Varyag" and "Koreets" would find themselves in a similar, or even worse position than if they were trying to go out to sea along the fairway. That moving slowly along the roadstead, that slowly moving along the fairway, in each of these cases, they would be an excellent target for the main "weapon" of S. Uriu - a Japanese armored cruiser, which would not even need to approach them to destroy both ships.
3. At the same time, the entry of Russian ships into battle would be perceived by the public, the crews of foreign stationers, etc. as a feat, and this is always important: at the same time, an attempt to fight on the roadstead, although it would hardly become the reason for accusations of cowardice, but would not allow talking about the heroism of Russian sailors. If at the same time, due to some accident, civilians or European ships or vessels were injured, then this could become the basis for a serious international incident.
In fact, as we will see later, the Varyag commander had another, very compelling reason not to stay in the roadstead, but to go for a breakthrough. But the above is enough to make an unambiguous conclusion: the decision of V. F. Rudnev's attempt to make a breakthrough should be regarded as the only correct one in the current situation - both from a military point of view and from the standpoint of international politics.
There was very little time left before the battle. At 10.00 Vsevolod Fyodorovich returned to the Varyag after a meeting with the commanders of the stationary personnel, and after only an hour and ten minutes, at 11.10, the command "All up, take off the anchor!" By this time, all the final preparations for the battle were ready - wooden furniture, etc., were sent overboard, and the topmills were also cut down on the Koreyets in order to make it difficult to determine the distance to the gunboat. Secret books, maps, orders, codes were burned. At 11.20 the Varyag weighed anchor.
But before we move on to the description of the battle, we note the entry in the logbook, made in the morning before the battle and subsequently provoked a lot of ridicule by the revisionists:
“07.00 All Japanese ships weighed anchor and headed out to sea. Morning tidying. They cleaned the copper."
War is war, and lunch is on schedule! The ship is threatened with imminent death, and what else can the crew do, no matter how much the favorite thing of the Russian Imperial Navy is to scrape a copper! How can we not recall Lieutenant Livitin from the wonderful work of Sobolev "Overhaul", who, explaining to his younger brother-midshipman the peculiarities of the ship's service, including why he, the future officer, is driven to scrub the deck, notes: “There are things, the meaning of which is in their meaninglessness. " The morning tidying up, according to the "historians of the new wave", testifies to the inertness and mossiness of the officers and the commander of the "Varyag", who did not find a more important task for their team before the battle. Everything would be fine, that's just:
1. Actually, the cleaning began at 07.00, and the commander of the French cruiser, who notified V. F. Rudnev about the impending Japanese attack and S. Uriu's demands for foreign stationary personnel, arrived on the Varyag an hour later. That is, when the cleaning began, no one knew that in a little over four hours the cruiser would go into battle;
2. Every commander is well aware of the rule: "whatever the soldier does, if only …" I'm tired, in general. It must be said that the service on the Varyag in Chemulpo was not easy - it was cold (January!), There were no vacations ashore, with provisions … it is clear that no one was starving, but there were interruptions in supplies. And then there is a whole squadron of Japanese with transports, how to understand all this is unclear. In general, it was absolutely right to occupy the team with something, and current, usual things were perfect for this;
3. And, finally, for some reason it is forgotten that cleaning is one of the most important procedures for preparing a ship for battle. Let us recall Semyonov's memoirs (“Reckoning”): “Or something else: people who are accustomed to consider cleanliness as a fad of the authorities, who lived for a whole year, only“sweeping the rubbish,”suddenly so easily understood its meaning, its necessity, when they were simply explained that the wounded a deck that, while they pick it up and carry it away, dirt can get into the wound, and it turns out that because of an empty scratch you cut an arm or a leg, otherwise you won't save you from death."
To be continued!
Articles in this series:
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo January 27, 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 3. Boilers Nikloss
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 4. Steam machines
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 6. Across the Oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Ch. 7. Port Arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Part 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Ch. 9. The release of the "Korean"
The cruiser "Varyag". Battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. Ch. 10. Night
