In the article offered to your attention, we will try to understand the circumstances of the appearance on the cruiser of the most discussed element of its design, namely the Nikloss boilers.
As we said earlier, in this matter, the contracts for the construction of Varyag and Retvizan directly violated the requirements of the ITC, and usually sources blame the drafters of the contract. The official history, represented by such authors as R. M. Melnikov, claims that Nikloss's boilers turned out to be extremely unreliable, which is why their installation on the Varyag led to the fact that in daily operation the cruiser's power plant constantly broke down and went out of order - accordingly, the contract speed "in life" turned out to be unattainable. Subsequently, already in our "times free from the heavy legacy of socialism", a different point of view took shape, according to which the MTK specialists were uniform retrogrades and only for this reason insisted on the installation of hopelessly outdated Belleville boilers, while all progressive mankind was switching to new types of steam boilers. According to this point of view, it is not the design of the boilers that is to blame for the constant problems and accidents of Nikloss's boilers, but the low qualifications of the Varyag machine commands. In other words, the fact that Nikloss's boilers required more qualified maintenance is usually not disputed, but it is argued that the qualifications of machine teams in other fleets quite allowed them to operate these boilers, but not in ours, and that in all the problems of the Varyag power plant "We ourselves are to blame.
Let's try to understand all this with an open mind.
Let's start with the outdated Belleville boilers. As you know, at the end of the 19th century, there was a transition from fire tube (or cylindrical) boilers to water tube boilers, which had a number of significant operational advantages. At the same time, there were many water tube boilers of various types, and the Belleville boilers were just one of many such boilers.
And yes, indeed, for the first time in the domestic fleet, boilers of this type were installed on the armored frigate Minin during its modernization in 1887.
However, after that, the Naval Ministry took a "time-out", either observing the operation of boilers of this type, or under the influence of the fact that the rest of the world was somehow in no hurry to abandon fire-tube boilers. They especially paid attention to England - for example, when designing the armored cruiser Rurik (laid down in 1892), preference was given to fire tube boilers for the reason that the British do not use them. They even abandoned a mixed power plant, in which some of the boilers would be water-tube, and some - fire-tube, which was proposed by N. Ye. Kuteinikov.
Oddly enough, but the Russian fleet began to widely introduce Belleville boilers only 6 years after their installation on the "Minin". Large warships, laid down in the late 1880s and early 1890s, were still equipped with fire tube boilers. They were received by the squadron battleships Navarin, Sisoy the Great, Three Saints, Rostislav, as well as a series of battleships of the Poltava type - they became the last squadron battleships with “cylindrical” (that is, fire tube) boilers. The massive transition to water tube boilers took place later: the first squadron battleships to receive these boilers in Russia were ships of the Peresvet type (the head was laid down in 1895), the armored cruiser Russia (laid down in 1893), the armored cruiser Svetlana "(1895). You can, of course, scold the Maritime Department for this, it is not clear why a reasonable six-year pause in the introduction of water-tube boilers, but let's see what happened in the fleets of other countries of the world.
England. The first large ships of the Royal Navy to receive the Belleville boilers were the Powerfull and Terribl, laid down in 1894. From then until the events we are describing (that is, until 1898), the British preferred to install Belleville boilers on their cruisers. Armored "Diadem", laid down in 1895-1897, armored cruisers "Cressy" (1898-1899) and "Drake" (1899) - they all received Belleville boilers, and only in the subsequent series of 10 armored cruisers of the " Kent "some ships received boilers of other types:" Berwick "and" Suffolk "got boilers of Nikloss," Cornwall "- boilers of Babcock, but it should be taken into account that these three ships of the series were laid by the British already in 1901! In other words, not that massively abandoning Belleville boilers in favor of some other ones, but even simply testing boilers of other types on serial large ships, the British took a chance only in the 20th century.
The same can be said about the British battleships - a series of the famous "Majestic", which gave rise to the "classic" battleships of the late 19th and early 20th centuries around the world, and laid down in 1894-1895 still carried fire-tube boilers. The transition to Belleville water-tube boilers in the Royal Navy took place only on the next series - six battleships of the "Canopus" type, laid down in the period 1896-1898.
In other words, it was in 1898 that England made a massive transfer of the main force of its fleet to the "outdated" boilers of Belleville. And what about other countries?
The first large French ship to receive Belleville boilers was the battleship Brennus, laid down in 1889. Since then, boilers of this type have been firmly "registered" on French warships. Battleships of the types "Charles Martel", "Charlemagne", "Jena" (the last one was laid in 1897) - all of them carried the boilers of Belleville. And only "Sufferen", founded in 1899, received Nikloss's boilers. True, the French began to experiment on "non-capital" ships earlier - so, in 1897, the battleship of the 2nd class (actually - coastal defense) "Henri IV" with Nikloss boilers was laid, and in 1898-1899. three armored cruisers of the "Montcalm" class were laid down, one of which received the Belleville boilers, the second - Niklossa, and the third - Norman-Sigody. As for the armored cruisers, the French obviously did not decide on the most suitable type of power plant for them and experimented with might and main: for example, in 1894 they laid the D'Antrcasto with fire tube boilers, and almost immediately, in 1895, the Guichen with boilers was laid Lagrafel d'Alley systems. But in the same 1895 "Chatoreno" with boilers of Norman-Sigody stood on the stocks, and in 1897 the French began construction of "Juren de la Graviere" with boilers designed by Guyot du Temple! It is usually indicated that for the first time the Nikloss boilers were installed by the French on the armored cruiser of the 2nd class "Freant", but the fact is that the series included three ships, one of which was built with Belleville boilers, the second with Nikloss boilers, and the third - with boilers of the Lagrafel D'Alley system. Uniform disaster!
Germany? On April 1, 1895, the first German armored cruiser "Fuerst Bismarck" was laid down, and there is no consensus in the sources about the boilers installed on it - either Schultz or Duerr. In the next 1896, 5 armored cruisers of the "Maria Louise" class were laid down, two of which were equipped with Belleville boilers, two by Dürr, and one by Nikloss. In 1898 (in December, that is, after the Russian competition), the Germans began construction of the "Prince Heinrich" with Dürr boilers. At the same time, the Germans did not dare to move away from the fire-tube boilers on the battleships - three ships from the series of battleships of the Kaiser Friedrich III type each had 10 fire-tube boilers, and only on the Kaiser Friedrich III itself there were 8 fire-tube and 4 boilers of the Thornycroft system, and on the "Kaiser Wilhelm II" - 8 fire tube and 4 Schultz systems. But these five ships were laid down in 1895-1898, and at the time of the competition were considered the newest German battleships! However, on the next series of Wittelsbach-class ships (and this is already 1899-1900!) It was the same - their power plants were a mixture of fire tube boilers and boilers from Schultz or Thornycroft.
USA? In 1896 they laid down their next battleships - "Kearsarge" and "Kentucky" - with purely fire-tube boilers. But the armored cruiser "Brooklyn", which entered service in the same year, had Belleville boilers.
The United States did not build any other large ships during this period.
Based on the foregoing, we can state the following - as of 1898, the Belleville boilers were absolutely modern and, by the way, the only type of water-tube boiler, which confirmed their high qualities in practice. What obsolescence of the Belleville boilers in 1898 can we speak of if the two major maritime powers (the USA and Germany) have not yet made the transition to water-tube boilers and continued to be content with fire-tube boilers? If the second fleet of the world, the French, built all its 1st class battleships with Belleville boilers? If the ruler of the seas herself - England just laid down her first series of battleships equipped with these boilers? And in the Russian fleet, by the way, besides the "Minin" of the large ships in April 1898, only the armored cruiser "Russia" was in service ("Svetlana" was handed over in March 1898)
We should also remember this when we read about the breakdowns of Belleville boilers on our ships - for example, what happened on the battleship Pobeda. The fact is that in the Russian Imperial Navy there was a situation when "there was not a penny, but suddenly altyn!" and "Diana", and "Bayan", and "Thunderbolt" … Where could we get trained machine commands for this splendor? Where was it to be taught? On the battleships of the coastal defense of the "Senyavin" type, which were in the training detachment, there were fire-tube boilers, but where else? On the cruiser "Russia", which left for the Far East almost immediately after completion of construction? On the Svetlana, which was used as a grand-ducal yacht? In general, the combination of all-round economy, with a well-known contempt for the "Beelzebubs" (as our naval engineers scornfully called them) did their dirty deed - they did not carry out a massive retraining of teams for the Belleville boilers, apparently hoping that they would figure it out somehow themselves - well, teams and understood … as best they could. However, in fairness, it should be noted that problems with the transition to a new type of boilers were observed in other countries, including England.
However, let us return to the order of the ITC regarding the Varyag power plant. All of the above seems to convince us that MTK made the right decision regarding the cruiser boilers and its demands to install Belleville boilers on the Varyag are completely justified. And if not for the sly Charles Crump, then …
But this, alas, is a wrong conclusion, because, despite all their obvious and indisputable merits, the Belleville boilers were completely unsuitable for an armored cruiser of the 1st rank, conceived by our Naval Department. After all, what happened? The naval department tried to independently create an armored cruiser with Belleville boilers, the specialists tried, worked, but what was the result? Ships over 6,600 tons with a displacement, a speed of 20 knots (no one knew that the Diana-class cruisers even this in 1898) and only eight 152-mm cannons. Now, just two years after the start of construction (despite the fact that the official laying of the "Dian" took place in 1897, construction began in 1896), the Naval Department wanted to receive a ship of 6,000 tons, with a speed of 23 knots and a dozen 152-mm guns - and all the same Belleville boilers. Obviously, such requirements were outrageous for any shipbuilding company in the world, and there is a persistent feeling that the ITC perfectly understood the impossibility of creating a ship with specified performance characteristics. Therefore, they were ready to "bargain" in matters of displacement, and, in general, in other matters too.
As you know, in the competition in 1898 won the firm "Germany", presenting the project of the cruiser, which later became "Askold". But then another German firm, Vulkan, proposed, albeit belatedly, a more perfect Bogatyr project. As a result, for the Russian Empire, according to one technical task, three different companies built three armored cruisers of different projects. What they had in common was that none of them had Belleville boilers installed. Boilers of the Thornycroft-Schultz system were installed on the "Akold" (which is somewhat incomprehensible, since in the German fleet itself, Schultz boilers and Thornycroft boilers were distinguished separately). Norman boilers were installed on the Bogatyr.
What did the use of such boilers give? Saving weight, of course. Thus, the power plant of the Bogatyr-class cruisers had a nominal power of 19,500 hp, and its weight was 1,200 tons. In fairness, let us clarify that the weight is given according to the weight sheet of Oleg, and not of the Bogatyr himself, but it is unlikely that they differed significantly. We will not now recall the Dian power plant (almost 1,620 tons with a power of only 11,610 hp), but let us turn to the armored cruiser Bayan, built in France, which, in general, can be considered the same age as the Bogatyr. The Bayan was expected to reach a 21-knot speed, and therefore, although it was somewhat larger than the Bogatyr, its power plant had a rated power of 16,500 hp. But "Bayan" was equipped with Belleville boilers, and the weight of its machines and boilers was as much as 1,390 tons.
In other words, for one ton of mass of the “Bogatyr” power plant there were 16, 25 horsepower, and for one ton of the “Bayan” power plant - only 11, 87 hp. Direct recalculation is unlikely to be correct, but still we are not much mistaken, assuming that to provide 19,500 hp. (as on "Bogatyr") would require a power plant with Belleville boilers weighing about 1,640 tons. In other words, in order to place the Belleville boilers on the Bogatyr cruiser, it was necessary to find somewhere a weight saving of 440 tons. What sacrifices would have to be made in this case are shown by two simple figures - the weight of all the artillery weapons of the Bogatyr together with the tower mechanisms (but, apparently, without the armor of the towers) was 550 tons, and the total mass of the armor was 865 tons.
Theoretically, perhaps, with the Belleville boilers, it would be possible to get a high-speed cruiser with a displacement of 6,500 tons and a speed of 23 knots, but it would be such an incomprehensible crystal-like thing, and with such a minimum of armor and weapons, that there is no military point in building such there was no ship.
Consequently, the fact that Charles Crump immediately refused to use the Belleville boilers on the Varyag (there is a separate conversation about the Retvizan), if it says anything, it is only about the professionalism of Mr. Ch. Crump, who immediately realized the impossibility construction of a high-speed cruiser with specified parameters.
Such a statement may seem inconsistent to the reader - well, of course, because the author of the entire previous article in the cycle told what Charles Crump is a resourceful and roguish predator. But the fact is that life, neither now, nor then, did not consist of black and white - either a knight on a white horse, or a serpent, defeated by him. Of course, Ch. Crump is both resourceful and crooked, but that does not mean that he was a worthless shipbuilder.
But whether Ch. Crump was right when he proposed Nikloss's boilers is another question.
I must say that Internet battles about Nikloss's boilers do not subside to this day. On the one hand, it seems to be perfectly clear that their design is much more complicated than that of the boilers of the same Belleville, there is numerous evidence of the capriciousness of these boilers, conclusions about their unsuitability for domestic ships, and they did not take root, did not become the main one fleet of the world. But the supporters of the point of view that these boilers were quite capable, only required a high level of training of stokers, have a very strong argument in defense of their point of view. Yes, Nikloss's boilers did not really conquer the world, but nevertheless they were installed on many ships of the USA, France, England, etc. And here's what is interesting - if the sailors of some countries were unhappy with them and scolded Nikloss for what the light was, then in other countries nothing of the kind is observed - it seems that boilers are like boilers, maybe not the best in the world, but some serious complaints about them there was no work. From this it is usually concluded that in those countries where the operation of Nikloss boilers did not cause any special problems, the seafarers were sufficiently prepared to handle them, and the seafarers of other countries where such problems occurred should be criticized less, and should be engaged more combat and political training, then, you see, there was no reason to swear.
Let's try to figure out who is right, and start with the design features of steam boilers of that time, trying to describe them as easily and easily as possible.
What was the fire tube boiler? Roughly speaking, this is a firebox on which a container of water is placed. But in this case, the heat would only heat the lower part of the container, and this was too slow, so "smoke tubes" were inserted into the water container, passing through the entire container with water from the firebox to the top of the container - the heat from the fire rose through these pipes, heated them and the water around them. Actually, from this, the boilers received the name fire tube.
Water-tube boilers worked exactly the opposite - pipes were laid in the furnace through which water flowed, respectively, the flame heated these pipes and the water inside them. If we look at the Belleville boilers, we will see that these pipes were made up by a "ladder" inside the boiler - water was supplied to the lower one, it entered the upper ones in the form of steam, which went into the steam collector.
It seems that the design is simple and straightforward, and what else can you think of? Nikloss's firm came up with: instead of a regular pipe, they used a "nesting doll", one pipe was inserted into the other. Water was supplied through an inner tube of small diameter, which (already in the form of a steam-water suspension) entered the outer one (the outer tube had a plug at the end, but the inner one remained open). In order for this system to work, in the Nikloss boiler, such a unit was provided as a junction box, into which the hot water pipes were "stuck".
At the same time, in one part of the junction box there was water supplied to the "inner" pipes, and steam from the "outer" pipes entered the other part of it, and from there it entered the steam collector. The special pride of the Nikloss company was the way of fastening the pipes and the junction box - these were special clamps, opening which it was easy to pull the tube out without disassembling the boiler itself (but at Belleville this was impossible). Thus, excellent maintainability of Nikloss boilers was achieved.
In general, the design of the Nikloss boilers was more complex, but potentially much more efficient than that of the Belleville boilers. However, MTK specialists almost immediately saw two weaknesses in it, which could lead to numerous breakdowns.
The first is the junction box, which was located dangerously close to the firebox and, of course, heated up from it. The Nikloss boiler junction box was made of ductile iron, and MTC quite rightly pointed out that such a complex and full of holes, being subjected to constant but uneven heating, will experience strong internal stresses that can lead to its deformation or even to the formation of cracks.
The second is the formation of scale in the pipes. In Belleville boilers, the consequences of this unpleasant process (which could ultimately lead to pipe burnout) were removed through a procedure called "blowing" - the author of this article, unfortunately, does not know how and with what the water pipes were blown. Nevertheless, this worked in the Belleville boilers, but not in the Nikloss boilers, and in order to clean the water pipes from scale and so on, they had to be completely removed from the boiler. However, the constant reaching of the tubes "back and forth" naturally should have led to the fact that the clamps, which ensure the tightness of the connection between the tubes and the junction box, loosened over time and no longer provide the required tightness. In addition, it should be understood that the pipes in any case covered the burn from the side of the firebox, they seemed to "stick" to the junction box, which is why it was not easy to pull them out even with a perfectly working lock - often a sledgehammer and a blowtorch were needed for this. Under such conditions, it is understandable that it was even more difficult to ensure the work of the clamp. Actually, a significant part of the accidents of Nikloss boilers happened this way - the lock holding the tube broke and the tube “crawled out” during the operation of the boiler - and, of course, the steam under pressure burst out and did its dirty deed.
So, the key issue in the efficiency of Nikloss boilers was precisely that they required the highest quality manufacturing of the junction box, clamps and tubes. How difficult was it to achieve the desired quality?
Let us recall that the head of the Marine Ministry P. P. Tyrtov raised the issue of the production of Nikloss boilers at the Baltic plant. However, the plant manager, S. K. Ratnik, although he confirmed the fundamental possibility of manufacturing the main parts, refused to guarantee the quality of the junction boxes. Probably, the Baltic plant was not the best plant of the ecumene, but certainly not the worst, and even if the required quality was not provided there, then who then could guarantee it at all? Probably some of the best businesses in the world.
And now let's ask ourselves a question - who, in fact, produced Nikloss's boilers? Alas, the answer "Nikloss's firm" will be too general and not entirely correct, because, as you can understand, boilers of this design were produced by different countries and at different factories. Perhaps the last major warships to receive the Nikloss boilers were the Courbet-class French dreadnoughts. But their construction began in 1910, that is, four years after J & A Niclausse stopped dealing with steam boilers for ships and reclassified to the production of cars with internal combustion engines.
But if so, then a natural question arises: can we expect that all these boilers of the same design, but completely different manufacturing plants, were of the same quality? Obviously not: and here is the time to recall the monograph by R. M. Melnikov, in which, when describing the order of Nikloss' boilers for "Varyag", he indicates:
"Meanwhile, the Chicago plant, which Crump had arbitrarily chosen, is starting production of Nikloss boilers for the first time."
What was the quality of the products of this plant? As you know, a skillfully minted crack was found in the manifold (junction box) of one of the boilers. That is, the plant did not even cope with the manufacture of the part, it was initially defective, and what quality can we talk about here?
Based on the foregoing, the author of this article makes the following assumption (this is a hypothesis, no more). The efficiency of Nikloss boilers largely depended not only on the quality of service, but also on the quality of workmanship. In those countries that were able to ensure the highest quality standards in their production, these boilers did not cause any special complaints, but where such quality was not ensured, the sailors drank with them grief. The boilers of the cruiser "Varyag", alas, were of poor quality, hence the problems of the crew of the cruiser "Varyag".
True, this raises the question - is it possible to base such a conclusion on just a few words of one, even a very respected author? Of course not, but let's see what happened to the Nikloss boilers in the USA. Let us repeat once again - we are not interested in the experience of their use in England or France for the simple reason that boilers for ships of these countries were produced at other, non-American factories, and, in accordance with our hypothesis, it makes no sense to compare them with US products.
So, as you know, the US admirals in 1898, comparing the results of the operation of their low-board "Indian", which was rather a type of extremely powerful coastal defense battleship and the only high-board battleship "Iowa" built in the United States at that time, made an unambiguous verdict about the preference of ocean-going ships … Here, the Retvizan project came in very handy, and the US Navy ordered the construction of three Maine-class battleships, which were laid down in 1899-1900.
At the same time, the lead ship of the series - the Maine itself, which entered service at the end of 1902, received Nikloss's boilers, the other two - boilers of the Thornycroft system. What's next?
The next series of US battleships - five Virginia-class ships, laid down in 1901-1902, became a real triumph for the Nikloss boilers - 4 out of 5 battleships received them (the Babcock-Wilcox boilers were installed on the lead Virginia). But in the subsequent Connecticut series, founded in 1903-1905, Nikloss's boilers mysteriously disappeared - their place was replaced by Babcock-Wilcox products.
And the same thing happened among the armored cruisers. After distinguished himself in the Spanish-American war, "Brooklyn", in 1901-1902. a series of armored cruisers of the "Pennsylvania" class, consisting of six ships, stood on the slipways. As far as the author knows, two ships from this series - "Pennsylvania" and "Colorado" received Nikloss boilers. But on the next "large cruisers" - four ships of the "Tennessee" class, Nikloss's boilers were not installed - only Babcock-Wilcox.
We also know that the power plant of the battleship Maine caused numerous complaints from the US sailors, which is why the ship was even called the "coal eater." And it is of considerable interest that before 1902, that is, while the battleship Maine was still under construction, the Americans widely used Nikloss's boilers for large ships under construction, but since 1903, after the Maine entered service, they completely stopped this make. Of course, one should never forget the logical rule: "after that, it does not mean because of this," but … In total, with Nikloss's boilers, the Americans built seven large ships - five battleships and two armored cruisers. So, later they replaced Nikloss's boilers with boilers of a different design on five of them: the Maine itself, two battleships of the Virginia class and both armored cruisers. And this is about something, yes it says.
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude: Ch. Crump was absolutely right in rejecting the Belleville boilers for the Varyag, but he should not have been allowed to replace these boilers with the American version of Nikloss's boilers. The naval department should have insisted on using boilers of the Schultz-Thornycroft or Norman-Sigody system, which were later installed on the Askold and Bogatyr cruisers and with which the "crooked" mechanical engineers of our fleet were perfectly controlled. And after all, interestingly, MTK specialists understood the potential problems of Nikloss boilers, so why did they end up in a contract with Ch. Crump's firm?
Indeed, in relation to our Naval Ministry in this case, the proverb would be best suited: "The left hand does not know what the right is doing." Apparently, this was the case: V. P. Verkhovsky, who, as you know, was a supporter of Nikloss's boilers, bypassing the MTC, convinced the admiral-general of the excellent quality of these boilers and the latter authorized them to be included in the agreement with Kramp. MTK specialists were just a little late: on April 14, 1898, just 3 days after the signing of contracts for the construction of Retvizan and Tsarevich, MTK issued a decree categorically prohibiting the use of Nikloss boilers on warships of the Russian fleet. Alas…
Can we consider that "the scoundrel and scoundrel Ch. Crump slipped unusable boilers to the Russian sailors"? Oddly enough - no, nothing like that. The fact is that at the time of the conclusion of the contract, advertising of Nikloss boilers was very strong and there were reports of their successful use, but information about the problems arising during their operation had not yet become public. Thus, Ch. Crump did not wish bad for the Russian imperial fleet at all - he chose effective, and, by all accounts, quite successful boilers for the Varyag and Retvizan, which were also successful for Crump himself, since they were produced directly in the USA and there would be no need to order them somewhere in Europe, to carry them to the USA, to incur extra costs from this … That is, Ch. Crump's decision does not at all mean that he is some kind of pest, based on the information that was in his disposal, he made a completely logical choice. Unfortunately, this choice turned out to be wrong.
So who's to blame? Generally speaking, there is a great desire to blame everything on V. P. Verkhovsky - apparently, it was he who became the "conductor" of Ch. Crump's ideas. But even here everything is not so simple.
Let us recall the story with the boilers of the armored cruiser Rurik. NOT. Kuteinikov then advocated the installation of Belleville boilers, which, in his opinion, were much better than fire-tube boilers, but he was stopped by the caution of other officials who preferred old, less efficient, but time-tested boilers. Doesn't it look like anything? V. P. Verkhovsky, after all, could also see retrogrades in the ITC, who, out of habit, did not want to accept something new … Today, in the case of Rurik, we criticize the inertia of the Maritime Department, because we know that the Belleville boilers turned out to be better. But what would happen if N. E. Kuteinikov had the opportunity, bypassing the others, to order the Belleville boilers for Rurik and would he do it? We would see him as a hero. But N. E. Kuteinikov did not have such an opportunity. And V. P. Verkhovsky - there was, and who knows what motives the admiral actually proceeded from in the process of "promoting" Nikloss's boilers? Today it is easy for us to judge, because we know what happened later, but V. P. Verkhovsky could not know this. In other words, V. P. Verkhovsky in this matter is completely unclear - from a banal bribe, and to a sincere desire to arrange everything in the best way, even if bypassing the ITC.
Therefore, the only person whom we can rightfully blame for what happened is Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who, by the Lord's permission, ended up in the post of admiral-general.
Those same "7 pounds of the august meat" that provided such "management" to the Ministry of the Navy entrusted to him, under which specifications for the latest ships of the fleet with Nikloss's boilers are signed today, and tomorrow these same boilers are anathema.
