In the final article of the cycle, we will bring together all the main facts and conclusions that we made in the previous materials.
The history of the cruiser "Varyag" began in an extremely strange way: the contract with Ch. Kramp (on our part, it was signed by the head of the GUKiS, Vice-Admiral V. P. competitive projects of other foreign firms were considered. At the same time, in fact, Ch. Crump did not present any project of the cruiser at all: the contract implied that the American industrialist would create such a project based on the specification, which, however, should have been agreed upon after the contract was signed. The contract itself contained only a preliminary specification of the most general nature, while it contained a lot of shortcomings: discrepancies in the English and Russian texts of documents, unclear wording, arithmetic errors, and - most strangely - the document contained direct violations of the requirements of the Marine Technical Committee (MTK). And, finally, the cost of the contract and the procedure for determining the over-contract payments were disadvantageous for Russia and, subsequently, raised questions from the state controller, Senator T. I. Filippov, to which the Maritime Department could not answer in any satisfactory manner. On the whole, it can be stated that the contract with the American industrialist was drawn up extremely illiterately.
One of the major violations was the permission to use Nikloss boilers on the new cruiser, while MTC insisted on Belleville boilers. In fact, the requirements of the Naval Department for the newest cruisers could not be satisfied with the Belleville boilers, and, subsequently, the ITC was forced to abandon this requirement - both "Askold" and "Bogatyr" were equipped with boilers of other systems (Schultz-Tonikroft, Norman), but MTC strongly objected to Niklossa's boilers, considering them unreliable. Unfortunately, the specialists were late, and the ban on the use of Nikloss boilers in the Russian Imperial Navy was signed three days later than the contracts for the construction of Retvizan and Varyag. In this matter, Vice Admiral V. P. Verkhovsky acted on his own initiative and contrary to the requirements of the ITC: however, in fairness, it should be noted that at that time there was no reliable evidence of the viciousness of the design of Nikloss's boilers. MTK came to its conclusions not from operating experience, but on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the design.
In fact, the history of the operation of Nikloss boilers is very peculiar, because individual ships that received boilers of this type sailed the seas quite successfully (at least at first) - in other cases, the operation of such boilers led to numerous accidents. From this, a conclusion is usually drawn about the insufficient qualification of machine commands, but our analysis shows that another interpretation is also possible - Nikloss's boilers required such a jewelry fit of parts (removable tubes to collectors), which, if it could be provided, then only at the best enterprises in the world … At the same time, boilers "Varyag" were produced by an American enterprise, which had not been engaged in Nikloss boilers before. This, and the fact that the US Navy immediately abandoned the Nikloss boilers immediately after receiving minimal experience in their operation, and, subsequently, converted five of the seven ships originally built with Nikloss boilers to other brands of boilers, indicate that the problems with the boilers of Russian ships, they are still much more connected not with the professionalism of the crew, but with their low quality, boilers, and manufacturing. Well, in those cases when Nikloss's boilers were manufactured at first-class European factories, they, at least for the first time, worked quite stably.
The design flaws of the Varyag boilers, unfortunately, were supplemented by the unsuccessful adjustment of its machines. They worked stably only at high steam pressure (15, 4 atmospheres), otherwise the low-pressure cylinders did not fulfill their function - instead of rotating the crankshaft that drove the ship's propellers, they were themselves driven by the crankshaft. Naturally, such stresses were not provided for by the design, which quickly loosened bearings and other structural elements of the cruiser's steam engines. As a result, a vicious circle was formed - it was dangerous to operate Nikloss's boilers, creating a high steam pressure, and with a small one, the machine gradually destroyed itself. According to the opinion of the most experienced engineer I. I. Gippius, who thoroughly studied the Varyag machines in Port Arthur:
“Here the guess is that the Crump plant, in a hurry to hand over the cruiser, did not have time to adjust the steam distribution; the machine quickly got upset, and on the ship, of course, they began to fix the parts that suffered more than others in the sense of heating, knocking, without eliminating the root cause. In general, it is undoubtedly an extremely difficult task, if not impossible, to straighten a vehicle that was initially faulty from the factory by ship means."
Unfortunately, all these circumstances were not revealed when the ship was handed over to the fleet. It is difficult to say whether this was a consequence of the mistakes of the selection committee, or the result of pressure from C. Crump, who sought to adhere not to the spirit, but to the letter of the contract. Another "six-thousander" cruiser "Askold" was not accepted by the commission until it reached the speed prescribed by the contract, without having any damage in the car, but in the case of the "Varyag" this was not done: it was accepted by the fact of reaching the contractual speed, despite the fact that after that his power plant needed significant repairs.
As a result, the service of the cruiser "Varyag" turned into endless torment with the power plant: for example, during the transition from Philadelphia to Russia and further, the cruiser had 102 running days to Port Arthur, but in order to provide them, it took at least 73 days repairs at parking areas and in ports, and this is not counting the repairs that were carried out at sea during the transitions (and this was done, the cruiser went to parts of the boilers, the rest were being repaired). Nothing of the kind was observed on the ships of the domestic fleet of French or Russian construction. After arriving in Port Arthur, the cruiser immediately got up for repairs: in 1902, upon leaving the armed reserve, the Pacific Ocean Squadron was engaged in combat training for 9 months, and the Varyag spent almost half of this time in repairs and as a personal yacht of the great Prince Kirill Vladimirovich (who took it into his head to visit Taka). In 1903, the situation was even worse - while the squadron was intensively training for 7 months (from March to September), the Varyag for the first 3, 5 months was subjected to various kinds of tests designed to determine the success of winter repairs, as well as an endless bulkhead of mechanisms (engineer I. I. Gippius was working on the cruiser at that time). For the next 3, 5 months, the cruiser stood in repair, which, alas, was as unsuccessful as the previous ones - the Varyag could stably maintain a speed of no more than 16-17 knots, for a short time it could develop 20, but with the risk of boiler accidents or damage to vehicles. When the "Varyag" finally came out of repair, a review began, which was arranged for the squadron by the governor E. I. Alekseev: during the last boat training there were many, but there was almost no combat training at all. As if all this was not enough, at the end of 1903 many old servicemen were demobilized from the cruiser (as well as from other ships of the squadron), including almost half of the gunners.
On the whole, it can be stated that by the time she left for Chemulpo, the Varyag cruiser was a slow-moving (she lost even to Pallada and Diana) cruiser with a trained crew. Despite the fact that V. I. Baer, and his successor as commander of the cruiser "Varyag" V. F. Rudnev, made great efforts to train gunners, endless downtime in repairs, especially during the 1903 campaign, in which the cruiser practically did not take part, led to the fact that the Varyag was much inferior in the quality of artillery training to other ships of the squadron.
Unlike most of the other ships of the squadron, the cruiser was not put into the armed reserve and at the end of 1903 she was sent as a stationary to the Korean port of Chemulpo, where she arrived on December 29 - less than a month remained before the famous battle.
Arriving in Chemulpo V. F. Rudnev found himself in an information vacuum. Politically, and at the highest level, the situation was as follows: Russia was not ready to start a war in 1904, and everyone realized this, including the tsar and his governor Alekseev. Korea was seen not as an independent state, but only as a battleground for Japanese and Russian interests - and it was also seen by other European and Asian powers. Therefore, if the Japanese began annexing Korea without declaring war on Russia, it was decided to accept this and not interfere - these were the instructions received by the commander of the cruiser Varyag, who was directly forbidden to interfere with the Japanese landing.
Soon after V. F. Rudnev found numerous evidences that the Japanese were going to land troops in Chemulpo, and regularly reported this to the authorities, without receiving, however, any additional instructions. They did not even bother to inform him about the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, although such rumors reached him, however, the envoy of Russia to Korea A. I. Pavlov did not confirm them. V. F. Rudnev, it seems, much better than the envoy sensed the full danger of the situation and offered to leave Korea, but A. I. Pavlov did not agree to this either, refusing to give instructions.
Since, due to the lack of orders to the Russian commanders and diplomats, there was a feeling that the Japanese were intercepting V. F. Rudnev and AI Pavlov, a "Korean" was sent to Port Arthur with a report. By chance, the gunboat moved to the sea just when the Japanese squadron with the landing force approached Chemulpo - they collided at the exit from the territorial waters, which caused some confusion among the Japanese, who did not know how to act - they would have sunk the Korean if he had met them in the sea, but in view of the raid and foreign stationers, they did not do this. "Asama" went out of order, maneuvering so as to be between the "Koreyets" and the transports with the landing force, which, most likely, was perceived by the gunboat commander G. P. Belyaev as an attempt to block his exit to the sea. The Korean turned into a raid, and at that time was attacked by Japanese destroyers operating without orders - during a short skirmish (two torpedoes were fired, the gunboat responded with two shells), the Japanese destroyer Tsubame was injured, did not calculate the maneuver and flew to the stones, as a result of which its propellers were damaged, limiting the ship's speed to 12 knots.
The charges against V. F. Rudnev in the fact that he did not support the "Koreets" with fire and did not prevent the landing of the Japanese landing force by force are completely groundless. From the cruiser they could not see the use of torpedoes by the Japanese and could only hear the shots of the Koreyets, and this was not a good reason for the immediate opening of fire: after all, if the Korean entered the battle, he continued to shoot back, but this did not happen - it means nothing to him does not threaten. A couple of shots from a small-bore gun could be warning, or even made by mistake. The Varyag commander simply had no right to interfere with the Japanese landing - he had instructions not to interfere with the landing. In addition, he did not have the physical ability to do this - by the time when G. P. arrived on the Varyag. Belyaev and reported on the torpedo attack, four Japanese destroyers of the 9th detachment had already entered the roadstead and were stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Russian ships.
In other words, there was no need to open fire to protect the Koreyets, since by the time this could have been done, the gunboat was no longer in danger. But if the "Varyag" still started shooting, this would have led to a violation of V. F. Rudnev, the order he received, violation of the neutrality of Korea and the war with Japan, which was completely unfavorable for Russia, in addition, it was fraught with complications in international politics, since it endangered foreign hospitals in the Chemulpo raid. In addition, in the event of an open fire, both Russian ships would be very quickly destroyed without any benefit, since they were at gunpoint of destroyers and cruisers of S. Uriu's squadron entering the raid.
Of course, firing torpedoes at a Russian warship should not have gone unpunished, but in this case, the measure of "punishment" was to be determined by the leadership of the Russian Empire, but not by the commander of the 1st rank cruiser.
The battle of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" with the Japanese squadron took place the next day - in fact, at V. F. Rudnev still had evening and night in order to take some action. However, he had no choice - he could not attack the Japanese transports for the above reasons, and he could not leave the raid, since he was under the gun of Japanese destroyers, which could sink the Russian ships immediately, or escort them before leaving international waters in order to destroy them immediately as soon as they leave neutral territory. Numerous alternative scenarios for the Varyag's night breakthrough "sin" with one assumption - that such a breakthrough would catch the Japanese squadron by surprise, and it would be unprepared for battle. Today, from the reports and orders of the Japanese commanders, we know for sure that nothing of the kind happened - Sotokichi Uriu feared not only and not so much Russian stationary personnel as the possibility of additional Russian forces approaching from Port Arthur and was ready for anything.
In other words, it turned out that if the Japanese were not ready to start a war and destroy Russian ships, then fleeing from the raid was completely unnecessary and would look cowardly, and if the Japanese were ready to fight, it would lead to the death of Russian ships with a minimum of chances of causing damage. to the enemy. And yes, most likely, in an attempt to break through, the Russians would be accused of violating neutrality in the roadstead. It must be said that Commodore Bailey quite unequivocally brought to Vsevolod Fedorovich the position of England on this issue - he considered the landing of troops to be an internal affair of the Japanese and Koreans, in which the third powers should not interfere, but was ready to immediately shoot at any ship that violated neutrality in the roadstead.
In this situation, V. F. Rudnev, in essence, had no choice but to wait for dawn, and he brought bad news. At 08.00, the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, Victor-Baptistain Senes, arrived on board the Varyag, with a notification from the Japanese admiral about the beginning of hostilities, which also contained a proposal to foreign ships, in order to avoid misunderstandings,leave the raid of Chemulpo before 16.00. If before the end of this period "Varyag" and "Koreets" did not reach a breakthrough, S. Uriu intended to attack and destroy them right on the roadstead.
Such a decision of the Japanese admiral did not leave V. F. Rudnev had no choice but to go into battle.
Having studied the combat plan drawn up by S. Uriu, we understand that it was completely pointless to stay on the roadstead. In this case, the Japanese were going to bring the Asama, Akashi and Niitaku into the fairway, and, stopping a few kilometers from the Varyag, shoot both Russian ships, as in an exercise. This was all the more simple because the Russian cruiser and gunboat could not maneuver in a narrow roadstead, and at a distance of more than two miles, the Asama's armor would remain completely invulnerable to the 152-mm guns of the Varyag and the eight-inch guns of the Koreyets. At the same time, if the "Varyag" tried to rush into the fairway to get closer to the enemy, then it would be met by a destroyer detachment accompanying the Japanese cruisers - obviously, they would not have had much trouble blowing up the cruiser, which by that time would have already been pretty much damaged by artillery fire.
But S. Uriu could not get involved in an artillery battle at all, but wait until dark, and then send destroyers to the Chemulpo raid. The statistics of night battles show that the few ships located in a foreign roadstead, without cover for coastal defense (the absence of stationary searchlights was especially important) and unable to maneuver, while moving at least at an average speed, would have become easy targets for Japanese mines (the successes of the Russians sailors in repelling Japanese mine attacks near Port Arthur, etc. are due to the factors listed above). In other words, accepting a daytime battle on the roadstead, the Varyag lost its ability to maneuver, acquiring nothing in return, and there was practically no chance of surviving a night mine attack. Thus, there was absolutely no point in staying on the raid - you had to go out and fight.
The Japanese squadron had a huge superiority in forces, the Asama alone was stronger than the Varyag and Koreyets combined, while the Varyag, either with a gunboat or without it, had no advantage in speed. Thus, with some correct actions of the Japanese, a breakthrough into the sea was impossible. Analyzing the actions of V. F. Rudnev in battle, it can be assumed that, announcing that the cruiser will go for a breakthrough, the commander of the Varyag decided not to make a "breakthrough attempt at any cost", but to engage in battle and then act according to circumstances, with the main goal of going into the open sea past the Japanese squadron, and if it is impossible to do this, inflict maximum damage on the Japanese.
V. F. Rudnev could not throw the gunboat "Koreets" into Chemulpo, despite the fact that the latter had a speed of only 13.5 knots. It was not in the tradition of the Russian fleet to leave a comrade in such a situation, and besides, one should not forget that two 203-mm guns of the gunboat were, in fact, the only trump card of V. F. Rudnev, especially since the "Korean", unlike his cruiser, had already taken part in the battle (Taku forts). It was necessary to fear that the Japanese could block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), maneuvering at a slow speed near the island, and in this case, if it was possible to bring the gunboat to a sufficiently close distance, one could hope to inflict considerable damage on the Japanese. As a matter of fact, if in the hands of the Russians there was any means that gave at least a shadow of a chance to force the Japanese to retreat, giving an exit from the fairway (if they had blocked it), then these were eight-inch "Koreets".
"Varyag" and "Korean" left the raid and entered the battle. V. F. Rudnev led his ships at low speed, which today many blame him for (they say, they don't go for a breakthrough at such a speed!), But thanks to this, the Varyag commander secured himself serious tactical advantages. First, he hid behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) from the main forces of the Japanese squadron, so that during the first quarter of an hour the battle, in fact, was reduced to a duel between "Asama" and "Varyag". Secondly, not allowing to concentrate fire on his ships, he led the Koreyets to the island, where his eight-inch ones began to reach the enemy. And, thirdly, walking at a low speed, he ensured "maximum favored treatment" for his gunners, because before the Russo-Japanese war, artillery exercises were usually conducted at 9-11 knots.
Oddly enough, the exit of the Russian stationaries caught the Japanese by surprise, but they in a matter of minutes weighed anchor and entered the battle. According to the plan of the cruiser S. Uriu, having divided into 3 detachments, they were supposed to disperse over the water area towards the Eastern y about Phalmido (Yodolmi) will not let the Varyag pass to the western channel. However, the small move of the Varyag played a cruel joke on the Japanese - they were too drawn to the Eastern Channel, opening the passage to the Western Channel, and V. F. Rudnev apparently tried to take advantage of this. Having passed the traverse of the island, he turned to the right - not that this maneuver gave him real chances for a breakthrough, but the Japanese, in order to intercept the Varyag, would have to ships could fire only from the bow guns, while the "Varyag" could respond to them with guns intact, until that time had not participated in the battle of the starboard side.
However, it was here that an unfortunate accident intervened, crumpled up the plans of the Russian commander. Unfortunately, we will never know what exactly happened there in reality. According to V. F. Rudnev, the Japanese shell interrupted the pipe where the steering drives passed, but the Japanese, who examined the cruiser during its ascent, claimed that the drives were in perfect order. We have presented two versions of what is happening. Perhaps the cruiser was really damaged, but not the steering drives, but the steering column installed in the conning tower of the ship, or the pipe leading from the steering columns to the central post, from where the steering was actually carried out, received such damage. That is, the cruiser lost its ability to be controlled from the wheelhouse, although the steering gears were not damaged - this does not contradict Japanese data. According to the second version, the steering control from the wheelhouse remained intact, but due to an exploding shell that killed several sailors and wounded the helmsman and commander of the cruiser, control of the Varyag was lost for a short time, while the rudder was turned to turn to the right.
Be that as it may, but as a result, according to independent of V. F. Rudnev's reasons, his cruiser, instead of turning to the right and going for a breakthrough in the direction of the Western Channel, turned almost 180 degrees. and went straight to about. Phalmido (Yodolmi). The revisionists' version that this turn was made as a result of a meaningful decision by the Varyag commander in order to get out of the battle as soon as possible does not stand up to criticism. A turn to the right brought the Varyag into close proximity to the island. The cruiser went with a relatively low speed downstream, and turned against the current - taking into account the inevitable loss of speed during the turn, as it was completed, the ship's speed dropped to 2-4 knots, while the current carried it to the rocks about. Phalmido (Yodolmi).
In other words, the turn to the right not only turned the Varyag into a “sitting duck”, the ship lost its course due to the enemy, making it easier for the Japanese to fire at the cruiser, but also created an emergency situation literally out of the blue. Such a maneuver contradicted the basics of the science of navigation and it was inconceivable that a captain of the 1st rank could make such a mistake. If V. F. Rudnev was really going to get out of the battle, he would have turned to the left - such a maneuver not only broke the distance with the Asama turning to approach, but also ruled out the possibility of landing on the rocks near Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). References to the fact that V. F. Rudnev allegedly panicked, completely meaningless - when a person succumbs to panic, he runs away from the enemy (turn to the left) and does not turn towards the enemy cruiser.
In fact, it was the short-term loss of control of the Varyag cruiser (regardless of the reasons that caused it) that put an end to the attempt to break through, because at this time the ship was almost without a move under the concentrated fire of Japanese cruisers, which caused a strong fire at the stern, and most importantly, a large hole at the waterline, through which one of the Varyag stokers was flooded. The cruiser received a roll of about 10 degrees to the port side (although it is difficult to establish at what moment it reached its maximum value, but the fact that the ship was heeling, and quickly enough, was, of course, noticeable), and all this was the reason for V. F. … Rudnev to leave for Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in order to assess the damage, and they were such that the ship had to interrupt the battle and retreat to the Chemulpo raid. Contrary to popular belief, "Varyag" did not run to the road at 20 knots at all - its speed only slightly exceeded the one with which it went to the breakthrough and, apparently, did not even amount to 17 knots, which it could develop without the danger of mechanisms coming out of building.
In fact, we can say that in the first quarter of an hour the cruiser suffered almost no damage (with the exception of the crew members killed and wounded by shrapnel), but then, in the next 15 minutes, from 12.00 to 12.15 Russian time, the ship received almost all he had direct hits in that battle, as a result of which the cruiser was completely incapacitated.
In total, 11 shells hit the hull, pipes and spars of the cruiser, according to other Japanese data - 14, but, according to the author, the first figure is much more realistic. It seems to be not so much - but one should not forget that the hit to hit is different, and that in the battle on January 27, 1904, the Varyag lost in killed and mortally wounded more than the crews of Oleg and Aurora combined, for all the time Tsushima battle. Taking into account the previously described damage and the fact that the cruiser lost 45% of the people on the upper deck killed and seriously wounded (and this fact is confirmed, among other things, by an English doctor who assisted the wounded "Varyag" directly on board the cruiser), the ship, of course, lost its combat effectiveness.
The "Varyag" itself used up no more than 160 rounds of 152 mm caliber and about 50 - 75 mm caliber in battle. Based on the statistics of the effectiveness of the shooting of Russian ships in the battle at Shantung, such a consumption of shells could provide no more than one hit of a 152-mm projectile on Japanese ships. Whether it was achieved or not is a debatable question, since if this hit did not cause any damage (for example, ricocheting off the Asama's armor plate), the Japanese might not have reflected it in the reports. Officially, the Japanese deny the existence of damage to their ships or casualties among their crews, and although there is circumstantial evidence that this is not the case, they are not significant enough to convict Japanese historians of lying.
V. F. Rudnev to destroy the cruiser was correct. In retrospect, we understand that it was best to blow it up, but the commander of the Varyag had weighty reasons not to do this (evacuation of the wounded, the need to move the cruiser away from the hospitals in time pressure, since the arrival of his squadron, promised by S. Uriu, was expected on a raid, etc.). Taking into account the information that V. F. Rudnev, the decision to flood the Varyag can be assessed as correct.
As you know, the reports and memoirs of V. F. Rudnev about the battle on January 27, 1904 contain many inaccuracies. Nevertheless, the main ones are quite understandable. So, information about the total failure of the Varyag's guns seems to be refuted by the fact that the Japanese subsequently considered all 12 152-mm guns suitable and transferred them to their arsenals, but in fact, not the guns themselves, but their machines, could have been damaged. and not combat, but operational, associated with design flaws (problems of lifting arcs, and chipping teeth of lifting mechanisms) - the Japanese did not indicate such damage. The cannon mounts could have minor damage (for example, jamming), easily eliminated at the artillery plant, but making it impossible to fire in a combat situation.
The high consumption of projectiles (1 105 units), most likely, fell into the reports of V. F. Rudnev from the logbook, where this expense came under the signature of Lieutenant E. Behrens and is the result of a counting error: the consumption of shells was most likely calculated as the difference between the actual shells remaining in the cellars and their nominal quantity, and it was impossible to count that - the cruiser wasted ammunition for firing even before the arrival in Chemulpo, part of the ammunition was brought to the upper deck, but not "spent" on the Japanese, etc.
V. F. Rudnev pointed out the super-high losses of the Japanese, but stipulated that in assessing the enemy's damage he was guided by second-hand information, which is quite acceptable immediately after the battle (report to the Governor). As for the later report to the Head of the Naval Ministry, as well as the memoirs of the Varyag commander, at the time of their writing, there was absolutely no reliable data on Japanese losses - domestic sources had not yet been written (let alone published), and foreign sources were cited the most polar points of view, from the complete absence of losses and up to the death of "Asama". It is not surprising that under these conditions V. F. Rudnev simply repeated the data of the first report. In addition, the possibility cannot be dismissed that, even if he knew from somewhere exactly about the absence of Japanese losses, he was simply forbidden to publish updated data on losses (as, for example, it happened with V. Semyonov, who fought on the 1st and 2nd -th Pacific squadrons, which was prohibited from publishing on the topic of the Battle of Tsushima until the completion of the work of the historical commission).
Much has been said about some agreements between the commanders of the Varyag and Koreyets in order to embellish the reports of the battle, but a comparison of these reports completely refutes this point of view. The fact is that the same (and - key!) Events of the battle on January 27, 1904 V. F. Rudnev and G. P. Belov was presented in very different ways, which is quite explainable by the usual discrepancies in eyewitness accounts, but which are completely inexplicable if we consider the version of the preliminary collusion of the commanders.
The revisionists claim that V. F. Rudnev deliberately lied in the report on damage to the steering gears, and this was done in order to justify the premature withdrawal from the battle. In fact, there is a perfectly reasonable explanation that this is not a lie, but an error, and that in fact either the steering column was damaged, or the transmission of data from it to the central post. But even if we assume that V. F. Rudnev still lied, the most likely reason for his deception is most likely not the desire to get out of the battle, but the desire to justify the unsuccessful U-turn of the Varyag near Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) for technical reasons. As we said above, V. F. Rudnev clearly did not plan and did not order to make this turn, and if this maneuver was not the result of damage to the rudders, then it could only have happened due to a temporary loss of control when the commander of the Varyag was hit by a shrapnel in the head. However, this turn led to the creation of an emergency situation, loss of speed and critical damage, excluding a further breakthrough, and V. F. Rudnev could have feared the role of the "scapegoat" for all this.
That, in fact, is all.
Concluding our almost endless cycle, we can state that Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, as the cruiser commander, showed himself extremely worthy. Having accepted a technically faulty ship that does not get out of repairs, he made great efforts to prepare its crew "for the campaign and battle", and if he did not achieve great success in this, it was only because this problem had no solution in principle - standing at the wall for repairs or during the inspection of the Steward, the ship cannot be prepared for war. Arriving in Chemulpo, in conditions of lack of information, V. F. Rudnev made reasonable and balanced decisions: until the last moment he followed the letter and spirit of the orders he received and did not provoke the Japanese, but when it became known about the declaration of war, he acted decisively and courageously.
The entry of "Varyag" and "Koreyets" into battle with a Japanese squadron consisting of (in fact) six cruisers and three destroyers should be considered a heroic deed that glorified the commanders and crews of Russian ships. The actions of V. F. Rudnev in battle should be recognized as tactically competent. The Varyag fought until the breakthrough capabilities were completely exhausted: we should not be misled by the fact that the ship exhausted these capabilities only 30 minutes after the start of the battle and a quarter of an hour after the first shell hit it. This is not the fault of the commander or the crew, because the cruiser, which did not have side armor and armor protection of artillery, was extremely vulnerable to the effects of high-explosive liddite shells and could not withstand their shelling for a long time.
Perhaps the feat of the "Varyag" hurts someone's eye with its … let's say, incompleteness. Indeed, the destroyer "Guarding", the armored cruiser "Rurik", the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov", the flagship battleship of the 2nd Pacific squadron "Prince Suvorov" fought to the last shell and died in battle, but the "Varyag" did not die. But you need to understand that no commander will condemn his crew to senseless death, if it is possible to avoid it without sacrificing honor. In other words, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev had a neutral port, where he could retreat after his cruiser lost its combat capability, and the commanders of the other Russian ships listed above did not have such a port at hand.
The commander and crew of "Varyag", no doubt, performed a military feat, and this feat caused a great resonance and admiration in Russia and in the world. It became, so to speak, the "visiting card" of the Russian Imperial Navy in that war - and one can only regret that many other, much brighter deeds of Russian sailors were, as it were, "in the shadow" of the Varangian. After all, there is no doubt that the sailors of the same armored cruiser "Rurik" had a much more terrible test - they fought for five and a half hours with superior enemy forces without hope of victory, having lost only those killed and subsequently died from wounds from above 200 people. Nevertheless, there were no mass awards and honors of its crew, and only those who are not indifferent to the history of the fleet know about the feat of the Rurik, while almost everyone knows about the feat of the Varyag (at least during Soviet times). …
This, of course, is unfair to many undeservedly forgotten heroes of the Russian-Japanese war. But such injustice cannot serve as an excuse to belittle the valor of the Varyag commander and crew - they fully deserve their laurels. In order to restore historical justice, we should not debunk the exploit of the "Varyag", but pay tribute to the other heroes of this war, unhappy for Russian weapons.
This concludes our story about the cruiser Varyag and the battle on January 27, 1904. The author expresses his deep respect and gratitude to the readers, whose interest in the topic did not fade for six months, during which this cycle was laid out. Separately, I would like to thank everyone who, with their comments, questions and reasoned objections, helped the work on these materials and made it more interesting and complete than it could have been.
Thank you for the attention!
Bibliography
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2. Log book of the 1st rank cruiser "Varyag"
3. Log book of the seaworthy gunboat "Koreets"
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5. V. Kataev "Cruiser" Varyag ". Legend of the Russian Navy ".
6. V. Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
7. M. Kinai. "The Russo-Japanese War: Official Reports of the Japanese Commanders-in-Chief of Ground and Naval Forces."
8. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji / Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo. Vol. 1.
9. Report of the British naval attaché on the battle in Chemulpo. Flotomaster 2004-01.
10. R. M. Melnikov. Cruiser "Varyag" (1975 and 1983 editions).
11. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Book One. Operations of the fleet in the southern theater from the beginning of the war to the interruption of communications with Port Arthur.
12. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The actions of the fleet. The documents. Section III. 1st Pacific Squadron. Book one. Actions at the Southern Naval War Theater. Issue 1-1. Vice Admiral Stark's period in command of the fleet.
13. T. Austin "Cleaning and accommodation of the wounded in a modern cruising battle (battle of the cruiser" Varyag "). Flotomaster 2004-01.
14. Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of the Maritime Department in Tokyo.
15. F. A. McKenzie "From Tokyo to Tiflis: Uncensored Letters from the War"
16. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés.
As well as materials from the sites https://tsushima.su and https://wunderwaffe.narod.ru and much, much more.
