The "Varyag" saga is drawing to a close - we just have to consider the decisions and actions of the Russian commanders after the battle, and … I must say that the author of this series of articles honestly tried to summarize the facts known to him and build an internally consistent version of events. However, some data in the resulting description of the battle do not want to be categorically "embedded", and we should list them exactly - even before we move on to describing the events after the battle on January 27, 1904.
First - these are the losses of the Japanese. An analysis of the documents that exist today shows that the Japanese did not suffer casualties in the battle with the Varyag and Koreyets, and the author himself adheres to this point of view. However, there is some evidence to the contrary.
So, a certain journalist McKenzie, author of the book From Tokyo to Tiflis: Uncensored letters from the war. London: Hurst an Blackett, 1905, who was personally present at Chemulpo during the battle on January 27, 1904, writes:
“This statement, like many other statements by the Japanese about the number of their killed and wounded, is questioned by some. I can name two facts - indirect evidence of this.
Fact One - Shortly after seven o'clock in the morning after the battle, I was walking along the main street of Chemulpo when I met a doctor from the Japanese Diplomatic Mission in Seoul walking towards the train station. I knew him well, and when we went together, he told me that he had come to examine the wounded. But officially the Japanese suffered no casualties, while the Russians were cared for on foreign ships.
Second fact. A few weeks after the battle, an enthusiastic friend of mine, who has close official ties to Japan, described to me the heroism of the people during the war. “For example,” he said, I recently came to see the mother of one of our sailors, who was killed during the battle in Chemulpo. She dressed in the best outfit to receive me, and viewed my condolences as congratulations on a happy event, since it was a triumph for her: her son had to die for the emperor at the beginning of the war.
“But,” I said in amazement, “there must be some mistake. After all, according to official figures, not a single sailor was killed in that battle.” "Ah," my friend replied. "This is so. There were no casualties on the warships, but some Russian shells hit Japanese ships nearby in order to monitor the movement of the Varyag. The sailor whose mother I visited was aboard one of them, and was killed there."
Let's face it, all of the above is extremely strange. One can still try to suppose that the Japanese had invited the doctor even before the start of the battle, so to speak, "in reserve" and he did not actually examine any wounded. But the explanations of a friend of a foreign journalist are more than unsatisfactory - no ships or boats from which the Japanese would watch the Varyag and which could at least theoretically be hit by Russian shells on January 27, 1904 did not exist in nature. Some Japanese boats could have been in the roadstead of Chemulpo, but the Varyag did not shoot there.
Second. As we know, the Varyag did not sink any Japanese destroyer, and moreover, judging by the "Battle report" of the commander of the 14th destroyer detachment Sakurai Kitimaru, all three ships of this class that participated in the battle on January 27, 1904, "behaved like goodies" - held on to the flagship cruiser Naniwa and did not even try to launch a torpedo attack. However, there are two inconsistencies that categorically do not fit into this version.
The first of them: according to the "Battle Report" Kitimaru, during the battle on January 27, 1904, his destroyers followed the "Naniwa": "Chidori", "Hayabusa", "Manazuru", being on the aft course angles from the non-firing side "Naniwa" at a distance of 500-600 m, walked in a parallel course, waiting for a convenient moment to attack. " However, if we look at the diagram presented in "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji (1904-1905) ", we will be surprised to find that on it the Japanese destroyers are not following the pair" Naniwa "-" Niitaka ", but rather the pair" Takachiho "-" Akashi ". But then the question arises - what route did the Japanese destroyers actually go?
And here is the second: if we take the diary of one of the eyewitnesses of those distant events: midshipman of the American gunboat "Vicksburg" Lery R. Brooks, then we read the following:
"When the Varyag began to withdraw, one of the Japanese destroyers tried to attack it from the south-west, but was driven off by Russian fire, not having time to approach."
It should be noted that no friendly ties of this midshipman with the Russian officers, which could have spurred L. R. Brooks on a lie did not exist in nature. And it’s hard to imagine that a person in a personal, not intended for the general public, diary would begin to lie. Who is there to deceive - himself?
The only thing that comes to mind is that some Japanese ships made a maneuver that from afar could look like a destroyer attack. But, if so, then, perhaps, on the "Varyag" could have considered the same? Or maybe the attempt to go into the attack really took place?
The fact is that if we assume that the compilers of the schemes of the book "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji (in 1904-1905) "were still mistaken, but the commander, who directly supervised the destroyers in battle, was right, it must be admitted that the preconditions for a mine attack nevertheless emerged when the Varyag left after 12.15 for about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), and "Naniwa", "Niitaka" approached this island from the other side. At this moment, three Japanese destroyers were able to give "full speed ahead", and being "in the shadow" about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), suddenly jump out from behind him at full speed and attack the Russian ships.
In other words, under the current circumstances, an attempt at a mine attack looks quite reasonable: at the same time, both the Russians and the American midshipman observed such an attempt, but the Japanese categorically deny its existence.
And finally, the third. We carefully studied the maneuvering of the Varyag and Koreets, and somewhat less detailed the movement of the Japanese ships, despite the fact that their courses after 12.15 were not described by us at all. Such an approach has the right to exist, because in general, the maneuvering of the Japanese cruisers looks quite rational - with the beginning of the battle they moved towards the eastern channel, blocking the Varyag's most obvious breakthrough route, and then, in general, acted according to circumstances, and went straight to the "Varyag" during his hitch at the Pkhalmido island (Yodolmi). Then the "Varyag" retreated, again setting sharply between themselves and their pursuers, but for Fr. Yodolmi to the fairway leading to the Chemulpo raid, only "Asama" followed the Russian ships. However, approaching the island, "Asama" made a strange circulation, noted, among other things, in the Japanese diagram
Obviously, such a circulation is not needed to pursue the Varyag, but Yashiro Rokuro does not give any reasons explaining it. Actually, the entry, approximately corresponding in time to this turn in the "Battle Report" of the commander of the "Asama", reads:
“At 13.06 (12.31 Russian time, hereinafter we will indicate it in brackets), the Varyag turned to the right, opened fire again, then changed course and began to retreat to the anchorage, the Koreets followed. At this moment I received the signal from the flagship - "Pursue!", Changed course and began to pursue the enemy ".
"Asama" turned directly to the "Varyag" and went to about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) at 12.41 (12.06) at the latest and moved directly towards the enemy until the very circulation. After the completion of the circulation, he also followed the Russian ships. Thus, it turns out that the order signal from the "Naniwa" could be raised only during the circulation of the "Asama": on the flagship they noticed that the "Asama" was turning somewhere, somewhere in the wrong direction, and ordered to resume pursuit of the enemy. Therefore, this circulation is not at all the result of some order of Sotokichi Uriu. But then what caused it?
The author suggested that, perhaps, the commander of the Asama, seeing that the Russian ships approached the border of the territorial waters (and at the indicated time they were approximately there), considered it necessary to stop the pursuit. Let us recall that the battle began exactly when the Varyag approached the border of the terrorist, but the Japanese, having opened fire, could have assumed that the Russian cruiser had already left them. And now that they were back there, Yashiro Rokuro might have thought it was bad manners to pursue them there. However, this is a very dubious explanation, since in this case the Asama should not have turned back, but should have stopped firing - nevertheless, there is no evidence that Asama stopped firing during circulation. And if the Asama had really ceased fire, then the order would have been raised on the Naniwa to resume firing, not Pursue.
The second option - that the Russian ships, as it were, “hid” behind the island during the approach of the Japanese cruiser and “Asama”, bypassing the island, found them too close to themselves, which is why they preferred to break the distance, also looks at least strange. Why would the Asama jump away from the Russian ships, and at the same time changing the firing side during the circulation? Somehow it doesn't look like the Japanese.
And finally, the third option - control malfunction, or receiving combat damage, as a result of which "Asama" was forced to break the distance. It looks the most logical, but, as we know, "Asama" had no breakages during the battle and received no damage.
It must be said that such a point of view was also expressed (V. Kataev) that "Asama" made a circulation, letting in a destroyer that approached the island to attack the "Varyag". But, with all due respect to the distinguished author, such an explanation is useless. Armored cruisers do not lay circulation in order to give way to destroyers, and, despite the relative narrowness of the navigable channel in the area of about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), "Asama" there could easily miss a destroyer, even though Heihachiro Togo's "Mikasa" without any circulation. And how can it be that an armored cruiser, sailing at 15 knots, has a place to turn, but a destroyer cannot pass by it?
Thus, we can only say one thing: having done a lot of work with the documents and materials available to us about the battle of the Varyag and Koreets with the superior forces of S. Uriu's squadron, we still do not have the opportunity to dot the i's. We can only hope that sometime in the future, from the depths of the Japanese archives, some more "Top-secret protocols to the" Top secret war at sea "" will emerge, which will give answers to our questions. In general, as the character of one entertaining book said: "I envy the descendants - they learn so many interesting things!" Well, we will return to the Varyag after either at 13.35 (13.00) or 13.50 (13.15) the knocked-out cruiser dropped anchor in the Chemulpo raid in the immediate vicinity of the British cruiser Talbot.
The French and English cruisers sent boats with doctors almost as soon as the Varyag anchored. A total of three doctors arrived: two Englishmen, including T. Austin from the Talbot and his colleague Keeney from the British steamer Ajax, as well as E. Prigent from the Pascal. The commander of the French cruiser V. Saines (Sene?) Also arrived on a French boat. Different sources give different transcriptions). The Americans also sent their doctor, but his help was not accepted on the cruiser. Generally speaking, the actions of the Vicksburg gunboat commander and his relationship with V. F. Rudnev are worthy of a separate material, but this has nothing to do with the topic of our cycle, so we will not describe this.
In order to understand the further actions of Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, it should be borne in mind that the commander of the Varyag had to act under time pressure. We know that Sotokichi Uriu did not dare to fulfill his ultimatum and did not go to the Chemulpo raid at 16.35 (16.00), as promised, but the Varyag commander, naturally, could not know about this. Equally important, when deciding to evacuate the crew, one should take into account the decision of the commanders of the foreign stationaries to leave before 16.35 (16.00), made so that their ships would not suffer during a possible attack by the Japanese.
In other words, Vsevolod Fyodorovich had less than three hours for everything about everything.
Soon after the Varyag anchored (after 20 or 35 minutes, depending on the correct anchorage time), V. F. Rudnev leaves the cruiser. An entry in the ship's logbook reads:
“14.10 (13.35) The commander on a French boat went to the English cruiser Talbot, where he stated that he intends to destroy the cruiser for its complete unusability. He received consent to transport the crew to an English cruiser."
The negotiations did not take long. The next entry in the magazine "Varyag":
“At 14.25 (13.50) the commander returned to the cruiser, where he informed the officers of his intention, and the latter approved it. At the same time, boats from French, English and Italian cruisers approached the cruiser. they began to put the wounded on the boats, and then the rest of the crew and officers."
It is not entirely clear when the first boats went to the Russian cruiser to evacuate the crew - it seems that they were sent to the Varyag even before Vsevolod Fedorovich announced his decision to evacuate the ship. Perhaps a semaphore was given from Talbot to Pascal and Elba? This is not known to the author of this article, but what we can say for sure - no delay was allowed. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the Varyag was anchored in the immediate vicinity of foreign stationary vehicles, the evacuation process was delayed.
Recall that the doctors started their work at 14.05 (13.30) - and, despite the fact that they provided only first aid, they finished it at 16.20 (15.45), and then without examining all the wounded, but only most received "more or less serious injuries." That is, in fact, only one preparation of the wounded for transportation (and dragging them along the ramps and boats, even without first aid, would be completely wrong), despite the fact that it was carried out with the help of foreign doctors who started work as soon as possible, all the same dragged on almost until the end of the time of S. Uriu's ultimatum.
True, the Varyag logbook gives slightly different information:
“14.05 (15.30.) The whole crew left the cruiser. The chief and bilge mechanics with the owners of the compartments opened the valves and the kingstones and also left the cruiser. I had to stop at the sinking of the cruiser due to the request of foreign commanders not to blow up the ships so as not to endanger their ships in the narrow roadstead, and also because the cruiser sank more and more."
However, the 15-minute difference in the memoirs of the British doctor T. Austin and the records of the cruiser's logbook is quite easy to "reconcile" with each other - for example, V. F. Rudnev could have gone to the last round of the cruiser, ordering to take away the last wounded (by that time - apparently on the upper deck of the "Varyag") and not see exactly when the last boats with the crew fell off.
“16.25 (15.50) The commander with the senior boatswain, having made sure once again that all the people had left the cruiser, rolled away from him in a French boat that was waiting for them at the gangway.”
And that was all. At 18.45 (18 hours 10 minutes Russian time)
"The cruiser" Varyag "plunged into the water and left completely on the left side."
As for the gunboat "Koreets", this was the case with her. After at 14.25 (13.50) V. F. Rudnev announced his decision to destroy the cruiser without attempting a second breakthrough, and midshipman Balk was sent to the Koreets. At 14.50 (14.15), he boarded the Koreyets and announced his decision to destroy the Varyag, and the command was brought to foreign stationary units.
At 15.55 (15.20) a council of war was held, at which it was decided to destroy the "Korean" due to the fact that the gunboat would have been shot by the enemy on the roadstead from distances unattainable for its guns. Apparently, someone suggested the option to leave the island of So-Wolmi (Observatory Island) in order to try to fight from there: it was a small island located not far from a fairly large island. Rose, between him and the exit from the raid. However, this idea could not be realized at low tide - the depth was not allowed.
At 16.40 (16.05), two explosions, which took place with an interval of 2-3 seconds, destroyed the gunboat "Koreets".
What do we usually like to blame Vsevolod Fedorovich for his actions and decisions after the battle? The first is the haste with which he made the decision to destroy the Varyag. Well, of course - as soon as the ship anchored, the officers had not yet finished inspecting the cruiser, and Vsevolod Fedorovich had already decided everything on his own and then put his decision into action.
But in fact, V. F. Rudnev had more than enough time to assess the combat capability of the Varyag. For some reason, critics of the Varyag cruiser commander believe that the examination of his condition can only be started after the ship anchored in the Chemulpo raid, and this was absolutely not the case. As we know, V. F. After 12.15 Rudnev retreated behind Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in order to assess the degree of damage to his ship, and, naturally, received some information about the existing problems. Then the "Varyag" retreated to the Chemulpo raid, and the fire on it was stopped at 12.40: after that nothing could interfere with the collection of information about the damage to the ship. As we know, V. F. Rudnev, went to the Talbot at 13.35, that is, from the moment of the ceasefire by the Japanese until the departure for the British cruiser, Vsevolod Fedorovich had almost an hour to sort out the state of the Varyag. During this time, it was impossible, of course, to delve into all the nuances of the damage received, but of course it was possible to assess the condition of the ship and the degree of drop in combat effectiveness.
As for the fact that Vsevolod Fedorovich left before the completion of the examination of the cruiser, here it is worth recalling the famous Pareto rule: "90% of the result is achieved by 10% of the effort expended, but for the remaining 10% of the result, the remaining 90% of the effort has to be applied." The survey of the ship meets certain requirements and must be complete - at the same time, as what was already known was quite enough to understand that it no longer makes sense to bring the ship into battle again - the possibilities of causing damage to the enemy were obviously exhausted.
The second thing that Vsevolod Fedorovich is accused of today is that he only sunk the ship, and did not blow it up. V. F. Rudnev gave the following explanation in a report to the Head of the Marine Ministry:
"I had to stop at sinking, owing to the assurances of foreign commanders not to blow up the ships, so as not to endanger their ships in the narrow roadstead, and also because the cruiser was sinking more and more into the water."
However, our revisionists considered such reasons unsatisfactory: the Korean was blown up, and nothing terrible happened, so no problems, in their opinion, with the Varyag would have arisen. Maybe it is, of course, so, but there are a number of nuances that do not allow to equate "Koreets" and "Varyag".
Now it is already difficult to determine the exact location of Russian ships relative to foreign ones, but comparing the photographs of the explosion of the Koreyets from the Vicksburg
and from "Pascal"
with a photo of "Varyag" at the anchorage,
We can reasonably assume that the "Varyag" was much closer to foreign stations than the "Koreets". It was impossible to put the "Varyag" further on arrival at the roadstead - it would complicate the evacuation of the wounded and the crew, and, as we remember, the foreigners were going to leave the roadstead before 16.35 (16.00). It should be remembered that the "Varyag" did not have its own boats, and he could not evacuate the crew on his own. Of course, the boats were on the Koreets, but, firstly, there were few of them, and secondly, with their help it was necessary to evacuate the crew of the gunboat.
In other words, in order to blow up the cruiser, it was necessary, after the evacuation of its crew, to move it away from the parking area of foreign ships, or to insist that they themselves leave closer to 16.35 (16.00). But at the same time, agree with the commanders so that they send boats to evacuate the subversive party.
Today it is easy for us to argue - we know when the transportation of the crew to foreign stations actually ended, but Vsevolod Fedorovich could not know for sure. The cruiser did not have special devices to load the wounded on boats, which made their evacuation another task. They were passed from hand to hand by a crew lined up in a chain, helping those who could walk on their own to go and get down, and all this turned out rather slowly. Including because it was necessary to start transporting the wounded only after at least first aid was provided to them, five doctors worked tirelessly, but the case still moved slowly.
Let's put ourselves in the place of V. F. Rudnev. He has a badly damaged cruiser on his hands and many wounded. There are no own means of evacuation, and it is necessary to start destroying the Varyag no later than 16.35 (16.00). To blow up a cruiser in the immediate vicinity of the Talbot, of course, is not worth it. But if the cruiser is taken away from the Talbot now, the evacuation will be delayed. If you first evacuate the wounded, and then try to take the cruiser away, then there may not be enough time, and the Japanese may appear on the raid - and on the cruiser there is only a party of "hunters", which should ensure its explosion. So you can even give the Japanese a ship. To ask the foreigners to leave their parking lots by 16.35 (16.00), reminding that this is exactly what they were going to do if the Varyag did not go out to battle with S. Uriu's squadron? And if by the specified time it will not be possible to evacuate all the wounded, then what? Blow up the cruiser with them?
Today we know that the Japanese did not go to the raid after 16.35 (16.00), but V. F. Rudnev, there was not the slightest reason to assume such a thing. His decision to sink, and not blow up the cruiser, was dictated by the need to manage before the specified time, on the one hand, and the need to be as close as possible to foreign inpatients for timely evacuation, on the other.
It should be noted that the sinking of the cruiser, although it did not completely destroy it, was guaranteed not to allow it to be raised until the end of the war. That is, the Japanese obviously could not use it in the course of hostilities, and then …
We must not forget that the Varyag was sunk in the roadstead of a neutral state. And on January 27, 1904, when the hostilities had just begun, it was in no way possible to imagine the crushing defeat that the Russian Empire would undergo in this war. But even in the event of a draw result, nothing would subsequently have prevented the Russians from raising the cruiser and reintroducing it into the Russian Imperial Navy … By the way, this should not have been done with the Koreyets - due to its small size it would have been much easier to lift it than a cruiser of the 1st rank over 6,000 tons in weight, which was the "Varyag".
Thus, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev faced an alternative - he could, at risk for the wounded, crew members, and even with certain chances of capturing the Varyag by the Japanese, blow up the cruiser, or, avoiding the indicated risks, flood it. The choice was neither easy nor obvious. Vsevolod Fedorovich chose flooding, and this solution had a number of advantages. As we know, it has not become optimal, and it would have been better for V. F. Rudnev to blow up the "Varyag" - but we are reasoning from the position of afterthought, which Vsevolod Fedorovich did not have and could not have. Based on the information that V. F. Rudnev at the time of the decision, his choice in favor of flooding is quite justified, and there can be no talk of any "betrayals" or "gifts from the Varyag Mikado".
Particularly absurd in this regard is the opinion repeatedly expressed that the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun II-degree, which was awarded to V. F. Rudnev after the war, was awarded to him for the fact that Vsevolod Fedorovich "presented" his cruiser to the Japanese. The fact is that in Japan itself at that time the Bushido code was still being cultivated, from the point of view of which such a "gift" would be regarded as a black betrayal. The traitors, of course, can be paid the agreed "30 pieces of silver", but to award them with the second Order of the Empire (the first was the Order of the Chrysanthemum, and the Order of Paulownia at that time was not yet a separate award - when it became such, the Order of the Rising Sun moved to third place) no one, of course, would. After all, if they were awarded a traitor, how would the rest of the holders of this order react to this? It would be a mortal insult to them, and such things are taken very seriously in Japan.
