In the article offered to your attention, we will consider the features of the Soviet naval and design thought of the mid-1930s on the example of the development of a large cruiser project "X"
It is well known that in the first half of the 30s, the leadership of the Naval Forces of the Red Army was forced to be content with theories of a small naval war, within which one should not count on more than light cruisers. But the country's success in industrialization gave hope for the creation of heavier ships, and therefore in the period 1934-1935. The Directorate of the Naval Forces approved the creation of initiative projects for heavy ships.
In March 1935, when our military-industrial complex was preparing for the laying of the first Soviet cruisers of Project 26, at TsKBS-1 under the leadership of the head of the corps department A. I. Maslov and the responsible executor of the design work V. P. Rimsky-Korsakov were presented with drawings with an explanatory note and a model of a large cruiser "Project X" ". What kind of ship was it?
His tasks included:
1) Autonomous operations on the high seas
2) Actions against enemy shores
3) Supporting light forces away from their bases
Immediately I would like to note the fundamental differences from the tasks assigned to the cruisers of Project 26 "Kirov". The latter were created primarily for a combined (concentrated) strike, that is, for actions against superior forces of the enemy fleet, but the interruption of enemy communications was not at all a priority for them, except in the form of supporting submarine operations. At the same time, "Project X" marked a return to the classical theory of cruising warfare on communications: however, the large cruiser was not an ordinary raider, since, in addition to the actual cruising operations, it was tasked with operating against the coast.
It was assumed that the main opponent for the large cruiser of the "X" project would be "Washington" cruisers, that is, ships with a standard displacement of 10,000 tons and armed with 203-mm artillery. Accordingly, "Project X" was created so that these cruisers would become "legal game" for him. For this, the offensive and defensive capabilities of a large cruiser were balanced so that it had a free maneuvering zone (i.e., the interval between the minimum and maximum distance to the enemy, in which enemy shells did not penetrate either the side or deck armor of our ship) of at least 30 cables, while enemy cruisers would not have such a zone at all.
Main artillery
Our designers quite correctly considered that it is impossible to create a balanced ship in the "ten-thousandth" displacement, and that the "Washington" cruisers will have weak protection. Therefore, it was assumed that 220-mm or 225-mm artillery would be sufficient for confident and defeat at all distances. But it should be taken into account that while the large cruiser "Project X" is being built, changes in international treaties and the appearance of cruisers with enhanced reservations are possible. Therefore, the caliber of 240 mm was adopted "for growth".
As for the number of such guns, in the opinion of the author of this article, to ensure superiority over any "Washingtonian" it would be enough to have 8-9 such guns, but the designers proposed 12. The answer, obviously, lies in the fact that the creators of "Project X" took into account the fact that Germany had "pocket battleships" with 280-mm artillery. It was not possible to provide protection from their shells on a ship of reasonable (for a cruiser) displacement, so the battle between a large Project X cruiser and a "pocket battleship" would be a duel of "eggshell armed with hammers." In a duel situation, none of these ships had free maneuvering zones. Consequently, it was required to equip the large cruiser with maximum firepower, and the ability to target the enemy as quickly as possible. A dozen of main-caliber barrels provided all this in the best possible way, including due to the ability to shoot with a "double ledge", i.e. fire three four-gun volleys at short intervals in time and distance, while waiting for the shells of the first volley to fall. Therefore, twelve 240-mm guns, generally redundant against the "Washington" cruisers, can be considered quite adequate armament.
The following characteristics of the future 240-mm artillery system were assumed:
Barrel length - 60 calibers
Projectile / charge weight - 235/100 kg
The initial velocity of the projectile - 940 m / s
Rate of fire at an elevation angle of 10 degrees - 5 rds / min.
Angles of vertical guidance - from -5 to +60 degrees
Ammunition - 110 rounds / barrel
Tower weight with armor - 584 t
Ball diameter - 7 100 mm
Each gun was housed in a separate cradle. The design of the tower was made by the engineer of the design bureau of the Leningrad Metal Plant (famous LMZ) R. N. Wolfe.
Flak
A very progressive decision was made to equip the "Project X" large cruiser with universal anti-aircraft artillery. Back in 1929, the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Directorate of the Naval Forces carried out work on this topic, on the basis of which a 130-mm caliber gun was considered optimal. It was decided to put twelve such guns on the cruiser in six two-gun turrets, three on each side. Other anti-aircraft armament consisted of six 45 mm 21-K semi-automatic cannons and four 12.7 mm machine guns.
MSA
The fire control was supposed to be carried out using four command and rangefinder posts (KDP), two for the main and universal caliber, the data of which could be processed in two central posts (bow and stern) and one located at the stern of the MPUAZO.
Torpedo and mine armament
The designers of the large cruiser believed that in the conditions of increased artillery combat distances, heavy ships would not converge at a distance that would allow the use of torpedo weapons. Therefore, the "project" X "" was equipped with only two three-pipe 533-mm torpedo tubes. Mines were not part of the cruiser's standard armament, but a large cruiser could take up to 100 minutes in overload.
Other weapons
A real highlight of "Project X", which distinguishes it from many other cruisers in the world. In the part of aviation, the developers proceeded from the need for constant vigil in the air of at least one seaplane during daylight hours. In their opinion, the seaplane, in addition to reconnaissance, could correct the cruiser's artillery fire at maximum distances, and also participate in repelling air attacks.
In order to ensure the requirement of constant watch, it was necessary to equip the cruiser with 9 (NINE) seaplanes, of which eight were located in the hangar inside the hull, and the ninth - on the ship's only catapult. But, as if this were not enough, space was provided for two or three more aircraft on the upper deck, that is, the total number of the air group could reach twelve machines!
The project proposed an unusual, but very ingenious system for lifting seaplanes: using a stern apron. The latter was a large awning, lowered from the cruiser into the water and towed directly behind the ship or next to it, depending on the design. The seaplane, which landed on the water, had to "leave" on the lowered "apron" - thus the speeds of the aircraft and the cruiser were equalized, and then the seaplane was lifted by an ordinary crane. All this, in theory, was supposed to allow a large cruiser to lift seaplanes on board without reducing speed.
However, a large air group is not all, because in addition to aircraft, the large "Project X" cruiser had to be equipped with two submarines! More precisely, these were submersible torpedo boats developed at TsKBS-1 under the leadership of V. L. Brzezinski. in 1934-1935 Two options were proposed: "Blokha-1" had a surface displacement of 52 tons, underwater - 92 tons; "Bloch-2" - 35, 3 and 74 tons, respectively.
The speed of both "Bloch" was supposed to be 30-35 knots on the surface and 4 knots - in the submerged position. Range data is extremely contradictory. So, for "Blokha-2" it is indicated that it could go at full speed for one hour (that is, at a speed of 35 knots to go 35 miles), but then - that it had a surface range at full speed - 110 miles. Submerged range at full speed - 11 miles; speed of 7.5 knots (??? obvious typo, maybe - 1.5 knots?) - 25 miles.
Armament - 2,450-mm torpedoes and one 12-, 7-mm machine gun, crew - 3 people, autonomy - no more than 3-5 days.
The author of this article did not manage to find images of "Flea-1" and "Flea-2"; there is only the appearance of the launching device of these boats.
The designers did not decide exactly where the submarines should be placed, two options were proposed - in the stern (on the automatic launching devices presented above) or in the middle of the hull along with the boats
There is also the appearance of "Flea-400"
But this ship, being the ideological successor of "Bloch" for the large cruiser of the "X" project, was developed later, in 1939 by the same VL Brzezinsky, but … not in TsKBS-1, but in OSTEKHBYURO NKVD.
Reservation
As mentioned above, the booking was supposed to provide a free maneuvering zone of 30 cables against any "203-mm" cruiser. The 203-mm British gun was taken as the basis for the calculations, because the developers considered it the best in the world at that time. According to the armor penetration formulas, 115 mm of vertical and 75 mm of horizontal armor were enough to provide the required level of protection. Accordingly, the cruiser was supposed to receive a citadel of 115 mm armor belt and traverses, on the upper edges of which a 75 mm armor deck was laid. The citadel protected the engine and boiler rooms, as well as the main caliber cellars. In addition, some additional protection was provided by the large thickness of the sides and the upper deck above the citadel - 25 mm.
The front plate of the towers of the main caliber was supposed to be 150 mm, the side walls - 100 mm, the roof - 75 mm, barbets - 115 mm. Towers and barbets of universal caliber were protected by 50 mm armor.
The cruiser had two armored wheelhouses, and their upper tier had walls 152 mm, lower tiers - 75 mm, roof -100 mm
Power plant
Of course, it was proposed to equip the large cruiser with the most advanced, as it seemed then, power plant. At this time, the Soviet fleet was carried away by the idea of steam turbine installations with high steam parameters. In 1935, the destroyer Opytny was laid down (as an experimental ship). Its power plant in size and weight had to correspond to that used on the destroyers of Project 7, but at the same time surpass it in power by 45%. It was assumed that with such a power plant, the new destroyer would develop 43 knots.
There seemed to be grounds for optimism. Experiments in this area were carried out by the American company General Electric, the Italian company Ansaldo and others. In England in 1930, the "Thornycroft" company built the destroyer "Acheron" with an experimental propulsion system. Germany was also fond of direct-flow boilers. Something similar was expected for the large cruiser "Project X" - the power of its power plant was supposed to be a phenomenal 210,000 hp, with which the ship's speed reached 38 knots.
It was assumed that direct-flow boilers would provide a phenomenal economic speed of 25 knots, but the only known about the range is that at full speed it should have been 900 miles. Obviously, in the economic course, it would have been much larger.
Despite the presence of one pipe, the cruiser provided for an echelon arrangement of mechanisms operating on two propellers.
Frame
As you know, "the length runs" - the longer the body, the easier it is to provide it with high speed. The length of the large cruiser "Project X" was 233.6 m, width - 22.3 m, draft - 6, 6 m. The standard displacement of the ship was supposed to be 15,518 tons. Below, in the Appendix, the mass load of the cruiser is given.
What about Project X? Alas, listing its shortcomings will take almost more space than describing the ship itself.
The main caliber of the large cruiser, with its 235 kg projectile at an initial speed of 940 m / s, is obviously overdriven. We will not recall the 240-mm guns of the French battleships of the "Danton" type (220 kg and 800 m / s) - after all, this is a development of the beginning of the century, but the 254-mm / 45 gun of the "Bofors" company, model 1929, installed on the Finnish coastal defense battleships fired 225 kg projectile with an initial speed of 850 m / s.
The maximum elevation angle was supposed to be as much as 60 degrees, but why would a 240-mm gun do that? They were not going to shoot at the planes, and in this case (to walk like that!) An elevation angle of at least 75 degrees would be required. The only reasonable reason for such a requirement could be the desire to provide the possibility of hanging fire on coastal objects. But such elevation angles greatly complicated the design of the tower, so the game was clearly not worth the candle.
Of course, 12 barrels of 130-mm universal caliber were quite appropriate on a heavy ship, but other anti-aircraft artillery was envisaged in an amount corresponding to the light cruiser Kirov - and even for him it was clearly insufficient, and even for a large cruiser, for which the standard Washingtonians should have been one tooth - and even more so.
But torpedo armament raises no objections. Of course, everyone who is interested in maritime history will remember the successes of Japanese cruisers armed with long-range torpedoes, but you need to understand that they needed numerous torpedo armament to fulfill their main tactical task - the destruction of large enemy ships in night battles. But for a Soviet large cruiser, such a task was never set. He had to realize his advantage over the "Washington" cruisers in daytime artillery combat, and there was no point in risking a heavy ship in night battles. Of course, ships do not always fight in the tactical situations for which they were intended, but in such a case, two three-tube torpedo tubes looked like a completely reasonable minimum. Their increase, in turn, would entail additional risks in an artillery battle, in which just a successful hit could lead to detonation of torpedoes and severe damage, if not even the death of the ship.
And besides, torpedoes for the raider are useful in a situation when, for some reason, it is necessary to urgently sink a large enemy transport.
Aircraft armament of 9-12 planes seemed to be a clever solution to the problem of daytime reconnaissance, but in fact it would result in endless takeoff and landing operations, and would only fetter the cruiser. And this is not to mention the danger that the hangar and storage facilities (or the fuel supply system) located outside the citadel would be exposed to in an artillery battle. It is also obvious that it is impossible to use seaplanes for air defense - in terms of their flight qualities, they were very much inferior to both land and deck aviation.
The tactics of using submarines is completely incomprehensible - given their scanty cruising range and autonomy, a large cruiser would have to take great risks, delivering them to the target of attack, and then waiting for the end of the operation in order to take them on board. At the same time, a dozen 240-mm guns in shelling an enemy port would have a much greater effect than four 450-mm torpedoes in side torpedo tubes, which could only be hit by shooting at close range - and even then having "excellent" chances to miss. In addition, a fire raid on an enemy base does not require a cruiser to stay in its area for a long time.
Reservation raises no particular criticism, except for the length of the citadel, which was less than 50% of the length of the ship and therefore is unlikely to ensure its unsinkability at an acceptable level. So, for the light cruiser "Kirov" the citadel length was 64.5% of the ship's length.
In addition, there are some doubts about the sufficiency of 115 mm of side armor against 203 mm armor-piercing shells. The designers of the large Project X cruiser were guided by the characteristics of the British eight-inch gun, believing that in the mid-30s it was the best in the world.
In fact, this is not true - the English 203-mm / 50 Mark VIII artillery system mod 1923 fired shells weighing 116, 1 kg with an initial speed of 855 m / s and was not at all the most powerful at that time, but was rather a strong average. So, the French 203-mm / 50 model 1924 g fired 123, 1 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 850 m / s, the Italian 203-mm / 53 model 1927 g - 125 kg with a projectile with a speed of 900 m / s, and the newly created German 203-m / 60 SK C / 34 model 1934 - 122 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 925 m / s.
Thus, we see another mistake, but, by and large, this is not a question for the designers of the large cruiser "X", but for those who provided them with information about the performance characteristics of foreign weapons. Again, today we have at our disposal the actual performance characteristics of naval guns of that time, but does this mean that our designers also had them in 1935? Or perhaps they thought the British gun was more powerful than it actually was? Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have an answer to this question.
The “Project X” power plant looks extremely strange. Of course, speed is one of the most important indicators of a battleship of those years, but why were you trying to bring it up to 38 knots? But … as you know, in those years the USSR cooperated very closely with Italy in terms of naval weapons and, of course, was aware of the results of sea trials of Italian heavy cruisers. In 1930 "Trieste" developed 35, 6 ties, a year earlier "Trento" - 35, 7, and in 1932 "Bolzano" showed enchanting 36, 81 ties!
Also, it cannot be completely ruled out that the USSR somehow received data on Japanese heavy cruisers: in 1928 the ships of the "Mioko" type showed from 35, 25 to 35, 6 knots, and in 1932 the "Takao" showed about the same. Against this background, the task of 38 knots for the Soviet large cruiser no longer looks like something outrageous.
And nevertheless, the attempt to place such a powerful power plant is certainly wrong. Even knowing about the super-high-speed heavy cruisers of Italy and Japan, one should still remember that the Soviet cruiser (like any other warship) needs to be faster than those who are stronger than him and stronger than those who are faster. The performance characteristics of the large Project X cruiser ensured it superiority over the Washington cruisers of Italy and Germany, so why try to be faster than them? Or did the designers, as in the case of the main caliber artillery, prefer to "re-lay" for the future, fearing that the speed of foreign battleships would grow to 35-36 knots?
To provide such a high speed, the large cruiser of the project "X" required a super-powerful, but compact power plant, which could only be obtained using direct-flow boilers and increased steam parameters, so this step looks logical. But the optimism of the designers is striking - at a power plant with a capacity of 210 thousand hp. only 2000 tons were allocated - and this at a time when the mass of mechanisms of the cruisers of the project 26 was already known, which amounted to approximately 1834 tons (data for the project 26-bis) with a rated power of 110 thousand hp!
The shipbuilders were just getting ready for the laying of the "Experimental", the specific power of the power plant which was supposed to exceed the ordinary power plants of the Project 7 destroyers by 45%. At the same time, the case is considered so new and unusual that the newest boiler-turbine installation was first preferred to be "run in" on an off-series ship. Consequently, the risks of not achieving record performance were fully understood, and it would be reasonable, before the end of the tests, to design KTU for promising ships with an increase in power density lower than that of the Experimental, or at least not exceeding it by 45%. But instead, the designers are putting into the project of a large cruiser a power plant, whose power density is 75% higher than the newly acquired, the latest Italian model of power plant for a light cruiser!
But you need to understand that the weight and size characteristics of the power plant for the large cruiser of the "X" project were of fundamental importance. Indeed, with an increase in their size, it would be necessary to increase the length of the ship's citadel, which in the most significant way increased the displacement of the latter.
An attempt to provide a large cruiser with a 38-knot speed had other negative consequences - an excessively long, but relatively narrow hull did not allow providing any serious anti-torpedo protection. On the other hand, between the engine and boiler rooms and the side, there were "inserts" of compartments - fuel storage, which to some extent could weaken the explosion.
In addition, there are still questions about the cruising range of the large cruiser of the "X" project. Unfortunately, only the range at full speed of the ship is given, but taking into account that it is only 900 miles, it is extremely doubtful that the range of 12-14 knots would reach at least 6,000 miles, and even this is not a very good indicator for an ocean raider.
In general, it can be stated that a large cruiser of the "X" type could not be built in the form proposed by the designers. In the case of the continuation of work on this cruiser, one should expect such significant adjustments to the project that, in fact, it would have been about another ship, created taking into account the experience gained during the development of the "project" X "".
But why did the creators of "Project X" make such a mass of mistakes in their work? In order to answer this question, one should take into account the huge "shipbuilding vacations": from the First World War until the development of "Project X", the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, carried out only the completion and modernization of large ships, but not their new construction. The military equipment of the 20th century was continuously improved in literally all directions: more durable structural steel and armor, significant progress in the power of ship turbines, a huge increase in aviation capabilities, etc., and so on.
But the most important thing is that both then and today, at every moment in time, the designers of a warship are faced with a dilemma. Should we use new technologies that have not yet been tested, hoping, if successful, to surpass the opponents, but risking, in case of failure, to spend money and time on an incapacitated ship? Or bet on reliability, using time-tested solutions, and risk the fact that enemy ships, created using the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress, will turn out to be much better and stronger?
In this difficult choice, the only "advisers" are experience in the design and operation of modern ships. In a number of cases, this experience is capable of suggesting the correct decision, but in the USSR, which for many years stopped building and developing heavy artillery ships, this experience did not exist, and it could not have been. The country, in fact, mastered the pre-revolutionary "groundwork" of the tsarist shipbuilding, created in the interval between the Russo-Japanese and the First World War. As a result, the designers of the large cruiser tried to make up for the lack of experience with, of course, ingenious, but hardly capable of withstanding the test of practice.
There is no need to blame the creators of "Project X" for their inability. And in the same way, it is senseless to blame the leadership of the USSR for refusing to build heavy ships in the first half of the 30s - for this the country had neither financial nor technical capabilities. The history of the design of the Project X heavy cruiser teaches us only how dangerous the breaks in the creation of complex weapons systems are. You should never think that now we do not have money / time / resources, and we will not do this, and then, after 5-10-15 years, when the necessary funds appear, we are at the behest of a pike! - and create a competitive weapon.
Even in conditions when the country's economy does not allow us to create heavy ships, we are able to find funds at least for R&D in this area. And therefore it is very important to maintain in an acceptable technical condition and intensively operate those few large surface ships that we still have.
From this point of view, the history of designing a large cruiser of the "X" project cannot be considered a failure. Although it did not lead to the creation of an effective warship, it nevertheless gave our designers the experience that was in demand in the design of new warships of the USSR.
Application
Load of the masses of the large cruiser of the project "X"
Metal body - 4 412 t
Practical things - 132 tons
Wood - 6 t
Painting - 80 t
Insulation - 114 t
Floor covering with cement - 48 t
Equipment of premises, storerooms and cellars - 304 tons
Ship systems and devices - 628 t
Electrical equipment - 202 t
Communication and control - 108 t
Liquid cargo in the hull - 76 t
Reservation - 3,065 t
Armament:
Artillery - 3 688 t
Torpedo - 48 t
Aviation - 48 tons
Mine - 5 t
Tralnoe - 18 t
Chemical - 12 t
Mechanisms - 2,000 t
Supply and crew - 272 tons
Displacement reserve - 250 t
Total, standard displacement - 15 518 t
